Context: Punjab has proposed shifting the border security fence closer to the International Border (IB) with Pakistan, a move that has reportedly received tentative approval from the Union government. The realignment aims to restore access to nearly 21,300 acres of fertile farmland currently located between the fence and the Zero Line, where farmers face severe operational restrictions.
Why Realignment Matters
In many stretches of Punjab, the security fence lies 2–3 km inside Indian territory, rather than the norm of about 150 metres from the Zero Line.
This has created a narrow belt of agricultural land beyond the fence where cultivation continues under strict security controls, affecting productivity and farmer livelihoods.
Regulated Farming Inside the Fence
Farmers cultivating land beyond the fence operate under a controlled regime:
Timed Access: Entry allowed only during fixed hours with identity cards.
Security Supervision: BSF “Kisan Guards” monitor all movement.
Crop Restrictions: Tall crops such as sugarcane and maize (above 3–4 feet) are restricted for visibility.
Machinery Approval: Heavy equipment must be pre-registered.
Tractor Quotas: Limited tractors allowed on designated days.
Mandatory Escort: Each tractor must be accompanied by two BSF personnel.
These measures aim to prevent infiltration and smuggling but often disrupt normal farming cycles.
Governance Framework of Border Fencing
Nodal Ministry: Ministry of Home Affairs (Department of Border Management).
Executing Agencies: CPWD, NBCC, and BRO depending on terrain.
Guarding Forces:
BSF (Pakistan, Bangladesh)
ITBP (China)
SSB (Nepal, Bhutan)
Assam Rifles (Myanmar)
Legal Basis: Border Security Force Act, 1968 and executive powers under the Passport Act, 1920.
Land Acquisition: Governed by the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
Policy Shift: Movement toward Smart Border Management using CIBMS (sensors, cameras, surveillance grids).
National Status of Border Fencing
Border
Length
Fencing Status
Pakistan IB
~2,290 km
~93% fenced; LoC has AIOS
Bangladesh
4,096 km
~79% fenced; river stretches use BOLD-QIT tech
Myanmar
1,643 km
<2% fenced; fencing expanded after FMR rollback
China (LAC)
—
No continuous fence; focus on roads, tunnels, logistics
Significance
The proposed shift reflects a human-security approach to border management—balancing national security with agricultural livelihoods. It may reduce farmer hardship while maintaining surveillance through technology-led smart fencing rather than deep in-country physical barriers.
Context: Recently, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and the Manipur state government signed a revised Suspension of Operations (SoO) pact with 24 Kuki-Zo insurgent groups under the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and the United People’s Front (UPF).
Relevance of the Topic: Prelims & Mains: Key features of Peace Pact between Centre, Manipur Government and Kuki-Zo Groups.
Suspension of Operations (SoO) Pact
The SoO pact was first signed in 2008 after the violent Kuki-Naga clashes of the 1990s.
Under the original pact, around 2200 cadres of KNO and UPF were moved into designated camps, received a stipend of ₹6,000/month, and agreed to suspend operations against the State and Union forces.
The pact was extended annually until February 29, 2024, when the Manipur Government refused renewal of the pact citing violations of ground rules and accusing SoO groups of instigating the 2023 ethnic violence in Manipur.
Key Provisions of the 2025 Revised SoO Pact
Verification of cadres will be carried out by security forces, and a complete list of cadres with name, date of birth, Aadhaar, and latest photographs will be prepared by the Government.
Foreign nationals (particularly from Myanmar’s Chin-Kuki community) if found among the cadres will be removed from the list and deported.
The number of designated camps will be reduced from 14 to 12 (6 for KNO and 6 for UPF), and these camps will not be located near highways, populated areas, conflict-prone zones, the Myanmar border, or inter-state boundaries.
Weapons belonging to cadres will be stored in the nearest CRPF or BSF camps rather than in the insurgent-run camps.
Stipends for cadres will resume but will only be paid through Aadhaar-linked bank accounts and only for those physically present in the camps during inspections.
The Manipur Police will issue photo identity cards to all cadres to facilitate proper monitoring.
The Kuki-Zo Council (KZC) has agreed to open National Highway-2 (Imphal-Dimapur) a critical supply route for the Imphal Valley for free movement of commuters and goods.
A Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) headed by the Principal Secretary (Home) of Manipur will monitor implementation, conduct physical verification, and deal firmly with violations.
The pact mandates that KNO and UPF must abjure violence, abide by the Constitution of India and the territorial integrity of Manipur, and not maintain links with other armed groups.
The agreement bars insurgent groups from recruiting new cadres, carrying out offensive operations, or associating with domestic or foreign armed groups.
The Army, Assam Rifles, CAPFs, and State Police will not launch operations against these groups as long as they abide by the pact.
The pact provides for a tripartite political dialogue among the Centre, Manipur Government, and KNO/UPF to work towards a negotiated political settlement within the Constitution of India.
Significance:
The pact represents a renewed attempt at peace-building after the collapse of the agreement in 2024.
It reaffirms the territorial integrity of Manipur, addressing concerns of the Meitei community.
It acknowledges the Kuki-Zo demand for a political settlement, but strictly within the framework of the Indian Constitution.
The opening of NH-2 restores the economic lifeline and ensures supply of essential commodities to the Imphal Valley.
The relocation of camps away from sensitive areas reduces the possibility of renewed violence and enhances civilian security.
Challenges:
Trust deficit remains between communities: Meiteis accuse Kuki groups of fuelling the 2023 violence, while Kukis distrust the State Government.
The phrase “negotiated political settlement within the Constitution of India” is ambiguous and may be interpreted differently by the parties.
Implementation difficulties exist in verifying cadres, relocating camps, and deporting foreign nationals from Myanmar.
The temporary nature of the pact (valid for one year) means long-term peace remains uncertain.
The Coordinating Committee on Manipur Integrity (COCOMI), one of the largest Meitei civil society groups in Manipur, has rejected the signing of Suspension of Operations (SoO) pact with the Kuki-Zo insurgent groups.
Context: The debate on creating theatre commands has re-surfaced following discussions at the Ran Samwad 2025 tri-service seminar at the Army War College, Mhow.
Relevance of the Topic: Mains: Theaterisation of Command: Significance and the Challenges.
What is Theaterisation?
Theaterisation refers to the integration of the Army, Navy, and Air Force resources into unified ‘theatre commands’ for operational deployment under a single commander.
Each theatre command will be responsible for a specific geographical region, enabling better coordination in combat.
Current Structure :
The Army and Indian Air Force (IAF) currently have seven commands each, and the Navy has three commands.
In addition, there are two tri-service commands: Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), and the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) which manages India’s nuclear arsenal.
There is also the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQIDS), which was created after the Kargil conflict to fulfil the need for an institutional framework for higher management of defence.
Rationale for Theaterisation:
Modernisation of warfare: Modern conflicts are multi-domain (land, sea, air, cyber, space, UAVs, precision weapons). Unified command is required to respond effectively.
Jointness: India’s forces often operate separately; integration will eliminate duplication and ensure synergy in operations.
Learning from advanced militaries: Advanced militaries like the US and China operate through unified commands; India cannot afford “siloed warfare”.
2019: Creation of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and Department of Military Affairs (DMA); mandate included restructuring into joint/theatre commands.
2020: Gen Bipin Rawat (first CDS) proposed 4 commands: Air Defence, Maritime, Western, Eastern.
Post-2021 (after Gen Rawat’s death): an adversary-based joint theatre command was proposed.
Northern & Eastern Theatres (China-centric)
Western Theatre (Pakistan-centric)
Maritime Theatre Command
Ongoing discussions cover command HQs, operational areas, reporting structure, lead service, and integration of ANC & SFC.
Steps already Taken towards Jointness:
Joint logistics nodes established.
Cross-postings among services.
Integration in procurement, training, and staffing via Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQIDS) and DMA.
Challenges in creating Theatre Commands:
Institutional Resistance: Services have operated under independent commands for over 70 years; dismantling them will be disruptive.
Inter-Service ‘rivalries’ and Disagreements:
IAF’s concerns over division of its assets
Perception of army dominance and
Bias towards threat on land borders, E.g. a proposed single Maritime Theatre Command for Eastern and Western commands of the Indian Navy from Sir Creek to Sunderbans.
Risk of Operational Delays and Decision-making Bottlenecks: Risk of longer decision-making chains if additional command levels are created.
One-size-fits-all Model: Blind replication of foreign models (like of the US) may not suit India’s unique threat environment and resource base.
Inter-service Dissonance: Despite consensus on the need for integration, divergence remains on how to achieve it, i.e., through theatre commands or by strengthening existing joint structures.
Way Forward
Consensus-building: Ensure reforms are consultative, not imposed.
Pilot Projects: Test limited theatre structures before nationwide rollout.
Future-readiness: Incorporate cyber, space, AI, and electronic warfare into doctrines.
Empowering CDS & DMA to overcome institutional inertia.
India-specific Model: Tailored to geography, adversaries, and force structure, not copy-paste from other militaries.
Theatre commands are a game-changer reform in India’s higher defence management. However, success depends on addressing doctrinal concerns, ensuring doctrinal balance between Army, Navy, and IAF, and evolving a flexible, India-specific model.
As CDS Gen Chauhan emphasises, the objective is to resolve “dissonance” and build consensus so that the armed forces fight future wars jointly rather than individually.
Context: Recently, the Union Home Minister of India accused Opposition’s Vice-Presidential candidate Justice B Sudershan Reddy (retd) of aiding Naxalism by delivering the landmark Supreme Court judgment that banned Salwa Judum in 2011.
Relevance of the topic:
Prelims: Salwa Judum; Salwa Judum Judgement.
Mains: Government approach to counter the challenges posed by LWE.
Justice B Sudershan Reddy, a retired judge of the Supreme Court, headed the Bench that in 2011 delivered the landmark ruling in Nandini Sundar v State of Chhattisgarh, which ended Salwa Judum.
What was Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh?
Salwa Judum was a state-backed vigilante movement launched to counter Maoist insurgency in Chhattisgarh. Tribal youth were recruited as Special Police Officers (SPOs), popularly called Koya Commandos.
Recruitment was voluntary for those 18 and above, with character verification and preferably Class 5 education. Preference was given to victims of Maoist violence who wished to resist them.
Recruitment was done under the Chhattisgarh Police Act, 2007, which gave wide powers to the Superintendent of Police.
Most SPOs were young tribal men from Naxal-affected villages. They were armed for self-defence but also used in counter-insurgency operations with police and paramilitary forces.
Their duties included guiding forces in forests, translating, gathering intelligence, and spotting Maoist movements. Each SPO received about ₹3,000 per month as honorarium.
The government justified Salwa Judum as both a security measure and a livelihood source for local youth.
In 2007, sociologist Nandini Sundar, historian Ramachandra Guha, and former IAS officer EAS Sarma filed a petition before the Supreme Court challenging the practice of Salwa Judum.
Salwa Judum Judgement 2011:
In Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2011), the Supreme Court held that Salwa Judum violated Articles 14 (equality) and 21 (right to life with dignity), and therefore ordered its disbandment.
The SC found that SPOs were poorly educated and inadequately trained, yet expected to perform duties of regular police, making it discriminatory. Arming such youth exposed them to life-threatening risks, which could not be justified as livelihood.
The SC criticised the state for treating citizens as expendable instruments of counter-insurgency, undermining their dignity. It directed that only trained police and paramilitary forces should conduct such operations.
Context: In contemporary warfare, as jets, tanks, and warships have become more sophisticated; the methods used to shield them from detection and attack have greatly evolved. Decoys have emerged as vital tools to protect assets through deception.
Relevance of the Topic: Prelims & Mains: Decoys - working, applications, examples; Role of Decoys in Contemporary warfare.
What are Decoys ?
A decoy in warfare is a deliberately created false target (physical or electronic) that imitates real military assets with the objective of misleading enemy sensors and weapons, thereby protecting actual platforms, wasting adversary munitions, and buying time for counteraction.
During Operation Sindoor, the Indian Air Force reportedly deployed the X-Guard Fibre-Optic Towed Decoy (FOTD) on its Rafale jets.
These decoys are believed to have misled Pakistan’s J-10C fighters and their PL-15E beyond-visual-range missiles, resulting in false kill claims by the adversary.
Integrated with the SPECTRA Electronic Warfare (EW) suite, the X-Guard provided an additional protective layer, enhancing the survivability of Rafales.
Following the operation, the Ministry of Defence began fast-tracking the emergency procurement of additional X-Guard units to strengthen the Air Force’s defensive capabilities.
T-90 Tank Decoys: In 2025, the Indian Army issued a Request for Information (RFI) to domestic vendors for the development of T-90 tank decoys. These decoys are required to replicate not only the physical dimensions but also the thermal and acoustic signatures of real tanks.
Kavach Decoy System: Indian Navy has inducted the Kavach decoy system, designed to protect warships by diverting radar-guided anti-ship missiles.
Maareech Advanced Torpedo Defence System (ATDS): Indian Navy has also operationalised the Maareech Advanced Torpedo Defence System (ATDS), jointly developed by DRDO and BEL, which detects incoming torpedoes and deploys decoys to neutralise them effectively.
Role of Decoys in Contemporary Warfare:
Protection of High-Value Assets: Decoys act as the first line of defence for expensive platforms like fighter jets, tanks, and warships. E.g., Indian Air Force reportedly used X-Guard Fibre-Optic Towed Decoys on Rafales during Operation Sindoor to protect jets from Pakistan’s J-10C fighters and PL-15E missiles.
Confusing and Misleading Enemy Sensors: They replicate radar, thermal, and acoustic signatures to misguide surveillance and targeting systems. E.g., X-Guard mimics a Rafale’s radar cross-section and Doppler velocity, making it hard for missiles to distinguish between real and fake targets.
Wastage of Enemy Munitions: By drawing enemy fire onto false targets, decoys force adversaries to expend costly missiles and bombs. E.g., Ukraine has used wooden and 3D-printed decoys of artillery and missile systems to make Russia waste drones and precision strikes.
Buying Time for Counteraction: Decoys delay enemy decision-making and create windows for evasion or retaliation. E.g., In naval warfare, Australia-US Nulka active decoy draws incoming missiles away from warships, giving them time to maneuver or launch countermeasures.
Force Multiplication in Ground Warfare: Ground decoys simulate massed formations, creating the illusion of greater strength. E.g., Russia’s Inflatech decoys can quickly create fake tank or artillery formations; Indian Army in 2025 issued an RFI for T-90 tank decoys with thermal and acoustic signatures to deceive drones.
Multi-Layered Defence Systems: Decoys work in tandem with Electronic Warfare (EW) suites to form a layered shield. E.g.,
On Rafales, SPECTRA EW suite + X-Guard FOTD together provide both onboard jamming and an external trailing shield.
Indian Navy’s Kavach chaff system and Maareech ATDS provide similar protection against radar-guided missiles and torpedoes.
Psychological and Strategic Impact: Decoys undermine the enemy’s confidence in their own sensors and kill claims, adding to the fog of war.
Decoys, across air, land, and sea, have become indispensable to modern war fighting. For a relatively low investment, they deliver high-impact protection.
Context: In a significant fillip to modernisation of military aviation capabilities, the Indian Army received the first batch of three Apache AH-64E helicopters from the US at the Hindon airbase.
Relevance of the Topic:Prelims: Key facts about Apache AH-64E Helicopters.
Apache AH-64E Helicopters
The AH-64E Apache is one of the world's most advanced multi-role combat helicopters.
Manufactured by: Boeing, the US.
Key Features:
Warhead: The choppers are fitted with:
Hellfire air-to-surface anti tank missile
Stinger air-to-air missiles
70 mm Hydra rockets
30 mm automatic cannons
Advanced Technology: AH-64E incorporates 26 new technologies to enhance battlefield performance. These include:
Advanced Digital Connectivity
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
Powerful T700-GE-701D engines with enhanced transmissions
Improved rotor blades made of composite materials
Ability to control unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) mid-flight (allowing manned-unmanned teaming in real time).
Sensors & Radar: Equipped with Longbow Fire Control Radar:
capable of simultaneously tracking up to 128 targets and engaging up to 16 at once
Fire-and-forget capability when combined with Hellfire missiles
All weather operation capability.
Significance: The induction of Apache combat helicopters strengthen India’s operational capabilities against Pakistan along the Western Border and high-altitude areas.
Can approach enemy troops covertly with relative stealth and launch as close range attack
Capability to operate in hostile airspace with threats from ground.
Capability to destroy enemy tanks, armoured personnel carriers and fortified positions in mountainous terrain.
Provides cover to army tanks and infantry during battle.
Armed Forces and Apache Helicopters
The Indian Air Force (IAF) has 22 Apache Helicopters which are used for air defence and deep-strike roles targeting enemy radar installations and command posts.
The Indian Army intends to use its fleet for close air support, tank-busting missions and battlefield dominance during armoured engagements. India signed a Rs 5691 crore deal in 2020 for 6 Apaches, specifically for the Indian Army.
Key Facts:
In early 2025, the Ministry of Defence signed a Rs 62,700 crore (approximately $7.3 billion) contract with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for 156 ‘Prachand’ Light Combat Helicopters, underscoring the increasing role of rotorcraft in India’s war-fighting doctrine.
These helicopters- 66 for the IAF and 90 for the Indian Army- will be delivered over the next five years. This would be a significant development unfolding on the Eastern front.
Context: After protecting the skies for more than six decades, the MiG-21 Bison fighter jets of the Indian Air Force are set to retire in September 2025. The plans are to replace them with indigenously developed Tejas Mk1A fighter aircraft.
Relevance of the Topic:Prelims: Key facts about MiG-21 Fighter Jets.
MiG-21 Fighter Jets: India’s First Supersonic Fighter
MiG-21 is a single-engine supersonic jet fighter and interceptor aircraft.
Developed by: Mikoyan-Gurevich Design Bureau in the former Soviet Union.
Induction: First procured in 1963 into the Indian Air Force (IAF). They formed the backbone of the Air Force till the mid-2000s, when the Su-30MKIs were inducted.
Initially developed as an interceptor, the supersonic jet was eventually upgraded to perform as a multi-role combat aircraft, including ground attacks.
With a maximum speed of 2230 kilometres per hour, the jet carries one 23mm twin-barrel cannon with four R-60 close combat missiles.
Key Role: They have played key roles in the wars with Pakistan (1965 and 1971), Kargil War (1999), Balakot air strikes (2019), and the most-recent Operation Sindoor (2025).
Variants of MiG-21 Fighter Jets:
Over the years, India procured more than 700 MiG-21 aircraft of different variants. Many were domestically built by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. They include- Type 74 or MiG 21F; Type 76 or MiG 21PF; Type 77 or MiG 21FL; Type 96 or MiG 21M; Type 75 or MiG 21 Bis (upgraded Type 96); and MiG-21 Bison.
MiG-21 Fighter Jets to Retire
The Air Force currently has two MiG-21 squadrons, or 36 aircrafts, that are operated by the squadrons stationed at the Nal airbase in Rajasthan.
Indian Air Force (IAF) has 31 fighter squadrons as against the sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons. It is significantly below the optimal readiness requirements.
The phase out of two MIG-21 squadrons has been long extended due to the delayed deliveries of LCA-Mk1A (Tejas fighter aircraft). After the phased out, the combat strength of the Air Force will drop to 29 squadrons.
Controversy:
The MiG-21 aircrafts have been involved in several accidents, leading to the deaths of 170 pilots and 40 civilians. They were once termed “Flying Coffin”.
Context: Recently, the United States has designated The Resistance Front (TRF) as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO) and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).
Relevance of the Topic: Prelims: Key facts about The Resistance Front (TRF); 1267 Sanctions Committee.
The Resistance Front
The Resistance Front (TRF) is a proxy of Pakistan-based UN-designated terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
Founded by Muhammad Abbas Sheikh (now deceased) in 2019, in the aftermath of the abrogation of Article 370. It is currently headed by designated terrorist Sheikh Sajjad Gul. As per Indian security agencies, the outfit was floated to evade international sanctions against Pakistan.
TRF has carried out several terror attacks in Jammu & Kashmir’s Keran (2020), Handwara, Sopore, Shopian, Anantnag, and Reasi with the latest one in Baisaran meadows of Pahalgam (2025).
TRF usually focused on security forces and political figures, but late 2024 onwards it started to target infrastructure projects and civilians (including non-locals) in J&K.
The Indian government has designated the outfit as a terror organisation under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act in 2023.
The move intensifies global pressure on Pakistan to rein in terror groups operating from its territory.
The designation will help India’s case in designating the TRF under the 1267 Committee for sanctions at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and imposing sanctions and travel bans on its members.
The 1267 Sanctions Committee
The 1267 Sanctions Committee, also known as the ISIS and Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee, was established under the UNSC Resolution in 1999.
It is one of the most important UN subsidiary bodies working towards combating terrorism, particularly in relation to ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and associated individuals, groups and entities.
The committee decides on sanctions and travel bans for individuals and entities associated with these terror organisations and ensures the enforcement of these measures under UNSC resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011), and 2253 (2015).
Pakistan, a non-permanent member of the UNSC, has been protecting TRF at UNSC with support from China.
Context: In a recent address, the Lieutenant Governor of UT Jammu & Kashmir emphasised the need for a multi-pronged Counter Terrorism Strategy in the region which is focused on Intelligence, Community engagement, Technology, and Inter-Agency collaboration.
Relevance of the Topic: Mains: Strategy to Counter Terrorism in J&K.
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) continues to face a complex security environment, where terrorism is not just a law-and-order problem but also deeply linked to local alienation, external interference, and governance deficits. Hence, a multi-pronged strategy is required.
Multi-Pronged Strategy to Counter Terrorism
Intelligence-based operations.
Community engagement to build trust and gather information.
Use of modern technology like Artificial Intelligence (AI) for threat prediction and surveillance.
Strong inter-agency collaboration between police, armed forces, and central police forces.
Reviving beat policing, which relies on local police officers patrolling and connecting with the community.
Role of State Police in Fighting Terrorism:
The primacy of the local or State police as the fulcrum of counter-terror operations is a well established fact -
Local police understand the terrain, demography, language, and culture better than any outside force.
Connect with the local population facilitates high-grade intelligence of terrorists who operate amidst the population.
The Pahalgam terror attack (April 2025) highlighted a critical gap in human intelligence (HUMINT). Strengthening local police could help prevent such lapses in the future.
Role of Technology in Fighting Terrorism:
Artificial Intelligence (AI), predictive analytics, and real-time data processing help to detect, track, and counter emerging threats.
Balance between Techint (Technical Intelligence) and HUMINT is essential for a responsive and layered security apparatus.
Role of Inter-Agency Collaboration in Counter-Terrorism:
Jammu & Kashmir Police, the Indian Army, and the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) must operate as a cohesive unit to eliminate terrorism and dismantle its support system.
Joint efforts between Police and Central Agencies are vital to intensify targeted strikes on Overground Workers (OGWs) and disrupt networks providing logistical and financial support to terrorists.
Inter-agency cooperation facilitates the pooling of resources, expertise, and jurisdictional powers, making the counter-terror response more agile, adaptive, and comprehensive.
Community Engagement and Participatory Governance
Presently, elected MLAs, sarpanches, and local representatives have been kept out of the security matrix. Jammu and Kashmir Police (JAKP) is kept outside the command of the locally elected government. Excluding elected representatives and local control over J&K Police weakens democratic accountability and hampers community trust in counter-terror efforts.
The local population feel more comfortable to share information with their sarpanch or their MLA than with someone from a central agency.
Restoring the control of the JAKP under the elected government will facilitate better accountability and responsiveness to community needs, ensuring that policing strategies align with the local population’s concerns and aspirations.
Elected officials can play a vital role in bridging the gap between the police and the community, fostering trust and cooperation essential for effective law enforcement and counter terrorism.
Policy makers need to encourage structured dialogue between police forces and local leaders to collaborate and address community concerns, gather information on terror-related activities and enhance public safety initiatives.
A one-size-fits-all approach would not work in J&K, India needs a multi-pronged counter-terrorism strategy rooted in intelligence, trust, governance, and technology. A key step is to empower the local institutions and adapt to regional realities to win both the war and the people's trust.
Context: At the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) summit in June, NATO members pledged to increase their military spending to 5% of their GDP by 2035, a significant jump from the previous target of 2%.
Relevance of the Topic: Prelims: SIPRI Military Expenditure data. Mains: Effects of Rising Military Expenditure.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Global military spending in 2024 hit a record $2.7 trillion, the highest year-on-year rise (9.4%) since 1988.
Top Five Military Spenders are:
The US ($997 billion)
China ( $314 billion)
Russia ($149 billion)
Germany ($88.5 billion)
India ($86.1 billion)
In terms of GDP percentage (excluding countries at war such as Russia, Ukraine and Israel), the highest spenders include:
Saudi Arabia (7.3%)
Poland (4.2%)
The US (3.4%)
According to the Global Peace Index, in 2023, militarisation increased in 108 countries and the year saw the highest number of conflicts since World War II.
All of the NATO members (32) combined spent $1,506 billion, which makes it around 55% of global military spending. There is a concentration of spending in a few countries.
Military Expenditures in India:
India is the fifth-largest military spender in the world, with an annual defence budget of $86.1 billion.
Military spending stands at 2.3% of India’s GDP. In comparison, the Public Health spending is only 1.84% of GDP, far below the 2.5% target of the National Health Policy.
Following Operation Sindoor, the government has approved an additional ₹50,000 crore for emergency defence procurement. This is over and above the regular ₹6.81 lakh crore annual defence allocation. In contrast, Ayushman Bharat, India’s flagship health insurance scheme covering 58 crore people, received just ₹7,200 crore in 2023-24.
Effect of Rising Military Expenditure:
Loss of Post-Cold War Peace Dividend: After the Cold War ended (1991), global military spending declined significantly, dropping to its lowest level of 2.1% of world GDP by 1998. The current wave of remilitarisation risks undoing the post-Cold War peace dividend, where falling military spending allowed greater investment in health, education, and development.
Crowding Out of Social Sector Spending: Higher military budgets reduce funds for health, education, welfare, and poverty alleviation. Example: Spain refused NATO's 5% target, saying it would cut welfare spending by €300 billion. Study of 116 countries shows rising defence spending reduces public health investment, especially in middle- and low-income nations.
Hampers SDG Progress: Redirects funds from Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) like ending poverty, ensuring health and education, combating climate change etc.
Increases Climate Burden: According to a study by the Conflict and Environment Observatory, if NATO’s defence spending reached 3.5% of GDP, greenhouse gas emissions would increase 200 million tonnes annually.
Weaken Peace-Building Institutions: Rising military expenditure diverts global resources away from peace and development, leaving institutions like the United Nations severely underfunded. The UN's latest $44 billion budget has received only $6 billion in six months, forcing a cut to $29 billion despite growing humanitarian needs.
Humanitarian Consequences: Cuts to foreign aid (e.g., USAID closed down by Trump) may cause 14 million additional deaths by 2030, one-third being children.
Hurts Poor and Developing Countries: Poor and developing countries are forced to match defence spending trends, harming basic services. Lebanon spent 29% of GDP, Ukraine 34% on defence.
Context: According to a research report by Delhi-based Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, an autonomous think tank, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is set to rapidly transform the landscape of warfare with deeptech being deployed for tasks ranging from autonomous weapons systems to intelligence gathering and cybersecurity.
Relevance of the Topic: Mains: How AI is transforming the landscape of warfare and India’s Preparedness.
Use case of AI in Warfare includes
Development of autonomous weapons systems that can select and engage targets without human intervention.
Analysing vast amounts of data to identify potential threats.
Tracking enemy movements, and forecasting future attacks.
Creating realistic battlefield simulations to enable field evaluation trials as well as allowing soldiers to train in virtual environments to prepare for real-world combat scenarios.
Countries around the world have started integrating AI in Warfare
China
China is using the AI models to improve artillery systems by reducing the time between shots and increasing accuracy.
Chinese military drones are equipped with generative AI that allows them to detect and destroy enemy radars automatically.
China combines AI across land, air, sea, space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum. This gives it a strong edge in multi-domain operations.
Pakistan
Pakistan’s Air Force set up a Centre of Artificial Intelligence and Computing (CAIC) in 2020.
During Operation Sindoor, Pakistan likely received LIVE satellite images and data from China. AI may have been used to quickly process this data, helping Pakistan track Indian troop movements in real-time.
Ukraine
Ukraine has equipped its long-range drones with AI that can autonomously identify terrain and military targets, using them to launch successful attacks against Russian refineries.
Israel
Israel has also used its Lavender AI system in the conflict in Gaza to identify 37,000 Hamas targets. As a result, the current conflict between Israel and Hamas has been dubbed the first “AI war”.
India
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) established the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics (CAIR) in 1986, with the aim of developing autonomous technologies for military use.
CAIR has worked on a wide range of applications including combat systems, path planning, sensor integration, target identification, underwater mine detection, patrolling, logistics, and localisation.
However, despite this early start, India faces several key challenges in effectively harnessing AI for modern warfare.
Challenges for India in AI Warfare
Lack of Energy Infrastructure
AI technologies need continuous, high-power electricity for data centres and simulations. India has low nuclear power capacity (around 7.5 GW), much less than countries like South Korea.
Overdependence on solar and wind energy without backup storage makes the power grid unstable.
Inadequate AI Infrastructure: India lacks large-scale, defence-specific AI data centres. Limited access to high-performance computing for real-time battlefield analysis and decision-making.
Fragmented Research & Development: Agencies like DRDO’s CAIR have been working since 1986, but progress has been slow. No large-scale, coordinated national mission focused on AI for defence.
Weak Civil-Military Fusion: Unlike China or the U.S., India does not have strong collaboration between private tech firms, startups, academia, and the military. Defence R&D is mostly government-driven, limiting innovation speed.
Lag in C4ISR, Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Domains: India lags behind China in C4ISR capabilities- Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, particularly in the domains of space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum.
Lack of National Policy or defence doctrine on AI integration: No clear national policy or defence doctrine on AI integration in military strategy. Regulatory and bureaucratic delays slow down tech adoption in defence forces.
Limited Private Sector Participation: Private sector involvement in nuclear energy and AI defence systems is limited. Without private innovation and investment, India cannot scale up AI infrastructure quickly.
AI is transforming modern warfare into an “agentic” battlefield, where autonomous systems, rapid decision-making, and multi-domain dominance decide outcomes.
According to Fortune Business Insights, the global military drone market was valued at $14.14 billion in 2023 and is projected to reach $47.16 billion by 2032, reflecting the rapid militarisation of drone technology.
Evolution of Drone Warfare
While unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) date back to World War II, their strategic utility surged post-1991 Gulf War.
In a watershed moment in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan’s drones overwhelmed Armenian defences. Since then, drones have redefined warfare: from Houthi strikes on Saudi oil sites and Hamas’s use in Gaza.
Recently, in Ukraine's bold Operation Spider’s Web in 2025, over 100 First-person view (FPV) drones hit deep into Russia, damaging 40+ aircraft and causing $7 billion in losses. In retaliation, Russia launched the world’s biggest drone attack till date, with almost 500 drones hitting Ukraine overnight.
This evolution has led to the rise of swarm drones, which work together in large numbers to overwhelm enemy defences.
Swarm Drones
Swarm drones are autonomous or semi-autonomous UAVs that operate in coordinated groups, much like swarms of birds or fish. They communicate via wireless networks and adjust in real time to achieve shared objectives.
Swarms are more resilient than traditional drones due to in-built redundancy, i.e., even if one drone is intercepted, others can continue on the mission.
Drone swarms are thus used to saturate air defences, gather intelligence, and attack high-value targets.
Countries are developing advanced AI-driven swarm drones that can make real-time decisions, adapt tactics mid-mission, and coordinate complex manoeuvres- set to play a key role in future combined arms warfare alongside infantry, armour, and cyber units.
What Makes Drone Swarms a Strategic Threat?
Low Cost, High Impact: A $500-$1,000 drone can damage a $200 million aircraft.
Difficult to intercept due to their small size, and ability to overwhelm defences- cluttering radars, exhausting ammunition, and slipping through even robust air defence systems.
High Agility and Mobility: Swarm drone attacks can be launched anytime, anywhere even from a truck near an airbase, as seen in Op Spider’s Web. In a country like India, with porous borders and diverse populations, this threat is both real and pressing.
Traditional military bases, aircrafts, and infrastructure, previously considered secure, are now vulnerable to drone attacks and demand new defence strategies.
Countering Drone Threats
Detection of Drones: Defence against drones begins with detection. Modern systems employ a combination of: AESA radars; Electro-optical and infrared sensors; Acoustic detectors; AI-powered fusion systems
Neutralisation of Drones: Once detected, drones can be neutralised by kinetic means such as:
Missiles and anti-aircraft guns, though these are expensive and less effective against swarms.
Automated gun systems like C-RAM and Phalanx, which autonomously track and fire at targets, offer a more practical solution.
Some cost-effective alternatives include:
Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs): Lasers and microwave pulses that disable drones by damaging sensors or frying electronics.
Electronic Warfare (EW): Jamming GPS signals or communication links.
Spoofing: Misleading drones about their location or issuing false commands.
Cyber Attacks: Taking control of drones and crashing them by exploiting software vulnerabilities.
Interceptor drones & nets: For close-range neutralisation, protecting critical assets.
The ideal defence is a layered system, integrating multiple modes of interception for redundancy and cost-efficiency purposes. Examples include Israel’s Iron Dome and the US’s Directed Energy M-SHORAD.
India’s Counter-Drone Infrastructure:
Since 2020, India has ramped up its counter-drone infrastructure, deploying a layered defence that blends indigenous technology, EW, and air defence systems. Key systems include:
Akashteer Air Defence Control System : Developed by Bharat Electronics Ltd, it integrates with the Indian Air Force’s integrated command network for real-time tracking.
Bhargavastra : Solar Defence and Aerospace Ltd’s weapon system fires 64 micro-rockets in salvos to eliminate drone swarms.
DRDO’s Anti-Drone System: It offers 360-degree radar coverage, with both jamming (soft kill) and laser (hard kill) capabilities. Drones can be detected up to 4 km away, and neutralised within a 1 km radius.
Indrajaal: An AI-powered grid from a Hyderabad startup that combines jammers, spoofers, and intelligence to protect areas up to 4,000 sq km. Already deployed at naval sites in Gujarat and Karnataka.
During the May 2025 swarm attacks, the IAF activated its Integrated Counter-UAS Grid, alongside conventional radars, guns, and missiles, neutralising attempted strikes on 15 military bases and several urban targets.
Drone warfare has ushered in a new age of asymmetric, AI-driven conflict and transformed the dynamics of the battlefield. As CDS General Chauhan aptly stated- We are at a cusp where war may be between humans and machines- and tomorrow, between machines themselves.
