Regional Organisations

India’s uneasy Balancing Act in the Bay of Bengal

Context: India has taken several strategic, infrastructural, and diplomatic steps to position itself as a regional integrator, particularly in the Bay of Bengal and broader South Asia. However, India risks undermining the idea of cooperative regionalism, if it begins to use trade access to signal political displeasure.

Relevance of the topic:

Prelims: India’s initiatives like BIMSTEC, Sagarmala, Act East, Neighbourhood first policy etc.

Mains: Impact of recent India - Bangladesh trade tensions on India's credibility as a regional leader in the Bay of Bengal.

India’s strategic steps in the Bay of Bengal Region:

image 30

India has taken several strategic, infrastructural, and diplomatic steps in the Bay of Bengal and broader South Asia. They include: 

  • India has invested heavily in port infrastructure through the Sagarmala programme to improve coastal logistics and connectivity.
    • India's port infrastructure remains the most extensive and efficient in the region. Cargo-handling capacity is expanding rapidly, and coastal shipping and multimodal linkages are more developed than those of any other BIMSTEC partner. 
    • Regional countries like Bangladesh rely on Indian gateways for faster, cheaper access to global markets. Alternatives via Sri Lanka or Southeast Asia are costlier and less time efficient. 
  • Policy changes such as Goods and Services Tax (GST) cuts on bunker fuel and incentives for coastal shipping have doubled the cargo movement on the east coast in a decade. 
  • At the regional level, India is pushing for better integration through BIMSTEC. India has signed the BIMSTEC Maritime Transport Cooperation Agreement to harmonise customs procedures and foster multimodal linkages, with the broader goal of reducing the cost and friction of trade within the Bay. 
  • Through Act East and Neighbourhood first policy, India emphasis on building connectivity with ASEAN and South Asian neighbours, especially through the Northeast.

These steps aim to improve connectivity, economic ties, and trust among its neighbours. 

image 22

Concerns about India's credibility as a regional trade facilitator

  • India recently withdrew a key transshipment facility granted to Bangladesh. India cited misuse of the facility and regulatory concerns as reasons for the withdrawal. 
  • This move, coupled with restrictions on Bangladeshi imports of some goods via land routes, has raised concerns about India's credibility as a regional trade facilitator in the Bay of Bengal.

Geopolitical Implications

Infrastructure alone does not confer leadership. In a fragmented region like the Bay of Bengal, credibility matters as much as capacity.

  • Erosion of Trust: If India’s neighbours see trade routes being weaponised for political signaling, they will start hedging- possibly turning more towards China or Southeast Asia.
  • Impact on Regional Leadership: India wants to be the economic and connectivity hub of the Bay of Bengal, but leadership requires predictable and rule-based behaviour.
  • Signal to smaller BIMSTEC Members: Countries like Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka may begin to doubt India’s commitment to neutral, cooperative regionalism.

Bay of Bengal is at an Inflection Point: 

  • On one level, it is a zone of opportunity. With improved connectivity, it could emerge as a self-sustaining corridor between South and Southeast Asia.
  • On another level, the region remains vulnerable to strategic anxieties. 

The line between economic policy and geopolitical preference is beginning to blur. 

Way Forward

  • Clarify Policy: Clearly state the reasons for suspending Bangladesh’s transshipment facility and the conditions for its restoration.
  • Rules-Based Mechanism: Establish transparent trade and transit rules to prevent political disruptions from affecting economic cooperation.
  • Strengthen BIMSTEC: Use BIMSTEC to institutionalise regional trade norms, customs coordination, and dispute resolution.
  • Credibility over Coercion: Maintain policy consistency to reinforce India’s image as a dependable regional leader, not a reactive power.

Shift from Globalism to Regionalism 

Context: The growing redundancy of the multilateral institutions like the United Nations and its affiliates is indicating the shift from globalism to regionalism and minilateralism. As globalism recedes, regional groupings will emerge as new power blocs in the future.

Relevance of the Topic : Mains: Is global multilateralism being replaced by regional and minilateral groupings?

Shift from Globalism to Regionalism

  • After the Second World War, the dream of a globally governed world began to take shape. Institutions like the United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were created to ensure peace, economic cooperation, and global governance. 
  • However, the 21st century is witnessing a visible decline in the influence and relevance of these global institutions. In place of globalism, regionalism and minilateralism are emerging as the defining features of the new world order.

Several recent events underscore the decline of globalism: 

  • Protectionist Policies: E.g., Trump’s recent reciprocal tariff policy, and the consequent tariffs imposition by other countries, marks a clear departure from globalism and further strengthens protectionist, inward-looking economic nationalism.
  • Russia-Ukraine War: The inability of the UN to stop or effectively manage the Russia-Ukraine conflict has exposed the limitations of global diplomacy. Instead, NATO — a regional military alliance — emerged as the key player, expanding its influence and support to Ukraine.
  • West Asia Tensions: The Israel-Hamas war shows the failure of global institutions to ensure peace and security in volatile regions. In contrast, regional players like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are asserting themselves more actively, often outside global frameworks.
  • COVID-19 Pandemic: During the pandemic, countries prioritised their own needs, closing borders and hoarding vaccines. Global coordination, as expected from the WHO and other agencies, was minimal, while regional cooperation like the EU’s joint vaccine procurement worked better. 

The Rise of Regional Blocs

Even in the last century, despite tall claims, the real geopolitics revolved around groups and regions. These groupings are based on geography, shared culture, economic interests, and strategic alignment.

  • European Union (EU): Originally a post-war economic pact, the EU has evolved into a major political and economic power bloc. It now leads on issues like climate change, data protection, and trade regulation.
  • ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations): A group of 11 Asian nations, ASEAN has grown into a key player in Asia-Pacific affairs. It plays a central role in regional diplomacy and trade frameworks like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
  • BIMSTEC & IORA: In South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region, India is pushing for regional integration through groupings like BIMSTEC and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). While still underperforming, these platforms offer immense potential for future cooperation.
  • Quad and BRICS:  Minilateral platforms like the Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) are now shaping geopolitical strategies outside the framework of global institutions.

India’s Stance in Regionalism: 

  • India has historically approached geopolitics with idealistic notions like Non-Alignment and global justice. However, the limitations of such an approach have become evident. Today, the Indian government is trying to reinvigorate India’s regional leadership. This can be seen by India’s emphasis on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) diplomacy, active participation in QUAD and BIMSTEC, and efforts to deepen ties with Africa and Southeast Asia. This shows a shift toward strategic realism.
  • South Asia remains the least integrated despite being the most contiguous geographically and culturally. Half-hearted efforts have been made to build regional alliances.
    • SAARC, despite early promises, is dysfunctional due to India-Pakistan tensions. 
    • In 28-years of BIMSTEC existence, its leaders have met only six times, once virtually. It grapples with challenges like a lack of resources and manpower. 
  • Greater integration of the IOR through minilaterals like BIMSTEC, the Western Indian Ocean initiative involving Mauritius and other island countries, and India-East Africa cooperation, must be a priority for the Indian leadership.

Conclusion: As the global order transitions into a multipolar, multi-regional world, countries that understand and invest in regional alliances will be better positioned to secure their interests. India, with its strategic location and growing economy, has both the opportunity and responsibility to lead regional integration in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.

6th BIMSTEC Summit 2025

Context: The 6th BIMSTEC Summit was held in Bangkok, Thailand in April 2025. BIMSTEC serves as a vital bridge between South and Southeast Asia, and is emerging as a powerful platform for advancing regional connectivity, cooperation and shared prosperity. 

Relevance of the topic:

Prelims: Key facts about BIMSTEC.

Mains: Significance of Regional groupings: BIMSTEC.

About BIMSTEC

  • Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is a regional organisation comprising seven member states around the Bay of Bengal region. 
  • BIMSTEC constitutes a unique link between South and South-East Asia, with:
    • five members from South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka) 
    • two from South-East Asia (Myanmar and Thailand).
  • The organisation came into being in 1997 through the 'Bangkok Declaration'.
  • Permanent Secretariat: Dhaka (operational since 2014)
  • BIMSTEC Summit Meetings are held once every two years, preceded by the Ministerial Meeting, and hosted by the Member State holding the BIMSTEC Chairmanship.
  • All decisions of the Summit Meetings are made on the basis of consensus.
image 22

Evolution of BIMSTEC

  • 1997: The economic bloc was formed with four members with the acronym 'BIST-EC' (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation). 
  • 1997: Later, in the same year, following inclusion of Myanmar, the group was renamed 'BIMST-EC' (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic Cooperation). 
  • 2004: With the admission of Nepal and Bhutan, the group was renamed to 'Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation' (BIMSTEC).

BIMSTEC Charter

  • The BIMSTEC Charter, which lays the institutional and legal foundation of the grouping, officially came into force in 2023.
  • This formalises BIMSTEC as a regional organisation with a defined structure and working mechanism. It provides a clear framework for cooperation among its member states. 

Salient features of the BIMSTEC Charter include

  • Legal Personality: The Charter grants BIMSTEC legal status as an international organisation. This enables it to engage formally with other entities, enter agreements, admit new members or observers, and expand its influence globally.
  • Objectives: BIMSTEC’s core goals:
    • To promote economic growth and social progress in the region.
    • To enhance collaboration across diverse sectors such as trade, technology, energy, connectivity, and security.
    • To address common challenges like poverty eradication, climate change, terrorism, and organised crime.
  • Guiding principles: BIMSTEC operates based on universally accepted principles:
    • Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
    • Non-interference in internal affairs of member states.
    • Peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit in all cooperative efforts.
  • Institutional Structure: The Charter establishes a hierarchical structure for decision-making:
    • Summit Meetings: Heads of State or Government meet periodically to set strategic direction.
    • Ministerial Meetings: Ministers oversee specific areas of cooperation.
    • Senior Officials’ Meetings: High-ranking officials implement decisions and monitor progress.
  • Sectoral Division: To streamline cooperation, BIMSTEC divides its focus into six priority sectors (trade & investment, energy, technology etc.). Each sector is led by a designated member state to ensure effective coordination.
  • Dispute Resolution Mechanism: A provision is included for resolving disputes amicably among member states to ensure smooth functioning of the organisation.

Key updates from the 6th BIMSTEC Summit (2025) held in Bangkok:

1. Institutional and Strategic Developments:

  • Adoption of the Bangkok Vision 2030: The Vision aims to build a prosperous, secure, and inclusive Bay of Bengal region. Reflects shared goals for deeper regional integration, sustainable development, and economic prosperity.
  • Emphasis on Collective Progress: PM Modi reiterated the motto of "Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas, Sabka Prayas" to underline India’s commitment to inclusive development and regional cooperation.

2. Security and Institutional Cooperation: 

  • Institutionalisation of Home Ministers' Mechanism: BIMSTEC Home Ministers’ meeting is being institutionalised as a permanent mechanism. Areas of cooperation include:
    • Counter-terrorism
    • Cybersecurity
    • Combating drug and human trafficking. 

3. Connectivity: Physical, Digital, and Energy: 

  • Physical and Energy Connectivity: PM Modi stressed that physical infrastructure must be complemented with digital and energy linkages. He called for accelerating efforts towards electric grid interconnection across BIMSTEC countries.
  • Digital Connectivity: Proposed integration of India's Unified Payments Interface (UPI) with the digital payment systems of other BIMSTEC member states.

4. Economic and Trade Cooperation:

  • BIMSTEC Chamber of Commerce: Proposal to establish a regional chamber of commerce to foster business-to-business ties.
  • Annual BIMSTEC Business Summit India suggested the institution of a yearly summit to bring together regional business leaders and policymakers.
  • Local Currency Trade: India proposed a feasibility study on the possibility of conducting trade within the BIMSTEC region using local currencies to reduce dependency on external currencies.

5. Connectivity: 

  • Establishment of Sustainable Maritime Transport Centre in India to work to enhance coordination in capacity building, research, innovation and maritime policies.

6. Disaster Preparedness and Management:

  • Establishing the BIMSTEC Centre of Excellence for Disaster Management in India to cooperate in disaster management, relief and rehabilitation.
  • BIMSTEC Joint Disaster Management Exercise: The 4th joint exercise of BIMSTEC Disaster Management Authorities will be held in India later in 2025.

7. Space:

  • India proposed initiatives- setting up ground stations for manpower training for BIMSTEC countries, manufacturing and launch of Nano Satellites, and use of remote sensing data.

8. Agriculture: 

  • Centre of Excellence in Agriculture which aim is to enhance: Best practice exchange, Research collaboration and capacity building among farmers in the region

9. Education, Skilling, and Youth Exchange: 

  • BODHI Initiative (BIMSTEC for Organised Development of Human Resource Infrastructure): Under this initiative, 300 youth from BIMSTEC countries will be trained in India annually.
  • Scholarships to be provided at Forest Research Institute and Nalanda University. 
  • An annual training programme for young diplomats from BIMSTEC countries will be organised. 

Asian Development Bank

Context: India inked a policy-based loan agreement with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), securing $400 million. The funds are earmarked to facilitate the development of high-quality urban infrastructure, enhance service delivery, and advance efficient governance systems, as outlined in a statement from the finance ministry.

More about the news: 

  • Sub-programme 1, sanctioned in 2021 with a budget of $350 million, laid the groundwork for national-level policies and guidelines aimed at enhancing urban services.
  • In parallel, the more recent sub-programme 2 is dedicated to supporting investment planning and reform initiatives at both the state and urban local body (ULB) levels. 
  • Specifically, sub-programme 2 aligns with the ongoing reforms led by states and ULBs to implement the national flagship program, Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT) 2.0, which targets universal access to water supply and sanitation.
  • Urban Local Bodies will play a pivotal role in advancing modernization efforts, including building bylaw updates, land pooling, urban agglomeration, and comprehensive urban mobility planning with a focus on transit-oriented development.
  • These integrated planning processes incorporate climate and disaster resilience, promote nature-based solutions, enhance the urban environment, and boost cities' financial sustainability by generating additional revenues.
  • Cities will be incentivized to enhance their creditworthiness through reforms targeting increased revenues, such as property taxes and user charges, coupled with efficiency improvements and streamlined expenditures.
  • This strategic approach aims to empower cities to explore innovative financing avenues, including commercial borrowings, municipal bonds issuance, sub-sovereign debts, and public–private partnerships, thereby addressing significant deficits in urban infrastructure investments.

About Asian Development Bank:

  • Founded in December 1966, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is a regional development bank with its headquarters situated in Mandaluyong, Manila, Philippines.
  • The bank extends its membership to countries within the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, as well as non-regional developed nations.
  • Drawing inspiration from the World Bank, the ADB closely mirrors its structure, featuring a comparable weighted voting system that aligns with the capital subscriptions of its members. 
  • This system ensures proportional representation in decision-making processes.
  • Furthermore, the ADB holds the distinction of being recognized as an official United Nations Observer.

Governance: 

  • At the apex of the bank's decision-making structure is the Board of Governors, comprising a representative from each member state.
  • From this assembly, the twelve members of the Board of Directors and their deputies are elected, with the Board of Governors themselves partaking in this selection.
  • Out of these twelve, eight are chosen from regional members in the Asia-Pacific area, while the remaining four are selected from non-regional members.
  • The Board of Governors is also responsible for the election of the bank's president, who serves as the chairperson of the Board of Directors and oversees the management of the ADB.
  • The president's term spans five years and is eligible for re-election.

Objectives and activities: 

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) characterizes itself as a social development organization committed to alleviating poverty in Asia and the Pacific through the promotion of inclusive economic growth, environmentally sustainable practices, and regional integration.

Key operational areas include:

  • Education: While there has been significant progress in primary education enrolment rates in many developing countries in Asia and the Pacific, persistent challenges threaten economic and social growth. The ADB focuses on addressing these challenges.
  • Environment, Climate Change, and Disaster Risk Management: Recognizing that environmental sustainability is fundamental to economic growth and poverty reduction in the region, the ADB actively engages in initiatives related to overall environmental conservation.
  • Finance Sector Development: This involves initiatives such as capital market development, support for microfinance, small and medium-sized enterprises, and regulatory reforms to benefit the most vulnerable populations.
  • Infrastructure: A critical focus area encompasses infrastructure development, spanning transport, communications, energy, water supply, sanitation, and urban development. 
  • Regional Cooperation and Integration: Introduced in 2004, regional cooperation and integration (RCI) is regarded as a longstanding priority. This process fosters stronger connections between national economies.

Financings:

  • The Asian Development Bank (ADB) extends ‘hard’ loans on commercial terms, primarily directed at middle-income countries in Asia.
  • It offers ‘soft’ loans to economically disadvantaged countries in the region, characterized by lower interest rates.
  • The ADB's Private Sector Department (PSOD) possesses the flexibility to provide a diverse array of financial instruments beyond commercial loans, including guarantees, equity, and mezzanine finance, which combines elements of both debt and equity.
  • Funding for ADB's operations is secured through various channels, notably by issuing bonds on the global capital markets.
  • Additionally, it relies on financial contributions from member countries, earnings retained from lending activities, and the repayment of loans.

Voting rights:

The Asian Development Bank's top 10 countries, ranked by their significant capital contributions and corresponding voting rights, are as follows:

  1. Japan (100.00)
  2. United States (12.751)
  3. China (12.751)
  4. India (5.437)
  5. Australia (4.913)
  6. Indonesia (4.641)
  7. Canada (4.469)
  8. South Korea (4.315)
  9. Germany (3.747)
  10. Malaysia (2.468)
image 22

ADB Strategy 2030:

  • Within this framework, the ADB commits to sustaining efforts to eliminate extreme poverty while expanding its vision to realize a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable Asia and the Pacific.
  • Aligned with major global commitments, the ADB will play a pivotal role in advancing the global infrastructure development agenda, recognizing it as a catalyst for worldwide economic growth.
  • ADB will broaden its interventions in social sectors such as education, health, and social protection. The institution aims to integrate its expertise across diverse sectors and themes to effectively address complex development challenges.
  • As a trusted development partner, the ADB will enhance the value it provides to its developing member countries (DMCs) by combining financial support, knowledge dissemination, and fostering partnerships.
  • It will maintain its role as a reliable financier and catalyst for financial mobilization.
image 23

The Asian Development Bank's (ADB) support, encompassing public and private sector operations, advisory services, and knowledge initiatives, will be strategically focused on the following key operational priorities:

  1. Addressing Remaining Poverty and Reducing Inequalities: ADB will intensify efforts in human development and social inclusion, addressing non-income dimensions of poverty. Emphasis will be placed on facilitating quality job creation, particularly by small and medium-sized enterprises and inclusive businesses.
  2. Accelerating Progress in Gender Equality: ADB is committed to supporting operations that empower women and girls, actively mainstreaming gender considerations to narrow existing gaps. The goal is for at least 75% of ADB's committed operations to promote gender equality by 2030.
  3. Tackling Climate Change, Building Resilience, and Enhancing Environmental Sustainability: ADB aims to ensure that 75% of its committed operations actively contribute to climate change mitigation and adaptation by 2030.
  4. Making Cities More Liveable: ADB will undertake crosscutting projects to enhance urban health, mobility, gender equality, and environmental sustainability. This involves exploring new funding sources for cities, fostering inclusive urban planning, and integrating climate resilience and disaster risk management.
  5. Promoting Rural Development and Food Security: ADB will support efforts to improve market connectivity and agricultural value chain linkages, boosting both farm and nonfarm incomes. This includes promoting advanced technologies and climate-smart agricultural practices.
  6. Strengthening Governance and Institutional Capacity: ADB will assist in public management reforms to enhance governance, creating an environment conducive to sustainable growth. This involves building resilience, responding to economic shocks, improving service delivery, and enhancing capacity and standards, all while adhering to fiduciary standards and implementing anticorruption measures.
  7. Fostering Regional Cooperation and Integration: ADB will increase support for regional public goods and collective actions to mitigate cross-border risks. This includes strengthening subregional initiatives, enhancing financial sector cooperation, and facilitating knowledge sharing and collaboration.

Implementation: 

  • To implement this strategy effectively, ADB will develop operational plans for each of the seven priority areas, outlining specific engagement approaches and skill requirements. 
  • Country partnership strategies will further refine priorities at the country level.
  • The work program and budget framework process will be enhanced to align the annual work plan and resourcing with operational priorities.
  • A new corporate results framework will be established to monitor and measure implementation progress.
  • A "One ADB" approach will be instituted, consolidating knowledge and expertise across the organization to streamline the implementation of Strategy 2030.

India and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Context: Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Council of Heads of State meeting, marking India's inaugural chairmanship of the summit.

Rationale behind India's SCO Membership

  • India joined the SCO in 2017, emphasizing the group's significance as its member countries collectively contribute to a substantial portion of global GDP, trade, oil reserves, and natural gas reserves.
  • The SCO's focus on regional security and connectivity aligns with India's growth priorities and addresses challenges such as terrorism in Pakistan and Chinese aggressions, including the Belt and Road Initiative.

Importance of Inclusion within the SCO

India's membership in the SCO provides it with a platform for engagement, especially considering Pakistan's membership. Joint exercises under the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure are conducted, and India gains access to Central Asian markets and resources.

  • SCO Membership and India's Strategic Ambitions: 
    • Joining the SCO aligns with India's goals of "multi-alignment" and "strategic autonomy," positioning itself as a balancing power in the global arena. India's simultaneous entry into the revived Quad with the United States, Japan, and Australia in 2017 reflects its strategic intent.
  • Economic Necessity and Neutrality on Ukraine Conflict:
    • India's decision -to remain neutral in the Ukraine conflict has made its engagement with the SCO economically essential, benefiting from fuel and fertilizer purchases from Russia.
  • Expectations for India's Chairmanship of the SCO Summit: 
    • India's turn to chair the SCO summit was anticipated to be a significant event, potentially revitalising the importance of the G-20 meeting. Given Russia and China's obstruction of the G-20 joint communiqué, India saw the SCO summit as an opportunity for Prime Minister Modi to negotiate resolutions with his counterparts.
  • Economic Cooperation and Energy Security:
    • The SCO provides a platform for India to enhance economic cooperation with resource-rich Central Asian countries. India aims to diversify its economic partnerships and tap into Central Asia's oil and gas reserves for energy security.
  • Cultural Cooperation and Tourism:
    • India benefits from cultural cooperation within the SCO, with initiatives such as designating Varanasi as the first cultural capital. The organization's cultural heritage includes numerous UNESCO World Heritage Sites.
  • Counterterrorism Efforts:
    • India, as a victim of terrorism, can benefit from the SCO's focus on counterterrorism cooperation. The organization's collective efforts can help combat terrorism in the region, providing security benefits for India.
  • Significance of Iran's Induction: Iran has been an observer in the SCO since 2005, and almost after 15 years, its bid for full and permanent membership in the organisation was approved at the 2021 Summit in Dushanbe. A formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iran was signed last year at the 2022 Summit held at Samarkand, Uzbekistan. 
    • The SCO's recent focus has shifted towards regional connectivity, making Iran's induction crucial.
    • India, with its connectivity strategy through Iran's Chabahar port and the International North South Transport Corridor, sees Iran's inclusion as a significant milestone.
    • Iran's presence supports India's efforts to bypass land-based trade through Pakistan, which has impeded transit trade for India. 
    • The potential for double land-locked Central Asian states (Uzbekistan and Iran) to establish a multimodal trade route via Afghanistan to ports in Pakistan and Iran.
    • Moreover, Iran's inclusion allows India to engage in regional trade while avoiding China's Belt and Road Initiative.
    • Additionally, Iran's historical partnership with India and its shared struggle against terrorism originating from Pakistan and Afghanistan strengthens India's stance against terror safe havens.

Diminishing Returns and Challenges for India

With the conclusion of India's chairpersonship of the SCO, the government may be experiencing the law of diminishing returns regarding its engagement with the organization. This situation could potentially complicate India's task of hosting the G-20 meeting.

  • Limited Consensus and Unendorsed Agreements
    • While the SCO members achieved consensus on the New Delhi declaration and joint statements on radicalization and digital transformation, India, as the Chair, was unable to forge agreement on other matters.
    • These included formalizing English as an SCO language and endorsing a road map on economic cooperation, likely due to concerns about China's influence.
  • Membership and Conflicts Among Member Countries
    • There are conflicts between member countries, including the border issues between India and China, state-sponsored terrorism causing tensions between India and Pakistan, border issues between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and instability in the border area between Taliban-led Afghanistan and Pakistan.
  • China's Rise and External Pressures
    • China's increasing influence in inner Asia has led to external pressures from regional powers, such as the United States, seeking to contain China's rise. This puts additional pressure on the SCO.
  • Limited Institutional Mechanisms and Divergent Interests:
    • The SCO lacks formal decision-making and enforcement powers, limiting its governance effectiveness. Member states with different political systems, economic models, and strategic priorities can lead to internal conflicts and disagreements.
  • Geographical Scope and Western Criticism:
    • The SCO's focus on Eurasia and neighbouring regions restricts its ability to engage with global issues. Western countries criticize the organization for its lack of democratic credentials, support for authoritarian regimes, and internal conflicts.
  • Challenges with the induction of Iran for India: While Iran's induction into the SCO aligns with India's interests, there are potential challenges. 
    • The SCO is increasingly seen as an "anti-West" forum, and both Iran and Russia face severe sanctions.
    • The US has accused Iran of supplying weapons to Russia, further contributing to this perception.
    • The expected inclusion of Belarus next year will reinforce the SCO's image, contrasting with India's strengthening ties with the Quad.
    • This situation presents a delicate balancing act for India in managing its relationships.

Way forward

  • Enhancing Connectivity with Central Asia:
    • India should focus on improving connectivity with Central Asia by utilizing the Chabahar port and becoming a part of the Ashgabat agreement. This will help strengthen India's presence in Eurasia.
    • Additionally, emphasis should be placed on utilizing the International North-South Corridor (INSTC) for enhanced regional connectivity.
    • This can be used to enhance relations with Pakistan and persuade them to remove obstacles blocking India's access to Eurasia. It is important to prioritize initiatives that facilitate cooperation, such as infrastructure projects.
  • Peaceful Coexistence of India and China: For the Asian century to be truly realized, India and China must coexist peacefully. Both nations should work towards maintaining harmonious relations and fostering cooperation for mutual benefit.
  • Strengthening the Fight against Terrorism: Efforts should be made to enhance the effectiveness of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, enabling better collaboration in combating terrorism.

Iran to Join Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Context: The recent virtual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) witnessed the announcement of a "more representative" and multipolar world order. This article highlights the key agreements signed at the summit, India's stance on certain issues, and the cooperative efforts of SCO member states.

Key Points:

  • Iran's Induction: SCO welcomed Iran as its ninth member, signifying its commitment to inclusivity and expanding its regional influence.
  • India's Dissent: India abstained from endorsing paragraphs related to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the joint statement, indicating a lack of consensus within the grouping. India also expressed concerns over cross-border terrorism by Pakistan and China's connectivity projects that infringe on sovereign boundaries.
  • New Delhi Declaration: The summit witnessed the signing of the New Delhi Declaration, which outlines areas of cooperation among SCO member countries.
    • Opposition to Militarization of ICTs: SCO member states collectively oppose the militarization of information and communication technologies, emphasizing the need for universal rules and responsible behaviour in this domain.
    • Criticism of Non-UN Sanctions: The SCO members voiced their disapproval of non-UN sanctions, deeming them incompatible with international law and detrimental to other countries.
    • Exploration of National Currencies: SCO member countries agreed to explore the use of national currencies for intra-group payments, aiming to reduce dependence on international dollar-based transactions.
    • Commitment to Peace and Cooperation: SCO member states reaffirmed their commitment to peace, joint development, and equal relations based on mutual respect, friendship, and good neighbourliness.
    • Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking: The countries agreed to continue implementing the SCO Anti-Drug Strategy and conduct joint anti-drug operations regularly.
    • Environmental Protection and Climate Change: Member states recognized the importance of cooperation in environmental protection, ecological security, and mitigating the consequences of climate change.
    • Strengthening the WTO: SCO member states emphasized the need for a more effective World Trade Organization (WTO) as a platform for discussing the international trade agenda and adopting multilateral trading regulations.
    • Multilateral Arms Control: The member states emphasized the use of political and diplomatic means to address global and regional security challenges, actively promoting multilateral arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation processes.

Saudi Arabia agrees to join SCO as a dialogue partner

Context: Saudi Arabia has agreed to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as a “dialogue partner”, the latest indication of closer political ties with China.

This is also seen as the step in the direction where Saudi Arabia can later become a full time member of the organization.

The Saudi-Iran Bonhomie

  • By joining the SCO, Saudi Arabia's security relationship with China is currently blossoming. But this relationship is nothing new and stems back decades before. 
  • The ballistic missile sales from China to Saudi Arabia as far back as the 1980s, with reported sales in 1992, 2007 and 2014. In 2021, the kingdom imported sensitive missile technology from the Chinese military to manufacture its own ballistic missiles
  • Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest crude supplier, and China, the biggest energy consumer, met to discuss their ambitions for an initial agreement of $29.26 billion. 
  • The United States was Riyadh’s largest trading partner at $76 billion in 2012, but now China, India and Japan have surpassed the United States, with which trade was only $29 billion in 2021
  • Saudi Aramco signed two deals to build a major refining and petrochemical complex in China valued in the billions of dollars. 

It can be concluded that Saudi Arabia is seemingly looking to diversify its global partnerships in the same way that it has been diversifying its economy into non-oil sectors and reducing its dependence on one single source. 

Reasons behind blossoming ties

  • The US is distancing itself from the region as it is no longer dependent on energy imports from the region. It has itself emerged as a significant exporter of both oil and gas.
  • The relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia entered a fraught timeline since President Joe Biden came into office
  • Joe Biden announced the end of combat assistance to Riyadh as it led a military campaign in Yemen against the Iran-aligned Ansar Allah, or Houthi, movement.
  • With the Russia-Ukraine war and the energy prices soared over the conflict and ensuing Western sanctions against Moscow, Washington called on Riyadh to increase production, only for the Kingdom to join with Russia and other members of the extended Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+) in cutting output.
  • America knows that its survival in the region is very costly, because it will remain under the strikes of the Axis of Resistance, which has grown and gained great influence in last decade, meaning that the American presence is no longer without cost, but rather the price will rise if US stays. 
  • Now reports have emerged that Saudi Arabia has begun talks to restore ties with Syria, which has been suspended from the Arab League since civil war broke out in 2011
  • Iran the long-time rival has joined SCO and has showed interest to join BRICS as well and this has prompted Saudi also, which has been aspiring for the same.

About Shanghai Cooperation Organization

It is a permanent intergovernmental international organisation and was formed in 2001. It is a successor of Shanghai five.

Shanghai Five

Shanghai Five, a political association based on the Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field in the Border Area and the Agreement on the Mutual

Reduction of Armed Forces Members: (SCO - UZBEKISTAN)

Members

NINE countries are currently SCO full members: Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan became full members in 2017 and IRAN in 2023.

SCO decided to admit India & Pakistan at the Ufa summit of 2015.

India participated for the first time as a full member at the recently held 18th Qingdao Summit of SCO in China that was held in 2018.

Working

  • The Heads of State Council (HSC) is the highest decision-making body in the SCO.
  • The secretary general and executive director of RATS is appointed by HSC for 3 Year term.
  • The Heads of Government Council (HGC) meets once per year to discuss a strategy for multilateral cooperation and priority directions within the Organisation's framework.
  • Organisation has two permanent bodies — the Secretariat in Beijing (China) and the Regional Anti- Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent.
  • SCO RATS: Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of SCO is a permanent body based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. 
  • The objective of RATS is based upon the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism. RATS possess information on terrorist organisations and terrorists.

China’s Global Security Initiative and the dichotomy

Context: Recently China introduced the Global Security Initiative (GSI) Concept Paper. The GSI is as a China-led framework that seeks to restore stability and security, particularly in Asia. The paper has outlined five major pillars to effectively implement the GSI, i.e., mutual respect; openness and inclusion; multilateralism; mutual benefit, and a holistic approach.

GSI is tailored more to be an empty narrative to compete with United States leadership and dominant U.S.-led concepts. As the war in Ukraine intensified and diverging perceptions among developing countries vis-à-vis the West and the unfolding war, China is seeking to leverage these fault lines by promoting its vision as a capable alternative leader.

Understanding the concept paper and dichotomy

  • The GSI’s first principle centres on the need for countries to adhere to the United Nations Charter and international law based on mutual trust and cooperation.

However China has consistently demonstrated the exact opposite in terms of its relations with its neighbours. Along its southwestern border, China continues to ensure that its relations with India are provocative by constantly undermining India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 

China is also increasing its assertive manoeuvres in the South China Sea by greatly militarising the disputed maritime territory at the expense of the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of its Southeast Asian neighbours. 

Further, in its complete rejection of international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China continues to assertively intrude and block the access of its neighbours within their respective Exclusive Economic Zones.

  • The second principle of the GSI lies in its openness to spearhead inclusive international engagements

However China at the same time continues to engage in exclusionary policies in the East and South China Seas. This an outright rejection of freedom of navigation enshrined in international law and also a display of narrowly defined interests to consolidate its sphere of influence in the region.

  • The third principle focuses on bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and consultations to address issues of concern with the parties involved.

However analysing the Chinese understanding of consultation can be seen through the prism of asymmetric power relations such as constraining members of the ASEAN from pursuing collective actions against Beijing’s assertion. 

Moreover, China continues to delay the establishment of a crucial Code of Conduct for the South China Sea as it continues to bolster its military power projection in the disputed territory and indulge in various grey zone strategies.

  • The fourth principle highlights the GSI’s prioritisation of positive-sum cooperation, where parties involved can equally benefit

However if we look at China’s Belt and Road which seems to address the significant infrastructure deficit in the developing world, but the initiatives disregard for international macroeconomic stability by funding unsustainable projects for countries with low or non-existing credit ratings that creates more debt burdens for these countries. 

Further China has also shown disregard for its neighbour’s sovereignty and sovereign rights, as China has insisted on receiving a larger share in its bid for a joint exploration of resources with Manila in Philippine waters

  • The fifth and the last principle that GSI advocates a holistic approach towards traditional and non-traditional security threats, with an equal emphasis on eliminating any “breeding ground for insecurity”.

Rather than being holistic, China’s engagements with the powers indicate a more narrowly defined goal for its power interests. 

China also continues to be a catalyst for insecurity in the non-traditional security realm, starting from its alleged lack of accountability regarding the COVID-19 pandemic to arming terror groups, such as in Myanmar.
Therefore it can be concluded that China’s GSI is far from being a sustainable, equitable, and transparent solution to the growing insecurity that the world is facing, given an objective understanding of its track record in fulfilling its own principle requirements. Rather, the GSI indicates Beijing’s attempt to counter U.S. leadership through narratives, regardless of whether it can effectively operationalise such initiatives on the ground.

Trending now

State of India’s Environment 2026: Rising Climate Risks and the Need for Resilience
Karnataka Announces Ban on Social Media for Children Under-16
India–France “Special Global Strategic Partnership”: A New Indo-Pacific Anchor
Front-of-Package Labelling: A Preventive Strategy to Address India’s Rising Lifestyle Diseases