International Relations & Security

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U.S. pick Ajay Banga confirmed as next president of World Bank

Context: The World Bank confirmed Ajay Banga was selected as its next president on Wednesday, taking charge at a pivotal time for the development lender as it looks to better address climate change. The Bank’s board voted to approve his leadership for a five-year term. He will take over the role from David Malpas in June.

About world bank

World Bank came into existence in the year of 1944 along with IMF at the meeting of the UN Monetary and financial conference, commonly known as the Bretton woods conference.

Now it has 189 members

India is one of the foundational members of the world bank

World bank Organization

  • The World Bank is like a cooperative, made up of 189 member countries.
  • These member countries, or shareholders, are represented by a Board of Governors, who are the ultimate policymakers at the World Bank.
  •  Generally, the governors are member countries' ministers of finance or ministers of development.
  • They meet once a year at the Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund.

World Bank is not a single entity rather it is a group of five institutions

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IBRD

  •  Created in 1944 to help Europe rebuild after World War II.
  •  IBRD joins with IDA, our fund for the poorest countries, to form the World Bank. 
  • They work closely with all institutions of the World Bank Group and the public and private sectors in developing countries to reduce poverty and build shared prosperity
  • The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) is a global development cooperative owned by 189 member countries.
  •  As the largest development bank in the world, it supports the World Bank Group’s mission by providing loans, guarantees, risk management products, and advisory services to middle-income and creditworthy low-income countries, as well as by coordinating responses to regional and global challenges.

IDA

  • The International Development Association (IDA) is part of the World Bank that helps the world’s poorest countries.
  •  Established in 1960 and headquartered in Washington DC, IDA aims to reduce poverty by providing zero to low-interest loans (called “credits”) and grants for programs that boost economic growth, reduce inequalities, and improve people’s living conditions.

IFC

  •  Established in the year 1956
  •  Headquarters at Washington DC
  •  It makes investments in productive private enterprises in association with private investors.
  •  It concentrates on areas where sufficient private capital is not forthcoming on reasonable terms and conditions.
  • It acts as a clearing house for bringing together investment opportunities, private capital and experienced management.
  •  It stimulates the international flow of capital.
  •  It assists the development of capital markets in less-developed countries.
  • It encourages private sector activity in developing countries through three types of activities.

MIGA

MIGA is the World Bank Group’s most recent agency (1988), created in Washington DC with the aim of attracting private capital to unfavourable environments, usually countries with a lower level of income and in contexts that are unappealing for investments.

This agency works as a complement to the IFC, providing guarantees to foreign investors against so-called “political risks”, which are risks related to the country where the investment will be applied, such as:

  •  Losses related to currency convertibility (difficulties in converting local currency into dollars or euros) and transfer restrictions of the same nature;
  •  Countries in violent contexts (wars, etc.);
  •  Contractual violations by local governments which place the investment at risk;
  •  Seizure of private investors’ assets or properties and failure to meet financial obligations on the part of the Host State

ICSID

  • It was established in 1966 by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention).
  • The ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty formulated by the Executive Directors of the World Bank to further the Bank’s objective of promoting international investment.
  • ICSID is an independent, depoliticized and effective dispute-settlement institution.
  • Its availability to investors and States helps to promote international investment by providing confidence in the dispute resolution process.
  • It is also available for state-state disputes under investment treaties and free trade agreements and as an administrative registry.
  •  ICSID provides for the settlement of disputes by conciliation, mediation, arbitration or fact-finding.

Rajnath, Maldives minister launch Delhi-assisted harbour construction.

Context: India and Maldives marked a major step in their growing defence cooperation by launching construction of a harbour for the Coast Guard of the Maldives National Defence Force (MNDF).

  • The UTF Harbour Project, as it is called, is among the biggest Indian grant-in-aid projects in Maldives. Previously in 2020, India had gifted a Dornier aircraft to Maldives and in 2019 handed over a patrol vessel.
  • The handing over of these vessels are in line with India’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) that seeks to work together with and jointly develop the capabilities of friends and partners for a safe, secure, prosperous and stable Indian Ocean Region
  • Further there is a need to explore additional avenues for cooperation, including in areas of defence trade, capacity building and joint exercises, according to the statement. 
  • There is also a need to promote people-to-people contact and exchanges between armed forces of the two countries and reaffirmed the importance of maintaining peace, stability and security in the region and recognised the need to work together to address common security challenges.

In the light of these recent developments, we will look at the relationship between India and Maldives.

Importance of Maldives for India

  • The geostrategic importance of the nearly 1,200 islands of the Maldives as a “most important interstate,” underlines the importance for New Delhi of positive bilateral relations with Male.
  • At present, India is dependent on oil for more than 90 percent of its energy needs, and over the next few decades, 90 percent of that oil will come from the Persian Gulf by way of the Arabian Sea.
  • Coal imports from Mozambique, are set to increase, augmenting the coal that India already imports from around the Indian Ocean from countries such as South Africa, Indonesia, and Australia.
  • Beyond refuelling stations, by maintaining access to these ports, the expanding Indian Navy can safeguard its interests by providing security for the sea lines of communication, ensuring vital resources reach India’s coast and thus emerge as a net security provider.
  • Moreover, such access provides strategic depth in any potential conflict with China, wherein India could attempt to restrict the flow of oil through the Indian Ocean to the Malacca Strait.
  • Maldives is a member of SAARC and thus is important for India to keep Maldives on board to maintain its leadership in the region and is also part of India backed Colombo security conclave ( Sri Lanka Indian and Mauritius being other members)
  • There are about 29,000 Indians in the country and almost 22,000 of them live in Male, the capital and also Indian tourists account for more than 23% of total tourist arrivals in the Maldives.
  • India is also a preferred destination of Maldivians for medical treatment, education and business

Indian Assistance to Maldives

  • Operation Cactus: In 1988, when armed mercenaries attempted a coup against President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, India sent paratroopers & Navy vessels and restored legitimate regime under Operation Cactus.
  • 2004 Tsunami: India had aided Maldives and had also supported it during the drinking water crisis in 2014
  • COVID-19: India rushed $250 million aid in quick time, India has also rushed medical supplies to the Maldives, started a new cargo ferry. Maldives was the first beneficiary under India’s vaccine Maitri initiative
  • Two sea ambulances to the Maldives Defence Ministry
  • Infrastructure projects:

(a) Greater Male Connectivity project: An infrastructure project in Maldives, connecting Male (capital) with three neighbouring islands through construction of a bridge-and-causeway link. This project was a part of $400 million line of credit will lead to cutting down logistics cost and drive people- centric economic growth.

(b) An international airport being developed by India at Hanimadhoo in HaaaDahaalu atoll. The $ 136.6-million development of the airport at Hanimadhoo has been financed by a line of credit to the Maldives from India’s Exim Bank

(c)Housing: India is financing 4,000 social housing units and community centre in Foakaidhoo island

(d) Further a proposed collaboration between Cochin University and the Maldives National University, and a $100 million grant for “high impact community development” projects.

Concerns in India – Maldives Relationship

  • Enhanced Chinese Presence: Maldives signed its first country-specific FTA with China in 2017 and became China’s 2nd FTA in South Asia after Pakistan. It raised concerns that it will deepen debt trap to China, as more than 70% of Maldives’ foreign debt is owed to China. There has growing trend of Chinese companies acquiring land in Maldives. This land grab has raised concern of Maldives being increasingly falling into an economic neo-colonial influence of China. However President Solih has affirmed that Maldives will scrap FTA with China and investigate Chinese land grab in Maldives. The Maldives has also agreed to become a partner in China's maritime silk route.
  • President Yameen Hangover: President Yameen had earlier declared an emergency in Maldives and halted the functioning of Maldives Parliament (Majlis) and arrested several opposition leaders. This was opposed by India and several other countries. Apart from this, President Yameen augmented relations with China without taking India into confidence. This led India-Maldives relations to decline
  • Previous President Yameen launched an ‘India Out’ campaign against India’s developmental funding for creating physical, social & community infrastructure. There have been protests for early release of Mr. Yameen — sentenced to five years of imprisonment in a money laundering case, pending appeal.
  • Growing Radicalization: There is a growing presence of ISIS/Daesh in Maldives and has been seen with growing influence of Saudi philosophy of Wahhabis.
  • New Consulate in Addu: Recently India approved Opening of a New Consulate General of India in Addu City, Maldives. But Maldivian government has not made any decision regarding it. This came in the backdrop of ongoing #saveAddu social media campaign by a section of Maldivians, who are sceptical of India’s presence in Addu atoll.
  •  Helicopter Issue: India had gifted Maldives two Advanced Light helicopters in 2013 operated by Indian Coast Guard & Indian Navy. A controversy broke out in 2018 after previous Maldives government refused to extend visas of Indian military personnel and asked India to take back helicopters.

Internal Chaos, External Crisis

Context: Pakistan Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s visit to India  is bound to generate much media interest but will make little dent in the indifferent relations between the two countries. Any meaningful change in bilateral relations must necessarily wait until Pakistan has a domestic consensus on foreign policy. The vocal opposition in Islamabad to Bilawal’s visit the first by its foreign minister to India in more than a decade underlines Pakistan’s sharp internal divisions about its external relations at a critical juncture in world politics.

Domestic Politics and Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

  • The lack of agreement on India is only one part of Pakistan’s foreign policy problem. The bigger tussle has been on finding a sustainable approach to Pakistan’s engagement with  the major powers that are at odds with each other—US, China, and Russia. 
  • Pakistan is also facing new challenges in Afghanistan and is struggling to cope with the shifting geopolitical dynamic in the Middle East.
  • Further there has been latest attacks on the former chief, General Qamar Jawed Bajwa ( Army- the second state). Media has accused Bajwa of making major “compromises” with India on Kashmir; they also alleged that he was claiming that the Pakistan army is in “no position to fight” India.
  • Army in the past has made endless meddling in domestic politics. Army helped install Imran Khan as the PM in 2018 and chose to pull him down in 2022. It also unseated Nawaz Sharif on flimsy grounds in 2017 and allowed the Sharif family to come back into the mainstream in 2022. 
  • Though the impact of Army on domestic politics needs continuous evaluation, it did during the last regime tried to reorient Pakistan’s foreign policy and made a major effort to improve ties with India. The testimony of this approach was announcement of a ceasefire agreement in February 2021 which came after heightened tensions following the Pulwama terror attack and Balakot bombing by India’s Air Force and the Pakistani riposte in February 2019

It has been highlighted that the ceasefire agreement was a product of back-channel talks between the Indian national security adviser Ajit Doval and Bajwa. The ceasefire was to be followed by several confidence-building measures to relax tensions between the two countries.

  • Army move (under Bajwa) to reduce tensions with India were part of a broader effort to rejig Pakistan’s foreign policy. It was a recognition that current policies are accelerating Pakistan’s relative decline in the region. 
  • Army’s call to discard Pakistan’s obsession with geopolitics and focus on national development, geoeconomics, and good neighbourly relations underlined the case for Pakistan’s urgent strategic course correction.
  • At the same time Government (the first state) had an anti-American posturing saw the deterioration of ties with Washington. The government enthusiasm to be seen in Moscow on the day Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine outraged Europe and the US. Imran also sought to align with Turkey as it sought to wrest the leadership of the Islamic world from Saudi Arabia and picked quarrels with the United Arab Emirates. This in turn undermined the traditional goodwill for Pakistan in the Arab Gulf

Conclusion

Pakistan will need a lot of time and space to get its domestic act together and rebuild a foreign policy consensus. The first priority for India must be to sustain the valuable backchannel to the army leadership in Rawalpindi. Weakened though it is, the Pakistan Army remains the only credible interlocutor for India in the near term.

Backchannel Diplomacy

India and Pakistan have engaged with each other via backchannel from December 2020 till April 2021. However, these talks are at a standstill because of the lack of willingness shown by the two countries to change their stands on the various existing issues. 

While Pakistan has welcomed the reports of third-party mediation, India has maintained silence as it goes against its traditional position on diplomacy with Pakistan. India maintains officially that issues with Pakistan are of a bilateral nature that has no space for third party mediation or intervention. 

What is Back-Channel diplomacy? 

  • Back-channel talks are used to talk to each other through non-official channels to discuss and resolve the problems facing the countries. 
  • It is conducted through foreign diplomats or neutral Governments trusted by both sides desirous of change in status quo. 
  • It is also a means of restoring the status quo ante in case of difficulties. 
  • It is also conducted by respected figures in public lives who are known for integrity, accuracy, who are capable of clarity, caution and patience and deep knowledge of the issue. 

What are the benefits of such a diplomacy? 

  • It enables would-be dealmakers to test the waters—to determine whether the other party is capable of negotiating in good faith—before exploring real commitments. 
  • They can be particularly appealing to high-level leaders who are fearful of a public failure if their efforts to reach a deal collapse. 

Backchannel Diplomacy DIPLOMACY IN THE PAST 

  • Such talks had been initiated by General Zia-ul-Haq and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi through Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan. 
  • During the Kargil War, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee chose an unorthodox back-channel interlocutor, R.K. Mishra. 
  • In 2016, six former Pakistani High Commissioners also travelled to Delhi for a Track-II consultation with nine former Indian High Commissioners, where they met NSA Doval and senior MEA officials 

Why backchannel now? 

  • Front door diplomacy is not possible because of a complex past. 
  • Pakistan’s dire economic condition and the mounting pressure from the Financial Action Task Force to shut down all terrorist safe havens or face severe sanctions is clearly one imperative for Islamabad’s willingness to engage via the backchannel even after India’s decision on J&K. 
  • To avoid the possible two Front war. UAE’s geostrategic role as a peace broker: In recent years, the UAE has shifted its attention away from military projection to diplomacy, investment and other forms of soft power. 
  • Abu Dhabi was prime mover in last year’s Abraham Accords between Israel and several Arab states. 
  • UAE played a key role alongside their Saudi counterparts in mediating the 2018 peace deal between Ethiopia & Eritrea. 
  • The UAE has reduced its footprint in Yemen and drawn down its forces in the Horn of Africa. It is looking to scale back in Libya, where it provided both air cover and material support for the rebel forces of Khalifa Haftar; the Emiratis are now backing a political solution to the civil war. 
  • UAE has also sought to reduce tensions with Iran and is leading Arab efforts to reengage with the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, having concluded that the war there has effectively ended and that the only way to advance Emirati interests is through political, diplomatic and commercial means. 
  • UAE’s strong trade & commercial ties to India and Pakistan, and as it is home to millions of Indian and Pakistani expatriate workers makes it uniquely qualified to mediate between the two countries. 
  • UAE is hoping restoration of trade links between two countries. 
  • More ambitious still, it is aiming to secure a viable understanding on Kashmir, which has been flashpoint for several wars since their 1947 partition upon independence from British rule. 
  • South Asian initiative also plays into the UAE’s pursuit of other important foreign-policy objectives. It helps to deepen the partnership with USA by paralleling American efforts to resolve the conflict in neighbouring Afghanistan, where India and Pakistan have competing economic and security interests. 

What are the risks? 

  • Back-channel negotiating may foster costly delays and perpetuate impasse they are designed to overcome. 
  • They provide only temporary protection from deal spoilers and public scrutiny. 
  • Such secret negotiations can facilitate early breakthrough agreements but yield diminishing returns when relied on too frequently. 

Geopolitics of Indo-Pacific

Context: There was an assessment made by Central Intelligence Agency as per which China will likely launch its military mission against Taiwan sometime around 2027. It has made efforts to ready itself for this mission continue to make ripples among the tiny island nations of the South Pacific where it seeks to set up bases to tighten its grip in the region.

Recent Steps taken by China that highlights China flexing its muscle:

  • The Solomon Islands have been in the news recently with China trying to enter into a security pact with that country by persuading it to quit its present arrangement overseen by Australia. China has also been eyeing Vanuatu.
  • China has been trying to coerce the countries in the region to toe its line on Taiwan, especially when taken with Federated State of Micronesia.
  • Australia definitely has reasons to worry about China's attempts to win over the South Pacific island nations. Strategic access to these island nations could help China's military manoeuvres in the event of a conflict involving Australia or the US. This fear has been testified by China's deployment of its anti-ship ballistic missiles DF21 and DF21D.
  • China's recent manoeuvres should worry India also. It was reported that one of the missions of Xi Jinping during his recent summit with President Putin was to seek Russian supply of nuclear fuel, which China needs badly for expanding its arsenal at a feverish pace.
  • The closer Russia comes within China's sphere of influence the more uncertain will be Russia's dependability as a friend if the India-China conflict were to worsen.
  • China's role as a peacemaker in the Middle East could also be problematic. Most nations will see the peace brokered by China between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the region as a symbol of its increasing heft as a global mediator and its ability to fill the space held so long by the US. It could become a leading arms supplier of the region and bring in massive investments. The promise of a $400 billion investment in Iran is one of them.
  • Further China could even help Iran overcome its bottlenecks and realise its nuclear ambitions. India's involvement in Iran's Chabahar port project could be jeopardised in the long term and if China succeeds in peddling its influence in Yemen, with its base also in Djibouti on the horn of Africa, its presence in the region will be formidable.

India-China Defence Ministers Meeting

Context: The meeting between defence minister Rajnath Singh and his counterpart Li Shangfu saw both sides reiterating their positions, highlighting the persisting gap in the respective perceptions about what went wrong in Ladakh in 2020, its resolution, and how to move forward peacefully from there.

  • It was reiterated that development of relations between India and China is premised on prevalence of peace and tranquillity at the borders, all issues at the LAC need to be resolved in accordance with existing bilateral agreements and commitments and the violation of basic agreements has eroded the entire basis of bilateral relations.

On Border Dispute and its resolution:

  • Previously Indian and Chinese armies have conducted 18 rounds of military talks on ending the border row.
  • Though at the 16th round of military talks, the two sides carried out disengagement from Patrolling Point 15 in the Gogra-Hot springs area. 
  • The ties between the two countries nosedived significantly following the fierce clash in the Galwan Valley in June 2020 that marked the most serious military conflict between the two sides in decades. As a result of a series of military and diplomatic talks, the two sides completed the disengagement process on the north and south banks of the Pangong Lake and in the Gogra area. The eastern Ladakh border standoff erupted following a violent clash in the Pangong Lake area.
  • Recently China released a statement included a map that showed the 11 places renamed by China as being within “Zangnan”, or southern Tibet in Chinese, with Arunachal Pradesh included in southern Tibet and China’s border with India demarcated as just north of the Brahmaputra river.

Army to raise Command Cyber Operations and Support Wings

Context: The Army Commanders Conference (ACC) that was held. The ACC had decided to operationalise Command Cyber Operations and Support Wings (CCOSWs) in the immediate future with current focus on net-centric operations.

  • These organisations will assist the formations to undertake the mandated cyber security functions to strengthen the cyber security posture of the Army. As Cyberspace has emerged as an important component of military domain both in grey-zone warfare as well as conventional operations and Indian Army too is rapidly migrating towards net-centricity, which entails increased reliance on modern communication systems at all levels.

About Grey zone Warfare

Grey zone warfare refers to employing aggression and other actions to achieve national objectives below the threshold of armed conflict and the ambiguity it creates. 

The characteristics of the Grey zone  warfare can be identified by 

  • Grey zone elements remain below the threshold that would justify a military response, often through the use of non-military tools. 
  • The second common characteristic of grey zone activities is that they unfold gradually over time rather than involving bold, all-encompassing actions to achieve objectives in one step. The progressive unfolding of aggressive moves over the years, or even decades, reduces opportunities for decisive responses as a counter. 
  • The third characteristic, which applies to some but not all the activities in this sphere, is a lack of attributability. Most grey zone campaigns involve actions, whereby the aggressor aims for plausible deniability of its action. Whether it is cyberattacks or disinformation campaigns or the use of proxy forces, these actions allow a grey zone aggressor to deflect responses—and obstruct the potential for successful deterrence—by simply denying that it is responsible.

For example  in cases where grey zone actions are open and attributable, such as China’s approach in the South China Sea, they are justified using extensive legal and political argument. Fourthly, grey zone campaigns target specific vulnerabilities in the targeted countries. Grey zone aggressors also typically aim to put the defenders in situations where strong responses appear ruled out or counterproductive for strategic and domestic political reasons. In other words, grey zone warfare takes advantage of strategic ambiguity to achieve gradual gains.

The ambiguities in the nuclear liability law

Context: The issues regarding India’s nuclear liability law has stalled work on Maharashtra’s Jaitapur, the world’s biggest nuclear power generation site under consideration.

What is the law governing nuclear liability in India?

Laws on civil nuclear liability ensure that compensation is available to the victims for nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident or disaster and set out who will be liable for those damages. 

The umbrella Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) was adopted in 1997 with the aim of establishing a minimum national compensation amount. The amount can further be increased through public funds, (to be made available by the contracting parties), should the national amount be insufficient to compensate the damage caused by a nuclear incident.

India was a signatory to the CSC (convention ratified in 2016). 

India enacted the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (CLNDA) in 2010, to put in place a speedy compensation mechanism for victims of a nuclear accident. 

Main Provisions: 

1. strict and no-fault liability on the operator of the nuclear plant, where it will be held liable for damage regardless of any fault on its part. 

2. It also specifies the amount the operator will have to shell out in case of damage caused by an accident at ₹1,500 crore and requires the operator to cover liability through insurance or other financial security. 

3. In case the damage claims exceed ₹1,500 crore, the CLNDA expects the government to step in and has limited the government liability amount to the rupee equivalent of 300 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) or about ₹2,100 to ₹2,300 crore. 

4. The Act also specifies the limitations on the amount and time when action for compensation can be brought against the operator.

India currently has 22 nuclear reactors with over a dozen more projects planned. All the existing reactors are operated by the state-owned Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL).

What does the CLNDA say on supplier liability?

The international legal framework on civil nuclear liability calls for exclusive liability of the operator of a nuclear installation and no other person. Similarly, suppliers of nuclear equipments called liability to be unviable and hinder the growth of nuclear energy. Other arguments were to provide single point liability and remove complexity of legal hurdles. 

Section 10 of the annex of the CSC lays down “only” two conditions under which the national law of a country may provide the operator with the “right of recourse”, where they can extract liability from the supplier — one, if it is expressly agreed upon in the contract or two, if the nuclear incident “results from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage”.

However, India, going beyond these two conditions, for the first time introduced the concept of supplier liability over and above that of the operator’s in its civil nuclear liability law, the CLNDA. 

CLNDA has a Section 17(b) which states that the operator of the nuclear plant, after paying their share of compensation for damage in accordance with the Act, shall have the right of recourse where the “nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of an act of supplier or his employee, which includes supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects or sub-standard services”.

Why is the supplier liability clause an issue in nuclear deals?

Suppliers have taken issue with two specific provisions in the law, Section 17(b) and Section 46. 

The latter clause goes against the Act’s central purpose of serving as a special mechanism enforcing the channelling of liability to the operator to ensure prompt compensation for victims. 

Section 46 provides that nothing would prevent proceedings to be brought against the operator. It allows criminal liability to be pursued where applicable. Issue: definition on the types of ‘nuclear damage’ being notified by the Central Government is not clear. Section 46 potentially allows civil liability claims to be brought against the operator and suppliers through other civil laws such as the law of tort. While liability for operators is capped by the CLNDA, this exposes suppliers to unlimited amounts of liability.

10 jawans killed in blast by Maoists in Dantewada

Context: Ten security personnel returning from a counter-insurgency operation and a civilian driver were killed when Maoists blew up their vehicle in Dantewada of Chhattisgarh. The deceased jawans were members of the District Reserve Guard (DRG), a locally-raised force designed to carry out anti-Maoist operations. The tri-junction of Chhattisgarh, Telangana and Odisha located right at the southern tip of Sukma district in the south Bastar region is an area that witnesses the highest number of such incidents including the deadly 2010 Maoist ambush in Dantewada where 75 CRPF and one Chhattisgarh police personnel were killed.

Current trends in Left wing extremism in India:

  • The influence of Maoists and associated violence has been falling consistently in the country because of multiple factors, including a stronger push by security forces in Maoist strongholds, roads and civic amenities reaching the interiors to a greater extent than earlier, and a general disenchantment with the Maoist ideology among the youth, which has deprived the insurgent movement of new leadership.
  • Maoist violence in the country has gone down by 77% since 2010. The number of resultant deaths (security forces + civilians) has come down by 90 % from the all-time high of 1,005 in 2010 to 98 in 2022, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) 
  • The government has cut the number of districts declared to be Naxal-affected from over 200 in the early 2000s to just 90 now, and claims that the geographical spread of violence is actually restricted to just 45 districts. 
  • The presence of Naxals is said to be minimal to zero in Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Odisha, Jharkhand, and Bihar, which were at one time their strongholds.

Timing of the attack?

  • The CPI(Maoist) carries out Tactical Counter Offensive Campaigns (TCOCs) between February and June every year, in which the focus of its military wing is to inflict casualties on security forces
  • This period is chosen because with the onset of the monsoon in July, it becomes difficult to conduct offensive operations in the jungles.  With the onset of the monsoon, both the Maoists and the security forces return to their camps. 
  • Almost all major attacks by Maoists on security forces, including the 2010 Chintalnar massacre of 76 CRPF personnel, have taken place during the TCOC period.

Why Chhattisgarh still remains contested?

  • It is the only state in the country where Maoists continue to have a significant presence and retain the capability to mount big attacks. In the last five years (2018-22), 1,132 “violent incidents[were perpetrated by Left Wing Extremists”, in which 168 security forces personnel and 335 civilians lost their lives. 
  • Chhattisgarh has  accounted for more than a third of all Maoist-related violence in this period but the problem is the share in death is extremely high wherein it had a share of 70%-90% of deaths.
  • The violence graph in the state for this period has been up and down. Maoists mounted 275 attacks in 2018; the number fell to 182 in 2019, but rose to 241 in 2020. It then declined to 188 in 2021, but rose to 246 in 2022.
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Delayed Response:

  • It is a widely accepted principle in counter-Maoist strategy that the war against Left Wing Extremism can only be won by the state police and not central forces. This is because the state police have local knowledge, understand the language, and have local networks that are essential for the generation of intelligence.
  • It was through the active involvement of local police in the leading role that states such as Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Odisha and Jharkhand were able to end their Maoist problem. All these states formed special units of their police forces with personnel and officers drawn from the state, gave them special training, and won the battle with concerted security and development efforts.
  • This process, security establishment started late in Chhattisgarh. By this time, police of neighbouring states had pushed Maoists from their states to Chhattisgarh, making it a concentrated zone of Maoist influence.
  • The special unit of the Chhattisgarh Police, the DRG, was raised from the local tribal population and trained to fight Maoists only a few years ago, and has become active relatively recently.
  • The absence of roads in the interiors of Bastar has stymied the operations of security forces.
  •  Minimal presence of the administration in the interiors of South Bastar has ensured that Maoists continue to have influence in the region and enjoy local support through a mix of fear and goodwill.
  • Further security officials cite the lack of fool proof technology to detect IEDs and the increasing desperation of Maoists, who are avoiding direct combat with the forces, for such incidents.

Government measures to tackle Left Wing Extremism (LWE)

  • Central Government  supports the  LWE states through Security Related Expenditure (SRE), which focuses on equipping security forces to fight Maoists
  • Further the Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS), which aims to strengthen local police and intelligence set ups
  • Special Central Assistance for building infrastructure such as roads in LWE districts, the Centre has maintained a massive presence of the CRPF in the affected states for almost two decades.
  • The Centre is also pushing for the erection of mobile towers in the interiors, which would help the local people connect with the mainstream, and also generate technical intelligence
  • The Centre has also unleashed the counter-terrorism National Investigation Agency (NIA) and the Enforcement Directorate on CPI(Maoist) cadres, leaders, and sympathisers with the aim to choke their funding.
  • The CRPF has also raised a Bastariya Battalion the recruits for which were taken from the local population, who knew the language and terrain, and could generate intelligence. This unit now has 400 recruits and regularly conducts operations in Chhattisgarh.
  • Further the CRPF has been consistently enlarging its footprint by opening new camps close to 20 forward operating bases have been set up in Bastar

The Wagner Group’s actions in Africa

Context: After fighting erupted in Sudan’s capital Khartoum on April 15, questions have been raised over the involvement of the Wagner group, which has been active in African countries for years.

About Wagner Group

  • The Wagner group is a Russian paramilitary organisation headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin.
  • Though it has been reportedly engaged in counter-militancy operations in Africa, its involvement is believed to have a more extensive scope covering political, economic and military fields.
  • There have also been reports of the group supplying arms and weapons, and training regional forces in fighting jihadist threats.
  •  Despite its involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war, the Wagner group’s presence in Africa has continued.
  • By siding with the domestic actors in a civil war situation, the group’s actions have impacted the democratic process in Africa.

Role of Wagner group

  • The Wagner group has been active in Sudan, Mali, the Central African Republic, Mozambique and Libya in Africa.
  • The activities are related to providing direct support to authoritarian governments, supporting rival leadership engaged in internal wars, filling the void created by the withdrawal of the French military engagement, taking part in resource exploitation etc.
  • The Wagner group presents itself as a security provider to a few governments, mostly authoritarian ones in Africa.
  • It has also been supporting rival leaders engaged in a civil war.
  • The group’s ties with Sudan aimed at guarding mineral resources, notably gold mines, and therefore, supported Bashir’s government against international opposition.
  • It also played a direct role in suppressing the Sudanese uprising in 2019 that toppled Bashir’s regime.

Why does the role of the Wagner group seem to be controversial?

  • In Sudan, Russia has recently forged a strong relationship with the Rapid Support Forces (RSP) and its commander, General Mohamed Hamadan Dagalo. The latter is a rival leader fighting against the Sudanese army.
  • Russia is set to sign an agreement with Sudan to build a military base in Port Sudan on the Red Sea.
  • Hence there is a conflict of interest because Russia has relations with parties involved in the civil war in Sudan

Operationalise Safe City Project by August: Saxena to Delhi Police

Context: Lieutenant-Governor Vinai Kumar Saxena reviews the progress of the Central government-funded project, and issues instructions to complete the first phase of the ₹798-crore Operationalise Safe City Project by August.

About Operationalise Safe City Project

  •  A Ministry of Home Affairs initiative in collaboration with the Ministry of Women and Child Development under the Nirbhaya Fund in eight metro cities — Delhi, Kolkata, Mumbai, Chennai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad and Lucknow.
  • The project aims to create a safe, secure and empowering environment for women and girls in public spaces.
  • Under the project, 10,582 CCTV cameras will be installed.
  •  A command-and-control centre will also be set up with facilities for video analytics, AI, machine learning, facial recognition, etc., at police headquarters, district headquarters and police stations.
  • Two mobile command and control vehicles and 88 Prakhar Vans will also be deployed with mobile data terminals, body-worn cameras, etc.
  • The cost of the projects is shared in a 60:40 ratio between the Central government and the States concerned.
  • In Delhi, however, the Centre fully funded the project and implemented it through the Delhi Police through the Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (C-DAC).
  • The Pune-based C-DAC has appointed RailTel and NEC India to install CCTV cameras and connect them to feeders and main servers.

G20 health working group meet in Goa: Focus on comprehensive global health architecture, Minister urges G20 delegates

Context- Recently the second meeting of the health working group for G20 began in Goa.

Focus areas of discussion

discussions will continue on the three priorities set by the Indian presidency –

Three technical sessions were held on the first day of the meeting

  • The first session focused on health emergency prevention, preparedness and response, with delegates discussing collaborative surveillance systems supported by advanced networks of laboratories and relevant infrastructure.
  • The discussion also centred on embedding anti-microbial resistance as part of any health emergency governance system and it being complementary to such ongoing efforts at various levels of government.
  • The second session focused on creating better collaborations at various levels for access and availability of safe, effective, and quality medical countermeasures.
  • The discussions centred on methods such as public-private partnerships, and international collaborations through a network-of-networks platform.
  • In the third session, a discussion on the draft outcome document was done exclusively among G20 member states in an hour-long session afterwards.
  • It was emphasised that any consensus must be built through measures that are evidence-based, inclusive, fair, equitable, transparent and need-based.

India’s proposals

  • With plugging the gap of inequitable access and creating a global manufacturing network for medical countermeasures – vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics – being priorities for the health working group, India is likely to raise the issue of intellectual property rights during a public health emergency.
  • The discussion is likely to focus on voluntary licensing and technology transfer by pharmaceutical companies, according to officials in the know of the matter.
  • For digital health, India is likely to propose a digital toolbox under an intra-government agency like the World Health Organization that can be accessed by other countries as per their need India will open up its teleconsultation platform eSanjeevani to all, just like it offered the vaccine management system CoWIN previously.
  • India focused on the need for collaborative surveillance, community protection, safe and scalable care, access to medical countermeasures and emergency coordination.
  • focus on reducing the drivers of pandemic risk, to prevent them before they emerge, surveillance, lab systems and strengthening the public health workforce”.

As Berlin shuts its nuclear reactors, Finland opens Europe’s largest one

Context; Recently Finland’s next-generation Olkiluoto 3 nuclear reactor, the largest in Europe, has gone into regular production after months of delays, and Germany ended its nuclear era.

About Olkiluoto 3 nuclear reactor

  • Olkiluoto 3, now producing around 14% of the country's power.
  • It is expected to remain operational for “at least the next 60 years”.
  • The plant is owned and operated by Teollisuuden Voima (TVO), a subsidiary of Pohjolan Voima
  • It is located on Olkiluoto Island, on the shore of the Gulf of Bothnia
  • The Olkiluoto plant consists of two boiling water reactors (BWRs), each producing 890 MW of electricity and
  • One EPR producing 1,600 MW. This makes unit 3 currently the most powerful nuclear power plant unit in Europe and the third most powerful globally

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