India’s Neighbours

Instability in Myanmar

Context: The article talks about the situation in Myanmar which has been under military rule for the last three years. The country today is challenged with violent conflicts between the political class, military regime, and ethnic organisations with no one emerging as a clear victor

The historic analysis of Myanmar’s social and political structure reveals that neither before nor during British colonial rule the task of nation-building was done wherein a unified polity where its Bamar majority and a mixture of ethnic and religious minorities could live peacefully.

Present contestation?

There is a power struggle going on between the two centres with political class and ethnic organisations on one side and military on the other.
The political class, represented by the unrecognised group called the National Unity Government (NUG), has defied the odds to assert itself through militia units called the People’s Defence Forces. The NUG has articulated its vision of a ‘federal democratic union’. However due to the regime's ruthless suppression, its leaders operate underground or from Thailand.
The ethnic armed organisations on the other hand have inflicted a heavy toll on the Myanmar military along the Thai border in the south-east and the Chinese border in the north-east. The victories secured at the end of 2023 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance comprising the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Arakan Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army shook the army. However the ethnic organisations remain divided as under different factions some oppose the army, some support it quietly, and some stay neutral.
The most powerful pillar of the power architecture Tatmadaw or the military has never faced such a dismal situation. Most citizenry is opposed to it, viewing it as a oppressor and harbinger of basic fundamental rights. Further within Army there is now considerable discontent within the military against its current leadership.
Lastly, various attempts by multilateral organisations like the United Nations, ASEAN, Japan, and Myanmar’s neighbours have been unable to move the country towards reconciliation. In particular, that the military has resiled from the ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus has dashed the region’s hopes for a settlement.

India’s interests, options

Implications of Myanmar’s Military Coup

Border security: Refugees fleeing military crackdown are entering Mizoram. This has led to disagreement between centre & Mizoram which supports refugees. Centre’s instruction of sealing border with Myanmar has irked ethnically and culturally connected communities on both sides. Ex – Chin community.
Strategic concern: India cannot upset the Myanmar junta by providing refuge to the officials fleeing military crackdown.
Containing China: Myanmar being crucial in containing China, India will have to take a calculated steps to not push Myanmar closer to China.
Insurgency: Several ethnic armed organisations are active within Myanmar. Being opposed to Junta, EAOs can lead to escalation in violence across the border.
Indian Investments: Instability would threaten India’s investments in Myanmar. Ex. Kaladan Project, Sittwe port, IMT trilateral Highway, Special economic zone in Rakhine.
Opportunity to reduce influence of China: Myanmar army has enjoyed a relatively strong relationship with India. It played a key role in handling the insurgency and Hot Pursuits of India. Su Kyi led democratic government was closer to China. China supported it on Rohingya crisis.
Drug trafficking: Drug production has shot up exponentially in Shan Province of Myanmar. The region was earlier large producers of heroine. However, currently it is world’s largest producer & exporter of meth (more potent & profitable). Most key individuals controlling the drug trade are pro-junta businessman as well as ethnic militia.

Way Forward for India:

Maintaining Cordial Relations: India's current policy of maintaining cordial relations with the government while supporting democracy is acknowledged as successful in strengthening bilateral ties. This approach recognizes the need for a balanced stance. The recommendation is to thus balance friendly ties with the military government while expanding engagement with other stakeholders which can be done via backchannel diplomacy which seeks to protect India's national interests.
Non-Interference in Internal Affairs: Emphasizing non-interference in Myanmar's internal affairs is crucial. This stance aligns with diplomatic principles and respects the sovereignty of nations, reinforcing the idea that India's engagement is based on mutual respect.
Communication with Resistance Components: Establishing communication links with certain components of the resistance, such as the Chin National Army, Arakan Army, and the National Unity Government (NUG), demonstrates an understanding of the evolving situation and the need for inclusive dialogue.
Message of Cessation of Violence: Conveying a strong message advocating the cessation of violence and the restoration of normalcy to both the government and the resistance reflects India's commitment to peace and stability in the region.
International Conclave: The proposal to convene a Peace Conclave involving senior officials from Quad member states and the ASEAN Troika reflects a multilateral approach. This platform could provide a space for dialogue and collaboration on addressing the Myanmar situation and also acknowledging India's support for the transition to a federal democracy
Focus on Aung San Suu Kyi: Highlighting the need for immediate freedom for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is a human rights and justice-oriented component in India's approach. This reinforces the importance of individual liberties in the broader diplomatic context.

Sheikh Hasina wins election in Bangladesh and India-Bangladesh Relations

Context: Sheikh Hasina was re-elected as the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. This win will ensure stability, continuity and common prosperity for India. Sheikh Hasina’s government has been friendly towards India.

Analysing India’s position and concerns in the scenario:

Ensuring security

India's keen interest in the potential return of Sheikh Hasina stems from her pivotal role in alleviating security concerns along the 4,100-km border.
Bangladesh is considered a strategic partner and a crucial ally for India, particularly concerning the security of its north-eastern states.
However, concerns loom over the potential return of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat-e-Islami, which could lead to a resurgence of Islamist influence.
Sheikh Hasina's actions against ethnic insurgent groups and her cooperation in regional connectivity play a crucial role in enhancing India's security interests.
Indian policymakers emphasize the necessity of a friendly regime in Dhaka to safeguard mutual interests.

Cultural and economic foundations

Bangladesh's economic ascendancy, surpassing Pakistan as the second-largest economy in South Asia, enhances India's economic interests. The two nations share deep economic ties, with Bangladesh being a significant export destination for Indian goods.
Dhaka relies on Delhi for essential commodities, and India has provided substantial financial support through a $7 billion Line of Credit for infrastructure and development projects.
However, challenges arise in India-sponsored projects, such as the Agartala-Akhaura rail link, due to gauge disparities, impacting seamless rail movement and connectivity to Chittagong port.
Countering China's influence
India's pursuit of road and river transport access through Bangladesh for its north-eastern states aims to reduce vulnerability in the ‘chicken's neck’ corridor. (The Siliguri Corridor, also known as the Chicken's Neck, is a narrow strip of land situated in West Bengal, linking India's northeastern states with the rest of the country. Spanning a mere 17 kilometers at its narrowest point, this corridor shares borders with Nepal, Bangladesh, and the Kingdom of Bhutan).

Geopolitically, having a friendly government in Dhaka becomes crucial for India to counterbalance China's growing influence in the region.
While maintaining relations with China, Bangladesh navigates a delicate balance between India and China, respecting India's security interests.

Regional hub aspirations

India envisions Bangladesh as a regional hub for cooperation in the Bay of Bengal, hosting BIMSTEC's secretariat and fostering ties with other countries like Japan.

Impact of US criticism

Historical distrust between Bangladesh and the US, rooted in the 1971 conflict, has influenced diplomatic relations.
Interactions between Hasina and the Biden Administration suggest a potential shift in US policy, acknowledging India's interests in Bangladesh, which could positively impact India's stance in the region.

Fair and non-violent elections

India emphasizes the importance of a fair and non-violent election process in Bangladesh, hoping Sheikh Hasina's leadership will ensure stability and prevent external critics from undermining the nation's positive image.
However, the opposition, particularly the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), expresses distrust in the election process and claims India’s influence and demands a neutral interim government, leading to heightened tensions.

Public sentiment

Despite India's clear preference for Sheikh Hasina's leadership aligning with its interests, bridging the gap with the people of Bangladesh remains a challenge.
The complex dynamics require a delicate balance between strategic considerations and addressing the concerns and sentiments of the Bangladeshi populace.

A balanced approach that considers historical, religious, and political dimensions while investing in future relationships beyond individual leaders is vital for India's long-term interests in the region.

India – Bangladesh Relations:

Indian foreign policy towards its neighbours is based on one main imperative: New Delhi wishes its neighbours to keep Indian interests in mind when determining their domestic and external policies.

There is no country integrated more closely with India than Bangladesh in respect of language, ethnicity, and culture. The key difference is Islam, and it is this factor that drives the relationship to an unusual degree.

Security and Border management

India and Bangladesh share 4096.7 km. of border, which is the longest land boundary that India shares with any of its neighbours.
India-Bangladesh Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) came into force in 2015 under which enclaves of India and Bangladesh in each other’s countries were exchanged and strip maps were signed.
Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP) signed in 2011 aims to synergize efforts of both Border Guarding Forces for checking cross border illegal activities and crimes as well as for maintenance of peace and tranquility along India-Bangladesh border.
Both sides recognize that terrorism remains a threat to global peace and security and have reiterated their strong commitment to eliminating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.
Security in Northeast States: Bangladesh cooperated with India in sorting out security issues in the Northeast. Bangladesh handed over leaders and shut down their training camps.

Ranjan Daimary: founder-chief of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
Anup Chetia of United Liberation Front of Assam ULFA.

Trade Partnership

Bangladesh is India’s largest trading partner in South Asia.
The bilateral trade between the two-countries has jumped to USD 18.2 billion in 2021-22 as compared to USD 10.8 billion in 2020-21.
Between 2009-10 and 2015-16, the trade deficit grew in India’s favour at a staggering 164.4%. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from India to Bangladesh is $3.11 billion.
India has extended 3 Lines of Credits to Bangladesh in the last 7 years amounting to US$ 8 billion. This makes Bangladesh the largest recipient of LOC funds from India till date.
Duty free and Quota free access has been given to Bangladeshi exports to India under SAFTA since 2011.
Both countries are working on a bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA).

Connectivity

Both jointly inaugurated, newly restored railway links between Haldibari (India) & Chilahati (Bangladesh). This rail link will further strengthen trade and people to people ties between the two sides.
To facilitate better connectivity, simplify movement of passengers and goods, both countries agreed to an early operationalization of BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal) Motor Vehicles Agreement through signing of Enabling MoU for Bangladesh, India and Nepal to commence movement of goods and passengers, with provision for Bhutan to join later.
Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade (PIWTT) was signed (Sonamura-Daudkandi on river Gomti and extension of Dhulia to Godagiri up to Aricha on river Padma) and five new ports of call and two extended ports of call.

Cooperation in Water, Power & Energy

Bangladesh wants early signing of an interim agreement for sharing of the Teesta waters, as agreed upon by both the governments in 2011.
Need for early conclusion of Framework of Interim Agreement on sharing of waters of six joint rivers, namely, Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Gumti, Dharla and Dudhkumar.
Expedite implementation of projects including India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline, Maitree Super Thermal Power Project as well as other projects.

Regional and Global Partnership

Both countries agreed to continue working together towards achieving early reforms of the UN Security Council, combating climate change, attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and protection of the rights of migrants.
Both reaffirmed the need for developed countries to fulfil their commitments under the Global Partnership for ensuring the means of implementation of the SDGs as enshrined in the Agenda 2030.
Bangladesh appreciated the work of the New Development Bank and thanked India for inviting Bangladesh to join the Institution.

Challenges in India Bangladesh Relations

Although Economic relations are expanding every day, in India’s Consolidated FDI policy 2017, Bangladesh is put in the same category as Pakistan.
Under which a citizen of Bangladesh/Pakistan or an entity incorporated in Bangladesh/Pakistan can invest only under the Government route.

Despite India-Bangladesh Coordinated Border Management Plan, 294 Bangladeshi Nationals have been killed along the border since 2010.
Teesta water agreement which was agreed to in 2011 is yet to be signed because of various contentious issues that remain.
The Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) and National Register of Citizens (NRC) have created a negative impression in Bangladesh of India’s intent.
Bangladesh is China’s second-largest arms export destination.
Chinese firms have been outbidding their Indian counterparts in infrastructure projects.

Way forward:

Efforts should be intensified to reach a timely consensus on delineating the Teesta river water-sharing arrangement, fostering mutual understanding between India and Bangladesh.
Strengthening cooperation in coastal connectivity, as well as improving road, rail, and inland waterways, is crucial for fostering closer ties and facilitating smoother movement between the two nations.
Fast-tracking the construction of the Friendship Pipeline, which facilitates the efficient transportation of high-speed diesel from India to Northern Bangladesh, is imperative for boosting economic collaboration.
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) Negotiations: Redirecting attention to ongoing CEPA negotiations since 2018 is pivotal for reinforcing economic relations between India and Bangladesh, fostering a more robust and mutually beneficial partnership.

Shutdown of the Afghan embassy in India

Context: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan announced the closure of its Embassy in Delhi.

More about the news:

The embassy was representing the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan which had been deposed by the Taliban in August 2021.
After the displacement of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the embassy was working as a “stateless mission” as it did not represent the current Taliban regime, with whom India has no diplomatic relationship.
India has maintained a “technical team”, which provides visas to Afghan traders and travellers to India. India is also sending humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people.

India’s Informal engagement with Taliban regime in Afghanistan

Currently, no country has formally recognised the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However, China has a full-fledged ambassador in Afghanistan. Other countries like Iran, Pakistan, Russia, UAE, Qatar and China also have deeper relations with the Afghan regime. This puts pressure on India to have relations with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
India has not formally recognised the current Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) due to the poor human rights record of the Taliban government especially their treatment of women and the Taliban government being non-inclusive.
Despite the closure of the embassy and non-recognition of the Taliban regime by India, India has continued to engage with the Taliban regime in Afghanistan using a ‘technical team’ in Kabul. This technical team provides visas to Afghan traders and travellers to India.
Currently, two weekly flights carry Afghan citizens and goods to India. India uses these flights to send humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people.
Indian goods are also sent to Afghanistan through other countries like Iran and UAE.
Indian diplomats have met the Taliban’s representative in multiple locations under multilateral initiatives like the recently concluded Moscow Format in September 2023.
The Taliban regime is also urging India to support it with its economic revitalisation through projects like electricity generation, and road construction.

India’s concerns with Taliban ruled Afghanistan

Support for Terrorism by Taliban regime
Support for poppy cultivation and promotion of narco-terrorism by Taliban
Close relations between Taliban and Pakistan army which can be harnessed by Pakistan to use Taliban as a safe haven for anti-Indian activity.
Poor human rights record especially regressive treatment of women.
Non-inclusive nature of Taliban regime which is dominated by certain Pashtun tribes and does not represent the entire Afghan community.

Importance of cultivating relations with Taliban regime

Safeguard India’s interests with Taliban regime
Location of Afghanistan as a crossroad for India’s engagement with Central Asian Republics
Ensuring India’s energy security as India can import gas through TAPI Pipeline via Afghanistan.
Controlling terrorism in India and the wider neighbourhood.
Good image of India among the common Afghan citizens can help India build quick relations with the Taliban.
Limiting Pakistan’s control over Afghanistan necessitates India to have engagement and closer relations with the Taliban.

Conclusion:

India is considering realpolitik to initiate any engagement with the Taliban, however, the deep-seated principles and relations with the region’s countries, bring ambiguity in its policy towards the new regime in Afghanistan, which is also impacting India’s interests.
A major challenge remains the Taliban’s adherence to Sharia law and severe restrictions around the movement of women.
Two factors can influence the Indian government’s future approach.
- Strong people-to-people ties: India has benefited from its ties with Afghan elites and there exists considerable goodwill towards India among Afghan citizens.
- Humanitarian assistance: Given the Taliban’s appeal for better ties, the Indian government can leverage its position through aid and assistance.

Maldives elects Mohamed Muizzu as President

Context: Maldives has elected Mohamed Muizzu as President of Maldives. He will replace Ibrahim Solih as the President of Maldives. Mohamed Muizzu is seen as pro-China and has promised to remove Indian military personnel stationed in the country.

About Mohamed Muizzu

Mohamed Muizzu belongs to Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM), the same party to which Abdulla Yameen belonged. He was earlier the Housing and Urban Development minister under the Presidency of Abdulla Yameen.
Abdulla Yameen had close ties with China. President Muizzu is seen as a proxy for Abdulla Gayoom who pursued a pro-China tilt in his foreign policy and launched an ‘India-Out’ campaign.
Mohamed Muizzu has indicated to continue with the India-Out campaign of Gayoom, calling for removal of India’s military personnel stationed in Maldives.
The incumbent President Ibrahim Solih pursued an India-First Policy resulting in greater cooperation between India and Maldives over projects like Greater Male Connectivity Project, Security Cooperation and India’s assistance to Maldives during COVID-19 pandemic.

Concerns over the election of Pro-China President Muizzu of Maldives

Concerns over India’s defence and security partnership: The stance taken by President Muizzu to remove the presence of military personnel from Maldives. These moves seem to be a continuation of earlier policies pursued by President Yameen when Indian Navy helicopters and personnel were requested to be removed from Maldives.
Increasing China's influence in Indian Ocean Region: The strategic location of Maldives near the International Sea lanes makes Maldives critical for China’s economic and energy security. To gain an increasing influence in Maldives, China has been courting Maldives as part of its Maritime Silk Route project of the larger Belt & Road Initiative.
- China’s infrastructure projects in Maldives: China has been heavily investing in physical and social infrastructure in Maldives by financing important projects like China-Maldives Friendship Bridge, Housing units and expansion of Velana International Airport.
- Free-Trade Agreement with China: President Abdulla Yameen signed the Free Trade Agreement with Maldives in 2017 to enhance trade and Maldivian marine exports to China. However, this agreement was not ratified by President Ibrahim Solih feared China will leverage its economic power to commercially dominate Maldives and pursue its geopolitical objectives. Ex. Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. President Muizzu is expected to ratify the FTA with China.
- China’s weaponisation of economic relations: China debt to Maldives accounts for one-fifth of Maldivian GDP and China has become a critical source of tourists to Maldives, which is critical for Maldivian economy.

Way forward for India

Leveraging India’s strengths: India enjoys proximity, convergent security interests and deep cultural ties with Maldives. India has been the first responder to any crises in Maldives. Chinese has no diaspora or no military presence in Maldives as compared to India. Thus, the geographic and cultural connect that India enjoys with Maldives is hard for China to overcome.
Prompt delivery of infrastructure projects: Slow progress on India backed India projects such as Greater Male Connectivity Project, this has increased attractiveness of China’s projects in Maldives. India needs to build on prompt delivery of India’s infrastructure projects to make it attractive for countries to have deeper relations with India.
Highlight China’s policies: India should highlight Chinese designs of using its commercial and business ties to pursue its geopolitical agenda. Chinese debt trap diplomacy and designs to accommodate Maldives in its ‘Strings of Pearls’ strategy for countering India. Thus, India should continue to assist Maldives to make its economy more resilient.
Pursue multiparty democratic engagement: India must not take sides in the domestic politics of neighbouring countries and pursue broader ties with all voices

Harami Nala: The rogue or treacherous channel Between India and Pakistan

Context: Union home minister visited Harami Nala (rogue or treacherous channel) in the Sir Creek sector of Kutch region of Gujarat, near the India-Pakistan border.

About Harami Nala

It is a natural water body, approximately 25 kilometers long, flowing from west to east from Pakistan into Kutch, just south of Vighakot sector. It is flanked by vast marshy mud flats affected by low and high tides.
About 22 kilometers of the channel lie on the Indian side of "vertical line" of the International Boundary (IB) between India and Pakistan, which itself is not contested. A portion of Rajasthan's Barmar district also touches this area.
It is extremely rich in fishing, especially prawns.
The formidable marshy terrain through which it runs makes it impossible to approach or patrol on foot, even during low tide.
There are dangerous tides, muddy areas, and mirages, and it also gets extremely hot in the summer, with temperatures exceeding 50 degrees Celsius.
It is one of the most inhospitable places along the border and has also been at the center of cross-border mischief and exploitation by infiltrators.
The water body has some unique characteristics. Tidal waters surge from the Pakistani side, and over the years, the channel has extended further on the Indian side.
On the Pakistani side, there's a wall called Chini-Bandh, built with assistance from China, to prevent ocean water from flooding their side. On the Indian side, there is a significant distance from the IB where factories have emerged to produce salt, bromide, and other chemicals carried by mineral-rich waters.
The channel's proximity to the coast and urban centers like Gujarat and Mumbai has made it an attractive route for potential infiltrators.

Collaboration over Indus Water Treaty

Context: The Indus Waters Treaty (1960), or IWT, that regulates the Indus water courses between the two riparian states of India and Pakistan, is cited by many as an example of cooperation between two unfriendly neighbours for many reasons.

Recent Development:

In the recent times exercising judicial recourse to settle the competing claims and objections arising out of the construction and design elements of the run-of-river hydroelectric projects that India is permitted under the IWT to construct on the tributaries of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab before these rivers flow into Pakistan, has increased.
Pakistan initiated arbitration at the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration to address the interpretation and application of the IWT to certain design elements of two run-of-river hydroelectric projects — on the Kishanganga (a tributary of the Jhelum) and Ratle, a hydro-electric project on the Chenab.
India raised objections as it views that the Court of Arbitration is not competent to consider the questions put to it by Pakistan and that such questions should instead be decided through the neutral expert process.
The court unanimously passed a decision (which is binding on both parties without appeal) rejecting each of India’s objections. The court determined that it is competent to consider and determine the disputes set forth in Pakistan’s request for arbitration.

Issues in Indus Water Treaty

Prevents Storage: It prevents storage projects by India that was even highlighted by Parliamentary committee.
Technical: The treaty is highly technical in nature which leads to different interpretations among the countries.
Political Mistrust: There is high-level of political mistrust between India and Pakistan which has historical underpinnings.
Underutilization: The parliamentary committee has also opined that India has underutilized water of western rivers for irrigation purpose though being legally permissible under the treaty
Data Sharing: There is absence of data sharing mechanism within the treaty.
Emerging issues: The treaty was signed in 1960 and is limited to river management and usage and thus does not incorporate contemporary issues like climate change, global warming and Environmental Impact assessment under its ambit.
Limited role of World bank: World Bank though a guarantor relies on the reports that are submitted by respective countries and thus has no independent way to ensure what actually is the issue.

Way Forward:

Internationalizing India’s position: India has only utilized 93% of the storage capacity under the treaty and 25% of water generation capacity which highlights India’s credential as generous upper riparian state.
Renegotiation of Treaty: To accommodate for climate challenges and other emerging issues.
Seeking Cooperation: The provisions of the treaty provides scope for joint studies and joint research and this can be utilized to ensure cooperation between countries.
Relationality over rationality: The focus should be on relationality i.e. benefit sharing rather than just restricting the goals to water sharing as it will give due importance to minor issues like soil erosion, water quality etc.
Changing approach: There is a need to change approach from and focus on sub-basin level, which will not only make use of existing hydrology mechanism but also the socio-economic impact of the same.
Contemporary laws: Both India and Pakistan can make active use of contemporary laws like “Helsinki Rule”, which provides for the International guideline asserting rights for all bordering nations to have equitable share in water resource.
Reconciling this divergent approach: Which can be sought with the help of two cardinal principles of international water courses law accompanying binding obligations, i.e., equitable and reasonable utilisation (ERU) and the principle not to cause significant harm or no harm rule (NHR). In order to ensure rapid development, the state’s (India and Pakistan) needs prioritise the ERU over the NHR.

New Visa Policy of The USA to Restrict Bangladeshis and its Impact on India

Context: The U.S. announced a new visa policy to support Bangladesh’s goal of holding free, fair, and peaceful national elections.

About New Visa Policy

The new visa policy threatens to restrict visas to Bangladeshis who undermine the democratic election process at home.
The restriction would apply to current and former Bangladeshi officials, members of pro-government and opposition political parties, and members of law enforcement, the judiciary, and security services.

Reason for the formulation of the US’s new policy

Because of the authoritarian style of functioning of Bangladesh’s Prime Minister. For example:

Digital Security Act 2018 as a threat to freedom of expression. The space for dissent and criticism has shrunk visibly in Bangladesh
Banned the Jamaat-e-Islami as a political party, and set up a court that convicted many of its members for collaborating with the Pakistan Army in 1971 and sentenced several to life terms in prison or death.

Reaction of Bangladesh

Government: US was seeking regime change in Bangladesh and demands such visa policy should not be applied arbitrarily in a non-objective manner.
Opposition: They said the policy will play a supporting role in holding the next polls in a fair and credible manner.

Consequences of this policy

The U.S. is the largest foreign direct investor in Bangladesh followed by Japan and China.
The U.S. is the third largest trading partner of Bangladesh and is the largest recipient of the garments produced in Bangladesh.
A Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) status with the US and Europe for its readymade garment exports is crucial when Bangladesh graduates out of the least developed country category in 2026. Dhaka is lobbying hard for this.
With China taking a keen interest in Bangladesh, the U.S. feels the need to look beyond trade ties. The importance of the Indo-Pacific strategy also makes Bangladesh politically indispensable for the U.S.

Impact on India

Over the last few years, the US and India were seen as acting in tandem in Bangladesh, especially as their security objectives converged. The visa policy is a sign that this may be changing.
The post-Afghanistan US, with new priorities, seems more open than India to political change in Dhaka.
The US position on the Bangladesh elections could complicate India’s diplomacy in Bangladesh as India prefers the present government as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), links to Islamist parties and is born with anti-India sentiment.

India’s Stand

India has not responded to the visa restrictions despite the fact that Bangladesh is the largest trade and security partner of India in South Asia.

Importance of Bangladesh to India:

The Prime Minister of Bangladesh has uprooted insurgents of northeast India who had maintained a base in Bangladesh for decades.
Signed land transit rights to the North-eastern states,
Signed a favourable coal power deal with an Indian company.

Visit of Nepal's PM to India

Context: During Nepal’s PM visit to India, both countries signed series of agreements to strengthen their bilateral relations.

Outcomes of the visit:

A Transit Agreement signed between two countries, which will help Nepal’s population to access India’s inland waterways.
A long-term Power Trade Agreement has signed to take forward India – Nepal vision document for cooperation 2022. Under this, target has been set for import of 10,000 MW of electricity from Nepal.
A proposal to build new pipeline from Siliguri to Jhapa in easter Nepal.
A MoU is signed for the development of Phukot Karnali Hydroelectric Project.
Both countries agreed to achieve the time bound progress on the Pancheshwar multipurpose project.
Both Prime Minister’s participated in a ceremony of Gorakhpur – Bhutwal Transmission line.
Inauguration of cargo train from Bathnaha in India to Nepal Customs Yard.
Two integrated check posts (ICPs) have been inaugurated at Nepalgunj in Nepal and Rupaidhia on India side.
Both countries calls for fast track completion of projects related to Ramayana Circuit.

India Nepal Relations background:

India and Nepal share close and friendly relations characterized by age-old historical and cultural linkages, open border and deep-rooted people-to-people contacts. The multifaceted relations between the two countries have been given a renewed momentum in the last few years through intensified high-level political exchanges, regular meetings of bilateral mechanisms across diverse sectors of cooperation, expanding economic and development partnership, boosting connectivity and cooperative initiatives in water resources and hydro-power sectors, defense and security. The India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950 forms the bedrock of the special relations that exist between India and Nepal. Nepalese citizens avail facilities and opportunities on par with Indian citizens in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Nearly 8 million Nepalese citizens live and work in India.

Areas of Cooperation:

Defence Cooperation: India and Nepal have a significant defense cooperation, with India assisting the modernization of the Nepal Army through equipment supply and training. Nepal Army personnel attend training courses in Indian Army institutions. The Indian Embassy in Kathmandu facilitates pension disbursement and welfare programs for ex-Gorkha soldiers and their families. They also conduct joint military exercises like Surya Kiran.
Connectivity & Development Partnership: India provides comprehensive development assistance to Nepal, with a focus on grassroots infrastructure, health, water resources, education, and rural development. Additionally, India has extended Lines of Credit worth USD 1.65 billion for infrastructure projects and launched the "India-Nepal New Partnership in Agriculture" for collaborative projects in agricultural research and development.
Water resources Cooperation: Water resources cooperation, particularly regarding shared rivers, is a crucial aspect of India-Nepal relations. Numerous rivers flow from Nepal to India, forming a significant part of the Ganges river basins. These rivers hold the potential for irrigation and power generation. A three-tier bilateral mechanism established in 2008 effectively addresses water resource-related issues, flood management, inundation, and hydropower cooperation between the two countries.
Energy Cooperation: India and Nepal have a Power Exchange Agreement since 1971, utilizing each other's transmission infrastructure for power supply in border areas. Several transmission interconnections enable power exchange and trade. High-capacity cross-border transmission lines and agreements facilitate enhanced electricity transmission and grid connectivity. Additionally, South Asia's first cross-border petroleum products pipeline was inaugurated in 2019, connecting Motihari in India to Amlekhgunj in Nepal.
Economic Cooperation: India is Nepal's largest trading partner, with bilateral trade more than $8.5 billion. Nepal mainly exports petroleum products, vehicles, and agricultural products to India, while importing items such as petroleum, machinery, medicine, and electrical equipment. Indian firms contribute over 30% of Nepal's foreign direct investment and operate in sectors like manufacturing, banking, insurance, power, and tourism.
Education: India offers approximately 3,000 scholarships each year to Nepalese students for various academic levels and disciplines, both in India and Nepal, including fields like engineering, medicine, agriculture, and fine arts.
Cultural Cooperation: Both countries have signed several agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) in fields such as literature, broadcasting, journalism, fine arts, youth affairs, and twinning of sister cities. Additionally, India is establishing an e-library system in Nepal. The Swami Vivekananda Centre for Indian Culture and the Nepal-Bharat Library are notable institutions promoting Indian culture in Nepal.

Issues between two India & Nepal:

SLOW PROGRESS ON DEVELOPMENTAL PROJECT:

There has been no progress on the 5000 MW Pancheshwar multipurpose project on Mahakali River because of Nepal's reluctance.
Progress has also not been witnessed on the dam on Kosi River which would prevent flooding in both India and Nepal because of lack of willingness on the part of Nepal.
India announced Rupees 100 crore grant for the development of Janakpur in 2018, but no proposal has been received from the Nepalese side.

BORDER ISSUE:

Nepal’s parliament gave approval to second constitutional amendment which gave legal status to the new political map of Nepal and its boundaries with India near the Lipu-Lekh pass.
For Nepal, the Kali River originates from Limpiyadhura in the higher Himalayas, giving it access to a triangular-shaped land defined by Limpiyadhura-Lipulekh and Kalapani. (Originating from Treaty of Sugauli, (1814).

TILT TOWARDS CHINA:

Nepal shares a border of 1400 km with China in the Tibet region. China is Nepal's second largest trading partner. It has undertaken various projects including the development of airports, hydropower etc.
Nepal has been using the China card in its dealing with India under the pretext of balancing its relation between the two big neighbors.
With increasing economic influence of China, Nepal does not want to be left out of this success story. It signed a MoU with China on the BRI in 2017.
China has also started to intrude in the affairs of Nepal Army by providing training and supply of equipment. This is one of the biggest causes of concern for India because of Indian army's links with the Nepal army.
China is leveraging ties with the Maoist parties of Nepal and occasionally using the cheque book diplomacy to increase its influence.

Way Forward

Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950 should be replaced with a more balanced and democratic treaty.
A regulatory regime needs to be introduced by making people produce identity cards while crossing over to either side.
Jointly tackling common challenges in areas of combating terrorism, extremism and all kinds of trafficking.
Our engagement with Nepal must find a prominent place for Nepali citizens who are our immediate neighbors. The engagement should not just be limited to the political elites.
India needs to appreciate that the people-to-people links between our two countries have an unmatched density and no other country, including China, enjoys this asset.
To counter the Chinese influence, India needs to speed up unfinished projects that India has committed and create conditions of mutual trust which makes it difficult for China to leverage any dispute that arises in future.
India needs to understand that the Nascent Nepalese democracy will assert independence in its Foreign Policy. But it important for India to create conditions which makes it a go to country for Nepal in times of need.
India also needs to work on its perception in the hill population of Nepal.

Buddhism, India’s soft power projection tool

Context: There is much significance to India having hosted a two-day global Buddhist summit in New Delhi (April 20-21), which was organised by the Ministry of Culture in collaboration with the International Buddhist Confederation. The summit saw the participation of key figures from the global Buddhist community, including the Dalai Lama. The summit was a significant opportunity for India to project and connect with the Buddhist population around the world, thereby strengthening the country’s soft power.

Use of Buddhism as a soft power tool:

With its strong historical and cultural ties to Buddhism, India is well-positioned to play a leading role in shaping the discourse around Buddhist issues on the global stage.

The Indian government has been actively investing in its Buddhist diplomacy efforts, with a focus on promoting tourism through the development of the “Buddhist tourist circuit”. Additionally, India under PM Modi has made it a point to visit Buddhist sites during his Southeast and East Asian visits. By hosting such a high-profile event, the Indian government hopes to demonstrate its commitment to preserving and promoting Buddhist culture and heritage, as well as strengthening ties with the global Buddhist community
Further India’s efforts to position itself as a great power is committed to cooperation rather than coercion and are rooted in its deep historical and cultural ties to the region. The current government’s guiding principles for foreign policy, Panchamrit principles include “Sanskriti Evam Sabhyata” which means cultural and civilizational links, which were highlighted during the Delhi summit
India hopes to reinforce its image as a responsible global power committed to peaceful cooperation and regional stability. By laying an emphasis on cultural and civilisational ties, India seeks to promote greater understanding and cooperation between nations and to demonstrate the unique role it can play in shaping the region’s future.

What can be done further?

India needs to utilise the reach of Bollywood in promoting its Buddhist heritage. China, with its influence over Hollywood, has completely dominated the narrative around Buddhism through cinema. In contrast, India is behind in this domain; there have not been any efforts made through cinema.
India’s G-20 presidency this year could be used to promote Buddhist diplomacy on a bigger scale through various cultural meetings, especially as Buddhist teachings align with the motto of India’s G-20 presidency, ‘One Earth, One Family, One Future’

As Buddha was the first diplomat of peace, his teachings of peace and cooperation in these tough times can become the guiding light of Indian diplomacy on the world stage.

ABOUT SOFT-POWER

DEFINITION: The American political theorist Joseph Nye, who coined the term Soft power, defines it as ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than

coercion.’ Indian External Affairs ministry has also defined the term soft power as ability to influence others through appeal and attraction, using non-coercive means.

INDIAN EFFORTS

India has been exercising a range of soft power resources which have widespread global appeal. These include Indian arts, dances and literature, cuisine, yoga and traditional holistic medicine, Indian cinema and entertainment and sports, historical monuments, India’s democracy, its Constitution, its unity in diversity and its composite cultural ethos, traditional values, unique approaches to contemporary issues such as climate change and environmental preservation, scientific and technological accomplishments and socio economic innovation.

METHODS UNDERTAKEN BY INDIA

Role of Culture: India has a rich culture and cultural diplomacy is its expression abroad to foreign audiences in order to facilitate/create long term international influence.
Role of Diaspora: India has a large Diaspora in the world with over 31 million including over 13 million NRIs and 18 million PIOs spread across the globe. The presence of an extensive and vibrant Indian Diaspora abroad with their growing political and economic profile has emerged as a unique soft power asset of the country.
The Indian Diaspora has emerged as a major partner in promotion of cultural diplomacy in their respective countries. Enumerating the steps taken to engage the extensive network of Indian Diaspora in furthering India's foreign policy and long term interests, various programmes and has taken several steps from time to time to engage with Indian Diaspora for example Know India Programme, Pravasi Teerth Darshan Yojana, Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Children, Bharat Ko Janiye Quiz, Promotion of Cultural Ties with Diaspora, Pravasi Bharatiya Divas among others.
Role of Tourism: The Committee are aware that tourism is a key indicator of a country’s soft power capital. Religious tourism and medical tourism have emerged as areas with immense tourism potential. As an ancient civilization and a land of many religions, India has been cashing on this potential.
Efforts that are being taken: India’s Buddhist Circuit/ Pilgrimage and attract foreign tourist to Buddhist sites in India, the International Buddhist Conclave (IBC) is being organized regularly by the Government. To promote tourism, various efforts have also been made viz, launching of the ‘Incredible India’ campaign Under the Champion Sector Scheme, Marketing & Promotion for Buddhist circuits in overseas markets shall be taken up are some of the schemes that are being undertaken.

Role of Parliamentary Democracy: India’s vibrant parliamentary democracy, multi-party-political system and orderly change of Government through regular peaceful elections have significantly enhanced India’s standing and profile globally. India is held in great esteem worldwide as the world’s largest democracy.
Role of Yoga: Yoga is the ancient Indian practice of physical and mental well-being. The Committee are pleased to note that The United Nations General Assembly declared 21st June as the International Day of Yoga (IDY). The Ministry of AYUSH is the nodal Ministry for International Day of Yoga celebrations and has been celebrating IDY since last five years at national as well as at international level.
ICCR has established the Indo-Turkmenistan Centre for Yoga and Traditional Medicine in Ashgabat and the India- China Yoga College at Yunnan Minzu University, China.
Role of Media and Cinema: The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting through Prasar Bharati, External Services Division of All India Radio, Film Facilitation Office, etc have been playing a prominent role in the projection of India’s soft power and cultural diplomacy. Hindi film industry, popularly known as Bollywood, has emerged as one of the most notable examples of global entertainment emanating from outside the Western world. The Committee are of the strong view that added emphasis needs to be given to the global imprint of our Cinema as an instrument of soft power while taking effective steps to celebrate and popularize our movies abroad, including regional cinema.

CHALLENGES

The Ministry of External Affairs has highlighted four key factors inhibiting effective conduct of India’s soft power and cultural diplomacy

Inadequate budgetary allocation: Non-availability of adequate finances is one of the factors derailing the effective facilitation of India’s soft power projection. Soft power capabilities require capital, both human as well as financial to be effective. A cursory glance at the budgetary allocation to India’s ICCR and Confucius Institutes of China or UKS’s British Council or Germany’s Goethe Institute is testimony to the hurdles in our institutional efficacy
Lack of coordination among multiple institution: There is a need for greater coordination and consultation among multiple institutions, both in the government and private sector, engaged in conduct of cultural and soft power projection. Currently, there is duplication of efforts and resources due to overlapping mandates of several ministries and agencies.
Shortage of skilled manpower: Shortage of skilled, motivated manpower in the Headquarters as well as in Indian Missions/Posts abroad who have the requisite enthusiasm and interest in cultural work.
Lack of clarity about the mandate of ICCR: While ICCR was established some 71 years ago, global situation has witnessed several drastic changes thereafter. Hence, an institutional device conceived some seven decades back needs a relook in the context of its organizational set functionality and efficacy. The Committee recommend that the Ministry should appoint a Study Group firstly to assess the working of ICCR in comparison to British Council, the American Centre and the Confucius Institute etc and later suggest ways to further strengthen ICCR

SOLUTIONS

The Committee, therefore, recommend that MEA should conduct a thorough assessment of our soft power potential and devise strategies for optimum utilization of the same in achieving India’s foreign policy objectives on priority basis and apprise the Committee accordingly.
The Committee recommend that the MEA should capitalize in multilateral diplomacy channels and abundantly incorporate Track 2 and Track 3 diplomacy in India’s foreign policy strategies.
The Committee therefore recommend that the Ministry should take urgent steps firstly to evolve and later adopt National Policy on Cultural Relationship Development across the countries or National Soft Power Policy.
The Committee, therefore, recommend that the Government should increase ICCR’s budgetary allocation by at least 20% than what is being provisioned as of now.
In view of the urgent need for greater synergy and coordination among the various Ministries/ Departments /agencies involved in India’s soft power and cultural diplomacy, the Committee recommend that the Coordination Committee may be constituted at the earliest.

The Committee, feels that a study could establish the linkages between our soft power and tangible outcomes in the field of diplomacy and hence they fail to comprehend the glaring delay in developing India’s Soft Power Matrix and thus recommends Ministry should have objective metrics for evaluating soft power outcomes through a ‘Soft Power Matrix’ at the earliest.

Rajnath, Maldives minister launch Delhi-assisted harbour construction.

Context: India and Maldives marked a major step in their growing defence cooperation by launching construction of a harbour for the Coast Guard of the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF).

The UTF Harbour Project, as it is called, is among the biggest Indian grant-in-aid projects in Maldives. Previously in 2020, India had gifted a Dornier aircraft to Maldives and in 2019 handed over a patrol vessel.
The handing over of these vessels are in line with India’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) that seeks to work together with and jointly develop the capabilities of friends and partners for a safe, secure, prosperous and stable Indian Ocean Region
Further there is a need to explore additional avenues for cooperation, including in areas of defence trade, capacity building and joint exercises, according to the statement.
There is also a need to promote people-to-people contact and exchanges between armed forces of the two countries and reaffirmed the importance of maintaining peace, stability and security in the region and recognised the need to work together to address common security challenges.

In the light of these recent developments, we will look at the relationship between India and Maldives.

Importance of Maldives for India

The geostrategic importance of the nearly 1,200 islands of the Maldives as a “most important interstate,” underlines the importance for New Delhi of positive bilateral relations with Male.
At present, India is dependent on oil for more than 90 percent of its energy needs, and over the next few decades, 90 percent of that oil will come from the Persian Gulf by way of the Arabian Sea.
Coal imports from Mozambique, are set to increase, augmenting the coal that India already imports from around the Indian Ocean from countries such as South Africa, Indonesia, and Australia.
Beyond refuelling stations, by maintaining access to these ports, the expanding Indian Navy can safeguard its interests by providing security for the sea lines of communication, ensuring vital resources reach India’s coast and thus emerge as a net security provider.
Moreover, such access provides strategic depth in any potential conflict with China, wherein India could attempt to restrict the flow of oil through the Indian Ocean to the Malacca Strait.
Maldives is a member of SAARC and thus is important for India to keep Maldives on board to maintain its leadership in the region and is also part of India backed Colombo security conclave ( Sri Lanka Indian and Mauritius being other members)
There are about 29,000 Indians in the country and almost 22,000 of them live in Male, the capital and also Indian tourists account for more than 23% of total tourist arrivals in the Maldives.
India is also a preferred destination of Maldivians for medical treatment, education and business

Indian Assistance to Maldives

Operation Cactus: In 1988, when armed mercenaries attempted a coup against President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, India sent paratroopers & Navy vessels and restored legitimate regime under Operation Cactus.
2004 Tsunami: India had aided Maldives and had also supported it during the drinking water crisis in 2014
COVID-19: India rushed $250 million aid in quick time, India has also rushed medical supplies to the Maldives, started a new cargo ferry. Maldives was the first beneficiary under India’s vaccine Maitri initiative
Two sea ambulances to the Maldives Defence Ministry
Infrastructure projects:

(a) Greater Male Connectivity project: An infrastructure project in Maldives, connecting Male (capital) with three neighbouring islands through construction of a bridge-and-causeway link. This project was a part of $400 million line of credit will lead to cutting down logistics cost and drive people- centric economic growth.

(b) An international airport being developed by India at Hanimadhoo in HaaaDahaalu atoll. The $ 136.6-million development of the airport at Hanimadhoo has been financed by a line of credit to the Maldives from India’s Exim Bank

(c)Housing: India is financing 4,000 social housing units and community centre in Foakaidhoo island

(d) Further a proposed collaboration between Cochin University and the Maldives National University, and a $100 million grant for “high impact community development” projects.

Concerns in India – Maldives Relationship

Enhanced Chinese Presence: Maldives signed its first country-specific FTA with China in 2017 and became China’s 2nd FTA in South Asia after Pakistan. It raised concerns that it will deepen debt trap to China, as more than 70% of Maldives’ foreign debt is owed to China. There has growing trend of Chinese companies acquiring land in Maldives. This land grab has raised concern of Maldives being increasingly falling into an economic neo-colonial influence of China. However President Solih has affirmed that Maldives will scrap FTA with China and investigate Chinese land grab in Maldives. The Maldives has also agreed to become a partner in China's maritime silk route.
President Yameen Hangover: President Yameen had earlier declared an emergency in Maldives and halted the functioning of Maldives Parliament (Majlis) and arrested several opposition leaders. This was opposed by India and several other countries. Apart from this, President Yameen augmented relations with China without taking India into confidence. This led India-Maldives relations to decline
Previous President Yameen launched an ‘India Out’ campaign against India’s developmental funding for creating physical, social & community infrastructure. There have been protests for early release of Mr. Yameen — sentenced to five years of imprisonment in a money laundering case, pending appeal.
Growing Radicalization: There is a growing presence of ISIS/Daesh in Maldives and has been seen with growing influence of Saudi philosophy of Wahhabis.
New Consulate in Addu: Recently India approved Opening of a New Consulate General of India in Addu City, Maldives. But Maldivian government has not made any decision regarding it. This came in the backdrop of ongoing #saveAddu social media campaign by a section of Maldivians, who are sceptical of India’s presence in Addu atoll.
Helicopter Issue: India had gifted Maldives two Advanced Light helicopters in 2013 operated by Indian Coast Guard & Indian Navy. A controversy broke out in 2018 after previous Maldives government refused to extend visas of Indian military personnel and asked India to take back helicopters.

Internal Chaos, External Crisis

Context: Pakistan Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s visit to India is bound to generate much media interest but will make little dent in the indifferent relations between the two countries. Any meaningful change in bilateral relations must necessarily wait until Pakistan has a domestic consensus on foreign policy. The vocal opposition in Islamabad to Bilawal’s visit the first by its foreign minister to India in more than a decade underlines Pakistan’s sharp internal divisions about its external relations at a critical juncture in world politics.

Domestic Politics and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

The lack of agreement on India is only one part of Pakistan’s foreign policy problem. The bigger tussle has been on finding a sustainable approach to Pakistan’s engagement with the major powers that are at odds with each other—US, China, and Russia.
Pakistan is also facing new challenges in Afghanistan and is struggling to cope with the shifting geopolitical dynamic in the Middle East.
Further there has been latest attacks on the former chief, General Qamar Jawed Bajwa ( Army- the second state). Media has accused Bajwa of making major “compromises” with India on Kashmir; they also alleged that he was claiming that the Pakistan army is in “no position to fight” India.
Army in the past has made endless meddling in domestic politics. Army helped install Imran Khan as the PM in 2018 and chose to pull him down in 2022. It also unseated Nawaz Sharif on flimsy grounds in 2017 and allowed the Sharif family to come back into the mainstream in 2022.
Though the impact of Army on domestic politics needs continuous evaluation, it did during the last regime tried to reorient Pakistan’s foreign policy and made a major effort to improve ties with India. The testimony of this approach was announcement of a ceasefire agreement in February 2021 which came after heightened tensions following the Pulwama terror attack and Balakot bombing by India’s Air Force and the Pakistani riposte in February 2019

It has been highlighted that the ceasefire agreement was a product of back-channel talks between the Indian national security adviser Ajit Doval and Bajwa. The ceasefire was to be followed by several confidence-building measures to relax tensions between the two countries.

Army move (under Bajwa) to reduce tensions with India were part of a broader effort to rejig Pakistan’s foreign policy. It was a recognition that current policies are accelerating Pakistan’s relative decline in the region.
Army’s call to discard Pakistan’s obsession with geopolitics and focus on national development, geoeconomics, and good neighbourly relations underlined the case for Pakistan’s urgent strategic course correction.
At the same time Government (the first state) had an anti-American posturing saw the deterioration of ties with Washington. The government enthusiasm to be seen in Moscow on the day Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine outraged Europe and the US. Imran also sought to align with Turkey as it sought to wrest the leadership of the Islamic world from Saudi Arabia and picked quarrels with the United Arab Emirates. This in turn undermined the traditional goodwill for Pakistan in the Arab Gulf

Conclusion

Pakistan will need a lot of time and space to get its domestic act together and rebuild a foreign policy consensus. The first priority for India must be to sustain the valuable backchannel to the army leadership in Rawalpindi. Weakened though it is, the Pakistan Army remains the only credible interlocutor for India in the near term.

Backchannel Diplomacy

India and Pakistan have engaged with each other via backchannel from December 2020 till April 2021. However, these talks are at a standstill because of the lack of willingness shown by the two countries to change their stands on the various existing issues.

While Pakistan has welcomed the reports of third-party mediation, India has maintained silence as it goes against its traditional position on diplomacy with Pakistan. India maintains officially that issues with Pakistan are of a bilateral nature that has no space for third party mediation or intervention.

What is Back-Channel diplomacy?

Back-channel talks are used to talk to each other through non-official channels to discuss and resolve the problems facing the countries.
It is conducted through foreign diplomats or neutral Governments trusted by both sides desirous of change in status quo.
It is also a means of restoring the status quo ante in case of difficulties.
It is also conducted by respected figures in public lives who are known for integrity, accuracy, who are capable of clarity, caution and patience and deep knowledge of the issue.

What are the benefits of such a diplomacy?

It enables would-be dealmakers to test the waters—to determine whether the other party is capable of negotiating in good faith—before exploring real commitments.
They can be particularly appealing to high-level leaders who are fearful of a public failure if their efforts to reach a deal collapse.

Backchannel Diplomacy DIPLOMACY IN THE PAST

Such talks had been initiated by General Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi through Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan.
During the Kargil War, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee chose an unorthodox back-channel interlocutor, R.K. Mishra.
In 2016, six former Pakistani High Commissioners also travelled to Delhi for a Track-II consultation with nine former Indian High Commissioners, where they met NSA Doval and senior MEA officials

Why backchannel now?

Front door diplomacy is not possible because of a complex past.
Pakistan’s dire economic condition and the mounting pressure from the Financial Action Task Force to shut down all terrorist safe havens or face severe sanctions is clearly one imperative for Islamabad’s willingness to engage via the backchannel even after India’s decision on J&K.
To avoid the possible two Front war. UAE’s geostrategic role as a peace broker: In recent years, the UAE has shifted its attention away from military projection to diplomacy, investment and other forms of soft power.
Abu Dhabi was prime mover in last year’s Abraham Accords between Israel and several Arab states.
UAE played a key role alongside their Saudi counterparts in mediating the 2018 peace deal between Ethiopia & Eritrea.
The UAE has reduced its footprint in Yemen and drawn down its forces in the Horn of Africa. It is looking to scale back in Libya, where it provided both air cover and material support for the rebel forces of Khalifa Haftar; the Emiratis are now backing a political solution to the civil war.
UAE has also sought to reduce tensions with Iran and is leading Arab efforts to reengage with the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, having concluded that the war there has effectively ended and that the only way to advance Emirati interests is through political, diplomatic and commercial means.
UAE’s strong trade & commercial ties to India and Pakistan, and as it is home to millions of Indian and Pakistani expatriate workers makes it uniquely qualified to mediate between the two countries.
UAE is hoping restoration of trade links between two countries.
More ambitious still, it is aiming to secure a viable understanding on Kashmir, which has been flashpoint for several wars since their 1947 partition upon independence from British rule.
South Asian initiative also plays into the UAE’s pursuit of other important foreign-policy objectives. It helps to deepen the partnership with USA by paralleling American efforts to resolve the conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan, where India and Pakistan have competing economic and security interests.

What are the risks?

Back-channel negotiating may foster costly delays and perpetuate impasse they are designed to overcome.
They provide only temporary protection from deal spoilers and public scrutiny.
Such secret negotiations can facilitate early breakthrough agreements but yield diminishing returns when relied on too frequently.