Context: Rapid advances in biotechnology, synthetic biology, and dual-use research have heightened the risk of deliberate biological threats. This makes biosecurity - distinct from biosafety—a strategic national priority for India.

What is Biosecurity?
Biosecurity refers to the policies, practices, and institutional systems designed to prevent the intentional misuse of biological agents, toxins, or life-science technologies.
- Scope: Human health, animal health, agriculture, and the environment
- Includes: Laboratory security, surveillance, export controls, and response to deliberate outbreaks
- Biosafety vs Biosecurity:
- Biosafety → Prevents accidental release of pathogens
- Biosecurity → Prevents intentional misuse of biological materials
Why India Needs a Stronger Biosecurity Framework
- Demographic Vulnerability:
With a population exceeding 1.4 billion and high urban density, even small outbreaks can escalate rapidly. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed stress points in hospital capacity and disease surveillance. - Agriculture & Livelihood Risks:
About 42% of India’s workforce depends on agriculture. Deliberate attacks on crops or livestock could undermine food security and rural incomes. - Dual-Use Research Risks:
According to the WHO, nearly 42% of high-risk laboratories globally lack adequate oversight to prevent diversion of legitimate research for harmful purposes. - Non-State Actor Threats:
Terrorist misuse of biological toxins remains a concern, with alleged ricin-related cases reported in India. - Global Preparedness Gap:
India ranked 66th in the Global Health Security Index (2023), indicating relatively weaker response and preparedness capacities.
India's Existing Biosecurity Framework
Institutional Architecture
- Department of Biotechnology (DBT): Regulates biotechnology research and biocontainment
- National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC): Disease surveillance and outbreak response
- Animal & Plant Authorities: Monitor zoonotic and agricultural bio-risks
Legal Framework
- Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: Regulation of GMOs
- WMD Act, 2005: Criminalises biological weapons
- Biosafety Rules, 1989 & rDNA Guidelines, 2017: Standards for recombinant DNA research
International Engagement
- Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): Prohibits biological weapons
- Australia Group: Export controls on dual-use biological materials
Key Challenges
- Fragmented Governance: No single nodal authority for biosecurity
- Outdated Laws: Limited coverage of synthetic biology and gene editing
- Dual-Use Oversight Gaps: No mandatory assessment of misuse potential
- One-Health Silos: Human, animal, and environmental surveillance remain disconnected, despite 70% of emerging diseases being zoonotic
Way Forward
- Unified Authority: Establish a National Biosecurity Authority (similar to Australia’s Biosecurity Act model)
- Legal Modernisation: Update laws to regulate synthetic biology and gene editing
- One-Health Integration: Link human, animal, and environmental surveillance
- DNA Order Screening: Mandate verification of gene-synthesis orders
- Global Cooperation: Deepen coordination under the Australia Group
