Miscellaneous topics in India’s International Relations

Collaboration over Indus Water Treaty

Context: The Indus Waters Treaty (1960), or IWT, that regulates the Indus water courses between the two riparian states of India and Pakistan, is cited by many as an example of cooperation between two unfriendly neighbours for many reasons.

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Recent Development:

  • In the recent times exercising judicial recourse to settle the competing claims and objections arising out of the construction and design elements of the run-of-river hydroelectric projects that India is permitted under the IWT to construct on the tributaries of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab before these rivers flow into Pakistan, has increased.
  • Pakistan initiated arbitration at the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration to address the interpretation and application of the IWT to certain design elements of two run-of-river hydroelectric projects — on the Kishanganga (a tributary of the Jhelum) and Ratle, a hydro-electric project on the Chenab.
  • India raised objections as it views that the Court of Arbitration is not competent to consider the questions put to it by Pakistan and that such questions should instead be decided through the neutral expert process.
  • The court unanimously passed a decision (which is binding on both parties without appeal) rejecting each of India’s objections. The court determined that it is competent to consider and determine the disputes set forth in Pakistan’s request for arbitration.

Issues in Indus Water Treaty

  1. Prevents Storage: It prevents storage projects by India that was even highlighted by Parliamentary committee.
  2. Technical: The treaty is highly technical in nature which leads to different interpretations among the countries.
  3. Political Mistrust: There is high-level of political mistrust between India and Pakistan which has historical underpinnings.
  4. Underutilization: The parliamentary committee has also opined that India has underutilized water of western rivers for irrigation purpose though being legally permissible under the treaty
  5. Data Sharing: There is absence of data sharing mechanism within the treaty.
  6. Emerging issues: The treaty was signed in 1960 and is limited to river management and usage and thus does not incorporate contemporary issues like climate change, global warming and Environmental Impact assessment under its ambit.
  7. Limited role of World bank: World Bank though a guarantor relies on the reports that are submitted by respective countries and thus has no independent way to ensure what actually is the issue.

Way Forward:

  1. Internationalizing India’s position: India has only utilized 93% of the storage capacity under the treaty and 25% of water generation capacity which highlights India’s credential as generous upper riparian state.
  2. Renegotiation of Treaty: To accommodate for climate challenges and other emerging issues.
  3. Seeking Cooperation: The provisions of the treaty provides scope for joint studies and joint research and this can be utilized to ensure cooperation between countries.
  4. Relationality over rationality: The focus should be on relationality i.e. benefit sharing rather than just restricting the goals to water sharing as it will give due importance to minor issues like soil erosion, water quality etc.
  5. Changing approach: There is a need to change approach from and focus on sub-basin level, which will not only make use of existing hydrology mechanism but also the socio-economic impact of the same.
  6. Contemporary laws: Both India and Pakistan can make active use of contemporary laws like “Helsinki Rule”, which provides for the International guideline asserting rights for all bordering nations to have equitable share in water resource.
  7. Reconciling this divergent approach: Which can be sought with the help of two cardinal principles of international water courses law accompanying binding obligations, i.e., equitable and reasonable utilisation (ERU) and the principle not to cause significant harm or no harm rule (NHR). In order to ensure rapid development, the state’s (India and Pakistan) needs prioritise the ERU over the NHR.

Horizon 2047: Vision for India-France Strategic Partnership

Context: During the recent visit of PM Modi to France a variety of agreements chief among the agreements was the strategic road map for the next 25 years “Horizon 2047” which includes cooperation in defence, space, nuclear energy, climate change and green transitions as well as education and people-to-people ties. 

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The document Horizon 2047, reflects a vision of the two leaders, of Prime Minister Modi and President Macron, on where the relationship should be in 2047 when India would celebrate 100th year of its independence and we will be celebrating 50 years of our Strategic Partnership. It has 63 specific outcomes that are divided among multiple pillars.

Major pointers of document Horizon 2047

  1. Partnership for Security and Sovereignty: A comprehensive approach to security and sovereignty cooperation between the two countries.
  2. India-France Partnership in the Indo-Pacific: Focused on providing solutions for security, strategic, and economic challenges.
  3. Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism: Joint efforts to combat terrorism and ensure global security.
  4. Renewed and Effective Multilateralism: Shared commitment to promoting multilateral cooperation.
  5. Science, Technology, and Academic Cooperation: Collaboration between research institutions in scientific, critical technologies, health, cyber, digital regulatory frameworks, and digital technologies.
  6. People-to-People Ties: Enhancing mobility partnership and skill-set cooperation to foster academic collaboration and meet the needs of skill development.
  7. Defence Cooperation: Roadmap for further cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, including military and naval exchanges and a trilateral development fund.
  8. Defence Procurement: Approval for the purchase of 26 Rafale-M fighter jets for the Indian Navy, three additional Scorpene submarines, and an agreement for helicopter engines.

The France-India strategic relationship is built on respect for each other's strategic autonomy, with France refraining from commenting on India's internal affairs or foreign policy choices.

China’s Outreach in South pacific

Context: Leaders of the Solomon Islands and China promised to expand relations that have fuelled unease in Washington and Australia about Beijing’s influence in the South Pacific.

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China & Solomon Islands

  • The Solomon Islands, 2,000 kilometres northeast of Australia, has been China’s biggest success in a campaign to expand its presence in the South Pacific. The Solomon government switched official recognition in 2019 to Beijing from Taiwan.
  • The Solomon Islands signed a secretive security agreement with Beijing that might have allowed Chinese military forces in the South Pacific.
  • Beijing wants to expand relations and trade through its Belt and Road Initiative to build ports and other infrastructure from the Pacific across Asia and Africa.

Recent Developments in the region:

Located between the US, China and Australia, the Pacific island countries hold strategic importance for security and defence. The US has long maintained influence and a military presence in the Pacific region. Over the last decade, China has focused on strengthening its ties in Pacific through increased aid development, diplomacy and security cooperation.

  • The area gained prominence when in 2022, Solomon Islands signed a security pact sparking international concern over the possibility of Beijing building its first military base in the region.
  • China has also signed off on a variety of smaller bilateral agreements during the same tour. To counter the move, newly appointed Australian Foreign Minister, immediately travelled to Fiji, Samoa and Tonga to shore up Australian diplomatic interests in Oceania.

Isolation of Taiwan

Strategist are of the opinion that China would use the island countries to further isolate Taiwan from the diplomatic support it receives from the region. 

  • Several countries in Oceania (The Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, and Tuvalu) recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country. Chinese outreach and development manoeuvrings could therefore help them reduce regional support for Taiwanese independence. 
  • As a testimony to this Honiara has recently cut ties with Taiwan and followed Beijing’s line on the “One China” policy. The “Inter-governmental Framework Agreement on Security Cooperation” between Beijing-Honiara is a culmination of these efforts.

Isolation of Australia:

  • Increased Chinese influence in the region could lead to more overseas military bases being built, and could lead to Australia, a vital Pacific ally for the United States, to be isolated, cutting them from supply lines from overseas.

The Zero Sum Game in the Pacific

  • China’s engagement with South Pacific is about increasing its influence and about diminishing American and Australian influence. It’s a zero-sum game. Australia has a security cooperation agreement with Honiara and is a preferred security provider. Australia went from being a “key security provider” to becoming “one of the options” to seek out.

Great Game in the Pacific

  • The US’ posture and initiatives in Indo-Pacific are also worrying China. US’ Indo-Pacific strategy outlines that it is keen to focus on “every corner of the region including the Pacific Islands. Further the formation of Quad and US’ Indo-Pacific strategy have worried China, so this game of influence will further intensify.

Regional Economics

  • The Pacific region is also an important route to transport products and natural resources. Further the exports from Australia (as Australia supplies critical minerals like that of iron ore, coal, and raw cotton and exports to important allies like Australia and other countries like New Zealand pass through this sea area. 

Climate Hazards

  • Many Pacific Island nations are worried of the impact of climate change and rising sea levels, which pose an immediate existential threat. In fact, the Fijian Defence Minister, in the recent Shangri-La Dialogues that the greatest threat to the region is not a conflict between China and the U.S., but rather the geopolitical effects of climate change.

Conclusion 

As two geopolitical superpowers start to compete for political dominance in the region, the region as a whole now risks being dragged into conflicts, being used as pawns in broader global ambitions, and at the worst, could see themselves as the site of an armed conflict.

India's Potential Engagement with NATO Plus

Context: This article discusses the potential benefits and fallouts for India in joining the NATO Plus framework.

About NATO Plus

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  • “NATO plus” refers to a security arrangement of NATO and the five treaty allies of the U.S. i.e. Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Israel, and South Korea as members — to enhance “global defence cooperation” and win the “strategic competition with the Chinese Communist Party”. 
  • Interestingly, the term ‘NATO Plus’ is not an officially recognised or established concept within NATO itself, but has been used in discussions and debates regarding the potential expansion of the alliance. 
  • The inclusion of these countries as members would require a complex process of negotiation and assessment of their compatibility with NATO’s principles, obligations, and defence commitments.
  • While NATO’s earlier target was the Soviet Union and now Russia, the focus of NATO Plus is clearly on containing China. Therefore, considering its disputes with China, India remains a missing link in the framework.

Benefits for India in Joining NATO Plus:

  1. Security Umbrella: India's participation in NATO Plus would offer a security umbrella, enhancing protection and deterrence against potential threats in the Indo-Pacific region.
  2. Access to Advanced Technologies: Joining NATO Plus could grant India access to advanced military technologies, intelligence-sharing platforms, and interoperability with other member states. This would bolster India's defence capabilities and modernization efforts.

Potential Fallouts:

  1. Geopolitical Consequences: India's inclusion in NATO Plus could strain its strategic partnership with Russia and annoy China. India's collaboration with Russia has been crucial in dealing with regional security challenges and moderating China's stance. Joining NATO Plus may crumble this solidified strategic partnership.
  2. Impact on Regional Security: Aligning with a U.S.-led alliance system may limit India's freedom of action and hinder the pursuit of an independent policy towards China. It may complicate India's security in the region and provide a potential justification for further military build-up along the India-China border.
  3. Impact on Strategic Autonomy: India's longstanding policy of strategic autonomy would be at stake as joining NATO Plus would require aligning defense and security policies with the alliance's objectives and strategies. This could strain relationships with other countries and regional organizations that value India's independent stance.
  4. Diversion of Focus: NATO's broader geopolitical agenda spanning Eurasia to the Indo-Pacific may divert attention and resources away from India's pressing regional dynamics, such as border disputes, terrorism, and regional conflicts. Therefore, India may not receive significant assistance from NATO in addressing these challenges.

Way Forward:

  1. Prioritize Regional Dynamics: India should focus on addressing its own unique set of traditional and non-traditional security challenges, including border disputes, terrorism, and regional conflicts.
  2. Emphasize Quad Engagement: India's involvement in the Quad, comprising India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S., presents a more promising avenue for countering China's influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Collaborative efforts within the Quad framework align better with India's regional priorities.
  3. Maintain Strategic Autonomy: India should continue to uphold its policy of strategic autonomy, allowing flexibility in engaging with various nations and blocs based on its own interests. This approach ensures India's ability to navigate regional dynamics while safeguarding its independence.
  4. Strengthen Regional Cooperation: India should prioritize building stronger partnerships and cooperation with neighbouring countries and regional organizations to address common challenges collectively. This approach fosters regional stability and maintains India's regional influence.

India supports 2016 Arbitral Award against China on South China Sea Dispute

Context: During the official visit of Foreign Minister of Philippines to India for Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation with India's External Affairs Minister, India upgraded its position and explicitly called for abiding by the 2016 arbitration award by the Permanent Court of Arbitration under the UNCLOS. The arbitral award came on a petition by Philippines to the Permanent Court of Arbitration and ruled in favour of Philippines. China did not participate in the arbitration process neither  does it recognise the legality of the Award.

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What is the dispute regarding the South China Sea?

  • South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea in the western Pacific Ocean. 
  • Following countries share the littoral of South China Sea: China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei.  
  • China has been making claim over the vast majority of South China Sea on the basis of historic entitlements. China claims over an area known as Nine Dash Line, which is based on the drawing a EEZ around disputed islands over which China claims its fishermen went on fishing and hence, it's sovereign territory.
  • Name of the disputed islands are:
    • Paracel Islands
    • Scarborough Shoal
    • Spratly Islands
  • China wants to pursue one to one negotiations with countries of the littoral, where it thinks it can muscle through it demands due to vast asymmetric power difference between China and these countries. 

Salient Features of the 2016 Arbitration Award

  1. No legal basis for China's 'Nine-Dash Line' which is based on historic rights which China enjoyed during ancient times in South China Sea. According to the Award, UNCLOS defines the scope of maritime rights of littoral states in South China Sea. 
  2. None of the land features claimed by China in the South China Sea (Spratly & Scarborough Shoal) are 'islands' for the purposes of UNCLOS. Since they are not islands, they cannot generate an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. UNCLOS defines islands as 'a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide' and only islands have claim over territorial sea, contiguous land and 200 nautical miles of EEZ and continental shelf. On the other hand,  a "rock" is a category of island which "cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of [its] own" and carries no entitlement to an EEZ or continental shelf.
  3. UNCLOS provides that any decision rendered by a court or Tribunal having jurisdiction is final and binding between the parties. Thus, China's not adhering to the Award against it goes against liberal economic order and adherence to international law. 
  4. China through its maritime surveillance vessels, promulgation of a fishing moratorium in South China Sea, and construction of artificial islands and installations, had interfered with the exercise of the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its EEZ and continental shelf with respect to fishing, oil exploration, and navigation;
  5. China failed to prevent exploitation of Philippines’ living resources by Chinese fishing vessels in the Philippines' EEZ; 
  6. China interfered with the traditional fishing activities of Philippine fishermen at Scarborough Shoal; 
  7. China failed to protect and preserve the marine environment by tolerating and actively supporting Chinese fishermen in the harvesting of endangered species and the use of harmful fishing methods that damaged the fragile coral reef ecosystem in the South China Sea;
  8. China inflicted severe harm on the marine environment by constructing artificial islands and engaging in extensive land reclamation at seven reefs in the Spratly Islands; and
  9. China through the activities of its law enforcement vessels, created serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine vessels and personnel.

India's evolving position on South China Sea

Earlier Position

  • In earlier statements, India called for peaceful resolution of disputes among the countries of South China Sea littoral. 
  • India called for freedom of navigation and overflight and unimpeded commerce based on international law in the South China Sea region. 
  • India has criticised unilateral use of force and abiding by principles of UNCLOS to amicably resolve the disputes between ASEAN countries of South China Sea Littoral and China. 

Present Position

The present joint statements is the first time India has officially asked parties to adhere to the Arbitral Award i.e., India is expressly siding with Philippines and against China on the South China dispute. The reasons for the same are:

  • Changing policies in Philippines: Earlier, Philippines government under President Duterte tried to court China and put the issue of 2016 award on the backburner. However, present Philippines government under President Marcos Junior has taken the award more seriously and consider its ruling as final. 
  • Geopolitical changes: USA and Quad countries have been backing India to play a larger role in the dispute resolution of South China Sea. China's increasing belligerence on India's territorial borders of Ladakh and Arunachal have also compelled India to take a more confrontational stand against territorial claims of China elsewhere.
  • Bolstering defence of Vietnam & Philippines: India has been selling weapons to Veitnam and Philippines, countries party to the South China Sea dispute against China to bolster their defences. India is considering to sell Brahmos missiles and Tejas airplanes to both Vietnam and Philippines. This will also boost indigenous defence industry and boost defence exports

Way Forward:

  1. India should focus on assisting ASEAN countries with all resources and technological knowhow to defend their territory. India has been a votary of ASEAN centrality while dealing with South China Sea dispute and this position should be continued.
  2. India should contribute and facilitate quick finalisation of Code of Conduct among the Littoral Parties of South China Sea, which will ensure long term peace and amity in the region. 
  3. Ensure that South China Sea remains open for maritime shipping and overflight. 

India – Egypt Relations

Context: During the recent visit of Indian PM to Egypt, the countries took mutual decision to upgrade their ties to a Strategic Partnership, which is seen as a significant move for India’s ties with the West Asia-North Africa (WANA) region that is long overdue, given their historical ties. The visit was also important because it was the first official bilateral visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Egypt since 1997. There have been visits in between but they have mostly been for the multilateral or plurilateral events.

India – Egypt Relations

Historic partnership between India & Egypt

  • The two countries signed a Friendship Treaty in 1955, and India’s support to Egypt, including during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, eventually led to the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, with both as founder members.
  • They were also instrumental in the G-77 grouping and “South-South Cooperation” initiatives
  • During the Cold War, India and Egypt were united over their desire not to become “camp followers” of either the U.S. or the Soviet Union

Recent Interactions:

  • In the recent times their positions on the Ukraine war have been extremely similar — refusing to criticise Russia’s actions but not condoning them either and calling for a diplomatic resolution.
  • India’s decision to supply wheat to Egypt, one of the world’s biggest importers that was hit by the blockade on exports from Russia and Ukraine last year, won New Delhi much goodwill in Cairo. 
  • The leaders have recently spent much time focusing on multilateral issues, India’s close ties in Egypt’s neighbourhood (especially Israel and Saudi Arabia), food and energy security constraints, and building more cooperation with the Global South including the African Union
  • Egypt joined the “New Development Bank” set up by BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa), and is keen to join this grouping that will deliberate new memberships at its Summit in Cape Town this August, where Egypt will seek India’s support.

During the recent visit apart from upgrading ties to strategic level following developments were made

  • The two sides are also pursuing closer cooperation in green energy, pharmaceuticals and defence, with MoUs in agriculture, archaeology and antiquities, and competition law.
  • Leaders identified green and renewable collaboration will be an important part of future partnership because of the importance the two sides attach to clean energy.
  • The setting up of the ‘India Unit’ by Egypt  was welcomed as it highlights ‘whole of the government approach’ to take forward bilateral relations and  also India’s readiness to work closely with Egypt in various areas of mutual interest.
  • Prime Minister also interacted with the leaders of Bohra community, who are actively involved in the upkeep of this Fatimid era Shi’a Mosque and highlighted the strong people to people ties between India and Egypt.

Importance of Egypt for India

  1. Egypt is the most populous country in West Asia, occupies a crucial geo-strategic location on the international trade map. Egypt hosts the Suez Canal, the channel which connects the Red Sea with the Mediterranean and Europe plus - 12% of global trade passes through it.
  2. Egypt can play a key role in countering global terrorism. With Al Azhar Mosque and university revered across the Muslim world, a voice of moderation emerging from Cairo to counter the millenarian ideas of global Jihad, espoused prominently by Al Qaeda and Islamic State terror groups, can play a major role in the battle of narratives.
  3. Egypt under El- Sisi is totally opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), making India Cairo’s natural partner in countering the MB ideology which is being transmitted by regional influencers including Qatar and Turkey.
  4. India’s engagement with Egypt can become part of an energetic but pragmatic exercise to limit Chinese influence as China’s bilateral trade with Egypt is currently at USD 15 billion, double that of India’s USD 7.26 billion in 2021-22 plus Sisi has also been wooing Chinese investments and has visited China seven times in the past eight years.
  5. Egypt is a major market for India and can act as a gateway to both Europe and Africa. It is also important to increase India’s influence is increasing in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean Region.

North-Africa in India’s foreign policy matrix:

  • Gateway to African continent: The nations such as Morocco and Algeria become geographical gateways to other parts of Africa. This is especially relevant for India given its desire to penetrate Francophone Africa
  • Connectivity to Europe: North African nations are also important for Europe which provides many opportunities for India to collaborate with the European Union (EU) on issues such as terrorism, migration, and climate change amongst others.
  • Diplomatic Support: India looks  forward to generate employment, develop the youth, advance agricultural technology, and combat issues such as climate change and terrorism, amongst others. Specifically with the North African nations, India also aims to garner support for its bid to gain a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council.
  • Critical Imports: Many of the North African Nations are trade partners of India with commodities such as petroleum, machinery, electrical appliances, medical goods, and many others often being exported and imported between the nations. Of these is phosphate which is used for agricultural purposes to enrich soil is a key import from the region. Indeed, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco account for almost 50 percent of India’s total imports of phosphates resulting in trade deficits occurring in some of the bilateral exchanges.
  • Traditional and Non-Traditional Security: The second aspect is defence and counter terrorism. India’s defence relations with nations in North Africa are staggered with Egypt, however recently India also upgraded its relationship with Algeria in 2021 having conducted its maiden maritime partnership off the Algerian coast in the Mediterranean a sign of India’s growing interest in growing its maritime prowess as well. 
  • Diplomatic Aid: India has long boosted its image in the North African nations by providing medical, financial, and agricultural aid such as when it donated more than a million dollar to Libya to help stabilise the nation after the fall of Colonel Gaddafi in 2010. Further recently India’s “Vaccine Maitri” programme meant to distribute vaccines for COVID-19 also included North African nations.
  • Vibrant Diaspora: Indian workers in nations like Libya are well regarded due to their role as skilled medical professionals. In addition, India has also provided educational scholarships to citizens of the North African nations who often come to India to take advantage of the affordable living costs amongst other things
  • Soft-Power Matrix: Many of the North African nations also have a long love affair with Bollywood, making it one of India’s most powerful soft power export apart from aid for the region. Thus, North African nations have even made documentaries on Bollywood due to the wide penetration of Hindi movies in the nation.

Conclusion:

India’s engagement with the North African nations are historic, but still not as immense as other nations such as UAE and Saudi Arabia. There exists immense potential for India to ramp up its presence in North Africa pertaining to trade, defence, and counterterrorism amongst others. In the long run, this region will become an important gateway to India’s global power ambitions and its presence in Africa, and it would do well to increase its activities here.

IEA to review all conditions for India’s membership

Context: International Energy Agency’s executive director, stated that the organization would evaluate membership requirements for India's entry, considering additional efforts or flexibility needed, during discussions with the Indian government.

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Criteria for Membership to IEA:

  • A candidate country to the IEA must be a member country of the OECD.
  • Crude oil and/or product reserves equivalent to 90 days of the previous year’s net imports, to which the government has immediate access (even if it does not own them directly) and could be used to address disruptions to global oil supply.
  • A demand restraint programme to reduce national oil consumption by up to 10%.

Special case of India:

  • India is presently the third largest consumer of oil in the world.
  • IEA believes that India can become a ‘superpower’ in green hydrogen production and should capitalize on the opportunity as the world makes a transition to clean fuels.

About International Energy Agency (IEA):

  • Established in 1974, the International Energy Agency (IEA) is an autonomous intergovernmental organization headquartered in Paris
  • The IEA family is made up of 31 member countries, 11 association countries, and 4 accession countries and it represents a significant portion of global energy demand, accounting for 75%. 
  • The organization was created within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as a response to the 1973 oil crisis, aiming to address disruptions in global oil supplies.
  • It offer insights and statistics regarding the worldwide oil market and energy industry, promote energy conservation and efficiency, and foster international collaboration on innovative research and development. 
  • Mission: The IEA works with governments and industry to shape a secure and sustainable energy future for all.

The US – China thaw

Context: In an attempt to foster greater cooperation and understanding, US and China have shown signs of willingness to engage in diplomatic dialogue.

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Outreach efforts by US

  • Recently the Director of CIA made a visit to China in order to stabilize the relationship and prevent a possibility of open conflict.
  • US National Security Advisor visited China in May 2023, to maintain channels of communication and ‘manage competition’.
  • At G7 meeting in Hiroshima, President Biden emphasizes that US is not looking to decouple from China but to de-risk and diversify its relations.

Instances of Conflict between US China

  • Antony Blinken called off a visit in February 2023 to China after Chinese high-altitude balloon appeared above US.
  • China is suspicious that QUAD is a mechanism to contain it in Indo Pacific.
  • The visit of Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in August 2022, further strained the relations between US and China.
  • Chinese side publicly stated that US led West wants to contain and suppress China.

US and China moving towards a detente

  • It will help in reducing tensions and pave the way for cooperation between them.
  • It is acknowledged that they possess the most formidable capacities globally and should commit to shape their policies in a manner that minimizes the likelihood of military confrontation with them.

India’s position in US China Dynamics

  • US and India have grown closer over a shared perception of China’s rise.
  • US sees India as a major partner in its endeavour to build a regional coalition against China.

Roadmap for India

India must develop a strategic approach to balance China by collaborating with the United States and other countries that share concerns regarding China, all while maintaining its own autonomy. It is crucial to clearly define the boundaries of this strategic alignment, determine India's willingness to engage, and effectively manage expectations on both sides.

Atlantic Declaration

Context: The United States and Britain have announced a new strategic pact as their leaders rededicated the “special relationship” to counter Russia, China and economic instability. The leaders (Joe Biden and Rishi Sunak) further concluded that the UK-US relationship was an "indispensable alliance". The leaders acknowledged the importance of the partnership as the U.S.-UK bilateral investment relationship is the largest in the world, with over $1.5 trillion in stock supporting more than 2.7 million jobs in both countries. There was also discussion on current geopolitical crisis and challenges to international stability from authoritarian states such as Russia and the People’s Republic of China; disruptive technologies; non-state actors; and transnational challenges like climate change.

Joe Biden and Rishi Sunak

Recent Developments - Atlantic Declaration

  • An “Atlantic Declaration” was adopted by the leaders aims to boost industry ties on defence and renewable energy, in the face of growing competition from China. This is seen in furtherance of the Atlantic charter that was signed in 1941. The Atlantic Declaration, includes commitments on easing trade barriers, closer defence industry ties and a data protection deal and steps up co-operation on AI.
  • The Atlantic Declaration sets a new standard for economic cooperation, propelling our economies into the future so we can protect our people, create jobs and grow our economies together
  • Expansion of subsidies: The Atlantic Declaration includes plans to mitigate some of the impact of US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) on the UK economy, with proposals to remove barriers which affected trade in electric vehicle batteries.
  • Under current policy, the IRA provides tax credit worth $3,750 (£3,000) for each electric vehicle (EV) manufactured in the US, or which use components mined, processed or manufactured in the country. The UK is already a net exporter of raw materials for EV batteries to the US. But nations without a US trade deal are barred from accessing IRA subsidies
  • Critical mineral Partnership: The Atlantic Declaration commits the UK and US to working on a new critical minerals agreement which would give buyers of vehicles made using critical minerals processed, recycled or mined by UK companies access to tax credits.
  • Data partnership: The declaration also includes a commitment to a "new UK-US Data Bridge" which would allow UK firms to transfer data freely to certified US organisations without paying a levy. Experts have estimated the change will affect around 55,000 UK businesses and translate close to £100m in direct savings per year.
  • Emerging Technologies: The leaders recognized the greatest transformations in global economy since the Industrial Revolution with the concrete materialization of AI (Artificial Intelligence).United states also supported UK’s plan to set up an international summit on AI safety.
  • Focus on Euro-Atlantic and Indo-pacific: The leaders reaffirmed their commitment  to deepen unrivalled defence, security, and intelligence relationship across every theatre in the globe and recognized the indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific and other regions. 
  • Indo-Pacific dialogue: Through the U.S.-UK Indo-Pacific Dialogue leaders agreed to continue find new opportunities to coordinate our approaches, to support ASEAN and ASEAN centrality, to partner with the Pacific Islands, to coordinate on economic and technological advancement, and to contribute to regional peace and stability.
  • Reaffirming faith in NATO: The leaders agreed to continuing strengthen NATO’s ability to deter further attempts to undermine Alliance security, in support of NATO’s new Strategic Concept.

US China Conflict in Asia Pacific

Context: As Prime Minister Narendra Modi heads to Washington for a state visit in two weeks, the unfolding geopolitical churn in Asia triggered by China’s rise will form a critical background to his talks with US President Joe Biden. In two and a half years, US has made significant strategic gains and reversed the dominant perception that China’s domination of Asia is inevitable and America’s retreat is irreversible.

Recent Development

  • The annual Shangri-La Dialogue, which concluded its 20th edition in Singapore witnessed the discussion on changes to capture the shifting strategic trends in Asia. 
  • The dialogue highlighted the deepening tensions between the US and China. There was an understanding to mobilise a broad-based coalition to balance China, the United States is seeking to resume high-level talks between the two sides and focus on confidence-building measures to prevent the tensions from escalating into a hot war.
  • The US has drawn in its closest partners — the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada – into the grand regional coalition. Acting on the same lines Australia has outlined its strategy of engagement with China while standing up to Beijing’s military bullying.
  • United States has elevated the Quad to the summit level.
  • It has also unveiled the AUKUS high-tech alliance with the UK and Australia. 
  • It has launched trilateral coordination with South Korea and Japan.
  • It also unveiled a “local quad” along with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines to counter the Chinese military pressures against Manila.
  • The US has been encouraging Japan to raise its military capabilities, modernising the military alliance with South Korea
  • US is also revitalising its frayed military partnership with Manila and enhancing security cooperation with Indonesia.
  • Further, NATO is now raising its game in Asia. For example, Japan has taken the lead in drawing Europe into Asian security and South Korea is ready to join hands. On the other hand, Australia and New Zealand now participate in NATO deliberations,
  • There is also a push for building a stronger strategic partnership with India, which has been a high priority for the US administration, and for the same a “road map” for a significant elevation of bilateral defence cooperation, including technology transfers and joint defence industrial production was recently agreed upon.

About  Indo – Pacific

The term Indo-Pacific which was first used in geo-political context by an Indian Navalist in a journal article. It was later used by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s speech in the Indian Parliament titled “Confluence of the Two Seas” in 2007. The term Indo-Pacific found its place in India’s official communiqués 2014 & recently Ministry of External Affairs has established an Indo-Pacific division within the ministry, considering India’s growing interests within that region.

Free & Open Indo-Pacific

  • Assertion for Free and Open Indo-Pacific by major powers can be considered a reaction to militarization of waters in Indo-Pacific, South China Sea (SCS) in particular, and emergence of Chinese economy and military across Asia & Africa. The assumption is that “freedom of navigation” is being or might be constrained by increased military presence in the SCS by China’s navy. It is worth noting that China continues to support the freedom of commercial shipping in the seas of the Indo-Pacific.
  • There is a fear among ASEAN members that Indo-Pacific is becoming a closed region due to major power rivalries including India, China, US and Japan and therefore ASEAN intends for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
  • As per Japan, the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” seeks to improve “connectivity” between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. In pursuit of this, Japan aims to strengthen strategic collaboration with India, the US and Australia. 
  • The US vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific has three components – economic, governance and security. The US seeks greater economic engagement with countries of the Indo-Pacific, maintenance of international law in Indo-Pacific region and primacy of U.S. navy and not of China in the region.

Indian Vision of Indo-Pacific

  • India put forth India’s vision of the Indo-Pacific at the Shangri La dialogue, 2018. The view was consistent with the overall norms enunciated by regional powers, including the US, Japan, Australia and Indonesia with the emphasis on ASEAN centrality in Indo-Pacific.
  • India has asserted that it will not take sides but chooses the side of values and principles which are commonly embraced with ASEAN based upon as Free & open Indo-Pacific.
  • India is evolving its regional role to encompass the Indo-Pacific and Eurasian region to ensure a balanced multipolar world.
  • India would continue to maintain its strategic autonomy irrespective of the prevailing geo-politics to ensure stability in power relations in Asian region among the great powers.
  • India will not be a part of closed group of nations or aggregate Indian power in any bloc and India's friendship with any nation should not be mis-construed as an alliance.
  • India's growing engagement in the Indo-Pacific region should not be considered anti-China.
  • India continues to maintain multi-literalism as form of foreign policy engagement with parallel interactions (E.g., SCO & Quad) based on respective common mutual interests.

Differences in Vision with others

  • Japan is primarily focused upon South China Sea, while India’s security is focused primarily towards Bay of Bengal and to Arabian Sea.
  • US does not follow ASEAN centrality in Indo-Pacific architecture. It has aligned with UK and Australia to form AUKUS which is a military partnership focusing on transfer of Nuclear submarine technology to Australia.
  • Chinese military installations have expanded towards Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, but India has not done similarly in South China and East Asia Sea.
  • India intends to become both a maritime & continental power in Asia, but Japan and USA are focused on maritime capability.
  • Major powers have constituted military alliances in Indo-Pacific region, but India has chosen not to indulge in military alliances.

India & Indo-Pacific 

With rise of China, India's Foreign policy seems to focusing on strategic and military considerations which is visible in its collaboration with USA and renewed focus on Indo-Pacific and the Quadrilateral security dialogue. However, there are differences in the understanding of the concepts of Indo - Pacific and the Quadrilateral grouping. Further there are hurdles in India’s strategy with regards to the Indo-Pacific and the Quad. So let us understand, the issues faced by India and what should be India's approach to clearly outline its interest in the Indo-Pacific and the Quad. Indo – Pacific vs Quad: Indo-Pacific is a grand politico-economic vision while Quad is a forum for common issues in the region concerning India, U.S., Australia and Japan. 

Similarities in Indo-Pacific & the QUAD

  • Quad members are major States in Indo-Pacific region, and both Quad and Indo-Pacific constructs are focused on China.
  • They are also in some ways centered around India’s geographic location and its policies. 

Differences

  • The Indo-Pacific provides a complex political and economic construct aimed challenging China strategically. The Quad on the other hand is inherently more anti-China in character and intent.
  • The Indo-Pacific has subtle anti-China undertones. But the Quad’s ability to succeed would entirely depend on China — the more aggressive China gets, the more resolute the Quad countries would be in strengthening it. 

Hurdles in India's Strategy

  • For a politico-economic construct such as the Indo-Pacific to survive, there must be strong economic partnerships and linkages among its members.
  • Merely focusing on strategic talk will not work. 

Indian Economic Engagement with Indo-Pacific

  • India's recent decision not to join Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), region’s flagship free trade arrangement, could potentially complicate its future engagements in the region.
  • There is huge gap between India and China on trade with every Indo-Pacific country.
  • This growing trade gap that India and China have with these countries will be a major determining factor in shaping the region’s strategic realities.
  • Further India's decision not to sign on to the RCEP also needs to be viewed in the broader context of the Chinese institutional engagement of the region.
  • India does not have FTAs with New Zealand, the U.S., Bangladesh and the Maldives. It has FTAs with South Korea, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, Japan and Sri Lanka.
  • In the case of China, it has FTAs with all these countries barring the U.S.
  • This shows that economic compulsions will go a long way in shaping strategic realities for a variety of reasons including that trade with China is crucial for the economies of these States.
  • Thus, strategic talks need to be aligned with the economic realities for the success of the Indo-Pacific.

Military engagement

  • Even on this front India lags China.
  • China is a major defence supplier to several region’s States including Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
  • While India has minimal sales, defence dialogues and occasional joint military exercises in the region. However, India’s decision to supply Brahmos to Philippines is a step in the right direction.

Way forward

  • India’s role in the Indo-Pacific will remain limited if it does not prove to be a major economic partner to these States.
  • But given the economic slowdown in India today in the wake of COVID-19 and the Ukraine crisis led global slowdown (compared to the much better place that China is in), India’s ability to economically engage with the region remains limited.
  • On the military-strategic side too, India’s performance in the region is less than desirable.
  • Further, it is said that the only way forward for India is a regional strategic alliance with the US.
  • But given the hangover its non-alignment principles and Material constraints India will need fresh mindset to do so.

Conclusion

Thus keeping in mind the sea change in the Indo-Pacific and the shared interests in stabilising the Asian balance of power are objective realities demanding a solid India-US defence partnership.

From De-coupling to De-risking

Context: The Trump-era policy which focused on  the U.S. to decouple from China is being phased out by a new concept. The U.S. has expressed that it is shifting its policy on China from decoupling to de-risking. The EU has already declared that its approach to China will be based on de-risking.

What is ‘de-risking’?

  • After the establishment of diplomatic ties between the U.S. and China in 1979, both the countries embarked on a path of increasing economic interdependence. China gained immensely from this relationship, as it helped the country drastically widen and deepen its diplomatic and economic engagement with the rest of the world.
  • As China’s economic and military power grew, its ambition to challenge the primacy of the U.S. in the international system became increasingly apparent. China’s rise not only came at the expense of America’s global clout, but also the latter’s domestic industry, which got “hollowed out” in its four-decade old economic embrace with China. ( This has been highlighted by United States as the weakness of the Washington Consensus, and for which it has floated the New Washington Consensus)
  • The Trump administration made it a point to attack the gargantuan bilateral trade imbalance in favour of China. It also wished to keep the U.S’s high technology sector out of China’s reach. The U.S.-China ‘trade war’ started, and bilateral relations were set on course for a “decoupling” from the American standpoint. 
  • The Biden administration added its own features into the China policy inherited from Trump. Most recently the label of “decoupling” has been changed to “de-risking”.
  • According to the U.S. “de-risking fundamentally means having resilient, effective supply chains and ensuring we cannot be subjected to the coercion of any other country”. For Example the U.S.’s geo-economic initiatives like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment as well as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity are also supposed to reflect the spirit of de-risking.

Why the Change now?

The policy change has been announced in the wake of several events of high geopolitical significance. 

  • The world has just emerged out of the tentacles of the pandemic after three disruptive years and the global economy is hoping for a resulting rebound. 
  • The U.S.-China rivalry had peaked in the past few months from the ratcheting of tensions across the Taiwan Strait to the acrimonious spy balloon episode between the two countries.
  •  China also witnessed Xi Jinping beginning his second decade of rule over China
  • China Under XI and under his third leadership tenure, extended his “peace-making diplomacy” to West Asia, striking gold in normalising the frayed Saudi-Iran ties. 
  • Further the U.S.-China relations as a new Cold War and a zero-sum game appears to be risky for the U.S. Bringing more nuance into its earlier decoupling approach could bring down China’s guard and give the U.S. more room to re-consolidate its strength.
  • The Russia-Ukraine conflict could have played a pivotal role in enabling the U.S’s policy shift towards China. The Biden administration, unlike its predecessor, has made it a point to reassure its European allies. At a time when China has been backing Russia in its shadow battle in Ukraine against the West, the idea of decoupling hardly appeals to the European Union (EU). The EU has in fact been looking to woo China in order to convince it to stop supporting Russia from skirting Western sanctions.

All of these developments have necessitated the U.S. to recalibrate its posture towards China

What could be the geopolitical ramifications of de-risking?

  • The U.S. efforts to keep its allies closer in its geopolitical rivalry against China by adopting the path of de-risking has already won a significant victory in Japan at the G-7 summit.
  • The West’s moves to counter China’s rise much more sustainable by facilitating a united front among allies.
  • At the same time China has expressed its scepticism to the West’s de-risking approach, portraying it as a façade to the decoupling agenda. It has expressed its disapproval in painting China as the actor responsible for heightening geopolitical risks. According to China, the real source of risks is the U.S., which it alleges to have created instability across the world by pursuing political and military interventions and perpetuating a Cold War mindset.
  • For countries like India it will stand to benefit from de-risking by leveraging its benefits like attracting supply chains and confronting China’s aggressive moves, it could also come at a cost.

To read more about New United States policy towards China visit ( https://compass.rauias.com/current-affairs/countering-the-chinese-rise/ )

International North South Transport Corridor

Context: The project was first mooted in 2000  and despite its perceived potential and the keenness shown by key powers, there was little progress on the project’s implementation for years. One of the reasons was the western sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme. However, Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, after which it was sanctioned by the West, seems to have brought Moscow and Tehran closer, giving a fresh impetus to the NSTC. In February this year, President Vladimir Putin said in his State of the Nation address that Russia was developing the NSTC, which would open up new routes for trade with India, Iran, Pakistan as well as Gulf countries. Recently, Mr. Putin and his Iranian counterpart Ebrahim Raisi virtually participated in a ceremony where both countries signed an agreement to develop the 162-km Rasht-Astara railway, a critical link in the NSTC.

ABOUT INSCTC

  • The INSTC is a 7,200 km-long multimodal transportation network encompassing sea, road, and rail routes to offer the shortest route of connectivity. 
  • It links the Indian Ocean to the Caspian Sea via the Persian Gulf onwards into Russia and Northern Europe. It is aimed at reducing the carriage cost between India and Russia by about 30 percent and bringing down the transit time by more than half.
  • It was launched in 2000 with India, Russia, and Iran as its founding members and work on actualizing the corridor began in 2002
  • Since then, INSTC membership has expanded to include 10 more countries – Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Syria, Belarus, and Oman. Bulgaria has been included as an observer state. The Baltic countries like Latvia and Estonia have also expressed willingness to join the INSTC.

The INSTC spirals across the following corridor:

  • Central corridor: It begins from the Jawahar Lal Nehru port in India’s western state of Maharashtra (in the Indian Ocean Region) and connects to the Bandar Abbas port on the Strait of Hormuz. It then passes through the Iranian territory via Nowshahr, Amirabad, and Bandar-e-Anzali, runs along the Caspian Sea to reach the Olya and Astrakhan Ports in Russia.
  • Western corridor: It connects the railway network of Azerbaijan to that of Iran via the cross-border nodal points of Astara (Azerbaijan) and Astara (Iran) and further to Jawaharlal Nehru port in India via sea route.
  • Eastern corridor: It connects Russia to India through the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. 

BENEFITS:

  • REDUCED COST: INSTC boasts of the shortest trade route connecting India with Russia. Reports indicate INSTC was 30 percent cheaper and 40 percent shorter than the traditional Suez route, slashing the transit time to an average of 23 days for Europe-bound shipments from the 45-60 days taken by the Suez Canal route.
  • INCREASED ACCESS: Cheaper cost of transport will lead to increased competitiveness of Indian exports, opening access to unfulfilled markets.
  • LOGISTICS HUB: Under the agreement, Iran and Azerbaijan are expected to develop into transit hubs. In India, Nagpur and Bhiwandi from Maharashtra state are identified as potential logistics hubs. 
  • SUPPLY CHAINS: The creation of diverse supply chains across Eurasia might surely alter the stereotype of East as the producer and West as the consumer.
  • INCREASED TRADE VOLUME: India’s trade with Russia and Central Asian countries highlight that he main reason for low trade with the landlocked Central Asian countries is lack of connectivity, which has now been taken care of with Iran’s Chabahar Port. The INSTC will not only enhance physical connectivity but will also improve knowledge and information sharing mechanisms.
  • ENERGY AS A COMMODITY: As India is one of the largest consumer and is dependent on the area to meets its energy demand.
  • Synchronization of INSTC with Ashgabat Agreement and Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC): Linking INSTC to existing transport initiatives in the Central Asian region like BSEC (Europe-centric) and the Ashgabat Agreement (Central Asia-centric) will expand trade linkages and opportunities in the region.
  • Potential materialization of free trade agreements (FTAs) in the region: There have been talks of signing an FTA between India and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU): It will provide the much-needed impetus to the trade momentum between different countries in the region. Access to the EAEU nations alone will open India to a market of 173 million people.
  • Possible synchronization with Baltic, Nordic, and Arctic corridors in the future: Alongside the North Sea-Baltic Corridor, INSTC may synchronize with the Scandinavian-Mediterranean (ScanMed) Corridor and the planned Arctic Corridor in the future.

CHALLENGES IN MATERIALIZATION

  1. Firstly, Iran wants to increase its role as a transcontinental transit country. Yet the problem is that, the infrastructure which remains hampered by US sanctions. There is also a major shortage of transit wagons and relatively poor road infrastructure which makes it difficult to sustain higher levels of traffic. 
  2. There are other practical problems such as the lagging construction of 22 tunnels and the construction of 15 special bridges along the corridor in Iran. At the same time, there is no single railway gauge option adopted for the route. The Russian standard of gauge of railways and that in Iran is different. Obviously, this would make the operation of the INSTC less smooth.
  3. The financial situation in both countries remain heavily sanctioned. While the Ukraine conflict continues and Iran’s nuclear negotiations remain stymied, Western restrictions are likely to remain in place. In normal times Russia is arguably the only power which would be able to finance the remaining Rasht-Astara railway section. With the sanctions the prospects seem less promising.
  4. Further tensions are also persistent in Azerbaijan-Russia relations. Amid the Ukraine conflict and Azerbaijan’s increasingly coercive position toward Armenia, Baku’s push to have Russian peacekeeping forces withdrawn from Nagorno-Karabakh by 2025 becomes ever more evident.
  5. Iran is also suspicious about Russia’s strategic goals and interests in the South Caucasus and the Middle East. Even on such issues as the provision of Iranian military drones to Russia, Iranian politicians appears deeply divided.