Context: Recently, Ethiopia has inaugurated the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Africa’s biggest dam, despite protest from downstream Egypt.
Relevance of the Topic: Prelims: Key facts about Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Africa’s largest hydroelectric project (largest dam by power capacity).
GERD is built on Blue Nile (spreads over 2 kms), a tributary of the River Nile.
Location: Benishangul-Gumuz Region of Ethiopia, near the Sudanese border.
Height: 145 m. It is designed to hold 74 billion cubic metres of water and generate 5150 megawatts (~5 GW) of electricity.
Construction began in 2011, and completed in 2025.
Significance: Electricity generation; Ethiopia can earn revenue by electricity export to neighbouring countries.
Associated Concerns
Threat to water security: Downstream countries like Egypt (dependent on the Nile for 97% of its water),and Sudan fear that the dam would adversely impact agriculture and undermine water supplies.
Risk of Military confrontation: Successive Egyptian presidents have even threatened military action if an agreement is not reached between the countries on fair water usage.
Key facts about Nile River:
The Nile is the longest river in the world. It rises south of the Equator and flows northwards through north-eastern Africa to drain into the Mediterranean Sea.
Length: ~6650 kms
The Nile has two major tributaries:
White Nile: begins at Lake Victoria and flows through Uganda and South Sudan.
Blue Nile: begins at Lake Tana in Ethiopia and flows into Sudan from the southeast.
The two rivers meet at the Sudanese capital (Khartoum).
The Nile River basin spreads in 11 African countries: Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.
Context: In recent years, the concepts of strategic autonomy and multipolarity have become central to India’s foreign policy discourse.
Relevance of the Topic : Mains: India’s pursuit of Strategic Autonomy: Opportunities and Challenges
Meaning of Strategic Autonomy:
Strategic autonomy refers to a nation’s ability to make sovereign decisions in foreign policy and defence without being constrained by external pressures or alliance obligations.
It does not mean isolationism or neutrality but implies flexibility, independence, and the capacity to engage with multiple powers on one’s own terms.
From non-alignment policy during the Cold War to present-day multi-alignment, strategic autonomy has remained the guiding thread of Indian diplomacy.
Meaning of Multipolarity:
Multipolarity refers to a world order where several states possess roughly comparable levels of power, as opposed to unipolarity (one superpower) or bipolarity (two dominant powers).
India has long sought multipolarity hoping it would ensure greater fluidity and options in external relations.
Scholars have cautioned that multipolar systems are less stable than bipolar ones, as multiple great powers lead to unpredictable alliances and constant recalibration of interests.
India’s Practice of Strategic Autonomy in a Multipolar World:
Relations with the United States:
India participates with the US in initiatives such as the Quad, Indo-Pacific dialogues, I2U2, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
The friction exists as seen in Trump-era tariffs and the pressure on India to reduce energy and defence links with Russia.
India has responded by maintaining engagement with the US, while asserting its right to pursue independent positions. This is an example of strategic autonomy in practice.
Relations with China:
China is India’s biggest trading partner but also its primary security challenge. The 2020 border clashes widened the existing fault-lines, yet India has engaged with China in BRICS and SCO.
Strategic autonomy means resisting both confrontation and capitulation (surrender). India balances deterrence through Indo-Pacific partnerships with cautious dialogue.
Relations with Russia:
India’s relationship with Russia is rooted in Cold War solidarity, defence cooperation, and shared strategic interests.
Despite Russia’s growing alignment with China and its global isolation after the Ukraine war, India continues to buy oil, import defence equipment, and engage diplomatically.
India faces Western criticism but upholds its independent stand, treating the partnership as multidimensional. Strategic autonomy means diversifying partnerships without abandoning old allies.
Challenges of Multipolarity for India:
Uncertainty and Risk of Isolation: In a multipolar world, multiple big powers constantly shift their alliances and policies. Multi-alignment sounds positive in theory, but in practice they may leave India alone in times of crisis, since no power can be fully relied upon.
Weakening of Multilateralism: India hoped multipolarity would strengthen global rules and institutions. Instead, many countries are acting unilaterally or making transactional deals, reducing the effectiveness of multilateral forums.
Secondary Power Status: In the emerging multipolar world, India is still behind the US and China in terms of economic and military power. This reduces its ability to influence major global decisions.
Economic and Technological Dependence: India depends on other major powers for defence equipment, advanced technology, energy, and supply chains. This dependence limits the extent of true autonomy.
Opportunities for India:
Strategic autonomy allows India to engage flexibly with multiple powers without rigid bloc politics.
Multipolarity provides India space to assert itself as an independent pole in the Global South, championing issues like development, climate change, and equitable trade.
India’s balancing role between the West, Russia, and China enhances its diplomatic importance.
The pursuit of indigenous defence production, digital sovereignty, and economic resilience strengthens India’s long-term autonomy.
Way Forward
India must invest in economic growth, technological advancement, and defence modernisation to underpin genuine autonomy.
Strategic partnerships should be pursued without dependence, ensuring resilience against sudden shifts in global alignments.
Multilateral institutions should be strengthened.
Autonomy must extend beyond traditional military and diplomatic domains to include data sovereignty, digital infrastructure, and critical supply chains.
India should continue to project itself as the “voice of the Global South,” balancing great power rivalries while asserting its independent agency.
India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy in a multipolar world would involve building economic and technological strength, diversifying partnerships, and asserting its role as an independent pole in global affairs.
Context: Recently, the Prime Minister of Singapore was on his official visit to India. India and Singapore marked 60 years of diplomatic ties by adopting a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Roadmap.
Relevance of the Topic: Mains: Significance of India-Singapore Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Roadmap.
Both countries agreed on a forward-looking roadmap for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) covering eight priority areas.
Key Elements of the Roadmap towards Comprehensive Strategic Partnership:
1. Economic Cooperation:
Deepen bilateral trade and market access by Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) and initiate the review of CECA in 2025.
Substantial review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA).
Semiconductor ecosystem collaboration through policy dialogues, resilient supply chains, R&D partnerships, workforce training, and business-to-business cooperation.
Jointly develop sustainable and next-generation industrial parks with advanced manufacturing capabilities.
Enhance capital market connectivity through NSE-IFSC-SGX GIFT Connect.
2. Skills Development:
The National Centre of Excellence for Skilling in Advanced Manufacturing will be established in Chennai with Singapore’s support.
Both sides will promote cooperation in Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET), curriculum development, certification frameworks, internships, and teacher training.
State-level initiatives (such as Singapore-Assam Nursing Talent Skills Cooperation) will be scaled up.
3. Digitalisation and Technology:
Strengthening digital finance and fintech cooperation, cyber security, and capital market linkages.
The Joint Working Group on Digital Technologies will explore opportunities in AI, quantum computing, critical and emerging technologies.
Specific AI collaboration will involve AI-ready datasets and sectoral applications in agriculture, healthcare, and education.
The UPI-PayNow linkage will be expanded to maximise paperless, secure, cross-border payments.
4. Sustainability:
Collaborate on green hydrogen and ammonia production and trade. Explore cooperation in urban water management and civil nuclear energy.
Joint work will continue in multilateral platforms such as the International Solar Alliance and Global Biofuels Alliance.
Food security cooperation will include export promotion and accreditation frameworks for agricultural products.
Green and Digital Shipping Corridor (GDSC) will be developed to strengthen maritime connectivity and promote green maritime fuels.
5. Connectivity:
Maritime connectivity will be expanded through the Green & Digital Shipping Corridor.
Aviation connectivity will be expanded through partnerships in aviation and aerospace Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO).
Cooperation in Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) will be promoted.
6. Healthcare and Medicine:
The MoU on Health Cooperation will be implemented to cover digital health, disease surveillance, maternal and child health, access to medicines, and combating communicable and non-communicable diseases..
7. People-to-People and Cultural Exchanges:
Student exchanges, including ITI students and Singapore-India Partnership Foundation's immersion programmes will be expanded.
Internships for Singaporean students in Indian companies under the India Ready Talent (IRT) programme will be encouraged.
8. Defence and Security:
Deepen defence technology cooperation in AI, quantum computing, automation, and unmanned vessels.
Maritime cooperation will include maritime security, submarine rescue, and Maritime Domain Awareness. Singapore acknowledged India’s interest in the Malacca Straits Patrol highlighting shared maritime security interests.
The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty will be used to strengthen cooperation in criminal investigations.
Institutional Mechanisms:
India-Singapore Ministerial Roundtable will be institutionalised as the foremost mechanism to monitor the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership roadmap annually. Regular Foreign Office Consultations will review bilateral relations.
Strategic Significance
The roadmap reflects India’s Act East Policy and positions Singapore as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific region.
The focus on semiconductors, digital economy, and green shipping aligns with India’s strategic priorities for self-reliance and sustainable growth.
Cooperation in maritime security and the Malacca Straits Patrol enhances India’s strategic presence in one of the world’s busiest sea lanes.
Skill development initiatives and the National Centre of Excellence in Chennai will strengthen India’s human capital and industry-readiness.
Expansion of UPI-PayNow and fintech linkages highlights India’s global leadership in Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI).
Counter-terrorism coordination deepens India’s regional and global security partnerships.
Context: Recently, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and the Manipur state government signed a revised Suspension of Operations (SoO) pact with 24 Kuki-Zo insurgent groups under the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and the United People’s Front (UPF).
Relevance of the Topic: Prelims & Mains: Key features of Peace Pact between Centre, Manipur Government and Kuki-Zo Groups.
Suspension of Operations (SoO) Pact
The SoO pact was first signed in 2008 after the violent Kuki-Naga clashes of the 1990s.
Under the original pact, around 2200 cadres of KNO and UPF were moved into designated camps, received a stipend of ₹6,000/month, and agreed to suspend operations against the State and Union forces.
The pact was extended annually until February 29, 2024, when the Manipur Government refused renewal of the pact citing violations of ground rules and accusing SoO groups of instigating the 2023 ethnic violence in Manipur.
Key Provisions of the 2025 Revised SoO Pact
Verification of cadres will be carried out by security forces, and a complete list of cadres with name, date of birth, Aadhaar, and latest photographs will be prepared by the Government.
Foreign nationals (particularly from Myanmar’s Chin-Kuki community) if found among the cadres will be removed from the list and deported.
The number of designated camps will be reduced from 14 to 12 (6 for KNO and 6 for UPF), and these camps will not be located near highways, populated areas, conflict-prone zones, the Myanmar border, or inter-state boundaries.
Weapons belonging to cadres will be stored in the nearest CRPF or BSF camps rather than in the insurgent-run camps.
Stipends for cadres will resume but will only be paid through Aadhaar-linked bank accounts and only for those physically present in the camps during inspections.
The Manipur Police will issue photo identity cards to all cadres to facilitate proper monitoring.
The Kuki-Zo Council (KZC) has agreed to open National Highway-2 (Imphal-Dimapur) a critical supply route for the Imphal Valley for free movement of commuters and goods.
A Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) headed by the Principal Secretary (Home) of Manipur will monitor implementation, conduct physical verification, and deal firmly with violations.
The pact mandates that KNO and UPF must abjure violence, abide by the Constitution of India and the territorial integrity of Manipur, and not maintain links with other armed groups.
The agreement bars insurgent groups from recruiting new cadres, carrying out offensive operations, or associating with domestic or foreign armed groups.
The Army, Assam Rifles, CAPFs, and State Police will not launch operations against these groups as long as they abide by the pact.
The pact provides for a tripartite political dialogue among the Centre, Manipur Government, and KNO/UPF to work towards a negotiated political settlement within the Constitution of India.
Significance:
The pact represents a renewed attempt at peace-building after the collapse of the agreement in 2024.
It reaffirms the territorial integrity of Manipur, addressing concerns of the Meitei community.
It acknowledges the Kuki-Zo demand for a political settlement, but strictly within the framework of the Indian Constitution.
The opening of NH-2 restores the economic lifeline and ensures supply of essential commodities to the Imphal Valley.
The relocation of camps away from sensitive areas reduces the possibility of renewed violence and enhances civilian security.
Challenges:
Trust deficit remains between communities: Meiteis accuse Kuki groups of fuelling the 2023 violence, while Kukis distrust the State Government.
The phrase “negotiated political settlement within the Constitution of India” is ambiguous and may be interpreted differently by the parties.
Implementation difficulties exist in verifying cadres, relocating camps, and deporting foreign nationals from Myanmar.
The temporary nature of the pact (valid for one year) means long-term peace remains uncertain.
The Coordinating Committee on Manipur Integrity (COCOMI), one of the largest Meitei civil society groups in Manipur, has rejected the signing of Suspension of Operations (SoO) pact with the Kuki-Zo insurgent groups.
Context: The debate on creating theatre commands has re-surfaced following discussions at the Ran Samwad 2025 tri-service seminar at the Army War College, Mhow.
Relevance of the Topic: Mains: Theaterisation of Command: Significance and the Challenges.
What is Theaterisation?
Theaterisation refers to the integration of the Army, Navy, and Air Force resources into unified ‘theatre commands’ for operational deployment under a single commander.
Each theatre command will be responsible for a specific geographical region, enabling better coordination in combat.
Current Structure :
The Army and Indian Air Force (IAF) currently have seven commands each, and the Navy has three commands.
In addition, there are two tri-service commands: Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) which manages India’s nuclear arsenal.
There is also the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQIDS), which was created after the Kargil conflict to fulfil the need for an institutional framework for higher management of defence.
Rationale for Theaterisation:
Modernisation of warfare: Modern conflicts are multi-domain (land, sea, air, cyber, space, UAVs, precision weapons). Unified command is required to respond effectively.
Jointness: India’s forces often operate separately; integration will eliminate duplication and ensure synergy in operations.
Learning from advanced militaries: Advanced militaries like the US and China operate through unified commands; India cannot afford “siloed warfare”.
2019: Creation of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Department of Military Affairs (DMA); mandate included restructuring into joint/theatre commands.
2020: Gen Bipin Rawat (first CDS) proposed 4 commands: Air Defence, Maritime, Western, Eastern.
Post-2021 (after Gen Rawat’s death): an adversary-based joint theatre command was proposed.
Northern & Eastern Theatres (China-centric)
Western Theatre (Pakistan-centric)
Maritime Theatre Command
Ongoing discussions cover command HQs, operational areas, reporting structure, lead service, and integration of ANC & SFC.
Steps already Taken towards Jointness:
Joint logistics nodes established.
Cross-postings among services.
Integration in procurement, training, and staffing via Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQIDS) and DMA.
Challenges in creating Theatre Commands:
Institutional Resistance: Services have operated under independent commands for over 70 years; dismantling them will be disruptive.
Inter-Service ‘rivalries’ and Disagreements:
IAF’s concerns over division of its assets
Perception of army dominance and
Bias towards threat on land borders, E.g. a proposed single Maritime Theatre Command for Eastern and Western commands of the Indian Navy from Sir Creek to Sunderbans.
Risk of Operational Delays and Decision-making Bottlenecks: Risk of longer decision-making chains if additional command levels are created.
One-size-fits-all Model: Blind replication of foreign models (like of the US) may not suit India’s unique threat environment and resource base.
Inter-service Dissonance: Despite consensus on the need for integration, divergence remains on how to achieve it, i.e., through theatre commands or by strengthening existing joint structures.
Way Forward
Consensus-building: Ensure reforms are consultative, not imposed.
Pilot Projects: Test limited theatre structures before nationwide rollout.
Future-readiness: Incorporate cyber, space, AI, and electronic warfare into doctrines.
Empowering CDS & DMA to overcome institutional inertia.
India-specific Model: Tailored to geography, adversaries, and force structure, not copy-paste from other militaries.
Theatre commands are a game-changer reform in India’s higher defence management. However, success depends on addressing doctrinal concerns, ensuring doctrinal balance between Army, Navy, and IAF, and evolving a flexible, India-specific model.
As CDS Gen Chauhan emphasises, the objective is to resolve “dissonance” and build consensus so that the armed forces fight future wars jointly rather than individually.
Context: Nepalese Prime Minister has voiced his concerns over India and China to resume using Lipulekh pass to carry out border trade. Nepal claims Lipulekh as its own territory, however, India has categorically dismissed it as “neither justified nor based on historical facts and evidence”.
Relevance of the Topic: Prelims: Key facts about Lipulekh Pass. Mains: An important aspect of challenges associated with India-Nepal Relations.
About Lipulekh Pass
The Lipulekh Pass is a Himalayan pass situated in the Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand, India. It is located on the border between Uttarakhand, Nepal and Tibet.
Lipulekh is strategically important to India as it provides access to Tibet and serves as a key route for the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra.
The pass is near the trading town of Taklakot (Purang) in Tibet and has been used since ancient times by traders, mendicants and pilgrims.
It is also used by pilgrims to Kailash-Manasarovar Yatra.
Nepal’s claim to Lipulekh Pass and Kalapani Region:
Historical Basis: Nepal claims the southern side of the pass called Kalapani territory, based on the Treaty of Sugauli 1816 between British East India Company and Nepal.
The treaty delimited the boundary along Kali river (Sharda/Mahakali river). It stated that Nepal would cede the territories west of the Kali river.
Nepal claims that the Kali river originates from Limpiyadhura, west of Kalapani and Lipulekh. On this basis, Nepal claims Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura as its part.
India claims that the Kali river originates at Kalapani village in Pithoragarh, where all its tributaries merge.
Hence, the bone of contention is the differing interpretation of the origin of the Kali River.
India’s stand on Lipulekh Pass:
Border trade between India and China through Lipulekh Pass commenced in 1954 and has been going on for decades. This trade had been disrupted in recent years due to COVID-19 and other developments, and both sides have now agreed to resume it.
India rejects Nepal’s objection to resumption ofIndia-China border trade through the Lipulekh Pass stating that the arguments are not based on “historical facts”. Any unilateral artificial enlargement of territorial claims by Nepal is untenable.
In the recent past the official map of Nepal, included in the constitution of Nepal, shows Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh and Kalapani located to the east of theMahakali River as integral parts of Nepal.
Context: The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change has signed an Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with the government of Japan on Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Relevance of the topic:
Prelims: Article 6.2 of Paris Agreement, National Designated Authority.
Mains: Significance of India-Japan Joint Crediting Mechanism.
The MoC was unveiled as part of the broader Indo-Japan cooperation framework titled Green Energy Focus for a Better Future.
Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement
Under Article 6.2 countries can trade emissions reductions bilaterally. It enables a host country to sell units to a buyer country, in exchange for investments, support for capacity building, and access to technologies not available through domestic resources.
The buyer country purchases these units known as Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) to address any gaps in meeting its own climate goals.
About the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM)
The JCM is a Japanese initiative designed to promote global climate action. Under this mechanism, Japan implements and invests in low-carbon technologies in developing countries.
The resulting emission reductions are credited to both Japan and the host country, and Japan uses its share to meet its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).
Unlike the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) established under Kyoto Protocol, host countries under JCM act as joint implementers, not just passive participants.
A Joint Committee manages the mechanism including rules, methodologies, project registration, and credit sharing.
India has established a National Designated Authority (NDA) to approve JCM projects and oversee the functioning of the domestic carbon market.
Significance for India’s Climate Commitments:
India has made ambitious NDC commitments under the Paris Agreement for 2030. These include:
Reducing the emission intensity of GDP by 45% from 2005 levels.
Achieving 50% cumulative electric power capacity from non-fossil fuel sources.
Creating an additional carbon sink of 2.5-3 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent through afforestation.
JCM will support India in meeting these targets by providing foreign investment, advanced technology, and access to international carbon markets.
It will also enable the international trading of carbon credits generated from such projects under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement with Japan and other countries on similar lines without adversely impacting India’s NDC commitments.
Context: Recently, the Prime Minister of India visited Japan for the 15th India-Japan Annual Summit. The visit is expected to further consolidate the Special Strategic and Global Partnership between the two nations.
Relevance of the Topic: Mains: India-Japan bilateral relations.
Key Highlights of India PM’s Visit to Japan
India and Japan inked 21 pacts during the recent visit. The key agreements, MOUs and announcements include:
India-Japan joint vision for the next decade: The roadmap covers vital areas such as economic growth, security, technology, innovation, health, sustainability, mobility and people-to-people exchanges.
Revision of the 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.
Bilateral energy partnership on clean Hydrogen and Ammonia.
Memorandum of cooperation on joint crediting mechanism.
Private investment target of ¥10 trillion (about $68 billion) in India over the next decade.
Economic Security Initiative launched to promote supply chain resilience in strategic sectors.
MoU on India-Japan digital partnership 2.0
Launch of the India - Japan AI Initiative to strengthen collaboration on large language models, data centres, and AI governance.
Launch of the Next Generation Mobility Partnership
Launch of the India - Japan Small and Medium Enterprises Forum
Launch of the Sustainable Fuel Initiative
Implementing arrangement between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and Japan aerospace exploration agency (JAXA) concerning joint lunar polar exploration mission.
Transfer of Japan's next-generation E10 series Shinkansen technology for the Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train project.
Japan Human Resource Exchange: an action plan to promote two-way exchange of 5 lakh people between India and Japan, particularly 50,000 skilled and semi-skilled personnel from India to Japan in the next five years.
Overview of India-Japan Bilateral Relationship:
India and Japan are two of Asia’s leading democracies and among the world’s top five economies. The partnership is rooted in civilisational ties reinforced by convergence in their regional and global outlooks. The countries share values, trust, and strategic outlook.
Strategic Partnership:
India-Japan bilateral relations were elevated to Global Partnership in 2000, Strategic and Global Partnership in 2006, and Special Strategic and Global Partnership in 2014.
India’s Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) align closely with Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) policy.
Multilateral and Regional Cooperation:
Cooperation between the countries extends to plurilateral platforms such as the:
Quad (India and Japan coordinate closely with the US and Australia to ensure a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific)
International Solar Alliance (ISA)
Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI)
Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (India and Japan are looking to diversify and secure supply chains through the SCRI which also involves Australia).
Japan leads the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI’s) connectivity pillar.
Trade Ties:
Bilateral trade reached $22.8 billion in FY 2024.
Imports from Japan continue to outweigh exports.
India’s main exports: chemicals, vehicles, aluminium, and seafood
India’s major imports: machinery, steel, copper, and reactors.
Investment:
Japan is India’s fifth-largest source of FDI with $43.2 billion cumulative investment up to December 2024. Annual inflows have been strong: $3.1 billion in FY 2024.
Around 1,400 Japanese companies with nearly 5,000 establishments operate in India; more than 100 Indian companies are present in Japan.
Emerging Focus Areas:
Digital cooperation (involving AI, semiconductors, startups), clean energy, supply chain resilience, industrial competitiveness, public infrastructure and skill development.
Economic security initiative focuses on semiconductors, critical minerals, AI, telecommunications and clean energy.
Infrastructure Cooperation:
Japan has been India’s largest Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) donor since 1958, supporting critical infrastructure and human development projects. ODA disbursement stood at about JPY 580 billion ($4.5 billion) in FY 2024.
The flagship Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail is the flagship project symbolising advanced technology transfer and skill development. The latest tranche of JPY 300 billion ($2.2 billion) was signed in 2023.
Japan is transferring its next-generation E10 series Shinkansen technology for the Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train project.
Defence and Security:
Key agreements on defence and security include the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (2008), Defence Cooperation and Exchanges MoU (2014), Information Protection Agreement (2015), Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Agreement (2020), and co-development of the UNICORN naval mast (2024).
Military Exercises:
Malabar (with the US and Australia), Milan (multilateral naval), JIMEX (bilateral maritime), Dharma Guardian (Army), and Coast Guard cooperation are held regularly.
Dialogue Mechanisms: Defence Ministers’ meetings, Chiefs’ visits, and Joint Service Staff Talks (2024) have consolidated trust.
People-to-People, Culture and Education:
Tourism: 2023-24 was celebrated as the Year of Tourism Exchange with the theme “Connecting Himalayas with Mount Fuji”.
Education: There are more than 665 academic partnerships between Indian and Japanese universities. Platforms like Edu-Connect and Universities Forum promote exchanges. The Skill Connect platform launched in 2023 links Indian talent with Japanese employers.
Diaspora: About 54,000 Indians live in Japan, mainly IT professionals and engineers.
The visit consolidates India-Japan relations making Japan India’s most consistent partner in Asia.
Context: The US has imposed 50% tariffs on most US imports from India with effect from August 27, 2025.
Relevance of the Topic: Prelims: Concept of Tariff, WTO, MFN Principle, India-US Trade. Mains: US’s Tariffs - nature, impact, and lesson for India.
What is Tariff?
A tariff is a tax or duty imposed on imported or exported goods by a government.
It is one of the oldest instruments of trade policy used to regulate cross-border trade.
Objectives:
To protect domestic industries from foreign competition
To raise government revenue
To be used as a tool of foreign policy or retaliation.
Under the WTO framework, members commit to tariff ceilings and must follow the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle, applying equal tariffs to all members except under FTAs or customs unions.
Nature of US Tariffs on India:
The US has imposed two layers of tariffs on Indian products:
a reciprocal tariff of 25% (effective August 7, 2025)
secondary tariff of 25% (effective August 27, 2025).
The tariffs apply to a broad range of Indian exports, sparing only a few critical sectors such as pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, mobile phones, lumber, and certain chemicals.
The tariffs have been imposed unilaterally by the US without negotiation or consultation, making them a violation of WTO commitments.
The tariffs directly breach the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle, since India is being treated less favourably compared to other WTO members such as the EU and China, which are not subjected to similar duties.
The tariffs violate binding tariff commitments under WTO schedules, where the US had agreed to maintain duties below certain ceilings for all members.
The tariffs are discriminatory in nature, the US has not imposed any tariff on the EU and China, the two largest buyers of energy from Russia.
The tariffs demonstrate the weaponisation of trade policy, where tariffs are being used to pursue geopolitical objectives such as pressuring countries on Russian oil purchases.
The paralysis of the WTO’s Appellate Body since 2019 has been exposed further, as countries like India have no effective mechanism to challenge such unilateral actions.
India’s Concessions to the US:
India reduced tariffs on bourbon whiskey, high-end motorcycles, and electric vehicles.
India withdrew the equalisation levy on offshore entities, a long-standing US objection.
India offered zero or near-zero tariffs on most industrial products and some agricultural products.
India expressed willingness to increase energy imports from the US to reduce the bilateral trade deficit.
At the same time, India drew red lines by refusing concessions on GM foods, soya, maize, cereals, and dairy products, citing farmer livelihoods and food security.
Likely Impact on India:
Impact on Exports:
Tariffs are expected to affect 55% of India’s $89-billion goods exports to the United States.
Labour-intensive industries such as textiles, clothing, gems and jewellery, and engineering goods will be among the worst hit.
Indian exporters in low-to-medium value segments will lose competitiveness, as South and Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh enjoy lower tariff regimes.
China may gain an advantage because of the 90-day tariff extension it received from the US and a lower 30 per cent tariff rate, thereby diverting some orders away from India.
Impact on Imports:
India’s imports from the US, which include mineral fuels, uncut diamonds, capital goods, machinery, organic chemicals and plastics, and edible fruits and nuts, will not be directly protected by retaliation.
Any counter-tariffs by India on these imports would hurt domestic industries that depend on these products as raw materials or intermediates.
Impact on Services and Investments:
Tariff retaliation by India may provoke the US to adopt cross-sectoral retaliation in services trade, threatening India’s IT and professional services exports.
Indian professionals may face stricter visa regimes or regulatory hurdles in the US, which would affect India’s services sector earnings.
The US investors may become more cautious about investing in India if trade relations deteriorate, thereby affecting foreign direct investment flows.
Impact on Employment and Economy:
Job losses are likely in labour-intensive industries like textiles, jewellery, and engineering goods, where export demand will shrink.
Export slowdown may create inflationary pressures in India by reducing foreign exchange earnings and widening the current account deficit.
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which form the backbone of India’s export ecosystem, will be particularly vulnerable to these shocks.
Way Forward
India must recognise the risks of overdependence on a single market, as nearly 17% of its goods exports currently go to the United States. It shows the urgent need to diversify export destinations, particularly towards Latin America, Africa, West Asia, and other emerging economies.
India must broaden its export basket by moving beyond traditional sectors such as textiles, gems, and jewellery to high-value areas like electronics, green technologies, and services.
Strengthening and fast-tracking trade agreements with partners such as the EU, Japan, Korea, ASEAN, and Australia is necessary to secure alternative markets.
India should expand intra-BRICS and South-South trade, thereby reducing dependence on Western economies and creating alternative trade corridors.
India must invest in skilling, technology, and innovation ecosystems to ensure its workforce and industries remain competitive in a rapidly changing global economy.
The episode should be seen as a wake-up call similar to the 1991 reforms, pushing India towards deeper economic reforms and stronger integration with global trade networks.
Context: Indian Prime Minister’s Asia tour covering the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summitin Tianjin, China and a bilateral visit to Japan has significant implications for India’s foreign policy. The visit comes amid trade tensions with the US, strained ties with China, and shifting alliances in Asia.
Relevance of the Topic: Mains: PM Modi’s Asia Tour: Opportunities and Challenges for India.
For India, the tour highlights both strategic opportunities and persistent challenges in its continental and maritime engagements.
Opportunities for India
Strengthening Strategic Partnership with Japan: India and Japan share converging interests in maintaining a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific. Defence cooperation, joint exercises, and technology collaborations can deepen mutual trust. Japan’s concerns over US unpredictability create room for India to emerge as a reliable strategic partner.
Expanding Trade and Technology Cooperation: Japan offers prospects for investment in critical technology, resilient supply chains, and infrastructure development. Collaborations in areas like digital economy, semiconductors, and green energy can reduce India’s over-dependence on China.
Leveraging Maritime Asia: India’s geographical position and naval strength make it a natural partner for Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asian nations. Maritime partnerships allow India to project influence beyond the continental constraints of its neighbourhood.
Diplomatic Space in SCO: Despite contradictions, the SCO provides a platform for India to engage with China, Russia, Central Asia, and Pakistan simultaneously. Participation helps India avoid isolation in regional forums where China is expanding its influence. Even limited dialogues on border management or counter-terrorism can reduce immediate risks of escalation.
Balancing Major Powers: India’s presence in both Japan and China underscores its multi-alignment strategy. By engaging with the US allies like Japan, while also remaining part of SCO, India signals its intent to retain strategic autonomy.
Challenges for India:
Economic Vulnerabilities to China
India’s manufacturing sector remains dependent on China for critical inputs like rare earth magnets and tunnelling equipment. Disruptions in supply chains, such as China’s withdrawal of engineers from iPhone production in India expose India’s fragile industrial base.
Campaigns like Make in India and Swadeshi will take time to reduce this dependency.
Limitations of the SCO Forum:
The SCO is portrayed as an inner-Asian club standing up to American dominance, but this aspiration is undermined by severe internal contradictions. They include-
India-China mistrust
India-Pakistan disputes
Though counterterrorism was one of SCO’s founding goals, the forum has been unwilling to censure Pakistan due to China’s protection.
Economic divergence: India rejects China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), central to SCO’s economic vision.
Russia’s Shrinking Utility:
Discounted Russian oil, once seen as a stabilising factor, has now become a diplomatic liability as the US pressures India to scale down energy ties with Russia.
Russia’s growing dependence on China reduces India’s room for manoeuvre in Eurasian geopolitics.
Erosion of Strategic Primacy in South Asia:
With SAARC effectively non-functional, China has quietly drawn much of the Asian subcontinent into the SCO orbit. China is promoting new minilateral formats such as trilaterals with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and dialogues with Bangladesh and Myanmar positioning itself as South Asia’s most consequential external power.
China seeks to entrench its role as both economic engine and political stabiliser, thereby eroding India’s traditional strategic primacy in the neighbourhood.
Uncertainty in US Relations:
Trade tensions with the US threaten India’s biggest export market.
While the SCO and Japan visits show alternatives, neither Russia nor China can replace the US as a trade partner. In 2024, India’s exports to the US stood at $88 billion with a $45 billion trade surplus, far exceeding exports to Russia ($5 bn) and China ($15 bn) combined.
Risk of Losing Strategic Space to US-China Rivalry:
As both the US and China advance competing regional visions for South Asia, India risks being squeezed between the two.
China is embedding itself as the region’s “benign benefactor” through the SCO and minilateral formats, while the US has signalled its intent to counter this influence by appointing a special envoy for South Asia.
In this growing great-power rivalry, India faces the danger of erosion of its traditional strategic primacy in its own neighbourhood.
For India, the challenge is to stabilise difficult ties with China and Russia, while deepening reliable partnerships like Japan to safeguard its strategic autonomy in an era of great-power rivalry.
Context: Recently, the Prime Minister of Fiji paid his first official visit to India. India and Fiji unveiled significant initiatives to enhance defence and maritime security cooperation, positioning Fiji as an important partner in the Indo-Pacific amidst rising Chinese influence in the region.
Relevance of the Topic: Mains: Strategic Significance of India-Fiji ties in the Indo-Pacific.
Key Outcomes of the Visit
The most important outcome of the visit was the announcement of enhanced defence and maritime cooperation between India and Fiji.
India has committed to providing training and equipment to upgrade Fiji’s maritime security and strengthen the capacity of its armed forces.
A Defence Attaché post was created at the High Commission of India in Suva, which will also cover the wider Pacific Islands, marking a permanent institutional mechanism for security engagement.
India announced the gifting of two sea ambulances to the Fijian Military Forces and extended support to Fiji’s initiative “Ocean of Peace,” which aligns with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative.
India announced the establishment of a Cyber Security Training Cell in Fiji, thereby extending cooperation in digital security and resilience against cyber threats.
Both sides agreed to deepen cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, given the vulnerability of Fiji and other Pacific Island countries to cyclones and climate-induced disasters.
Nine agreements and MoUs were exchanged between the two countries, including- construction and operation of a super-speciality hospital in Fiji; supply of medicines under the Jan Aushadhi scheme; migration and mobility partnership etc.
Strategic Significance of India-Fiji Ties in Indo-Pacific
Geopolitical Leverage: Fiji’s central location in the South Pacific provides India with a strategic gateway to engage with other Pacific Island nations and expand its maritime outreach.
Maritime Security Cooperation: By assisting Fiji in protecting its vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), India strengthens regional maritime security and ensures safe and open sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific.
Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC): India views Fiji as a hub for its engagement with Pacific Island countries, and closer ties with Suva strengthen India’s position in FIPIC.
Countering Chinese Influence: Strengthening defence and development ties with Fiji helps India counterbalance China’s growing military and economic footprint in the Pacific Islands.
Quad Plus Alignment: Closer India-Fiji ties complement the objectives of the Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia) to promote a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific order.
Climate and Disaster Resilience: Cooperation in disaster management and humanitarian assistance positions India as a credible partner for climate-vulnerable Pacific Island states.
Diaspora Connect: Fiji’s large Indian-origin community (nearly 38% of the population) provides India with strong cultural and people-to-people linkages that reinforce strategic trust.
Soft Power and Development Diplomacy: India’s initiatives in healthcare, migration, and capacity building enhance its image as a development partner, broadening the scope of its influence beyond defence into socio-economic cooperation.
India-Fiji relations have acquired new strategic depth by combining defence, development, and maritime cooperation within the larger Indo-Pacific framework.
Context: Recently, the Union Home Minister of India accused Opposition’s Vice-Presidential candidate Justice B Sudershan Reddy (retd) of aiding Naxalism by delivering the landmark Supreme Court judgment that banned Salwa Judum in 2011.
Relevance of the topic:
Prelims: Salwa Judum; Salwa Judum Judgement.
Mains: Government approach to counter the challenges posed by LWE.
Justice B Sudershan Reddy, a retired judge of the Supreme Court, headed the Bench that in 2011 delivered the landmark ruling in Nandini Sundar v State of Chhattisgarh, which ended Salwa Judum.
What was Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh?
Salwa Judum was a state-backed vigilante movement launched to counter Maoist insurgency in Chhattisgarh. Tribal youth were recruited as Special Police Officers (SPOs), popularly called Koya Commandos.
Recruitment was voluntary for those 18 and above, with character verification and preferably Class 5 education. Preference was given to victims of Maoist violence who wished to resist them.
Recruitment was done under the Chhattisgarh Police Act, 2007, which gave wide powers to the Superintendent of Police.
Most SPOs were young tribal men from Naxal-affected villages. They were armed for self-defence but also used in counter-insurgency operations with police and paramilitary forces.
Their duties included guiding forces in forests, translating, gathering intelligence, and spotting Maoist movements. Each SPO received about ₹3,000 per month as honorarium.
The government justified Salwa Judum as both a security measure and a livelihood source for local youth.
In 2007, sociologist Nandini Sundar, historian Ramachandra Guha, and former IAS officer EAS Sarma filed a petition before the Supreme Court challenging the practice of Salwa Judum.
Salwa Judum Judgement 2011:
In Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2011), the Supreme Court held that Salwa Judum violated Articles 14 (equality) and 21 (right to life with dignity), and therefore ordered its disbandment.
The SC found that SPOs were poorly educated and inadequately trained, yet expected to perform duties of regular police, making it discriminatory. Arming such youth exposed them to life-threatening risks, which could not be justified as livelihood.
The SC criticised the state for treating citizens as expendable instruments of counter-insurgency, undermining their dignity. It directed that only trained police and paramilitary forces should conduct such operations.
