Other Constitutional Bodies

State Public Service Commissions: Challenges, Reforms and Constitutional Mandate

Public Service Commissions were envisaged as independent constitutional institutions to uphold fairness, meritocracy and administrative integrity in government recruitment. However, repeated controversies across States—paper leaks, inconsistent evaluation, delayed results and prolonged litigation—have eroded public trust and disrupted career trajectories of lakhs of aspirants. This makes State PSC reforms a critical governance priority.

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Why Reform State PSCs?

1. Safeguarding Merit

Articles 315–323 of the Constitution grant State Public Service Commissions (SPSCs) autonomy, insulating recruitment from political influence. Strong and independent PSCs are essential to prevent patronage-based selections and ensure that only qualified candidates enter the administrative system.

2. Restoring Youth Confidence

Recurring exam cancellations and legal disputes trigger mass protests and psychological distress among aspirants. The SPSC controversies in Telangana (2023) and Bihar (2024) affected thousands due to flawed evaluation and litigation. Transparent and timely processes are crucial to maintain public confidence.

3. Strengthening Governance Capacity

Frontline sectors—health, education, police, revenue, social welfare—face chronic vacancies. The 2nd Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) notes that personnel shortages significantly weaken service delivery. Efficient PSCs help fill posts quickly, improving governance outcomes.

4. Judicial Endorsement of PSC Independence

In T.N. Public Service Commission vs A. Balasubramaniam (1994), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that PSC independence is vital for administrative fairness and democratic legitimacy.

Key Issues Affecting State PSC Functioning

1. Political Interference

Although the 41st Constitutional Amendment (1976) increased the age limit of PSC members to attract experienced civil servants, many States appoint underqualified individuals, undermining institutional credibility.

2. Outdated Syllabi & Exam Patterns

Unlike the UPSC, which periodically updates its syllabus, several State PSCs rarely revise exam frameworks. This leads to academic imbalance, outdated content and misalignment with evolving administrative needs.

3. Evaluation & Translation Errors

Poor moderation, scaling issues, and mistranslated questions frequently trigger court cases. The UPPSC and Karnataka PSC have faced repeated litigation over inconsistent evaluation.

4. Reservation Complexities

Errors in calculating vertical, horizontal and zonal reservations often lead to litigation. High Courts have repeatedly intervened in roster preparation in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.

Way Forward

  • Dedicated Personnel Ministry:
    States should create independent personnel ministries modelled on the Union Ministry of Personnel to streamline recruitment and workforce planning.
  • Transparent Appointments:
    Adopt 2nd ARC recommendations—fix minimum (55) and maximum (65) age, and establish clear qualification norms for PSC members.
  • Periodic Syllabus Review:
    Set up standing committees and conduct public consultation before finalising syllabi, following UPSC’s consultative model.
  • Adopt Global Best Practices:
    • UK Civil Service Commission: annual audits, transparent reports
    • Canada PSC: structured grievance redress, strong ethics mechanisms

About State Public Service Commissions (SPSCs)

Origin & Constitutional Status

They trace their origin to the Lee Commission (1924) and the Government of India Acts of 1919 and 1935. SPSCs are constitutional bodies under Articles 315–323, tasked with recruiting for State services and advising governments on personnel matters.

Composition & Appointment

  • Appointed by the Governor
  • Tenure: 6 years or until 62 years
  • At least 50% must have 10+ years of government service

Independence & Financial Security

  • Expenses are charged on the Consolidated Fund of the State
  • Post-tenure:
    • Members may join another SPSC or the UPSC
    • But cannot take up State government employment—ensuring neutrality

Removal Process of Chief Election Commissioner of India 

Context: After the Election Commission of India dismissed allegations of electoral fraud as “baseless and invalid”, the INDIA bloc is considering moving a motion of removal of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) during the ongoing session of Parliament.

Relevance of the Topic:Prelims: Removal process of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC). 

About Election Commission of India

  • The Election Commission is a permanent and an independent body established by the Constitution of India directly to ensure free and fair elections in the country. 
  • Article 324 of the Constitution provides that the power of superintendence, direction, and controlof elections vested in the Election Commission, related to:
    • Parliament
    • State legislatures
    • Office of President of India
    • Office of Vice-President of India 
  • Election Commission is an All-India body i.e., it is common to both the Central government and the state governments. 

Chief Election Commissioner of India

Article 324 of the Constitution and the CEC and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 lay down provisions regarding the appointment, tenure, and removal of the CEC.

  • Article 324(2): 
    • Election Commission shall consist of the Chief Election Commissioner and such number of Election Commissioners, as the President may fix from time-to-time. 
    • Appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners are made by the President, subject to the law enacted by the Parliament. Parliament has enacted the CEC and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023. 
  • The Election Commission was a single-member body when it was set up in 1950. This system lasted until 1989 with the CEC as the lone member. After the Election Commission Amendment Act 1989, it became a multi-member body. Since then, it has been a three-member body (1 CEC + 2 ECs). 
  • Tenure: The CEC has a tenure of up to six years or up to the age of 65, whichever is earlier.

Removal Process of Chief Election Commissioner of India:

  • The CEC or an EC can resign from his office at any time by writing under his hand addressed to the President. 
  • CEC can only be removed from office through the process of impeachment requiring two-thirds majority of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha or on grounds of proven misbehaviour or incapacity.
    • CEC cannot be removed from his office except in like manner and on like grounds as needed for the removal of a Supreme Court judge.
    • A motion supported by 50 MPs of the Rajya Sabha or 100 MPs of the Lok Sabha has to be moved in Parliament and passed by the House with a two-thirds majority of those present.
  • ECs cannot be removed from office except on the CEC's recommendation.

Immunity to Chief Election Commissioner:

  • Clause 16 of the CEC and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 grants immunity to the CEC and ECs from any legal action for decisions taken while in office.
  • No court shall entertain or continue any civil or criminal proceedings against any person who is or was a CED or an EC for any act, thing or word, committed, done or spoken by him when, or in the course of act in the discharge of his official duty or function. 

Election Commission Appointments: Independence under Question

Context: The Election Commission of India (ECI) plays a pivotal role in conducting free and fair elections, regarded as the bedrock of Indian democracy. Recent legal and legislative changes have brought the independence and impartiality of ECI under scrutiny.

Appointment of Election Commissioners

  • Article 324 of the Constitution vests the superintendence, direction and control of elections to Parliament, state legislatures, and the offices of President and Vice-President in the Election Commission of India.
  • Article 324 does not provide a clear mechanism for appointing the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Election Commissioners (ECs). As per Article 324(2), the appointment method is left subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament.
  • Traditionally, appointments are made by the Executive, raising concerns about bias and autonomy.

Landmark Case: Anoop Baranwal vs. Union of India (2023)

  • The Constitution Bench interpreted Article 324 of the Constitution, which provides for the appointment of Election Commissioners.
  • It held that exclusive executive control over appointments compromises the independence of the ECI.
  • To prevent a pliable ECI, the Court directed that appointments must be made by a Selection Committee comprising:
    • Prime Minister of India
    • Leader of Opposition
    • Chief Justice of India 

Parliament’s Reaction: The Chief Election Commissioner and Other ECs Act, 2023

  • The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023 was enacted to nullify the Baranwal verdict. 
  • The Act removed the CJI from the Selection Committee and added a Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM.
  • So, effectively the government dominates the Committee (2:1 majority: Prime Minister + Cabinet Minister vs Leader of Opposition).
  • Criticism: This ensures that the ECI is under the control of the ruling regime.

The Act was challenged in multiple writ petitions. Petitioners sought an interim stay before the 2024 Lok Sabha elections.

However in Dr. Jaya Thakur & Ors. v. Union of India (2024), Supreme Court refused to grant stay, citing the principle of “presumption of constitutionality” of laws.

Issues and Concerns: 

  • The exclusion of the judiciary from the appointment process raises concerns about the independence of the ECI.
  • Executive control over appointments increases the risk of biased or partisan decision-making.
  • Exclusion of the judiciary from the selection committee weakens the system of checks and balances.
  • Public trust in the electoral process may decline if the ECI is perceived as partisan. 

Global Comparison

  • Many modern constitutions have created independent “fourth branch institutions” (in addition to the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary which are autonomous and independent of the ruling dispensation) to safeguard democracy from executive dominance.
    • E.g., Constitution of South Africa envisages a cluster of state institutions for “supporting constitutional democracy”. The Chapter Nine institutions (as they are called) include the Electoral Commission of South Africa.

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Anoop Baranwal can be seen as an attempt to transform the ECI into such an institution by insulating it from executive control. However, the enactment of the 2023 Act and the refusal of the Court to stay its implementation have weakened this progress.

The independence of the Election Commission of India is central to preserving democratic legitimacy. Hence, there is a need to revisit the appointment mechanism for the Election Commission of India. The inclusion of the Chief Justice of India or another independent authority in the Selection Committee would strengthen the neutrality of the process.

National Commission for Schedule Caste

Context: The National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) on Friday issued a notice to Punjab government officials, seeking an action taken report on the alleged sexual misconduct by Lal Chand Kataruchak, a Minister in the ruling Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) government.

The National Commission for Scheduled Castes is an Indian constitutional body established with a view to provide safeguards against the exploitation of Scheduled Castes and Anglo Indian communities to promote and protect their social, educational, economic and cultural interests, special provisions were made in the Constitution. Article 338 of the Indian constitution deals with National Commission for Scheduled Castes.

Institutions are often distinguished by whether they perform a protective or a promotional role. The NCSC is clearly more of a protective institution, though it does monitor the progress of promotional policy initiatives emanating from other state agencies. While its creation was mandated by the Constitution, neither the responsibility of promoting the welfare of the scheduled castes nor that of protecting them against injustices has been vested exclusively in this institution. Indeed, though it enjoys constitutional status, the recommendations of the Commission are advisory rather than mandatory.

General Studies- II: Governance, Constitution, Polity, Social Justice and International relations.

  • General Studies- II: Governance, Constitution, Polity, Social Justice and International relations.

Mains: 

  • 2020. Which steps are required for constitutionalization of a commission? Do you think imparting constitutionality to the National Commission for Women would ensure greater gender justice and empowerment in India? Give reasons.
  • 2018. Whether National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) can enforce the implementation of constitutional reservation for the Schedules Castes in the religious minority institutions? Examine.

So we can see that coverage of constitutional bodies is important. From the perspevtive of Mains as well as Prelims. So in this discussion we are going to cover the following: 

  • Main functions of the NCSC
  • Evaluation of the performance of the comssission:
  • Way forward

The National Commission for Scheduled Castes (NCSC) is an Indian constitutional body established under Article 338 of the Constitution of India. It was set up in 2004 to investigate and monitor all matters relating to the constitutional safeguards provided for the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and to protect their rights.

The main functions of the NCSC

  1. To investigate and monitor all matters relating to the safeguards provided for the Scheduled Castes under the Constitution or under any other law for the time being in force.
  2. To inquire into specific complaints with respect to the deprivation of rights and safeguards of the Scheduled Castes.
  3. To participate and advise in the planning process of socio-economic development of the Scheduled Castes.
  4. To evaluate the progress of the development of the Scheduled Castes under the Union and any State.
  5. To make recommendations for the effective implementation of safeguards for the Scheduled Castes.

Four areas of functioning:

Of the four core areas of the Commission’s functioning – viz., service safeguards, education, economic development and atrocities – the Services Safeguards Wing is the most active. These complaints relate mostly to promotions, discrimination and harassment on various counts, institution of disciplinary proceedings on flimsy grounds, the conduct of departmental enquires in an unfair manner, adverse entry in the annual confidential reports, transfers to far off places or insignificant positions, delay in payment of retirement benefits, delay in the completion of departmental inquires, and so forth. It has also succeeded in institutionalizing the system of liaison officers and special SC and ST cells in all central ministries and public sector enterprises for the speedy and effective resolution of the grievances of employees of these communities.

The NCSC also has the power of a civil court and can summon witnesses, record evidence, and issue orders. It submits annual reports to the President and the Parliament on its performance and recommendations.

The NCSC plays an important role in protecting the rights and interests of the Scheduled Castes, which are one of the most vulnerable and marginalized sections of the Indian society. It ensures that the constitutional safeguards provided for them are effectively implemented and any violations are addressed promptly.

Evaluation of the performance of the commission:

  • There are a variety of conflicts that characterise the functioning of the Commission. Firstly, there has historically prevailed a conflict between the Commission and its nodal ministry, the Ministry of Social Welfare (now the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment), which has often taken the form of conflict between the Minister and the Chairman of the NCSCST. Conflict between the Chairperson and members has also tended to characterise the Commission, because of the politicised nature of appointments to it. 
  • By choosing to interpret its constitutional mandate narrowly, the Commission has laid itself open to the charge of elite bias. The fact that it is most effective in the area of servicerelated safeguards speaks for itself.
  • The Commission’s competence in settling service-related grievances may be contrasted with its inability to reduce the incidence of atrocities and violence against dalits, or to effectively fight the persistent scourge of untouchability.
  • A particular Commission seems to be only as good as its members, and especially its Chairperson, are. The lack of institutionalisation in the procedures of appointment to the Commission has meant that competent and committed members are less likely to be appointed, especially in a political and policy environment where membership of the Commission becomes a convenient sinecure for unemployable politicians or a temporary shelf for bureaucrats belonging to these groups.
  • The most significant handicap of the Commission is the fact that its decisions are not binding, but recommendatory. Though this is not explicitly stated in the Constitution (as amended), Article 338, with all its sub-clauses, is deeply ambiguous on this issue. It gives the Commission quasi-judicial powers of investigation, but does not mention the form in which the Commission’s judgement of a particular issue would be delivered and implemented.
  • The quality of reports in terms of the data they contain, and the manner in which the data is organized, has also been declining over the years.
  • The Commission is supposed to prepare an Annual Report for presentation to Parliament. Reports are often tabled two or more years after they have been submitted to the President.
  • Even when Reports are tabled in Parliament, they are frequently not discussed. There is no evidence in the Lok Sabha debates of a discussion on any of the first four reports. Of the four Special Reports, only one has an all-India scope and this is about service safeguards.

Way Forward: 

It is often argued that the Commission is a paper tiger which needs to be armed with greater powers. This argument is premised on an inadequate appreciation of the location of the Commission in the existing constitutional setup. To give the Commission additional powers, in the matter of criminal investigation for instance, would require it to follow prevailing rules and procedures pertaining to evidence and prosecution. These may in fact retard the effectiveness of the Commission by rendering it vulnerable to litigation in the form of appeals to higher judicial bodies, and thereby nullifying its

operational effectiveness, and diluting its moral stature.

  • An amendment is required either in Article 338 itself, or in the rules by which the President may fix a period for the discussion of the Report in Parliament.
  • It would be appropriate for the Commission to undertake qualitative studies, commission social anthropologists and other social scientists to undertake such studies, and to institutionalize mechanisms by which contemporary changes and transitions in the social structure can be mirrored, recorded and acted upon.
  • The process of appointment to the Commission should be made more autonomous of the government of the day. 

It would be desirable for the Commission to engage in an internal evaluation of its priorities on an ongoing basis, and to redefine them in a substantively more egalitarian way so as to accomplish its mandate in the spirit in which it was intended.

Constitutional bodies fighting corruption under attack, says PM Modi

Context: 

  • Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Tuesday launched a scathing attack against what he termed conspiracies by forces within and outside the country to undermine constitutional institutions that were cracking down on corruption and the corrupt. 
  • India is the world's largest democracy and has a well-established constitution that lays down the framework for its governance. Constitutional bodies are an integral part of the Indian democratic system, established to ensure the proper functioning of the government and safeguard the rights of its citizens. 
  • These bodies are independent, autonomous, and have their own powers and functions, which are enshrined in the constitution. From the Election Commission of India to the CAG, these bodies play a crucial role in upholding the principles of democracy, promoting accountability, and ensuring transparency in the functioning of the government. 
  • This write-up will provide a overview of the various constitutional bodies in India, their functions, and their significance in the country's democratic setup.

So it is important for us to cover the constitutional bodies along following items: (EXCEPT GST COUNCIL)

  • Articles in the constitution
  • Appointing authority
  • Tenure & Removal
  • Immunities
  • Eligible for further Appointment. 
  • Powers

Union Public Service Commission

  • It is the …… Well, if you are reading article this far the chances are that you already know what UPSC is. 
  • Articles: 315 – 323
  • Composition: 9 to 11 members
  • Tenure & removal: Presently for 6 years or 65 years (whichever is earlier) whichever is earlier
  • Further Appointment:
    • UPSC Chairman is not eligible for a second term. 
    • Other members are eligible only for an appointment within SPSC and UPSC
  • Powers: Recruitment of All India Services, public services of centrally administered territories, Central services, advisory powers. 

Goods and Services Tax Council (The latest, MOST DIFFERENT and hence the first to be covered)

  • The 101st Amendment Act of 2016 paved the way for the introduction of a new tax regime (i.e. goods and services tax - GST) in the country. 
  • The smooth and efficient administration of this tax requires co-operation and coordination between the centre and the states. 
  • In order to facilitate this consultation process, the amendment provided for the establishment of a Goods and Services Tax Council or the GST Council. 
  • While discharging its functions, the Council is to be guided by the need for a harmonised structure of GST and the development of a harmonised national market for goods and services. Further, the Council has to determine the procedure in the performance of its functions
  • Composition: The Council is a joint forum of the centre and the states and consists of the following members:
    • The Union Finance Minister as the Chairperson
    • The Union Minister of State in-charge of Revenue or Finance
    • The Minister in-charge of Finance or Taxation or any other Minister nominated by each state government

Working of the Council

  • The decisions of the Council are taken at its meetings. One-half of the total number of members of the Council is the quorum for conducting a meeting. Every decision of the Council is to be taken by a majority of not less than three-fourths of the weighted votes of the members present and voting at the meeting. The decision is taken in accordance with the following principles:
    • The vote of the central government shall have a weightage one-third of the total votes cast in that meeting.
    • The votes of all the state governments combined shall have weightage of two-thirds of the total votes cast in that meeting.

Attorney General of India

  • He is the highest law officer in the country
  • Articles 76, 88
  • Appointment by the president 
  • Important Immunities: 
  • Tenure & Removal: Holds office during the pleasure of the President
  • Eligible for further Appointment
  • Powers
    • Privileges of an MP (Right to Speech within Parliament). 
    • Right of an audience in all Indian courts. 
    • Right to attend both Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha proceedings without right to vote.  

Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG)

  • He is the head of the Indian Audit and Accounts Department1. He is the guardian of the public purse and controls the entire financial system of the country at both the levels–the Centre and the state.
  • Article 148, 149, 150, 151 
  • Appointment by the president 
  • Important Immunities:
    • His salary and other service conditions are determined by the Parliament.
    • The administrative expenses of the office of the CAG, including all salaries, allowances and pensions of persons serving in that office are charged upon the Consolidated Fund of India. Thus, they are not subject to the vote of Parliament.
  • Tenure & removal: Holds the office for six years or 65 years (whichever comes earlier)
    • Removal is the same as for a judge of the Supreme Court
  • Not eligible for further appointment.
  • Powers
    • Audits accounts concerned with the Contingency Fund, the Consolidated Fund of India and states,  and the Public Accounts Fund of the states and centre.
    • Advisory function with respect to accounts to the country’s President

Election Commission

  • It  is a permanent and an independent body established by the Constitution of India directly to ensure free and fair elections in the country
  • Article: 324
  • Appointment by the president 
  • Composition: CEC/Chief Election Commissioner, Other Election Commissioners
  • Tenure & removal: Presently for 6 years or 65 years, whichever is earlier
  • Eligible for further appointment. 
  • Powers
    • Conduct of free and fair elections in India
    • Political parties’ registration
    • Overseeing elections

Finance Commission

  • It is constituted by the president of India every fifth year or at such earlier time as he considers necessary
  • Article: 280
  • Appointment by the President 
  • Composition: Chairman, Four members
  • Eligible for further appointment
  • Powers
    • Decides the basis for sharing the divisible taxes by the centre and the states
    • Any matter in the interest of sound finance can be referred to the President evaluates the rise in the Consolidated Fund of a state in order to affix the resources of the state Municipalities and Panchayats
    • FC has the powers of a civil court

National Commission for Scheduled Castes (Similarly for tribes and OBC)

  • It is an Indian constitutional body established with a view to provide safeguards against the exploitation of Scheduled Castes and Anglo Indian communities to promote and protect their social, educational, economic and cultural interests, special provisions were made in the Constitution. 
  • Articles 338
  • Composition
    • Chairman, Vice-chairman, 3 other members
    • Tenure & removal: 3 years
  • Eligible for further appointment
  • Powers
    • It is a quasi-judicial body
    • Monitoring and reporting about the implementation of constitutional safeguards for Scheduled Castes
    • It has a civil court’s powers

Special officer for Linguistic Minorities

  • Articles 350 B
  • Composition Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner
  • Tenure and removal: Pleasure of the President
  • Further appointment: Yes
  • Powers: Monitoring and reporting the working of constitutional safeguards for linguistic minorities