International Relations & Security

At the 50th-anniversary conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), India’s External Affairs Minister cautioned that bioterrorism is no longer a hypothetical risk but an emerging global reality.

Rapid advances in biotechnology, inexpensive gene-editing tools, and weak international oversight have expanded opportunities for non-state actors to misuse biological agents.

Bioterrorism involves the deliberate release of bacteria, viruses, toxins, or engineered pathogens to cause mass illness, disrupt economies, and spread fear. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed serious gaps in global preparedness, demonstrating how easily biological threats can escalate across borders.

Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

The BWC, also known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, is the world’s first multilateral disarmament treaty eliminating an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

Negotiated in Geneva (1969–1971) and entering into force in 1975, it bans the development, production, stockpiling, and acquisition of biological weapons.

The BWC complements the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibited only the use of biological weapons but not their possession. Today the Convention has 188 States Parties, including India (ratified 1974), and 4 Signatories yet to ratify (Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, Syria).

Five states—including Israel and Chad—have neither signed nor acceded. A Review Conference takes place every five years to strengthen implementation.

Why Bioterrorism Is a Serious Concern

Technological and geopolitical changes have intensified risks:

• Low-cost gene editing: CRISPR kits costing under ₹50,000 increase accessibility.
• Rising terror interest: A 2024 UNSC study found 35+ groups attempted to procure biological agents.
• Weak surveillance: 191 countries reported monitoring failures during the 2020–22 pandemic.
• Dual-use danger: WHO notes that 42% of high-risk labs lack adequate oversight.
• Synthetic biology boom: A projected $30–35 billion market by 2030 raises misuse potential.

Weaknesses in the BWC Framework

Despite its importance, the BWC struggles with structural limitations:

• No verification mechanism to inspect labs or confirm compliance.
• No permanent technical body for scientific risk assessment.
• Lack of mandatory reporting of pathogen inventories or research activities.
• Poor compliance culture: Only 19% of member states regularly file confidence-building measures.

India’s Contributions to Strengthening Biosecurity

India has adopted institutional, legal, and diplomatic measures:

• 1989 Biosecurity Rules regulating hazardous microorganisms and genetically engineered organisms.
• WMD Prohibition Act, 2005 criminalising illegal manufacture, financing, or transfer of WMDs.
• SCOMET Export Controls monitoring high-risk biological materials (Category-2).
• India–France proposal for a BWC Article VII assistance database.
• ITEC training programmes on UNSC 1540 and strategic trade controls.

Way Forward

• Verification Protocol: Create an inspection-based mechanism similar to IAEA and OPCW.
• Permanent BWC Secretariat for tracking gene-editing and dual-use risks.
• Global Data-Sharing Network for outbreak alerts and unusual lab activity.
• National Biosecurity Law integrating existing rules, export controls, and disaster-response frameworks.

Strengthening the BWC is essential for ensuring that scientific progress does not become a pathway to global insecurity.

Context: The 15th edition of the India–Vietnam Defence Policy Dialogue (DPD) was held in Hanoi to review progress under the Joint Vision Statement 2030, which identifies defence cooperation as a central pillar of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the two nations.

Major Outcomes

• MoU on Submarine Search and Rescue: Facilitates coordinated operations during maritime emergencies.
• Letter of Intent on Defence Industry Cooperation: Strengthens collaboration in joint R&D, production, and technology transfer.
• Maritime Security: Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Broader Context of India–Vietnam Relations

• Diplomatic relations were upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016.
• The BrahMos missile deal (worth $700 million in 2025) is India’s largest defence export to date.
• The Plan of Action 2024–2028 focuses on political, economic, and defence cooperation.
• Vietnam hosted the Holy Relics of Lord Buddha from India in May 2025, strengthening cultural diplomacy.
• Regular Political Consultations and Strategic Dialogues ensure continuity in bilateral engagement.

Strategic Importance

1. Act East Policy: Vietnam remains a vital anchor of India’s engagement with ASEAN.
2. Indo-Pacific Vision: Collaboration enhances maritime stability against Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.
3. Defence Exports: Supports India’s goal of becoming a major defence manufacturer and exporter.
4. Technology Cooperation: Promotes indigenisation and joint development of advanced systems.
5. Regional Balancing: Strengthens India’s position in regional power dynamics.

Conclusion

The 15th DPD reaffirms India–Vietnam relations as a model of mutual trust and strategic depth.

It demonstrates how New Delhi’s diplomacy in Southeast Asia combines defence cooperation, cultural outreach, and developmental support to advance a stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific order.

Context: The United States has granted India a six-month sanctions waiver for the operation and development of Iran’s Chabahar Port, effective October 29, 2025.
This move allows India to continue strategic work at the port without facing penalties under U.S. sanctions laws.

Background: U.S. Sanctions on Iran

The sanctions originate from the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA), Section 1244, targeting entities engaged in Iran’s energy, shipping, shipbuilding, and port sectors.
Violations could result in asset freezes, exclusion from the U.S. financial system, and business restrictions.

The U.S. employs these sanctions to maintain “maximum economic pressure” on Iran—aiming to halt nuclear proliferation, curb Tehran’s support to regional militias, and push for a stricter nuclear accord.

In 2018, the U.S. granted India a waiver recognizing Chabahar’s role in Afghanistan’s post-war reconstruction and as a humanitarian trade hub. However, following the Taliban takeover in 2021 and shifting geopolitical priorities, the exemption was revoked in September 2025—until this recent six-month reinstatement.

Chabahar Port: India’s Strategic Gateway

Located in Iran’s Sistan-Balochistan province, Chabahar sits on the Gulf of Oman, only 170 km west of Pakistan’s Gwadar Port (operated by China under CPEC).
It is Iran’s only oceanic port and provides India direct access to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Europe, bypassing Pakistan.

Key Terminals:

1. Shahid Kalantari Terminal:
   Developed in the 1980s for conventional cargo operations, reducing Iran’s dependence on the congested Strait of Hormuz.
2. Shahid Beheshti Terminal:
   Operated by India Ports Global Limited (IPGL), it forms the backbone of India’s connectivity projects—enabling cargo movement to Afghanistan and Central Asia via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

Strategic Importance for India

• Connectivity & Trade: Strengthens India’s trade links to Eurasia, offering a secure supply chain alternative amidst global disruptions.
• Regional Balancing: Counters China’s Gwadar influence and enhances India’s maritime and logistical presence in the region.
• Energy & Security: Serves as a logistical node for energy imports and humanitarian outreach to landlocked neighbors.
• Geopolitical Significance: Reflects India’s ability to maintain strategic autonomy while managing ties with both Washington and Tehran.

Conclusion

The temporary U.S. waiver reaffirms Chabahar’s role as a strategic lifeline for India’s regional outreach. While the exemption offers short-term relief, long-term success will depend on sustained diplomatic engagement with both the U.S. and Iran, ensuring the port’s full integration into India’s connectivity vision under INSTC and Viksit Bharat 2047.

Context: The 15th India–Australia Joint Working Group (JWG) on Counter Terrorism was held in Canberra to enhance cooperation in tackling global terrorism and violent extremism. The dialogue, co-chaired by senior officials from both countries, reaffirmed mutual commitment to a free, open, and secure Indo-Pacific.

Key Outcomes of the Meeting

• Broad Cooperation: Both sides reviewed domestic, regional, and global terrorism threats and discussed mechanisms for coordination between law enforcement, judicial bodies, and maritime security agencies.
• Technology & Radicalisation: They resolved to counter the misuse of emerging technologies—such as encrypted communications, social media, and cryptocurrencies—by terrorist networks, while reinforcing efforts against radicalisation and violent extremism.
• Information Sharing: Reaffirmed the importance of timely intelligence exchange and operational coordination, especially to curb terrorism in the Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
• Multilateral Engagement: Both nations agreed to deepen cooperation through UN, FATF, GCTF, IORA, and QUAD mechanisms to combat terror financing and cross-border terror networks.

India–Australia Strategic Partnership

• Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP), 2020: The relationship was elevated to a CSP, establishing annual leaders’ summits and 2+2 ministerial dialogues, strengthening institutional cooperation in security and trade.
• Defence & Security Cooperation: Joint military engagements such as AUSINDEX (naval exercises), Malabar drills, and logistics support agreements boost maritime domain awareness and regional security.
• Economic Cooperation: The India–Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA, 2022)—India’s first trade deal with a developed nation in a decade—reduced tariffs on over 85% of goods, enhancing trade diversification.
• Critical Minerals Partnership: Both nations are collaborating on securing supply chains for lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements, supporting India’s green energy and EV manufacturing goals.
• Education & Migration: The Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement (MMPA, 2023) facilitates smoother movement of students, researchers, and professionals, reinforcing people-to-people ties.

Significance

This enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation aligns with India’s strategic objective of strengthening maritime security and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. It also reinforces Australia’s role as a trusted partner in maintaining rules-based order and ensuring peace in the region.

Way Forward

• Institutionalise real-time intelligence exchange frameworks.
• Enhance capacity-building and training programmes for counter-terrorism forces.
• Expand cooperation in cyber and financial crime tracking.
• Promote collaboration in multilateral counter-terror forums to set global norms on terror financing and tech misuse.

Source: Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Government of India; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australia.

Context: China has filed a complaint at the World Trade Organization (WTO) alleging that India’s electric vehicle (EV) and battery subsidy schemes — including the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) for Advanced Chemistry Cells — violate global trade rules.

Beijing claims that India’s policy discriminates against foreign automakers and suppliers, contrary to WTO norms of fair competition.

About the Dispute:

The complaint has been lodged under the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), which prohibits subsidies contingent upon export performance or use of domestic goods over imported ones.

Allegations by China:

1. National Treatment Violation (Article III, GATT):
   India’s local-content requirements in EV and battery subsidies allegedly favour domestic firms like Tata Motors and Ola Electric over foreign companies.
2. Import-Substitution Subsidy (Article 3, ASCM):
   China contends that India’s benefits are tied to sourcing from domestic manufacturers — a prohibited form of subsidy under WTO rules.
3. Market Access Barrier:
   India’s 70–100% import duty on fully built EVs discourages entry of Chinese automakers, limiting market access.

Consequences for India:

• WTO Dispute Risk:
  If consultations fail, the WTO may establish a dispute panel, potentially ruling against India’s EV PLI scheme.
• Trade Deficit Concern:
  India’s $99.2 billion trade deficit with China (FY 2024–25) could widen if bilateral trade relations deteriorate further.
• Diplomatic Strain:
  The complaint could set back recent efforts to stabilise India–China ties following the 2020 Ladakh border tensions.

India’s Defence and Way Forward:

Transparent Subsidy Design:
Recast EV incentives as green-tech or R&D subsidies permissible under ASCM Article 8 (non-actionable subsidies).

Bilateral Consultation:
Engage China under the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Article 4 consultation stage to seek an amicable solution.

Strategic Diversification:
Build alliances through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and Global Biofuels Alliance to reduce dependency on Chinese EV inputs.

Technology Localisation:
Promote domestic innovation via Atmanirbhar EV Mission 2030, public–private R&D grants, and partnerships with Japan, the EU, and the US.

WTO Norms & Principles (At a Glance):

Conclusion:

While India’s EV incentives aim to foster sustainability and self-reliance, they must remain WTO-compliant to avoid sanctions or trade retaliation. Balancing green industrial policy with global trade obligations will be key to ensuring both domestic innovation and international credibility.