Context: Thirty-nine people were killed in a series of coordinated attacks by Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) terrorists in Balochistan province. The separatist assaults took place in Musakhel and Qalat/Kalat districts. Beyond these attacks, insurgents also targeted regional infrastructure and security, striking in Bolan, Mastung, and Gwadar. Balochistan has been the epicentre of a prolonged insurgency in Pakistan, where various separatist groups have launched frequent attacks, mainly against security forces, in their pursuit of independence from the central government in Islamabad.
(Map-Balochistan)
About Balochistan
Balochistan is Pakistan's largest province by land area, located in the southwestern part of the country.
It borders Iran to the west, Afghanistan to the north, and the Arabian Sea to the south.
It is home to the world's largest deep-sea port, the Port of Gwadar, located on the Arabian Sea.
Although Balochistan accounts for approximately 44% of Pakistan's land area, only 5% of its land is arable, and the region is known for its extremely dry desert climate.
One of the earliest pre-Indus Valley Civilisation settlements, Mehrgarh, dating back to around 7000 BCE is located in Balochistan.
Context: India's continued silence on the escalating tensions between Iran and Israel, following the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, underscores its diplomatic ‘dilemma’ in maintaining balanced relationships with both nations. Mr. Haniyeh was accused of orchestrating the October 7 terror attacks on Israel and served as Hamas' political chief.
Dilemma
The Ministry of External Affairs has issued a travel advisory for Indians in Israel and Lebanon and plans to update advisories for other regions.
No statement has been made regarding the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh. The assassination is significant for India due to its proximity to the country's neighbourhood.
The Indian government faces a dilemma in responding, given its strong ties with both Iran and Israel.
India condemned the October 7 attacks in Israel as acts of terrorism but has not classified Hamas as a terrorist organization despite Israeli requests.
Additionally, India has facilitated the transfer of 5,000 construction workers and plans to send 5,000 caregivers to Israel following the termination of Palestinian workers after the October 7 attacks.
India will carefully consider the implications for its relations with Israel, crucial for security and military cooperation, and with Iran, where India has significant economic interests.
Israel-Iran conflict:
In 2024, the Iran–Israel proxy conflict escalated to a brief period of direct confrontation.
On April 1, Israel bombed an Iranian consulate complex in Damascus, Syria, killing multiple senior Iranian officials.
In retaliation, Iran and its proxies seized the Israeli-linked ship MSC Aries and launched strikes inside Israel on April 13. Israel responded with retaliatory strikes in Iran and Syria.
The Israeli strikes were limited, signalling a desire to de-escalate, and Iran did not respond further, leading to a reduction in tensions back to the proxy conflict level.
Other actors, including the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Jordan, intercepted Iranian drones to defend Israel.
Concerns about a wider regional conflict in the Middle East have been raised since the Hamas attack in Israel on October 7, 2023, and subsequent attacks in the Red Sea by Yemen’s Houthis, placing Iran and Israel at the centre of these tensions.
However, the Iran-Israel relationship was not always as fraught.Iran was one of the first countries in the region to recognize Israel after its formation in 1948, with diplomatic ties ending only after 1979.
Pre-1979 Iran-Israel ties:
In 1948, the Arab states' opposition to the newly established State of Israel culminated in the first Arab-Israeli war.
Iran, which did not participate in this conflict, recognized Israel following its victory, making it the second Muslim-majority country to do so after Turkey.
According to the Brookings Institute's analysis, Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, developed the ‘periphery doctrine’ to counter Arab hostility.
This strategy involved forming alliances with non-Arab, predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East, notably Turkey and pre-revolution Iran, both of which had Western orientations and felt isolated in the region.
During this period, Iran was under the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty, led by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and enjoyed strong US support. Similarly, Israel was a US ally.
The two nations maintained amicable relations, with Iran supplying oil to Israel despite the economic boycott imposed by the Arab states.
The 1979 Revolution:
The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, which overthrew the Shah, led to the establishment of a religious state with a fundamentally different stance towards Israel.
The new regime viewed Israel as an occupier of Palestinian land.
Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian Supreme Leader, labelled Israel the ‘Little Satan’ and the United States the ‘Great Satan,’ accusing both of regional interference.
Post-revolution Iran sought to expand its regional influence, directly challenging US allies Saudi Arabia and Israel.
Egypt's leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, had promoted ‘pan-Arabism,’ advocating for Arab unity based on cultural commonalities, which placed non-Arab Iran at odds with this ideology.
However, following Nasser’s death in 1970, Iran’s relations with Arab countries like Egypt improved.
The 1975 Iran-Iraq accord, where Iran agreed to cease arming Kurdish separatists, temporarily ceased hostilities between the two countries, reducing Israel's strategic value to Iran.
Shadow War-post 1979:
Following the revolution, Iran-Israel relations deteriorated significantly, leading to a shadow war characterized by proxy conflicts and strategic attacks rather than direct military confrontation.
Israel has periodically targeted Iranian nuclear facilities, including a series of attacks in the early 2010s aimed at halting Iran’s nuclear weapons development.
The 2010 Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran’s Natanz nuclear site, believed to be a joint US-Israel operation, was the first known cyberattack on industrial machinery.
Conversely, Iran has funded and supported anti-Israel and anti-US militant groups in the region, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. These actions have fuelled concerns about escalating conflicts.
US President Joe Biden has largely backed Israel's right to self-defence, despite facing criticism over the high civilian casualties in Gaza. This delicate balance of support, especially in an election year, contributes to the ongoing regional uncertainty.
India’s stakes in Iran-Israel conflict
India’s adeptness at maintaining balanced relationships with both Israel and Iran has been a notable aspect of its foreign policy.
However, the recent escalation of conflict in the Middle East poses significant challenges that could impact India in multiple ways.
1. Impact on Indian citizens:
India’s large expatriate community in the region is at risk if the conflict intensifies.
With approximately 18,000 Indians residing in Israel and 5,000-10,000 in Iran, and around 9 million Indians living across the Gulf and West Asia, any escalation would endanger these individuals.
2. Economic interests;
India’s energy security is intricately linked to the West Asian region, which supplies about 80% of its oil.
The potential disruption of oil supplies due to conflict could lead to increased energy prices, impacting India’s economy.
Although India has mitigated some of the effects of global oil price volatility through discounted Russian oil, a new conflict could negate these efforts and exacerbate economic challenges.
New Delhi is also concerned about the impact of these tensions on recent initiatives like the 10-year India-Iran MoU for the development of Chabahar port.
Any conflict or US sanctions could affect India's plans for Chabahar port and connectivity projects with Afghanistan and Central Asia.
3. Strategic needs:
India’s strategic interests in the region are substantial.
The country has cultivated significant ties with major Arab nations, Iran, and Israel, and is invested in initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC). This corridor is crucial for economic integration and strategic positioning.
The ongoing West Asian tensions have hindered meetings of the IMEEC steering committee.
Additionally, the India-Israel-UAE-US I2U2 initiative and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) linking Indian cargo routes to Russia could be jeopardized.
An expanded conflict could unravel the regional consensus necessary for stability and cooperation.
India’s strategic relationship with Israel, particularly in defence and security, has been robust, highlighted by support during critical moments such as the October 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas.
Conversely, India’s ties with Iran are also significant, especially considering Tehran’s role as a major crude supplier and its alignment with India’s counter-terrorism objectives.
Balancing relations with both Israel and Iran have historically been challenging for India. Notable incidents include diplomatic confrontations between Israeli and Iranian representatives in New Delhi, underscoring the delicate nature of India’s position.
India’s stance on de-escalation and return to diplomacy is crucial for preserving its national interests amidst the volatile regional dynamics.
As the situation evolves, India’s diplomatic manoeuvres will be essential in safeguarding its people, economic interests, and strategic objectives while navigating the complex web of Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Context:The targeted killings of top Hamas and Hezbollah leaders have increased the possibility of all-out war in West Asia to perhaps its highest level since the October 7 attacks on Israel.
Overview:
Hamas killed around 1,200 Israelis and took 250 hostage on October 7, 2023, and Israel’s response with air strikes and ground operations is estimated to have killed more than 40,000 people in Gaza so far.
Yet, the recent deaths of three key figures may have more profound implications.
Key figures and assassinations:
Fuad Shukr: A senior Hezbollah commander, was killed in an Israeli airstrike. Israel claimed Shukr was responsible for a rocket attack on Israeli-controlled Golan Heights.
Ismail Haniyeh: The head of Hamas' political bureau, was killed in Tehran. This act was particularly provocative, occurring on Iranian soil.
Mohammed Deif: He was reportedly killed in Gaza
Objectives of Israel
1. Demonstration of intent:
These targeted killings are seen as a huge victory for Israel, which had vowed revenge for the October 7 attacks, a catastrophic failure of its intelligence, operations, and response mechanisms.
Its Swords of Iron military offensive in Gaza had the twin objectives of destroying Hamas and freeing the hostages.
By killing key figures, Israel can claim to have substantially achieved the target of neutralising Hamas.
Israel seeks to restore its strategic credibility and reputational damage of Mossad.
2. Message to Iran:
By targeting the leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas, both groups are part of the ‘Axis of Resistance’ sponsored by Iran, Israel has redrawn the red lines of the conflict in West Asia.
The possibility of all-out war in the region is perhaps the highest now since the October 7 attacks.
In April, Israel had previously targeted Iranian military officials in Syria, leading to a retaliatory aerial attack from Tehran. The latest strikes against Iranian-affiliated leaders further illustrate Israel’s readiness to confront Iranian interests directly, even within Iranian territory.
Israel aims to expose the vulnerabilities of Iran’s intelligence and security establishment in much the same way as the Hamas attack had exposed and embarrassed the Israelis.
Israel has sent the message that Iran’s security umbrella cannot protect the leaders of Hamas.
Potential Iranian responses
While the three targeted assassinations and Israel’s military response in Gaza is intended to re-establish its deterrence against Iran and its proxies, Tehran cannot be expected to take it lying down.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Pezeshkian have vowed revenge. There are three scenarios on the possible Iranian response.
1. Direct retaliation:
Iran may opt to strike Israeli targets within Israeli territory, similar to the aerial attacks of April. Such a response would heighten regional tensions and could escalate the conflict further.
2. Coordinated attacks:
Tehran might collaborate with its allies, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, to launch coordinated assaults on Israeli targets. This strategy could increase the scope and scale of the conflict, potentially drawing in more regional actors.
3. Indirect targeting:
Another possibility is for Iran to target Israeli officials in third countries, similar to the 2012 attack on an Israeli diplomat’s wife in New Delhi. This approach could complicate diplomatic relations and pose security challenges internationally.
Implications for India
1. Impact on regional stability:
About 9 million Indian nationals live and work in the region. They are the largest source of remittances to India. The first two scenarios could trigger a broader conflict, affecting the safety of Indians in West Asia.
The potential disruption of energy supplies, given that two-thirds of India’s crude oil and natural gas imports come from this region, would also have significant economic implications.
2. Diplomatic and security challenges:
India faces a difficult diplomatic balancing act. India has so far made no statements on the volatile situation. New Delhi, which has friends across the region, does not want to get drawn into regional rivalries.
The country has issued travel advisories for Israel and Lebanon, and airlines have adjusted their routes to avoid the region.
Other countries in the region have launched efforts to de-escalate the situation. Efforts of these regional players, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman, to mediate could influence India’s strategy.
During the visit of UK's new Foreign Secretary David Lammy, India and the UK launched the UK-India Technology Security Initiative (TSI) to spearheaded by the National Security Advisors of both countries. The Technology Security Initiative aims to expand collaboration between India and UK on many critical and emerging technologies.
About Technology Security Initiative
Increasing role of technology in national security and economic development.
Reinforces already existing collaborative efforts in various technologies, broaden mandates of existing mechanisms and establishing new mechanisms of cooperation in critical & emerging technologies.
Collaboration Global Tech Governance: As part of Strategic Tech Policy Dialogue, UK and India will hold a dialogue on global tech governance to coordinate positions on digital technical standards and support multi-stakeholder model of internet governance.
Coordination:
Technology Security Initiative will be coordinated by National Security Advisors (NSAs) of both countries through existing and new dialogues.NSAs will set priority areas and identify interdependencies for cooperation on critical and emerging tech that will lead to building of meaningful technology value chain partnerships between India and UK.Progress under the mission will be reviewed on a half-yearly basis at the Deputy National Security Advisors level.
A Bilateral mechanism will be established to be led by India's Ministry of External Affairs and UK Government for promotion of trade in critical and emerging technologies, resolution of relevant licensing and regulatory issues.
Technological Domains for cooperation under Technology Security Initiative
Telecom:
UK and India will build a new and enhanced Future Telecom Partnership.
Expanding the mandate of Strategic Tech Dialogue between India's Department of Telecommunication and UK's Department of Science, Innovation & Technology, which will take forward this pillar.
Specific focus areas
Collaborate on joint research on future telecoms, focused on Open RAN systems, testbed linkups, telecom security, spectrum innovation, software and systems architecture
Partnership between UK's SONIC Labs (a joint program between Digital Catapult and Ofcom), India's C-DOT and Telecom's Startup Mission under Department of Telecommunication of India.
Collaboration in global design and development of next generation telecom technologies like 6G technology.
Collaboration on telecom diversification, telecom security, telecom standards, telecom equipment and use of spectrum.
Collaboration between UK and Indian telecom companies for simulating commercial opportunities in existing networks and integration of advanced technologies and practices in future telecom infrastructure.
Collaboration between startup ecosystem of India & UK.
Launching a joint UK-India research program on Future Telecom with support from UKRI, International Science Partnership Fund, India’s Department of Telecom and Department of Science & Technology.
Critical Minerals:
India & UK will expand critical minerals collaboration on critical mineral strategies to improve supply chain resilience, R&D and technological partnerships along the complete critical minerals value chain (including exploration, processing and manufacturing) and sharing best practices on ESG standards.
To be overseen by India’s Ministry of Mines and the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and Department for Energy Security and Net Zero.
Specific focus areas:
Develop a roadmap for cooperation and establishment of UK-India Critical Minerals community of academics, innovators and industry.
An Observatory to be set up led by Cambridge University, IIT (ISM) Dhanbad & IIT Bombay to provide a mechanism for storing data on critical minerals supply chains and flows.
Launch of innovation pilots in partnership with UK's Centre for Process Innovation.
Develop economically feasible and environmentally sustainable extraction technologies for identified critical minerals.
Develop capacity building programs in critical mineral processing, data management and mining finance.
Establish collaboration between leading research institutes on extracting critical minerals from end of life waste stream products through recycling.
Launching of Critical Mineral Recycling Centre in India which will also focus on advanced military waste recycling.
Collaboration with British Geological Survey (BGS), Geological Survey of India (GIS) and IREL (India) Limited on strategies, workflows and expertise for 3D geological modelling, enhance Rare Earth Elements (REE) exploration methods by incorporating geophysical characterization, identification and assessment of potential REE deposits.
Semiconductors:
UK and India will pursue a broad semiconductor partnership aiming to leverage each other's strengths and incentives, explore mutually beneficial R&D focused on supply chain resilience collaboration, skills exchange and hardware security.
Expanding the mandate of Strategic Tech Dialogue between India's MEITY and UK's Department of Science, Innovation & Technology, which will take forward this pillar.
Specific focus areas:
Facilitating academic & industrial R&D collaboration in chip design and IP, compound semiconductors, advanced packaging and innovative systems like strategically important applications like powering net zero, advanced telecommunications, closer relationships between semiconductor firms in manufacturing and product development.
Sharing best practices and knowledge exchange on workforce development with right technical skills and expertise.
Facilitating trade missions between UK and Indian semiconductor companies to boost trade and investment flows.
Promoting integration of supply chains for manufacturing and designing semiconductor chips and wafers
Strengthening resilience of semiconductor supply chains through expert consultations for addressing challenges of raw materials, components, design and devices.
Artificial Intelligence
Both countries will towards safe, responsible, human-centric and trust-worthy AI aiming to promote global good and strengthen interoperability between their AI governance frameworks.
The existing mandate of Strategic Tech Dialogue between India's MEITY and UK's Department of Science, Innovation and Technology will expanded to take this pillar forward.
Specific focus areas:
Work together in forums such as G20, GPAI & UN. UK's committed to ensure that India's 2024 GPAI Chairmanship delivers successful outcomes.
Establishing a mechanism for collaboration and policy exchange on applications of AI.
Facilitate trade missions between UK and Indian industry on developing critical technologies with enterprise applications.
Develop knowledge and skills needed to detect, mitigate and challenge bias in AI algorithms through joint bias detection challenges, platform to co-develop and test innovative solutions for identifying and mitigating bias in AI models and co-hosting a conference on AI bias.
Creation of a joint Centre for Responsible AI composed on British and Indian experts based on recommendations of IIT Madras, University of Southampton and University of Oxford.
Knowledge sharing in AI including machine learning models, multi-domain applications and data governance principles.
Cooperation between AI centres like the Alan Turing Institute and Indian Institutions.
Commission of a group of experts to prepare a report on specific areas for targeted collaboration for further development of AI and its applications across sectors.
Quantum:
High level dialogue between the two countries for understanding each other's national quantum strategies.
This pillar will be taken up by India's Department of Science & Technology and UK's Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.
Specific focus areas:
Joint hackathons in quantum algorithms and solutions for automotive, life sciences, chemicals and greenhouse gas domains.
Entrepreneurship training for translating quantum capabilities into business applications.
Academic/industry exchanges on skill development led by UK's Imperial College London/Orca, India's C-DOT & Telecommunication Engineering Centre (TEC).
Biotechnology & Health Tech:
Both countries will launch a high level partnership on engineering biology for sharing knowledge to help facilitate research advances.
This pillar will be taken forward by India's Department of Biotechnology and UK's Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.
Specific focus areas:
Strengthen biotechnology collaboration in genomics, genomic prediction and precision medicine, cell and gene therapy, biotherapeutics (including bio-manufacturing), smart bio-sensors and bio-electronics, biomaterials and bio-fabrication in line with ethical and legal frameworks and requirements of both countries.
Partnerships between research institutions, co-developing and evaluating affordable healthcare like low-cost diagnostics for early detection of important diseases, novel preventive and therapeutic interventions.Share expertise and best practices on responsible innovations and standards in biotechnology and bioinformatics.
Collaboration on Femtech between India's Department of Biotechnology and UK's Centre for Process Innovation on Biotechnology and UK's National Institute for Health and Care Research.
Advanced Materials
Establish a high-level dialogue on advanced materials to identify specific R&D collaboration on materials/composites and collaboration on research, responsible innovation and standards in Advanced Materials.
This pillar will be taken up by India's Department of Science & Technology and UK's Department for Science, Innovation and Technology.
Specific focus areas:
Enhance development of technologies for materials/composites focused on bringing up lower TRL (Technology Readiness Level) technologies to higher TRL and CRL (Commercial Readiness Level).
Collaboration on specific types of materials such as novel alloys and powders.UK-India Research & Innovation partnership on industrial sustainability, including power electronics, machines and drives; advanced materials for extreme environments; sustainable materials and manufacturing for transforming foundation industries like glass, paper, cement, ceramics, chemicals and metals.
Collaboration between Manchester University's National Graphene Institute, Cambridge University's Graphene Centre and IISc Bengaluru's Centre for Nanoscience & Engineering on advanced 2-Dimensional and atomically thin materials and nanotechnology. This will include joint research ventures, facilitating student and start up exchanges, and opening access to respective world leading laboratories and prototyping facilities.
Joint steps towards qualification and certification of advanced materials.
Context:Despite consistent efforts by India and other countries, the move for United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform and expansion has made ‘no progress’ so far. This was emphasised by the former Indian Ambassadors to the United Nations.
India continues to push its demand for inclusion in the top global decision-making body. India and its partners in the G-4 (Brazil, Germany and Japan) claim a permanent seat at the UNSC.
About Summit for the Future
The Summit of the Future at the United Nations (September 22-23) is expected to bring together world leaders to discuss plans to ‘reboot’ the UN.
Member States agreed to hold the Summit in September 2024. They also agreed that the Summit would have an outcome, ‘a Pact for the Future’.
The proposal for a Summit of the Future originated in the Our Common Agenda report.
Our Common Agenda is an agenda of action, designed to strengthen and accelerate multilateral agreements, particularly the 2030 Agenda, and make a tangible difference in people’s lives.
It contains recommendations across 4 broad areas for: renewed solidarity between peoples and future generations, a new social contract anchored in human rights, better management of critical global commons, and global public goods that deliver equitably and sustainably for all.
It presents the Secretary-General's vision on the future of global cooperation through an inclusive, networked, and effective multilateralism.
They articulated the overarching purpose of the Summit, and the Pact: to reaffirm the UN Charter; to reinvigorate multilateralism; to boost implementation of existing commitments; to agree on solutions to new challenges; and to restore trust.
United Nations Security Council (UNSC):
The UNSC is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and is charged with ensuring international peace and security, recommending the admission of new UN members to the General Assembly, and approving any changes to the UN Charter.
Its powers as outlined in the United Nations Charter include:
establishing peacekeeping operations, enacting international sanctions, and authorizing military action.
The UNSC is the only UN body with authority to issue resolutions that are binding on member states.
Like the UN as a whole, the Security Council was created after World War II to address the failings of the League of Nations in maintaining world peace.
First session: 1946
Resolutions of the Security Council are typically enforced by UN peacekeepers, which consist of military forces voluntarily provided by member states and funded independently of the main UN budget.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court recognizes that the Security Council has authority to refer cases to the Court in which the Court could not otherwise exercise jurisdiction.
The Council exercised this power for the first time in 2005, when it referred to the Court ‘the situation prevailing in Darfur since 2002’.
Since Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, the Court could not otherwise have exercised jurisdiction.
The body's presidency rotates monthly amongst its members.
Members of the UNSC:
The UNSC consists of five permanent members and ten non-permanent members.
Permanent Members:
The permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (Permanent Five, Big Five, or P5) are the five sovereign states to whom the UN Charter of 1945 grants a permanent seat on the UN Security Council: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States.
All have the power of veto which enables any one of them to prevent the adoption of any ‘substantive’ draft Council resolution, regardless of its level of international support.
Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, Security Councildecisions on all substantive matters require the affirmative votes of three-fifths (i.e. nine) of the members.
A negative vote or a ‘veto’ by a permanent member prevents adoption of a proposal, even if it has received the required votes.
Abstention is not regarded as a veto in most cases, though all five permanent members must vote for adopting any amendment of the UN Charter or any recommendation of the admission of a new UN member state.
This veto right does not carry over into General Assembly matters or votes, which are non-binding.
(India’s 2020 term ended in December 2022)
Non-Permanent Members:
These ten non-permanent members are elected by the United Nations General Assembly for two-year terms starting on 1 January, with five replaced each year.
To be approved, a candidate must receive at least two-thirds of all votes cast for that seat.
A retiring member is not eligible for immediate re-election.
The temporary members hold seats on a rotating basis by geographic region.
Membership reform:
Their proposal is to create a new category of seats, still non-permanent, but elected for an extended duration (semi-permanent seats).
Proposals to reform the Security Council began with the conference that wrote the UN Charter and have continued to the present day.
There has been discussion of increasing the number of permanent members.
The countries which have made the strongest demands for permanent seats are Brazil, Germany, India and Japan (G4 nations).
Italy leads a movement known as Uniting for Consensus in opposition to the possible expansion of permanent seats. Core members of the group include Canada, South Korea, Spain, Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Turkey, Argentina and Colombia.
Their proposal is to create a new category of seats, still non-permanent, but elected for an extended duration (semi-permanent seats).
Context: India reiterated its commitment to conclude FTA with UK during meeting the visiting Secretary of State for Foreign, UK.
What is a free trade agreement?
Free trade agreements (FTAs) are arrangements between two or more countries or trading blocs that primarily agree to reduce or eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers on substantial trade between them.
FTAs, normally cover trade in goods (such as agricultural or industrial products) or trade in services (such as banking, construction, trading etc.). FTAs can also cover other areas such as intellectual property rights (IPRs), investment, government procurement and competition policy, etc.
India has signed free trade agreements with many individual countries and trade blocs like India-ASEAN FTA, India-Japan CEPA, SAFTA with SAARC countries etc.
FTA with UK and EU have been languishing over many years as Indian industry resisted competition and sough higher level of protection. This came in the backdrop of poor performance of India’s exports with the countries with which it has signed similar FTA deals before. The Asian Development Bank has estimated India's utilization of its trade agreements to be below 25%, one of the lowest rates in Asia.
Reasons for low utilization of FTAs:
Inverted duty structure:
When taxes on input items are higher compared to the final product, it affects the competitiveness of exports. This situation is detrimental to industries that heavily rely on imported raw materials or components, such as the engineering sector.
Free trade agreements signed in the past, especially the trade deals with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, South Korea and Japan led to higher imports and minuscule gains on the export front.
E.g., GST rates for ferrous and non-ferrous metals is 18 per cent but the products that use these raw materials (agricultural implements/ manually operated hand tools) attract a GST lower than 18 per cent.
Non-tariff barriers:
Non-tariff barriers could come in the form of regulations, standards, testing, certification or pre-shipment inspection that are aimed to protect human, animal or plant health and environment.
Indian agri-exports are routinely subjected to high non-tariff barriers in the form of standards. Export growth of chilies, tea, basmati rice, milk, poultry, bovine meat, fish, meat, fish and dairy products also face barriers. These products face Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures.
Rules of origin:
Rules of origin (ROOs) are used to determine if products are eligible for duty-free or reduced duties under the FTA rules even though they may contain non-originating (non-FTA) components.
The rules of origin for the India-ASEAN FTA are very strict. This makes it difficult for Indian exporters to export products to ASEAN countries and benefit from the tariff reductions under the FTA. On the other hand there are a number of alleged instances where merchandise is being re-routed from China, via ASEAN countries with minimum value addition, thereby misusing the India-ASEAN FTA.
Low Awareness: Lack of awareness among exporters about the provisions and benefits of FTAs can hinder their ability to take advantage of preferential tariffs and market access opportunities.
Changing export composition: Indian exports have become more income sensitive rather than price sensitive. So reduced tariffs won’t help India much. As per UNCTAD, 1% decline in world GDP growth lead to 1.8% decline of India's exports.
Context: The foreign ministers’ meeting of QUAD nations to be held comes at a time when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is weakened and its reform nowhere in sight.
Current geostrategic realities and dilemmas
Both the Ukraine war and Israel's actions in Gaza demonstrate blatant disregard for international law.
An axis of Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran is gaining momentum and Chinese influence is growing not just in the Indo-Pacific, but regions like West Asia too.
The U.S. has realised that it needs not just allies, but also credible partners in its security architecture, including in the Indo-Pacific, and reached countries like India to partner with them in smaller pluri-lateral groupings and joint security initiatives.
Further, ASEAN countries are getting increasingly vulnerable, with the South China Sea remaining a conflict point.
While India is a member of many pluri-lateral groups on both sides of the geo-strategic ‘divide’, its engagement in Quad and with BRICS present the country with interesting, and sometimes contrasting, dilemmas.
India has enthusiastically embraced Quad and its strategic objectives.
The fact that India, during its presidency of the UNSC in 2021, held a high-level virtual event on ‘Enhancing Maritime Security’, which was attended by the Russian President, among others, indicates the importance India attaches to strengthening maritime security in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
India was an enthusiastic founder of BRICS. In fact, at the 10th annual summit of the BRICS in 2018, India reminded the BRICS members of its ‘reformed multilateralism’ vision.
In the backdrop of this, let us understand the significance of QUAD and BRICS and their importance for India.
What is QUAD?
The occurrence of a Tsunami in the Indian Ocean led to India, Japan, Australia, and the US to build an informal alliance for collaborating on disaster relief efforts.
In 2007, Japan formalised it into the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the QUAD.
The QuadrilateralSecurity Dialogue (QSD), the Quad is an informal strategic forum comprising, United States of America (USA), India, Australia and Japan.
One of the primary objectives of the Quad is to work for a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.
The group met for the first time in 2007 on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Quad regained momentum in 2017, driven by shared concerns regarding the assertiveness of China in the Indo-Pacific region and a desire to uphold peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
It was in 2017 when the first official talks under the Quad took place in the Philippines.
Quad Summit in 2022 (Tokyo):
The Quad summit witnessed the launch of a new initiative for continuous collaboration in the maritime domain, space, climate change, health, and cyber security.
The member countries pledged to meet challenges for ensuring rules-based maritime order, including in the East and South China Seas.
The members strongly opposed any coercive, provocative, or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo.
Significance of Quad:
Delivering outcomes for the Indo-Pacific: In response to the region's priorities and most pressing challenges, including health security, climate change, infrastructure, critical and emerging technology, cyber security, disaster relief, maritime security, countering-terrorism, etc.
In the face of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the Quad gained further relevance as the group shifted its focus to vaccine diplomacy, health security, and economic recovery.
ASEAN centrality: Quad partners work closely to ensure efforts complement wider engagement in the Indo-Pacific, both bilaterally and through regional institutions.
All Quad partners are long-standing ASEAN Dialogue Partners and steadfast supporters of ASEAN centrality, the ASEAN-led regional architecture and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
Strengthened bilateral relationships among Quad nations:
India now has ministerial-level ‘2+2’ (defence and foreign minister) meetings with Japan and the United States and Australia.
India and the United States further signed a communications compatibility and security agreement (COMCASA) in 2015 and a logistics exchange memorandum of agreement (LEMOA) in 2016.
A major obstacle to closer Japan-India relations was removed with the passage of the landmark Japan-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement in May 2017.
Japan became a permanent member of the formerly bilateral U.S.-India naval exercise, Malabar, in 2015.
The AUSINDEX exercise between Australia and India grew in size and scope.
The function of these bilateral and mini-lateral exercises was to create trust among the militaries of the Quad nations,promote interoperability, and set the foundation for political ties at a deeper level.
Grappling with geopolitics:
Japan’s foreign policy has become more explicitly anti-Chinese, with emphasis on the physical security of its territorial space and linking defence of Northeast Asia to the rest of the Indo-Pacific.
Australia views China as a strategic rival and seeks security through partnerships, both formal and informal, with other powers, rather than having to balance relationships with China.
As for the U.S., it benefits from the Quad principally because, until the emergence of the framework, Washington lacked any overarching instrument to manage its many security relationships in the Indo-Pacific.
The U.S. is now party to a structure that oversees all the key lines of communication from Northeast Asia through the Indian Ocean, and stands to gain from intelligence sharing.
Significance for India:
It is believed that the forum strategically counters China’s economic and military rise. Interestingly, if Chinese hostilities rise on the borders, India can take the support of the other Quad nations to counter the communist nation.
India can even take the help of its naval front and conduct strategic explorations in the Indo-Pacific region.
From a security perspective, New Delhi’s relationship with Washington delivers effective balance against China at both the strategic (nuclear deterrence) and conventional levels.
On the diplomatic field, a U.S. partnership adds weight to India’s geopolitical heft. As India strives to grow its economy, it needs the U.S. military presence to ease its defence spending burden.
Being a strategic partner of the U.S. helps India attain better access to the lucrative U.S. market and thereby build its citizens’ affluence.
India’s vision goes beyond viewing Quad as a geopolitical security objective vis-à-vis China.
India aims to redraw the security and techno-economic architecture of the Indo-Pacific region.
With Quad now working on reorientation of global supply chains of critical technologies and on a range of areas of direct strategic relevance to the region, including digital, telecom, health, power, and semiconductors, it has underlined that development too has a security perspective which cannot be ignored.
What is BRICS?
The BRICS countries are considered the foremost geopolitical rival to the G7 bloc of leading advanced economies, implementing competing initiatives such as the New Development Bank, the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, the BRICS pay, the BRICS Joint Statistical Publication and the BRICS basket reserve currency.
Initially termed BRIC in 2001, the acronym BRICS was coined by Jim O’Neill, a Goldman Sachs economist, to encompass Brazil, China, India, and Russia.
The BRIC grouping’s first formal summit was held in Yekaterinburg, Russia, commenced in 2009. During this summit, BRIC Leaders issued a Joint Statement elucidating the objectives of the BRIC collaboration.
South Africa officially became a member nation in 2010. The group was renamed BRICS – with the “S” standing for South Africa – to reflect the group’s expanded membership.
In 2023, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and UAE joined BRICS.
These BRICS nations possess a notable competitive advantage owing to their economical labor costs, advantageous demographics, and copious natural resources, particularly during the era of the global commodities upswing.
Significance of BRICS:
BRICS has evolved into a unified and purposive entity, championing the cause of reforms in major multilateral institutions with a clear intention of democratising global governance.
Establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) in 2013:
Endowed with an initial capital of US$50 billion, the NDB was conceived as a credible alternative to existing financial institutions (like IMF and World Bank which are dominated by the western powers).
The equitable distribution of the initial subscribed capital among BRICS members underscores the commitment to collective action.
Trade and investment landscape within BRICS:
Promising dynamics between India and China within the broader BRICS umbrella.
The bilateral trade between India and China reached a historic high of US$ 135.98 billion in 2022.
The contribution of BRICS members to global exports has been on the rise, with the growth rate of exports between BRICS member states surpassing the global average.
This has yielded concrete advantages and played a pivotal role in fostering increased investment within the bloc.
The intra-BRICS integration encompasses free trade agreements and export-oriented strategies, including tariff exemptions, tariff reductions, across various goods and service sectors. This proactive approach has led to substantial growth, expanding trade, and a rise in both inward and outward foreign direct investment (FDI).
According to UNCTAD data, cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) holdings within the BRICS nations substantially increased from US$ 27 billion in 2010 to US$ 167 billion in 2020.
This shift collectively represented 1.3 percent to 4.7 percent of their total FDI assets, marking considerable growth.
Notably, China played a predominant role, being the most significant contributor and recipient of FDI among BRICS nations.
Moreover, Brazil and India also observed robust investment expansions from fellow BRICS members.
BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade Issues (CGETI):
Acknowledging the significance of enhancing BRICS nations' attractiveness as investment destinations, even amid the challenges posed during the COVID-19 pandemic, CGETI has urged additional measures to create a conducive atmosphere for sustainable development-oriented investments.
This includes initiatives to improve transparency and simplify national administrative processes and prerequisites.
Significance of the inclusion of new members:
Enhanced inclusivity:
Including more countries from Africa and Asia will enhance BRICS' representation of developing nations and diversify its geographical reach.
A more diverse BRICS gains legitimacy advocating for Global South issues like fair-trade, climate justice, and technology access.
Formerly representing 40% of the world’s population and a quarter of GDP, expanded BRICS now covers nearly half the global population.
Economic strength:
BRICS, earlier represented 24% of global GDP and now with the inclusion of five new economies, it could increase its influence in IMF and World Bank forums.
In 2022, intra-BRICS trade reached $500 billion and the expansion could enhance trade and investment, strengthening economic ties and bargaining power.
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE, among the world's top-10 oil producing countries, enhance BRICS' global influence in shaping energy policies and market dynamics, strengthening its role as a Global South champion.
Advocacy for reforms:
BRICS have collectively called for reforms to the UN Security Council to include more representation from the Global South.
An expanded BRICS can bolster the Global South's political voice in international forums, advocating for reforms aligned with their interests.
BRICS nations agreed to promote use of local currencies in trade to reduce dependence on major global currencies.
The expanded BRICS could provide grounds for this practice. The UAE and India have agreed to trade in Rupees and Dirhams instead of the US Dollar.
With India being the only country common to both Quad and BRICS, the country has immense opportunities at its doorsteps which can be explored with the right strategic policies to serve its larger goals.
Context: The recent protests in Bangladesh, which began in early July 2024, are centered around the controversial job quota system in government jobs. This quota system, reintroduced by a Supreme Court order in June 2024, reserves more than half of civil service positions for specific groups, including descendants of freedom fighters from the 1971 War of Independence, women, ethnic minorities, and people with disabilities.
Banga Protests Explained
The primary trigger for the protests was the Supreme Court's directive to reinstate job quotas that were previously abolished in 2018 following massive student protests. The protesters, primarily university students, demand an end to this quota system, advocating for a merit-based recruitment process. They argue that the current system disproportionately benefits certain groups, particularly those aligned with the ruling Awami League party.
Key Events:
Protests erupted in early July after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina refused to abolish the quotas, stating that the matter was under judicial review. Her remarks, comparing the protesters to the Razakar Force (a group that collaborated with the Pakistani army during the 1971 war), further inflamed the situation, leading to night time protests and demonstrations across major universities.
The protests took a violent turn on July 16, 2024, when clashes between police and students resulted in the deaths of six individuals. The most significant violence occurred in Dhaka, Chittagong, and Rangpur, with the police using rubber bullets and tear gas to disperse the demonstrators.
In response to the escalating violence, the Bangladeshi government ordered the indefinite closure of all schools and universities. Paramilitary forces were deployed in major cities to maintain order. Prime Minister Hasina vowed to punish those responsible for the violence but maintained a firm stance on not interfering with the judicial process concerning the quota system.
Key Demands of the Protesters:
Abolition of Quotas: The primary demand is the complete abolition of the quota system, except for minimal quotas for disabled and marginalized groups.
Merit-based Recruitment: Protesters advocate for a transparent, merit-based recruitment process in government jobs to ensure equal opportunities for all candidates.
Withdrawal of PM’s Remarks: Many protesters also demand an apology and retraction of the Prime Minister’s controversial remarks comparing them to the Razakar Force.
Relation with Radicalization
The protests have also brought to light concerns about radicalization. Some analysts believe that the discontent among youth, particularly students, could be exploited by radical groups looking to destabilize the government. This is a critical dimension, as it underscores the potential for socio-political unrest to be leveraged by extremist elements. The government’s heavy-handed response, including the use of force against peaceful protesters, might further alienate the youth, making them susceptible to radical ideologies.
Opposition's Role: Khaleda Zia's Party
The main opposition party, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khaleda Zia, has voiced its support for the protesters. The BNP has historically opposed the Awami League's policies and sees the current unrest as an opportunity to gain political leverage. The opposition’s backing adds a significant political dimension to the protests, potentially escalating the conflict. The BNP’s involvement might also lead to broader anti-government demonstrations, complicating the political landscape further.
Impact on Relations with India:
India, as a close neighbour and significant regional power, closely monitors the political developments in Bangladesh. The unrest and potential instability in Bangladesh could affect bilateral relations, particularly in areas such as trade, security, and regional cooperation.
India has historically supported Sheikh Hasina’s government, which has been cooperative in addressing cross-border terrorism and maintaining stability in the region. However, prolonged instability could challenge this dynamic, especially if a change in government brings the BNP, known for its nationalist and sometimes anti-India stance, into power.
Context: There has been increasing trend of terrorism in the Jammu region of UT of J&K in the recent past.
Changes in terrorism landscape of Jammu & Kashmir
Broad declining trend in terrorism in J&K: According to Union Home Ministry, between 2017 and 2022 there has been broad decline in terror related incidents in the region. This is reflected by following data: number of infiltrators has fallen from 53 to 14, civilians killed from 55 to 31 and terrorist-initiated incidents from 228 to 125.
Widening in the geography of terrorism to include Jammu region: In recent times, there has been a broader shift of terrorist activity across the Pir Panjal range to the Jammu region from the Kashmir Valley. This year alone, there have been at least 6 major incidents in the Jammu region, including the death of 9 people in Reasi in an attack on bus carrying pilgrims.
Factors for increasing terrorism in recent times:
Approaching elections in J&K: Supreme Court has given a deadline to hold elections by September 30 in UT of J&K. As these elections are fast approaching terrorists and their backers have stepped up their activity damage the chances of return to political normalcy.
Healthy Participation in Lok Sabha elections: Voter turnout in the Kashmir region was around 58.6% which is the highest in past 35 years. This shows enhanced trust among the citizens in the electoral process. Terrorist groups and Pakistan particularly who want to show the apathy of the citizen of J&K towards the Indian state must not be happy with this development. Hence, have increased their activity.
Strategic repositioning of forces towards Eastern Ladakh: Due to the enhanced security challenges being posed by China along the Ladakh and Arunachal Borders, the large majority of armed forces has shifted from the Kashmir region to Ladakh and Arunachal. This has created a security vaccuium in the J&K region making it easier for terrorist groups to attack.
Greater reliance on local terrorists: As the India's border security infrastructure has improved in recent times, the strategy of terrorist groups has been increasingly to radicalise and hire local youth as terrorists. This also helps to keep their propaganda that terrorism in J&K is home grown born out of of apathy of local citizens against the Indian state alive.
New techniques and technologies employed by terrorists: Terrorists have started to use new techniques which are easily available such as drones, telegram groups etc. These allow terrorist groups to bypass the eyes of Indian intelligence agencies.
Rise of new terror groups: In recent years, there has been rise of new terror outfits in the region which are either offshoots of older terror groups such as JeM, Hizbul Mujahideen like The Resistance Front,
Pakistan's policy of state support to terrorism in J&K: Even since the Independence, Pakistan has maintained that it has moral right over province of J&K as it is Muslim majority and by the principle of 'Two-State Solution' should have gone to Pakistan. Pakistan has tried to enforce many warns on the issue of J&K and each time has been successfully defeated by India. As the overt military adventures of Pakistan failed, Pakistan started supporting terror groups in the valley to push its agenda of antagonizing citizens against India.
Attitude of Pakistan's military: Pakistan Army is the most important power centre in the political landscape of Pakistan. The Pakistani Army has a vested interest in keeping the security pot boiling between India and Pakistan, which increases their legitimacy and high budgets.
Lost generation of youth: Large population of youth in the region remains alienated from the Indian state due to lack of economic opportunities in the past two decades and widespread terrorism and violence in the region which has made them loose family members. Often they fall into the fishing net of terror recruiters and succumb to resorting terrorism.
Radical Islam: Kashmir's sufi version of Islam has been increasingly replaced by a wahabi cult of islam which thrives on the philosophy of jehad against the Indian state. The earlier movement for self-dependence has increasingly taken a communal colour rooted against the minority hindu and other religions of India.
India's security centric response to Pakistani terrorism: Ever since the 2008 Mumbai Terror attack, India has followed the policy of 'talks and terror cannot go together'. However, this overt reliance on security to stop Pakistan's support of terrorism has not resulted into complete stoppage of terrorism from Pakistan. However, changing the behaviour of Pakistan should demand both a mix of diplomatic and security measures.
Way forward:
Security related measures:
Boosting border security to reduce infiltration of terrorists, ammunitions and other support from Pakistan into Kashmir.
Empowerment of J&K Police with state of the art technology and manpower who are the first respondents in terror related cases.
Improving intelligence capabilities of security forces like the Army in the region to have better control of terrorism.
Arrest routes of terror financing the region to plug the flow of funds which are used to finance terrorism.
Better training in counter insurgency operations and strict adherence to standard operating protocols to reduce casualities among the armed forces.
Confidence building measures:
Normalisation of provincial democratic system in the region while increase the trust of the people in the region in India's constitution and liberal values.
Addressing the alienation of citizens by focusing on economic and human development.
Special economic package and tax rebates for greenfield industries in the region.
Foreign policy related measures:
India should try to present credible evidence of support of Pakistan to terror groups on global forums like UN.
Context: As the procurement of new submarines under P-75I goes on, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has taken up a preliminary study on the design and development of an indigenous conventional submarine under Project-76.
What is Project-75I?
Project-75 (India), also known as P-75(I), is a military acquisition initiative by the Ministry of Defence (MoD).
The initiative aims to procure diesel-electric attack submarines with fuel cells and Air-Independent Propulsion System (AIP) for the Indian Navy to build India's naval strength and develop indigenous submarine-building capabilities.
Difference between Project 75 and Project 75I?
Project 75I is a follow-up to Project 75 and improves upon the design and technology of its predecessor.
The conventional diesel-electric submarines such as the Scorpene, under Project 75, come with improved stealth features such as advanced acoustic absorption techniques, low radiated noise levels, long-range guided torpedoes, tube-launched anti-ship missiles, sonars and sensor suites.
However, as electrical batteries power them, they need to surface every 48 hours to be recharged.
The AIP technology will improve on this in Project 75I building six submarines that can stay submerged for up to two weeks.
An AIP module acts as a force multiplier as it enables conventional submarines to remain submerged for a longer duration thereby increasing their endurance and reducing chances of detection.
These submarines may even be larger in size compared to the ones under Project 75.
Another staggering difference between the projects is the budget, while Project 75 came to just Rs 23,000 crore, Project 75I is beginning at almost double the budget at a staggering Rs 43,000 crore.
However, as the bidding on Project-75I has only just begun, the project itself may take another two years before it starts.
Context: After the election results, NDA allies raised the issue of Agnipath and called for a discussion on it. The government is open to changes and discussions are on.
About Agnipath Yojana:
Launched in: 2022
Nodal ministry: Ministry of Defence
Aim: To ensure a youthful profile for the forces.
Eligibility: 17.5 to 21 years.
Key features: Replaces the permanent recruitment process in the armed forces.
It is a new human resource management scheme for the Armed Forces. Candidates inducted through this scheme will be called Agniveers.
Agniveers are recruited for four years on completion of which, up to 25% would be selected into the regular ranks on a permanent basis.
The Army is inducting 40,000 Agniveers per year and the Navy and Air Force are recruiting around 3,000 Agniveers each.
Agniveers during their tenure can get class 12 certificates or a Bachelor’s degree in addition to other skill certificates and when leaving after four years will get a lumpsum amount but are not eligible for pension.
On completion of the engagement period of four years, Agniveers will be paid a one-time ‘SevaNidhi’ package which shall comprise their contribution including accrued interest thereon and a matching contribution from the Government equal to the accumulated amount of their contribution
Benefits of Agnipath Scheme:
It will inculcate values of discipline, sacrifice, teamwork, physical fitness, ingrained loyalty for the country and brotherhood.
They will be provided with adequate re-employment opportunities for those returning to society and could emerge as role models for the youth. Agniveers will get preference in PSUs, and State Governments’ jobs.
After serving the tenure, youth will be able to contribute to other sectors more effectively. Trained personnel will be available to boost national security in times of external threats, internal threats and natural disasters.
Modernize the military and provide army with youthful tech savvy soldiers.
Across the globe, there is a trend towards reduction in the number of personnel and emphasis on increasing capital expenditure on modern weapons and equipment.
Why is the Agnipath scheme being revamped?
The Army faces a personnel shortage, as 60,000 annual retirements and only 40,000 new recruits yearly, a deficiency exacerbated by the COVID-19 recruitment halt for over two and a half years.
The 25% conversion rate to regular soldiers may worsen the shortage.
The focus on recruiting a large number of individuals for a short period may compromise the quality of personnel and will dilute professionalism, military ethos & fighting spirit.
Takes 7-8 years to become a fully trained combat-ready soldiers. Agniveers will be risk-averse, will lead to the bulk looking for a second career. It may also hit the basic ethos of ‘Naam, Namak and Nishaan’ (reputation of battalion, fidelity & ensign/colours) for which soldiers fight
Lead to militarisation of society with around 35,000 combat-trained youth being rendered jobless every year.
Way forward:
For enhancing intake numbers, increasing the permanent recruitment from 25% to at least 50%.
Increase the age limit for entry though the technical route from 21 to 23 years to attract enough technically qualified individuals.
The Indian Army suggested increasing the service period for Agniveers from 4 years to 7-8 years.
Agniveers should receive a contributory pension plan, a generous gratuity, and compensation for any disabilities incurred during training.
Comprehensive training and skill programs should be provided to help Agniveers smoothly transition into civilian life.
Context: NATO appointed Mark Rutte as its next secretary-general putting in charge of the world’s biggest security organisation at a critical time for European security as war rages in Ukraine.
About NATO:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization also called the North Atlantic Alliance, is an intergovernmental military alliance of European and North American nations.
Established in the aftermath of World War II, the organization implements the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington, D.C., in 1949.
NATO is a collective security system: its independent member states agree to defend each other against attacks by third parties.
During the Cold War, NATO operated as a check on the threat posed by the Soviet Union.
The alliance remained in place after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and has been involved in military operations in the Balkans, the Middle East, South Asia and Africa.
NATO's main headquarters are located in Brussels, Belgium, while NATO's military headquarters are near Mons, Belgium.
Founding Members: These joined together on April 4, 1949, to form NATO. NATO initially included 12 North American and Western European nations.
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Iceland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
United Kingdom
United States
Most recently, Sweden joined the alliance in 2024.
The secretary general of NATO:
The Secretary General is the chief civil servant of the NATO.
The officeholder is an international diplomat responsible for coordinating the workings of the alliance, leading NATO's international staff, chairing the meetings of the North Atlantic Council and most major committees of the alliance.
The secretary general however, does not have a military command role; political, military and strategic decisions ultimately rest with the member states.
Term: Four years which can be extended repeatedly.
