India’s Neighbours

India’s Emphasis on Neighbourhood First Policy: Budget 2025

Context: In the Union budget 2025, the Ministry of External Affairs has been allocated a sum of 20,516 crores, with an emphasis on Neighbourhood First Policy (NFP).

Relevance of the Topic: Prelims: Key facts about Neighbourhood First Policy (NFP).

Key allocations in the MEA budget for 2025-26

Emphasis on Neighbourhood First Policy (NFP):
- Immediate neighbours of India have been allocated Rs 4,320 crore, or 64% of the total scheme portfolio, for large infrastructure projects (hydroelectric plants, power transmission lines, housing, roads, bridges, integrated check-posts).
- The allocations highlight India's continued focus on regional diplomacy.
Major changes in Foreign Aid Allocations**: (**Just for understanding, no need to remember the allocated amounts)
- Bhutan: Increased to Rs 2,150 crore (from Rs 2,068 crore in last year’s budget estimate).
- Maldives: Increased to Rs 600 crore (from Rs 400 crore in budget estimate).
- Afghanistan: Reduced to Rs 100 crore (from Rs 200 crore in budget estimate).
- Myanmar: Increased to Rs 350 crore (from Rs 250 crore in budget estimate).
- Nepal: Maintained at Rs 700 crore.
- Sri Lanka: Increased to Rs 300 crore (from Rs 245 crore in budget estimate).
- Bangladesh: Unchanged at Rs 120 crore.
Other regions**:
- African Nations: Increased to Rs 225 crore (from Rs 200 crore).
- Latin America: Reduced to Rs 60 crore (from Rs 90 crore in revised estimate).
- Chabahar Port (Iran): Unchanged at Rs 100 crore.

About Neighborhood First Policy (NFP)

India’s ‘Neighbourhood First policy’ guides its approach towards the management of relations with countries in its immediate neighbourhood: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. It officially came to being in 2008.
Aim: To enhance physical, digital and people to people connectivity across the region, as well as augmenting trade and commerce.
Focus:
- To create mutually beneficial, people-oriented, regional frameworks for stability and prosperity.
- India engages with these countries on a consultative, non-reciprocal and outcome-oriented basis, driven by the principles of Samman (respect), Samvad (dialogue), Shanti (peace), and Samriddhi (prosperity).
This policy has evolved into an institutional priority for all the relevant arms of the Government managing relations and policies with our neighbourhood.

Importance of Neighbourhood First Policy

Countering Chinese influence: By collaborating closely with neighbouring countries, India can counterbalance Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region.
Support in multilateral forums: Working with neighbouring partners strengthens India's leadership role in representing the interests of the Global South at international forums. This fosters better understanding and cooperation on global issues.
Ensuring territorial integrity: Collaboration with neighbouring countries is essential for India to protect its territorial integrity and tackle separatist threats effectively.
Increasing maritime security: Effective cooperation with neighbours is key to bolstering maritime security, which enables India to tackle transnational security challenges more effectively.
Addressing energy security: Close cooperation with neighbouring countries is critical for India's energy security, particularly concerning the import of oil and gas through sea routes.
Bridging development deficits: Actively engaging with neighbouring countries helps in the development of India's northeastern states, thus narrowing development disparities in the region.
Leveraging soft power diplomacy: India's deep cultural and historical connections with its neighbours strengthen people-to-people ties, solidifying India's influence in the region through soft power diplomacy.

Challenges:

Geopolitical tensions: Issues like border disputes and political disagreements can complicate relationships.
Implementation issues: Difficulties in executing cross-border projects due to logistical and bureaucratic challenges.
Economic differences: Different levels of economic development among neighbouring countries can affect the balance and effectiveness of cooperation.

Initiatives taken as a part of NFP

Under NFP, India has been assisting neighbouring countries on development of infrastructure projects, augmentation of capabilities and extending financial, budgetary, and humanitarian assistance.
Some important examples include:

1. Afghanistan:

Humanitarian Assistance- Supply of Wheat, medical aid, vaccines, scholarship schemes for Afghan students.
Salma Dam- Major hydroelectric & irrigation project
Zaranj-Delram Highway- 218 km long road project connecting Delaram district in Afghanistan to the border of Iran.

2. Bangladesh:

Maitree Thermal Power project- 1320MW coal-fired power station under construction in Rampal, Bangladesh.
India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline- 131.5 km long oil pipeline connecting Siliguri in North Bengal to Parbatipur in Bangladesh's Dinajpur province.
Agartala-Akhaura rail link- Spanning 12.24 km and costing Rs 972 crores, designed to enhance trade between India's North-East and Bangladesh.

3. Bhutan:

Expansion of Paro International Airport.
Introduction of RuPay card in Bhutan as a cross-border payment initiative.
India-Bhutan SAT (jointly developed by India and Bhutan) launched by ISRO in 2022.
Hydropower projects- key collaboration in Mangdechhu, Chukha, Tala Project, Kuricchu hydro projects.
Aid in building Gelephu Mindfulness City.

4. Maldives:

Greater Male Connectivity Project- 6.7 km long bridge connects the capital city Male with the nearby islands.
Grant Assistance of USD 100 million to ease financial challenges- 2022.
Coastal Surveillance Radar System comprising 10 radar stations handed over to Maldives.
Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital in Maldives (gifted by India)

5. Myanmar:

Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project- Enhancing connectivity to Mizoram & NE India from ports through Sittwe port in Myanmar.
Sittwe port- deepwater port constructed by India at Sittwe, Rakhine State in Myanmar.
Border Area Development Program- multifaceted development in the international border to bridge physical and social infrastructure gaps.
India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway Project- connect India's Northeast region with Thailand via Myanmar,
Humanitarian assistance- supply of vaccines during COVID-19 and medical aid.

6. Nepal:

Jayanagar-Kurtha line- 35 kms long cross-border railway line between India and Nepal to enhance connectivity.
Motihari-Amlekhgunj pipeline- 69 km long trans-border petroleum pipeline between Amlekhgunj Oil Depot in Parsa, Nepal and Motihari, Bihar.
Hydropower projects- key collaboration in Sapta Kosi dam project, Upper Karnali Project, Arun - III project etc.
High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDP) to build hospitals, colleges, drinking water facilities, sanitation, drainage, rural electrification etc.

7. Sri Lanka:

Colombo Port Terminal project- expansion of Colombo Port.
Jaffna Cultural Centre- promoting cultural ties.
Solar Energy Projects- 135-MW solar power plant in Trincomalee, Sri Lanka.
$1 billion credit line to Sri Lanka for financial assistance.

Other Major Initiatives:

Major Infrastructure Projects

BBIN Initiative (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal): Improving Road and rail connectivity.
Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project: Connecting India with Myanmar and further with Southeast Asia.
Chabahar Port: Developing a strategic port in Iran to improve connectivity with Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Regional Forums

SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) aimed at promoting regional cooperation. However, the effectiveness of SAARC has been limited due to political differences, particularly between India and Pakistan.
BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) has gained prominence as an alternative to SAARC, focusing on economic cooperation, security, and cultural exchange among countries bordering the Bay of Bengal.

India’s comprehensive and longstanding ties with its neighbouring countries also stand on their own footing and are independent of the relations of these countries with third countries.

Role of Assam in lifting India-Bhutan Ties

Context: Subnational diplomacy has increasingly become a vital aspect of India’s engagement with its neighbours, particularly in regions sharing borders with other countries.

Relevance of the Topic: Mains: India and its Neighbourhood: India-Bhutan relations.

About Subnational diplomacy

Subnational diplomacy or Para diplomacy is the diplomacy conducted by sub-state governments. It introduces the idea of decentralisation of political power to make regional governments prominent actors in the international sphere.
While foreign affairs remain under the purview of the Central government, States like Assam have demonstrated the potential of regional governments to influence cross-border relations and deepen economic and cultural ties.

India-Bhutan Relationship and Assam’s significance

Historical and diplomatic Ties: India and Bhutan share a special relationship, characterised by mutual trust, friendship, and economic cooperation.
- The relationship is shaped by geopolitical factors, including Bhutan’s strategic location between India and China.
- Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Paro in 2024 reinforced India’s commitment to strengthening bilateral ties, amidst reports of Bhutan’s growing engagement with China.
India-Bhutan Trade Agreement: India-Bhutan Agreement on Trade, Commerce, and Transit was first signed in 1972 and last revised in 2016.
- The agreement establishes a free trade regime and provides duty-free transit for Bhutanese exports to third countries.
Economic Ties:
- Trade Statistics (2022-23): India is Bhutan’s top trade partner, accounting for 73% of Bhutan’s total trade.
- Bilateral trade volume: ₹11,178 crore.
- India’s exports to Bhutan: ₹8,509 crore.
- Assam’s contributions: Major exports include bricks, LPG, rice, and motor spirit.
Potential Trade Expansion:
- Assam’s rich natural resources (tea, oil, Joha rice, Bhut Jolokia) offer further opportunities for exports to Bhutan.
New Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) (E.g., Darrange) and alternative trade routes can diversify trade beyond the Jaigaon Land Customs Station (LCS) in West Bengal, which currently handles 70% of India-Bhutan trade.
Connectivity and Infrastructure Development:
- Assam-Bhutan border length: The Assam-Bhutan border length is 267 km.
- Upcoming projects to boost connectivity:
  - Kokrajhar-Gelephu Railway Project (57.5 km): Expected to be completed by 2026.
  - Banarhat (India)-Samtse (Bhutan) Railway Link.
  - Dhubri River Port (Assam): It could facilitate Bhutan’s trade with Bangladesh, reducing cost and transit time.
  - Asom Mala initiative: Assam’s infrastructure development program aimed at improving roads and transportation links to the remote districts.

Energy Cooperation: Hydropower is Bhutan’s economic backbone (accounts for 63% of GDP).
- There is a complementarity as Assam faces high power demand (2,879 MW in September 2024).
- Existing Power Purchase Agreements (PPA), such as with the Nikachhu Hydroelectric Project, can be expanded to meet Assam’s energy needs.
Tourism and Cultural Collaboration:
- Potential for joint tourism initiatives, such as a unified tourism circuit connecting attractions in Assam and Bhutan.
- Promoting eco-tourism and cultural tourism can enhance centuries old people-to-people ties.
Ecological and Environmental Cooperation:
- Joint conservation efforts between Manas National Park (Assam) and Royal Manas National Park (Bhutan) for wildlife and biodiversity protection.
- Collaboration in sustainable resource management and cross-border environmental initiatives.

Bhutan is at a critical juncture, balancing its economic aspirations and territorial disputes with China. India’s continued diplomatic, economic, and infrastructural support is vital for maintaining strong ties. Assam’s active role in subnational diplomacy can act as a model on how Indian states can contribute to foreign policy initiatives.

Indian engagement with Afghanistan

Context: Recently, India’s Foreign Secretary met the Taliban’s acting Foreign Minister in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The Taliban has called India a “significant regional and economic partner” in the meeting.

Relevance of the Topic: Mains: Detailed question on India-Afghanistan relations after Taliban takeover.

Background:

In August 2021, the US forces vacated Afghanistan, leading to Taliban takeover of the country and the government in Kabul.
Concerns of India after Taliban’s takeover:
- Connectivity challenge: India sees Afghanistan as a key element to Central Asia connectivity via Zaranj-Delaram Highway. Taliban takeover may hamper the connectivity project leading to delay.
- Skepticism over investments: The Indian government invested in infrastructure like Salma dam and Parliament building of Afghanistan. Taliban takeover threatened the safety of these investments.
- Internal security challenge: Taliban regime can give push to cross-border terrorism in India.
- Narco-terrorism: Taliban is sanctioned by the US leaving little scope to raise funds. This may lead Taliban to give a push to the drug trade as Afghanistan is part of Golden crescent.
- Human rights violations: India has raised concerns over the Taliban’s decision to ban education for women.

Challenges in dealing with Taliban

Third-party influence: Taliban is influenced by Pakistan intelligence agency ISI and other nations like China, creating an external challenge for India to deal with the Taliban.
Ideological difference: Indian and Taliban ideology differs in domains like human rights and civil rights. This makes consensus difficult between India and the Taliban regime.
Trust deficit: India is doubtful about the Taliban intentions as Taliban has established terrorist involvements against India.
Indian policy: Indian policy to not to engage with terrorist organisations leads to the obstacle to deal with Taliban and recognising the Taliban government in India.
Stalled diplomacy: India and Afghanistan had suspended their embassies in the nations after the Taliban takeover.

Steps Taken to Negotiate

Establishing contact: India held the first formal meeting with Taliban in August 2021 in Doha, Qatar. This meeting marked a significant departure from India’s earlier reluctance to engage with the Taliban.
Humanitarian Assistance: Recognising the Humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, Indians began sending aid in December 2021. E.g., Wheat grant for Afghanistan and free CoVid vaccines to Afghanistan.
Re-establishing diplomatic presence: In 2022, India reopened its embassy in Kabul, signaling a willingness to engage more directly with the Taliban administration.
High level engagement: India 2025, India engaged in a high level meeting with the Taliban’s Foreign Minister Muttaqi unfolding new agendas of engagement between the nations.

What more can be done?

Multilateral engagement: India can explore relations with Afghanistan at Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to promote central-asia connectivity.
Expanding soft power: India can explore cricket diplomacy and cultural connect with Afghanistan.
Humanitarian aid: India needs to expand humanitarian aid with medical assistance and allowing Afghan students to join Indian Universities.
Inclusive governance: Encouraging the Taliban to protect the rights of ethnic minorities, women, and children to create a more inclusive governance system.

Three redline concept to deal with Taliban

Counter-terrorism and Security- India insists that Afghan soil must not be used to harbor or support terrorist groups targeting India, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). Any direct or indirect support for terrorism by the Taliban is a strict redline.
Inclusive governance: India emphasises the need to include minorities, women and all ethnic groups in the government.
Safeguarding development: India expects the Taliban to respect and secure its developmental investment in Afghanistan. Any harm to these assets would jeopardise India's willingness to deepen its engagement.

Conclusion: India’s engagement with the Taliban reflects a pragmatic shift, balancing geopolitical challenges and humanitarian needs. By fostering diplomatic ties, boosting trade, supporting Afghan stability, and countering security threats, India can safeguard its interests while promoting regional peace. A nuanced approach ensures India's role as a constructive partner in Afghanistan’s future.

India-Bangladesh Border Fencing Issue

Context: Bangladesh has lodged opposition to India’s efforts to fence the India-Bangladesh border.

Relevance of the TopicMains: India and its neighbours- India-Bangladesh relations and issues.

Major Highlights:

India and Bangladesh share a 4096 kms long complex border (India's longest terrestrial border) with various terrains like marshy land of Sunderbans.
India has been working on fencing the border for several years to address security concerns, but this initiative has faced opposition from Bangladesh, citing legal, humanitarian, and diplomatic challenges.

What are the Issues?

Border dispute: India and Bangladesh border is a densely populated area and lacks clear demarcation of border in riverine or marshy areas.
Security concerns: India has initiated fencing of the border as the porous border facilitates illegal migration, smuggling of goods, trafficking of women and children and drug trade.
Humanitarian and social impact: The regime change in Bangladesh is leading to hardships of people. This is leading to a threat of mass migration to India.

Arguments presented by Bangladesh

Bangladesh presented following arguments to restrain Indian efforts of fencing;

Violation of Agreements: Bangladesh claims that India’s fencing efforts violate the Indra-Mujib Accord of 1974, according to which there should be no fencing within 150 yards of the border.
Encroachment concerns: Bangladesh has raised concerns that fencing in some areas, particularly near riverine borders, results in the occupation of disputed land or encroachment into Bangladeshi territory.
Humanitarian issues: Fencing near residential and agriculture areas will restrain free movement, hampering livelihood of locals.

Indian response to Bangladesh’s arguments

Security justification: India has emphasised the need of fencing to prevent;
- Illegal infiltration
- Threats of cross-border terrorism
- Organised crimes like goods smuggling and human trafficking.
Commitment and cooperation: India has reiterated commitment to peace in the region, as India is fencing on the Indian side.
Diplomatic measures: India has proposed a joint survey, consultation and high level discussion to address concerns related to fencing alignment and humanitarian issues.

Way Forward

Enhancing dialogue: Border forces of both nations should engage in high level i.e. Director General level border talks.
Joint Border management: India and Bangladesh should establish joint patrols and surveillance mechanisms to reduce reliance on fencing alone.
Alternate measures: Both nations can establish economic corridors and integrated check posts to facilitate legal migration to sustain livelihood of locals.

Other issues between India and Bangladesh

Apart from border dispute there are various other issues between India and Bangladesh

Illegal migration: Cross border migration has been a contentious issue, with India raising concerns about influx of illegal migrants into states like Assam and West Bengal.
Organised crimes: India-Bangladesh face issues like goods smuggling and Human trafficking. Also, cattle smuggling and urea smuggling are persistent.
Water sharing dispute: India and Bangladesh have various river water sharing issues like Teesta river and Brahmaputra water sharing issue.
Energy cooperation challenges: Bangladesh is facing challenges with the Adani powers on energy sharing agreement due to delay in payments.
Minority issues: There have been persistent issues of attack on minorities in Bangladesh. India has lodged multiple concerns about protection of minorities in Bangladesh. E.g., Attack on ISKCON in Bangladesh.

Read More: India - Bangladesh border

Conclusion: Despite ongoing issues such as border disputes, water sharing, and trade imbalances, India and Bangladesh continue to prioritise cooperation. Diplomatic efforts, joint initiatives, and dialogue mechanisms remain essential in resolving conflicts and enhancing bilateral relations, fostering stability and growth in the region for both nations.

Sri Lankan President is on India Visit

Context: After sweeping Presidential and Parliamentary elections, Sri Lankan President Dissanayake is on his maiden visit to India. He met the Indian Prime Minister and has requested to continue its grants assistance to Sri Lanka and help it tide over its economic problems.

Relevance of the topic:

Prelims: Location of Katchatheevu Island.

Mains: India and its Neighbourhood relations- India & Srilanka.

Key Takeaways from the Visit

Security: Two leaders discussed various issues including regional security, digital infrastructure, connectivity, and energy projects, as well as the Tamil issue and rights of fishermen.
- It is to be noted that India has often raised concern about Chinese ships berthing in Sri Lankan ports.
Financial Assistance: India announced it would convert loans given to Sri Lanka into grants for railway signalling systems and the Kankesanthurai port and extended a $20.66 million grant to settle payment for projects already completed, which had originally been signed under a ‘Letter of Credit’ or loan.
Energy Security: The two countries agreed to continue their partnership on energy projects, including connecting to a common grid, an India-Sri Lanka “multi-product pipeline” with UAE support, LNG supplies, and completing the Sampur coal power project.
Training and Capacity Building: India agreed to train 1,500 Sri Lankan civil servants over five years and to explore further training programs in various sectors.
Cooperation in Education and Technology: Both leaders agreed to expand collaboration in research and development in sectors such as agriculture, aquaculture, digital economy, health and other areas of mutual interest and cooperation between Start-up India and Information Communication Technology Agency of Sri Lanka (ICTA), for mentorship for Sri Lankan start-ups.
Provincial Elections: PM Modi also requested Mr. Dissanayake to fulfil their commitment towards fully implementing the Constitution of Sri Lanka and conducting the Provincial Council Elections.
Cooperation at Multilateral forums: President Dissanayake has requested India to support Sri Lanka’s bid to join the extended BRICS grouping of emerging economies and for India’s intervention on the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) for the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf beyond Exclusive Economic Zone, which Sri Lanka has asked for.

Significance of Sri Lanka for India:

Strategic: India and Sri Lanka share membership in SAARC, BIMSTEC and IORA.
- Sri Lanka is also important for India in its ambitions to become a net security provider in the Indian ocean.
- Pursuing Strong ties with Sri Lanka is an integral part of India’s Neighborhood first policy.
Trade and Investment: Sri Lanka is one of India’s largest trading partners in South Asia. India in turn is Sri Lanka’s largest trade partner globally. Exports from India to Sri Lanka in 2016 were US$ 3.83 billion.
- Sri Lanka also provides investment opportunities for Indian Infrastructure companies. E.g., Colombo port west terminal project.
- India and Sri Lanka entered into a Free trade agreement in 2000. The two countries are negotiating the Economic and Technology Co-operation Agreement (ETCA).
- Debt relief: India played a key role in Sri Lanka debt relied on deals from the IMF.
- Digital Payments: Agreement to operationalize UPI-based digital payments for enhancing trade and transactions between businesses and common people.
- Digital Public Infrastructure: Leverage India’s Digital Public Infrastructure in accordance with Sri Lanka’s requirements.
Connectivity: Transshipment ports of Sri Lankan like Colombo and Hambantota handle huge cargo that comes to India, since India did not fully develop a transshipment port in the southern Coast.
- Maritime Connectivity: Cooperation in developing ports and logistics at Colombo, Trincomalee, and Kankesanthurai to consolidate regional logistics and shipping. o Development Focus: Ports and logistics development at Colombo, Trincomalee, and Kankesanthurai.
- Maritime Security Cooperation: Inauguration of the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) to enhance maritime security, with installations across Sri Lanka’s coastline.
- Trade, Economic, and Financial Connectivity: Operationalise UPI-based digital payments to enhance trade and transactions.
- People-to-People Connectivity.
Energy and Power Connectivity:
- Power Grid Interconnection: Plan to establish a high-capacity power grid interconnection for electricity trade between Sri Lanka and other regional countries.
- Undersea Transmission Line: Ongoing project for a USD 1.2 billion undersea transmission line linking Sri Lanka’s power grid with India to ensure energy security.
Tourism: Huge scope for religious tourism (Buddhist tourism) and medical tourism (Sri Lankan patients frequently visit Chennai for medical treatment)

Issue and Challenges in Relationship:

Ethnic issues: The long drawn ethnic conflicts and human rights violation of Tamils, lack of proper rehabilitation and insufficient devolution of powers (Under 13th Amendment act) to the northern Tamil provinces strained the relation between the two countries.
UNHRC resolution: India voted against Sri Lanka in UNHRC resolutions in the past (2012 & 2013).
Fishermen issues: Sri Lankan fishermen object to Indians using bottom trawlers and fishing illegally along their coast, which often leads to arrests of the Indians. The dispute status of Kachateevu islands is still not resolved.
Growing trust deficit:
- Scrapping of Indian infrastructure projects like Colombo east container terminal project at a time when China is increasing its investments in the same Colombo port city.
- India’s passive response to Sri Lanka’s request for a debt repayment waiver for 3 years and a separate currency swap for $1 billion to help with the economic crisis.
China factor:
- Recently, Sri Lanka gave approval to the Chinese funded ‘Colombo port city’ with some autonomy.
- China has developed the Hambantota port which was later leased to it for a period of 99 years.
- Sri Lanka has already endorsed the Belt & Road Initiative of China.
- India has often raised concern about Chinese ships berthing in Sri Lankan ports.

Katchatheevu Island Issue

Geographical Location: A 285-acre island located within the maritime boundary line of Sri Lanka. Proximity to India and Sri Lanka: Situated 33 km off the Indian coast to the northeast of Rameswaram in Tamil Nadu and southwest of Sri Lanka’s Delft Island.

Historical Control and Ownership:
- Ramanad Kingdom: The island was historically under the control of Ramanad Raja, a zamindari in Ramanathapuram in the Madras Presidency during British rule (1795 to 1803).
Disputed Claims
- India and Sri Lanka's Claims: Both countries have been claiming Katchatheevu since at least 1921, following a survey that placed the island within Sri Lanka’s boundaries.
- Contestation by British Indian Delegation: The British Indian delegation contested Sri Lanka's claim, citing the historical ownership of the Ramanad kingdom.
1974 Agreement
- Indira Gandhi’s Tenure: In 1974, during Indira Gandhi's tenure as Prime Minister, India and Sri Lanka signed an agreement that transferred Katchatheevu to Sri Lanka.
- Fishermen's Rights: The agreement allowed Indian fishermen "access to Katchatheevu for rest, drying of nets, and participation in the annual St. Anthony’s festival."
- Lack of Clarity on Fishing Rights: The agreement did not specify the fishing rights of Indian fishermen, leaving a critical issue unresolved.

Peace in Myanmar

Context: The 44th ASEAN Summit, held in Vientiane, Laos, highlighted the growing concerns in the Southeast Asia region, particularly the deepening crisis in Myanmar.

Go through the neighboring countries of Myanmar and the Indian states sharing land border with Myanmar (#PreFact)

Background of Myanmar crisis

In 2021, Myanmar’s military seized control in a coup, dismantling the country’s democratic government and attempting to reinstate the authoritarian rule in the country.
The present crisis has unleashed unforeseen consequences such as instability and rising crime across Southeast Asian region.

Present situation:

Myanmar is currently embroiled in a brutal civil war between the military junta and various resistance groups, including Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) and the People’s Defence Forces (PDFs).
After the junta forcibly seized power, it encountered broad armed resistance, with opposition groups now controlling significant areas, including six key border trade routes.
The junta’s reluctance to cooperate with international peace efforts has aggravated the conflict.
Myanmar’s economy is nearing collapse, with dwindling foreign reserves, escalating foreign debt which amount to USD 10 – 11 bn, and deepening poverty. Amid a severe forex shortage and rising inflation, many international businesses are withdrawing, while the junta heavily relies on Chinese-backed infrastructure projects and loans.
Agricultural output has plummeted due to conflict, and economic forecasts predict worsening conditions. The UN and ILO have warned of widespread poverty, job losses, and a looming humanitarian crisis, with Myanmar’s survival increasingly dependent on Chinese support.

Implications of Myanmar’s instability:

Trade distortion: The ongoing crisis in Myanmar disrupts regional flow of trade, particularly along key border routes with countries like Thailand, China, and India. The conflict-related shutdowns, lack of stable governance have reduced trade efficiency due to increased costs.
Security of neighboring countries: Myanmar’s conflict poses security challenges for neighboring nations as violence and unrest spill across borders. Thailand, in particular, faces challenges with the flow of refugees, arms trafficking etc.
Humanitarian crisis: The present tussle between junta and resistance groups has led to widespread displacement of innocent people (around 18.6 million) who are forced out of their homes and are in need of urgent assistance (UN reported it).
Extremism: Continuous instability and repression provides a breeding ground for extremism, as disenfranchised groups may turn to radical ideologies in response to political exclusion and violence.

Impact on India:

The strategic projects, such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Corridor (#PreFact), may face indefinite delays due to Myanmar’s conflict, making it impossible for India to continue these efforts under current conditions.
India’s ‘Act East’ policy, aimed at using Myanmar as a land bridge to Southeast Asia, cannot advance without stability in Myanmar.
Myanmar’s instability has led to a rising influx of refugees into India’s northeastern states, stretching their limited resources and impacting local communities in Mizoram and Manipur.
As resistance groups in Myanmar might seek safe havens or resources in Indian states, local sympathies could arise, particularly in border regions.

Efforts for Peace in Myanmar:

ASEAN’s role:

It’s Five-Point Consensus (#PreFact), calling for an end to violence, inclusive dialogue, and humanitarian assistance, remains largely ignored by Myanmar’s military, exposing ASEAN’s limited influence in the region.
ASEAN allowed Myanmar to send a representative to the 44^th summit in Laos, showcased a pragmatic approach to keep dialogue open with the junta. ASEAN’s consensus-based decision-making continues to limit response effectiveness, especially with divided stances among members ( On one hand Indonesia, Malaysia wants a stronger action and on the other countries like Thailand maintains closer relations with military government).
Western response:
The United States and the United Kingdom have initiated a crucial step towards an intervention in Myanmar by introducing a UN Security Council resolution in 2022. It strongly condemned Myanmar’s military regime and called for an end to the violence, as well as the release of political prisoners, including the State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.

India’s approach towards Myanmar:

Discontinuation of Free Movement Regime (FRM): Due to concerns over regional stability and an influx of refugees, Government of India has decided to end the Free Movement Regime (#PreFact) with Myanmar. This move faces opposition from several Indian state governments, putting India in a delicate balancing act.
Agreement for socio-economic development: India and Myanmar signed five Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) under the Quick impact Projects framework, focusing on areas like agriculture, vocational training, disaster management, and education etc.
Financial support: India has committed $250,000 to support the Quick Impact Projects and to uplift the communities in Myanmar.

Way forward for India to bring stability in the region:

End strategic inaction: India can no longer afford inaction regarding Myanmar's crisis; New Delhi must adopt a proactive approach to address the stakes involved.
Launch a Peace-making platform: Establish a “Gandhi Peace Mission” within the Prime Minister’s Office, supported by the National Security Council and Ministry of External Affairs, to institutionalize India’s peace efforts.
Initiate an outreach programme: Begin by sending a delegation, including a representative from Manipur, two senior Buddhist monks, and former diplomats experienced with Myanmar, to engage directly with all stakeholders (ethnic groups, democratic factions, and the military) and initiate dialogue.
Leverage Religious Diplomacy: Include top Buddhist leaders like Venerable Chalinda Bhante and Dr. Lam, who have shown interest in negotiating with influential Burmese Buddhist monks, fostering peace through mass prayers and reconciliation in line with Buddhist principles.

As a key gateway to Southeast Asia, Myanmar’s challenges complicate India’s efforts to counter China’s influence, necessitating a balanced approach emphasizing strategic rationality and commitment to democratic values.

Indus Waters Treaty

Context: The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), facilitated by the World Bank, is a landmark transboundary water-sharing mechanism between India and Pakistan. But disagreements persist.

In an unprecedented move, India called for amendments to the agreement last year due to its dissatisfaction with the dispute resolution process. It blamed Pakistan’s continued “intransigence” in implementing the treaty — particularly its material breach. Pakistan sought arbitration at The Hague for resolution of its differences and objections over India’s Kishenganga and Ratle hydroelectric projects, bypassing the treaty-compliant Neutral Expert proceedings.

This topic is crucial for the understanding of India-Pakistan Relations under GS II.

General Studies- II: Governance, Constitution, Polity, Social Justice and International relations.

India and its neighbourhood- relations.

Hence in the ensuing discussion we are going to understand:

Geographical locations (Rivers)
The need for a treaty
Mains provisions of the treaty
Current challenges with the treaty
Way forward

Indus Water Treaty Explained

Indus Waters Treaty, treaty, signed on September 19, 1960, between India and Pakistan and brokered by the World Bank. The treaty fixed and delimited the rights and obligations of both countries concerning the use of the waters of the Indus River system.

The Need for water sharing:

Geographical Context:
- The waters of the Indus system of rivers begin mainly in Tibet and the Himalayan mountains in the states of Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir. They flow through the states of Punjab and Sindh before emptying into the Arabian Sea south of Karachi and Kori Creek in Gujarat.
Partition Impact
- The partition of British India, based on religion not on geography basis, created a conflict over the waters of the Indus basin. The newly formed states were at odds over how to share and manage what was essentially a cohesive and unitary network of irrigation.
- Furthermore, the geography of partition was such that the source rivers of the Indus basin were in India. Pakistan felt its livelihood threatened by the prospect of Indian control over the tributaries that fed water into the Pakistani portion of the basin. Where India certainly had its own ambitions for the profitable development of the basin, Pakistan felt acutely threatened by a conflict over the main source of water for its cultivable land.
Agriculture Dominance:
- Irrigation and cultivation in the Indus plains are central to both economies. The Indus is responsible for over 90 per cent of Pakistan’s agricultural output and accounts for 25 per cent of the GDP. Given the ballooning population and corresponding consumption, deteriorating water quality poses an additional threat to food and nutritional security, human health and biodiversity.

Sharing of water (Treaty):

Eastern rivers: Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej were allocated to India for unrestricted use.
Western rivers: Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab were allocated largely to Pakistan. India is permitted certain agricultural uses and can build 'run of the river' hydropower projects with limited storage.
Permanent Indus Commission (PIC): Commissioners are appointed by both countries for cooperation and information exchange regarding their use of the rivers.
The treaty provides a 3-tier dispute resolution mechanism:
- PIC is the first stage.
- A neutral expert is the second stage.
- The Court of Arbitration is the third stage.
IWT does not have a unilateral exit provision: The treaty is supposed to remain in force unless both countries ratify another mutually agreed pact.

Issues:

Dissatisfaction over water apportionment: There is long lasting dissatisfaction in India because 80% of the water is allocated to Pakistan.
Suboptimal data sharing: Diplomatic tensions lead to suboptimal data sharing, and the quality of shared data is often questioned. There is no mechanism for the research community to access this data.
Ambiguous and room for conflict: The technical nature of the treaty and the fact that the western rivers flow through the conflicted region of Jammu and Kashmir pave the way for conflict. Perceived impacts of infrastructure development on downstream flows, and Pakistan’s concerns as a lower riparian state.
Changing realities such as climate change also fuel the need for amending the treaty.
- In 2015, the Indus basin was ranked by NASA as the world’s second most over-stressed aquifer. An estimated 31 per cent of the net basin flow originates from climate-impacted glaciers and snow melts, making mean annual flows more volatile and seasonal. Other factors like unpredictable monsoons also contribute to increased variability of flow volume.
Lack of mutual trust: There is a lack of trust-building mechanisms between India and Pakistan. Perceived impacts of infrastructure development on downstream flows, and Pakistan’s concerns as a lower riparian state.
- A recent case in point is Pakistan’s accusation of “water terrorism” against India for the Shahpurkandi barrage project. But Ravi’s water-flow from India into Pakistan is not substantial in the first place, and the dam would streamline the river’s flow — as legally permitted within the IWT — to support power supply and agricultural growth in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir.
Limited role of the Guarantor: In disputes like those involving the Krishanganga and Ratle Hydroelectric Projects, the World Bank had to appoint the Neutral Expert and chairman of the CoA simultaneously. This concurrent appointment poses practical and legal risks. Moreover, the World Bank lacks the power to decide which one should take precedence.
Lack of adequate environmental safeguards: The treaty lacks sufficient provisions to protect the environment.

To resolve these conflicts:

It's essential to view the Indus river system as a cohesive geographical unit, benefiting all stakeholders.
An ecological perspective should be integrated into the governance framework of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), including the institutionalization of Environmental Flows (EF).
- According to the Brisbane Declaration (2018), EFs are necessary to sustain aquatic ecosystems, which support human cultures and economies. Harmonizing EFs with the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention principles—equitable use and prevention of transboundary harm—is crucial.
International customary law, such as the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water Resources, also emphasizes sustainability and ecological flows. The 2013 Permanent Court of Arbitration's verdict on India's Kishanganga project underscores the obligation to release EFs in transboundary basins, setting a precedent for similar cases.
Ratification of the UN Water Convention to ensure the sustainable use of transboundary water resources by facilitating cooperation.
Promoting open data policy encouraging open data policies to international supervisory bodies and other stakeholders to promote transparency and applied scientific research.
Both countries should undertake joint research on the rivers to study the impact of climate change for future cooperation, as underlined in Article VII of the IWT.

Additionally, a nuanced understanding of climate change and population pressures on the Indus basin's hydrology is needed. This includes developing a robust mechanism for real-time data-sharing between India and Pakistan, supervised by the World Bank, to ensure accountability and enhance policy-making. Recognizing climate change as a shared vulnerability and focusing on holistic basin management will strengthen the IWT, improving India-Pakistan relations and serving as a model for global transboundary climate cooperation.

Engaging China in Modi 3.0

Context: It has been 4 years since Galwan valley clashes in which the Forces of China and India locked horns in the high altitudes of Himalayas. As PM Modi has returned to power for the third time, there is a need to look at how India will engage with China in Modi 3.0

Developments in India-China relations:

Managing the relationship with China is the most pressing challenge for the Modi government in its third term. About 50,000 to 60,000 troops are still deployed on each side of the border.
In a pre-election interview, PM Modi had remarked that stable and peaceful relations with China are important not just for the countries, but for the whole world.
- China responded positively to the overture and said that India-China ties are “more than border situation” and China wishes to maintain relations from “strategic heights and long-term perspectives.”
EAM S. Jaishankar remarked that the primarily revolved around “patrolling rights” and “patrolling abilities”.
- Limiting the dispute to “patrolling rights” and “patrolling abilities” can be seen as a nuancing of the Indian position, pivoting away from the earlier stance of “disengagement” and “de-escalation”.

Post-election:

Issue of Taiwan: Exchange of messages between the Prime Minister and Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-Te with respect to deepening cooperation trade, technology, peace, and stability in Indio-Pacific on the social media platform angered the Chinese as they saw it as provocation.
- China saw it as deviation from One-China Policy.
Tibet: A seven-member bipartisan delegation of the United States Congress met the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, the former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi remarked that while the Tibetan spiritual leader’s “legacy will live forever”, Xi will “be gone and nobody will give him credit for anything”.
- China reacted sharply, and “urged” US to “adhere to its commitments of recognizing Xizang as part of China and not supporting “Xizang independence”.
- Recently, US Congress has also passed “Resolve Tibet Act”.
  - Resolve Tibet Act authorizes the use of funds to counter Chinese disinformation about Tibet (including disinformation about the history of Tibet, the Tibetan people, and Tibetan institutions).
  - Act also challenges the Chinese contention that Tibet has been a part of China since ancient times.
  - Act underlines the right of the Tibetan people to self-determination and human rights.

What lies ahead:

Some analysts believe that while India has shown its intent on resolving the border situation through the interviews given by the PM and Jaishankar, it has also sent out a signal through Pelosi’s visit to the Dalai Lama ahead of a possible meeting between Modi and Xi in Astana that in any case, India will not negotiate on a weaker stance.
Whereas some other analysts believe that while New Delhi had initially wanted to resolve the border situation after the Lok Sabha election, it has now changed its mind after the NDA got a weaker mandate, the government might now be wary of criticism which reconciliation might draw.

Way forward:

India needs stable borders as they are key for the government to focus on its agenda for economic growth and job creation.
India can follow the template of ongoing engagement between Australia and China in which Australia is engaging with China at the highest level without compromising Australia’s core Interest.
Even though there is heightened awareness of security threat perception from China has led to the decoupling of Interests, the upcoming meet of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Astana (Kazakhstan) is likely to show someway ahead.

India-Maldives Meet

Context: In the recent meeting between Indian and Maldivian foreign ministers in New Delhi, S. Jaishankar reiterated that the development of India-Maldives ties was based on ‘mutual interests’ and ‘reciprocal sensitivity’ given that they are close and proximate neighbours.

More information:

India recently approved the highest-ever export quotas for essential commodities: eggs, potatoes, onions, sugar, rice, wheat flour and pulses, river sand and stone aggregates, to the Maldives for 2024-25 under a unique bilateral mechanism.
The approved quantities are the highest since this arrangement came into effect in 1981.

India-Maldives relations in recent years:

The relations strained after President Muizzu was elected to the Presidential Office.
President Muizzu immediately demanded the withdrawal of Indian Military personnel keeping with his disinclination to accommodate India.
President Muizzu is following the India-Out and China-In policy.
He pressed for non-renewal of the Hydrology pact with India signed in 2019, but commenced the operationalisation of the FTA signed with China (PRC) in 2017.

Geo-Strategic and Geopolitics importance of Maldives:

Maldives is very important for India due to the existence of India’s Sea lanes of communication(SLOCs) passing around Maldives. Most of India’s trade and energy supplies transit through this route.
Kerala and Lakshadweep security to an extent depends on Maldives’s stability as it forms an outer buffer zone for India.
China’s PLN (People’s Liberation Navy) increasing presence in the Indian Ocean and the (Xiang Yang Hong 03) arrival of research vessels from China in Male has deepened India’s concerns.
China is increasing its power and status by constructing bases in the Indian Ocean Region. China also wants to win mining rights and conduct bathymetric and topographic surveys of the region.
India cannot risk the radicalisation of Maldives which may lead to adverse downstream consequences for regional security in general and Indian security in specific.

India’s options:

The recent push by Muizzu to diversify resources and import partners asks for sustained quiet diplomacy from India.
India needs to consistently use sustained diplomacy as India shares a lot of commons with Maldives which includes geographical access, historical ties, political ties, people to people connectivity etc.
India’s deep political ties are showcased by recent high-level exchanges done by both sides in 2023 and annual joint exercises like Ekuverin.
When Abdulla Shahid became the UNGA President, India has used its instrumental diplomatic clout to ensure its victory.
India can leverage People to people (P2P) relations.
India has always been a first responder like in 2014 incident of acute water supply crisis and even has stood beside Maldivians through Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital(IGMH).
India also sent the highest number of tourists to Maldives from 2020 to 2023.
India has an official policy of not commenting or taking sides in internal elections of other sovereign countries but it can try to use its non-governmental leverage by Track II diplomacy to ensure President Muizzu alone cannot sideline India.
India can rope in other Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) partners. France really wants to make sure International Shipping Lines (ISL) are not compromised and can collaborate with India for Maldives’ security.

Way Forward:

The deep-rooted Chinese investments which come with strings and strategic imperatives is forcing India to quickly adapt to the changing geopolitical situations. India is trying to be accommodative to new realities and Maldives needs to do its bit to ensure it does not use its largely Muslim populace to create rifts in its time-tested partnerships to make the Indian Ocean Region a geopolitical conquest where one wins at the other’s expense.

For more information:

INDIA – MALDIVES Evolution and Contemporary Issues

40 years of Operation Meghdoot

Context: April 13, 2024, marks the fortieth anniversary of Operation Meghdoot, during which the Indian Army pre-emptively occupied the Siachen Glacier on the Saltoro Ridge, overlooking the Nubra Valley in the Karakoram Range. Although a ceasefire is currently in effect, the operation is still ongoing.

About Operation Meghdoot:

An IAF aircraft flies past as Operation Meghdoot marks 40 years of the Indian Army’s presence in Siachen glacier since April 13, 1984, in Ladakh.

It was the codename for the Indian Army operation to take full control of the Siachen Glacier in Ladakh.
Siachen, in Balti language means “land of roses’, ‘Sia’ is a kind of rose species that grows in the region and ‘Chen’ means “in abundance”.
It is known for being the world’s highest and coldest battlefield. It sits at a very strategic location with Pakistan on the left and China on the right.
It is a legacy of the Partition between India and Pakistan. While the Line of Control (LoC) was delineated and accepted by both sides upto NJ-9842 as part of the 1972 Shimla agreement, the glacier itself was left unmarked.
India claims the area based on the Jammu and Kashmir Accession Agreement of 1947 and the Karachi Agreement of 1949, which define the ceasefire line beyond NJ-9842 as running “Northwards to the glaciers”. On the other hand, Pakistan interprets it as ‘North-Eastwards’ to claim the area beyond the Saltoro Ridge and beyond Siachen as its own. This would give Pakistan direct connectivity to China as well as strategic oversight over the Ladakh region and the crucial Leh-Srinagar highway, posing a serious threat to India.
Launched on 13 April 1984, this unique military operation was the first assault launched in the world's highest battlefield.
This operation pre-empted Pakistan's Operation Ababeel; and was a success. Resulting in Indian forces gaining control of the Siachen Glacier in its entirety.
The operation resulted in India gaining the 70 kilometers long Siachen Glacier and all of its tributary glaciers, as well as the three main passes on the Saltoro Ridge immediately west of the glacier; Sia La, Bilafond La, and Gyong La. Thus, giving India the tactical advantage of holding higher grounds.
The Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) runs roughly along the Saltoro Ridge which extends nearly 120 kilometers from Point NJ9842 to the Shaksgam Tract (a part of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir; which Pakistan had illegally ceded to China in 1963).
It is still on and will continue till a political solution of the Jammu and Kashmir problem is achieved with both Pakistan and China.
However, this Operation was unique in its own ways as no such operation was ever carried out by any military in history and no one had occupied such a terrain continuously for over four decades.

Genesis of Operation Meghdoot

Shaksgam Valley was ceded to China (Although it was very well part of India) by Pakistan in 1963. Siachen Area is located so strategically that while it dominates Shaksgam Valley in the north, controls the routes coming from Gilgit Baltistan to Leh from the west, and at the same time, dominates the ancient Karakoram Pass in the eastern side too.
Towards the west, nearly the entirety of Gilgit Baltistan which too is an Indian territory illegally occupied by Pakistan in 1948.
Soon after the ceded of Shaksgam Valley, Pakistan started allowing multiple mountaineering expeditions in this area in 1970s and 1980s with dual purpose, to internationally claim that the area belongs to them and to have some kind of physical domination over the terrain.
To strengthen this, Pakistan was sending a military officer with each of these expeditions as a liaison officer who was not only mapping the area but was also helping in planning.
Accordingly, India too started planning mountaineering expeditions in this area. From 1978 to 1984, India sent multiple military mountaineering expeditions in this area. The first team which went there in 1978 was led by Colonel Narinder (Bull) Kumar followed by another large expedition in 1980. More than a dozen expeditions were launched in various areas.
It was revealed that Pakistan has kept the day of 17th April 1984 to launch the operation. The strength and overall planning of Pakistan was also uncovered by Indian Intelligence agencies which acted as a major decisive factor in “Operation Meghdoot”.
The operation was launched under the leadership of Lt.General Manohar Lal Chibber, Lt.General PN Hoon, and Major General Shiv Sharma.

Chinese infrastructure creation along border

Context: Chinese nationals have started occupying several of their model “Xiaokang” border defence villages across India’s north-eastern borders

China has been constructing 628 such “well-off villages” along India’s borders with the Tibet Autonomous Region, including Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh for over five years now.
This infrastructural drive raises concern in India as the dwellings are understood to be “dual-use infrastructure” i.e. it can be used for both civil and military purposes and seen as a Chinese assertion of its territorial claims along the LAC which remains disputed between the neighbouring countries.
China has also been constructing infrastructure, including border villages, in Bhutanese territory.

Indian Response to border construction

Indian government has launched Vibrant Village Programme with a three-fold objective that it aims to deliver

First, Improve connectivity and basic amenities in border villages to curb migration from these areas. Lack of roads, healthcare, education and economic opportunities have led to migration of youth from border villages in search of jobs. This poses challenges for border security as it reduces the population providing intelligence inputs.
Second, Boost the local economy in border villages through promotion of tourism, trade and handicrafts. This will provide livelihood support to communities living in harsh border conditions.
Third, Strengthen security in border areas by enabling access for defence forces and boosting the morale of local communities. Lack of infrastructure has hampered patrolling in some border areas. Locals acting as ‘eyes and ears’ also need to feel connected to the mainstream.
- The Government of India has identified villages in the eastern part of Arunachal Pradesh, and in the Tawang region such as Zemithang, Taksing, Chayang Tajo, Tuting and Kibithu.
- Further, three major highways are at different stages of construction in Arunachal Pradesh: the Trans-Arunachal Highway; the Frontier Highway; and the East-West Industrial Corridor Highway.
- There are plans to improve connectivity to Tawang with the construction of at least two alternate axes —in addition to the existing one connecting Guwahati and Tawang.

About LAC (Line of Actual Control)

The LAC is the demarcation that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory. India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km. The line is divided between the Eastern, Middle and the Western Sector.
Initially, India rejected the concept of LAC in both 1959 and 1962. However the LAC was discussed during Chinese Premier Li Peng’s 1991 visit to India, where PM P V Narasimha Rao and Li reached an understanding to maintain peace and tranquillity at the LAC.
India formally accepted the concept of the LAC when PV Narasimha Rao paid a return visit to Beijing in 1993 and the two sides signed the Agreement to Maintain Peace and Tranquillity at the LAC

Why did India accept LAC?

The Indian and Chinese patrols were coming in more frequent contact during the mid-1980s, after the government formed a China Study Group in 1976 which revised the patrolling limits, rules of engagement and pattern of Indian presence along the border.
Finally due to the Sumdorongchu standoff, when PM Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in 1988, the two sides agreed to negotiate a border settlement, and pending that, they would maintain peace and tranquillity along the border.

Difference between LOC and LAC?

The Line Of Control (LoC) emerged from the 1948 ceasefire line negotiated by the UN after the Kashmir War. It was designated as the LoC in 1972, following the Shimla Agreement between the two countries.
It is delineated on a map signed by DGMOs of both armies and has the international sanctity of a legal agreement.
The LAC, in contrast, is only a concept – it is not agreed upon by the two countries, neither delineated on a map or demarcated on the ground.

To Read more about India-China border dispute visit:

Recognition of McMahon Line by the US to mark boundary between India & China

India-Pakistan Trade Ties

Context: Pakistan's Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar has highlighted the need for revival of trade ties with India.

Evolution of India-Pakistan trade ties in recent times

India and Pakistan had taken trade measures against each other in 2019.
India's steps against trade with Pakistan: India had withdrawn the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan and raised tariffs on all trade with Pakistan by multiple times. India has made opening of formal trade with Pakistan conditional on Pakistan ending state support to terrorism.
Pakistan's steps against trade with India: Following India's removal of Article 370 on J&K in August 2019, Pakistan had suspended direct trade ties with India.

Impact of closure of trade ties between India & Pakistan

Closure of India-Pakistan trade adversely affected businessmen, traders and transporters engaged at the Attari-Wagah land border.
The closure of formal trade ties between India and Pakistan led the trade between two countries through third countries such as Dubai and Singapore. Trade through these routes involve higher freight, transshipment and other transportation costs.

What is Most Favoured Nation?

Most Favoured Nation is the cornerstone of WTO agreements.
Although, Most Favoured Nation sounds like giving special treatment, but in the WTO system it means non-discrimination - ie treating all nations with most favoured nation status equally.
Each member treats all the other members equally as “most-favoured” trading partners. If a country improves the benefits that it gives to one trading partner, it has to give the same “best” treatment to all the other WTO members so that they all remain “most favoured”.
Countries which are not members of WTO such as Iran, Ethiopia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Algeria, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan etc. Member countries of WTO can impose any number of tariffs on these countries. Note: Currently 164 countries are members of WTO.
Exceptions to Most Favoured Nation: For example, countries can set up a free trade agreement that applies only to goods traded within the group — discriminating against goods from outside. Or they can give developing countries special access to their markets. Or a country can raise barriers against products that are considered to be traded unfairly from specific countries. And in services, countries are allowed, in limited circumstances, to discriminate. But the agreements only permit these exceptions under strict conditions. In general, MFN means that every time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a market, it has to do so for the same goods or services from all its trading partners — whether rich or poor, weak or strong.
Security Exception: Article 21 of GATT gives contracting parties 'Security Exceptions' which allows countries to take trade measures which are necessary to protect the security of the nation. Using this clause,
- India withdrew MFN status of Pakistan (Though Pakistan is a member of WTO)
- US withdrew MFN status to Russia (Though Russia is a member of WTO).