Context: A Private Member’s Bill has been introduced in the Lok Sabha proposing significant reforms to the Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law). The Bill seeks to allow Members of Parliament (MPs) to vote independently on most legislative business, while retaining party discipline only on motions that directly affect the stability of the government.
Key Features of the Bill
The Bill proposes a limited application of disqualification. An MP would face disqualification only if they vote or abstain against party directions on motions that determine government survival, such as confidence motions, no-confidence motions, and money bills.
On all other legislation, MPs would enjoy free voting, enabling them to exercise judgment based on constituency interests and legislative merit. To ensure clarity, the Speaker or Chairman must explicitly announce when a party whip is issued for stability-related motions.
The Bill introduces a structured appeal mechanism, allowing a disqualified member to appeal within 15 days, with a mandatory decision by the Presiding Officer within 60 days.
Further, it proposes shifting defection adjudication from the Presiding Officer to independent tribunals, comprising Supreme Court Division Benches for Parliament and High Court Division Benches for State Legislatures.
Rationale Behind the Bill
The proposal addresses key shortcomings of the existing anti-defection framework. While the current law curbs individual defections, it has failed to prevent coordinated group defections that destabilise elected governments.
The Bill seeks to restore voter-centric accountability, ensuring that MPs are answerable primarily to their electorate rather than party leadership.
By limiting whips to critical votes, the reform aims to improve legislative scrutiny, encouraging MPs to engage more deeply with bills, suggest amendments, and enhance parliamentary deliberation.
Anti-Defection Law: Constitutional Background
The Tenth Schedule was inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, and later strengthened by the 91st Amendment Act, 2003.
It provides for disqualification of legislators who voluntarily give up party membership or violate party whips, unless condoned within 15 days.
Independent members are disqualified if they join a political party post-election, while nominated members face disqualification if they join a party after six months.
An exception exists where two-thirds of a legislative party support a merger. Currently, disqualification decisions are taken by the Presiding Officer, subject to judicial review.
Significance
If enacted, the Bill could rebalance the relationship between party discipline and parliamentary democracy, strengthening debate, accountability, and legislative effectiveness without undermining government stability.