At the 50th-anniversary conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), India’s External Affairs Minister cautioned that bioterrorism is no longer a hypothetical risk but an emerging global reality.
Rapid advances in biotechnology, inexpensive gene-editing tools, and weak international oversight have expanded opportunities for non-state actors to misuse biological agents.
Bioterrorism involves the deliberate release of bacteria, viruses, toxins, or engineered pathogens to cause mass illness, disrupt economies, and spread fear. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed serious gaps in global preparedness, demonstrating how easily biological threats can escalate across borders.
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
The BWC, also known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, is the world’s first multilateral disarmament treaty eliminating an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.
Negotiated in Geneva (1969–1971) and entering into force in 1975, it bans the development, production, stockpiling, and acquisition of biological weapons.
The BWC complements the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibited only the use of biological weapons but not their possession. Today the Convention has 188 States Parties, including India (ratified 1974), and 4 Signatories yet to ratify (Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, Syria).
Five states—including Israel and Chad—have neither signed nor acceded. A Review Conference takes place every five years to strengthen implementation.
Why Bioterrorism Is a Serious Concern
Technological and geopolitical changes have intensified risks:
- Low-cost gene editing: CRISPR kits costing under ₹50,000 increase accessibility.
- Rising terror interest: A 2024 UNSC study found 35+ groups attempted to procure biological agents.
- Weak surveillance: 191 countries reported monitoring failures during the 2020–22 pandemic.
- Dual-use danger: WHO notes that 42% of high-risk labs lack adequate oversight.
- Synthetic biology boom: A projected $30–35 billion market by 2030 raises misuse potential.
Weaknesses in the BWC Framework
Despite its importance, the BWC struggles with structural limitations:
- No verification mechanism to inspect labs or confirm compliance.
- No permanent technical body for scientific risk assessment.
- Lack of mandatory reporting of pathogen inventories or research activities.
- Poor compliance culture: Only 19% of member states regularly file confidence-building measures.
India’s Contributions to Strengthening Biosecurity
India has adopted institutional, legal, and diplomatic measures:
- 1989 Biosecurity Rules regulating hazardous microorganisms and genetically engineered organisms.
- WMD Prohibition Act, 2005 criminalising illegal manufacture, financing, or transfer of WMDs.
- SCOMET Export Controls monitoring high-risk biological materials (Category-2).
- India–France proposal for a BWC Article VII assistance database.
- ITEC training programmes on UNSC 1540 and strategic trade controls.
Way Forward
- Verification Protocol: Create an inspection-based mechanism similar to IAEA and OPCW.
- Permanent BWC Secretariat for tracking gene-editing and dual-use risks.
- Global Data-Sharing Network for outbreak alerts and unusual lab activity.
- National Biosecurity Law integrating existing rules, export controls, and disaster-response frameworks.
Strengthening the BWC is essential for ensuring that scientific progress does not become a pathway to global insecurity.