Other Bilateral Relations of India

India–UAE Third CEPA Joint Committee Meeting

Context: India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) convened the third Joint Committee Meeting under the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) in New Delhi. The meeting reviewed CEPA’s progress since its signing in 2022 and outlined measures to deepen economic, regulatory, and strategic cooperation.

About CEPA

The India–UAE CEPA, signed in 2022, is India’s first comprehensive economic partnership agreement with any West Asian nation. It aims to:

Liberalise trade in goods and services
Boost investments
Reduce tariff barriers
Facilitate customs cooperation
Strengthen supply-chain connectivity

The India–UAE Joint Commission is the institutional mechanism responsible for monitoring implementation and ensuring alignment with CEPA objectives.

Key Outcomes of the Third CEPA Joint Committee Meeting

1. Non-Oil Trade Target

Both countries reaffirmed their commitment to achieving USD 100 billion in non-oil, non-precious metal trade by 2030. This target aligns with CEPA’s goal of diversifying economic relations beyond hydrocarbons and gold.

2. Competitive Bidding for Gold TRQ

India informed the UAE of its new online competitive bidding system for Gold Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) allocations under CEPA.

A TRQ allows a specified quantity of imports at a lower or zero tariff.
This mechanism is expected to make gold imports more transparent and predictable for industry stakeholders.

3. Regulatory and Sectoral Cooperation

The discussions covered:

Pharmaceutical trade facilitation, including faster regulatory approvals
Early signing of the Food Safety MoU to harmonise SPS (sanitary and phytosanitary) standards
Anti-dumping discussions, aimed at preventing market distortions and ensuring fair trade

Together, these measures aim to reduce non-tariff barriers and strengthen sector-specific value chains.

India–UAE Bilateral Relations

1. Trade Relations

UAE is India’s third-largest trading partner and second-largest export destination.
Bilateral trade crossed USD 100 billion in FY 2024–25, growing 19.6% year-on-year.

2. Investment Cooperation

UAE sovereign wealth funds have committed USD 75 billion for Indian infrastructure.
The Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 2024 strengthens investor confidence and long-term capital flow.

3. Energy Security

UAE is India’s fourth-largest crude oil supplier.
It is the only country storing crude oil in India’s Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPRs), strengthening supply security.

4. Defence and Security

Defence cooperation includes high-level exchanges, joint exercises like Desert Cyclone and Zayed Talwar, and maritime security collaboration in the Indian Ocean Region.

5. Climate Partnership

India and UAE jointly launched the Global Green Credit Initiative (GGCI) to promote international climate stewardship and sustainable practices.

6. Diaspora and Culture

The UAE hosts 3.5 million Indians, forming its largest expatriate community.
The inauguration of the BAPS Hindu Temple in Abu Dhabi represents a milestone in cultural diplomacy.

Conclusion

The third CEPA Joint Committee meeting reinforces India–UAE relations as one of the most dynamic bilateral partnerships in the Indo-West Asian region.

With deeper trade integration, regulatory harmonisation, major infrastructure investments, and strong diaspora linkages, the relationship is poised to evolve into a comprehensive strategic and economic partnership aligned with India’s long-term global trade goals.

India–Australia Renewable Energy Partnership (REP): Powering a Sustainable Future

Context: Australia’s Minister for Climate Change and Energy recently met with India’s Minister for New & Renewable Energy to advance cooperation under the India–Australia Renewable Energy Partnership (REP).
The meeting underscored the growing convergence between both countries in developing a clean, resilient, and diversified renewable energy ecosystem.

About the India–Australia Renewable Energy Partnership (REP)

The REP is a strategic framework launched in 2024 under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) between India and Australia. It aims to deepen bilateral collaboration in the renewable and clean energy sector, combining Australia’s resource wealth and technology with India’s manufacturing scale and energy demand.

Objectives and Framework

Diversified Value Chain: REP seeks to build an integrated supply chain in solar PV, green hydrogen, and energy storage.
Technology & Resource Synergy: Australia provides critical minerals like lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements, while India brings manufacturing capacity and market scale.
Dialogue Mechanism: A Track 1.5 Dialogue connects government officials, industries, and research bodies to convert policy intent into practical outcomes.
Supporting Agreements: The India–Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) underpins REP by reducing tariffs on clean energy commodities and critical minerals.
Implementation: The Ministry of New & Renewable Energy (MNRE) serves as India’s nodal agency for coordination.

Key Priority Areas

The partnership focuses on eight sectors:

Solar PV manufacturing and deployment
Green Hydrogen production and use
Energy Storage Systems
Solar Supply Chain resilience
Circular Economy models
Two-way Investments in renewables
Capacity Building and training
Shared Policy Priorities for sustainable transition

Significance for India

✅ Mineral Security: Expands access to critical minerals, reducing dependence on China.
✅ Skill Development: The Rooftop Solar Training Academy aims to train 2,000 technicians by 2027.
✅ Industrial Integration: The Green Steel Partnership will link Australian raw materials with Indian low-carbon steel initiatives.
✅ Energy Targets: Supports India’s Panchamrit goals, especially 500 GW non-fossil capacity by 2030, including 280 GW solar.
✅ Ethical Supply Chains: Ensures adherence to ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) norms for transparent, responsible sourcing.

Challenges Ahead

Downstream Gaps: Australia lacks large-scale refining capacity for minerals.
Regulatory Mismatch: Divergent standards complicate certification and trade.
Capital Competition: The U.S. and EU’s subsidy-driven clean energy policies divert investments.
Grid Bottlenecks: India needs stronger grid infrastructure to integrate large-scale renewables.

Conclusion

The India–Australia Renewable Energy Partnership reflects a pragmatic model of climate diplomacy — balancing growth, sustainability, and strategic autonomy.

By linking resource-rich Australia with energy-hungry India, the REP not only accelerates the clean energy transition but also strengthens the Indo-Pacific’s green economic architecture, positioning both nations as pivotal players in the global net-zero movement.

Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement

Context: Recently, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement which formalised the defence and security partnership between the countries.

Relevance of the Topic: Mains: Key provisions of the pact; Implications for India’s strategic interests.

The pact comes in the aftermath of Israel’s strike in Qatar and amid growing regional instability in West Asia, including threats from Iran, Yemen’s Houthis, and Israel’s assertiveness.

Key Feature of the Defence Pact

Mutual Defence Clause: Any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.
Strategic Objectives:
- To enhance defence cooperation, joint training, and military exchanges.
- To strengthen joint deterrence against regional adversaries.

Pakistan has announced that its nuclear programme will be made available to Saudi Arabia, if needed, under the new defence pact.

Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Defence Partnership:

The partnership has deep historical roots shaped by shared security concerns and sustained military cooperation since the 1960s.

Historical Background of Defence Cooperation:

1960s: Pakistani troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia to bolster internal and regional security.
1979: Pakistan’s special forces assisted during the Grand Mosque seizure in Mecca.
1982: A Bilateral Security Cooperation Agreement institutionalised defence ties, enabling training, advisory roles, and Pakistani arms supply to Saudi Arabia.

Historically, the Saudi-Pakistan defence equation, underpinned by religious commonality, has been defined by Saudi economic support and Pakistani military assistance. Pakistani military personnel have trained Saudi forces, while Riyadh has provided crucial financial and energy support.

Implications of the Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Defence Pact:

For Saudi Arabia:

Strategic Security: Strengthens deterrence against Iran and its proxies like Houthis, militias in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon.
Regional Balancing: It demonstrates Riyadh’s strategic autonomy, diversifying its defence alignments beyond exclusive reliance on the United States.

For Pakistan:

Military Benefits: Access to advanced weaponry (possibly via Saudi financing of the US arms purchases).
Economic Relief: Strengthens Pakistan’s bargaining power for financial aid and investments from Riyadh.
Geopolitical Leverage: Reinforces Pakistan’s role in Muslim world security architecture.
Domestic Prestige: Enhances the political capital of Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership.

India’s Position and Concerns:

India is aware of the long-standing arrangement and will study its implications for national security and regional stability. The strategic concerns include:

Saudi financing may indirectly bolster Pakistan’s military capabilities altering the regional balance of power to India’s disadvantage.
The pact’s mutual defence clause could embolden Pakistan, complicating India’s security calculus in South Asia.

For Saudi Arabia, its partnership with India continues to offer greater economic and strategic value. A core characteristic of India’s strategic autonomy has been to develop its own relationship with Saudi Arabia (and other countries) with a focus on leveraging India’s economic heft.

Also Read: India-Saudi Arabia Relations

Yudh Abhyas 2025: India-US Joint Exercise

Context: The 21st edition of Yudh Abhyas 2025, India-US Joint Exercise, concluded in Alaska in the United States.

Relevance of the Topic:Prelims: Key facts about Yudh Abhyas 2025.

Yudh Abhyas 2025: India-US Joint Exercise

It is an annual bilateral army-to-army drill between India and the US.
The exercise has steadily grown in scale and complexity alternating between locations in India and the US.
Infantry units, artillery, aviation, electronic warfare and counter-drone systems were employed under joint command and control. The joint exercise provides valuable lessons in operational planning, command and control, precision, adaptability and joint targeting.

Yudh Abhyas is a hallmark of the growing military-to-military interaction between India and the US, aligned with the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership between both countries.

Important bilateral exercises between India and the US

India has the largest number of military exercises with the US, which are growing in scale and complexity. Important bilateral exercises include:

Yudh Abhyas (Army)
Vajra Prahar (Special Forces)
Malabar (Navy)
Cope India (Air Force)
Tiger Triumph (tri-services)

Also Read: US-India Defence Ties

Bilateral Investment Agreement between India and Israel

Context: Recently, Israel’s Finance Minister visited India and signed a Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIA) with India.

Relevance of the Topic: Prelims: Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIA).

Key Features of Bilateral Investment Agreement

Israel has become the first Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member state with which India has signed a BIA under its new model Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) framework.
Aim: To facilitate reciprocal investments by providing investors from both countries with legal certainty, transparency and protections.
The BIA replaces the earlier investment agreement signed in 1996, which was terminated in 2017.

Significance of Bilateral Investment Agreement:

Groundwork for FTA negotiations: The agreement lays the groundwork for future Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations between India and Israel.
Expected to increase bilateral investments between the two countries, which presently stands at a total of $800 million. Includes provisions to safeguard investments against expropriation, ensure transparency, and enable smooth transfers and compensation for losses.
Protection for investors: Incorporates provisions for independent dispute resolution through arbitration, ensuring that investors have recourse in case of disputes.
Labour mobility: Israel has already hired a large number of Indian blue-collar workers. BIA may further increase avenues for Indian labour mobility.
Balances investor protection with the State’s regulatory rights, preserving sufficient policy space for sovereign governance.

The agreement is expected to strengthen Israeli exports, open new opportunities for both Indian and Israeli investors, and expand trade flows.

India-China Border Relations

Context: India and China have renewed diplomatic activity such as border patrol agreements, resumption of direct flights and efforts to expand trade and cultural exchanges.

Relevance of the Topic: Mains: India - China bilateral relations.

India-China border is un-demarcated and is referred to as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The border length is around 3,488 km as per India, while China claims it to be about 2,000 km. The different interpretations by the two countries leads to frequent disputes.

The border is divided into three main sectors

Western Sector (Ladakh, ~1597 km): Aksai Chin (~38,000 sq. km) under Chinese occupation, and China also controls Shaksgam Valley ceded by Pakistan in 1963.
Middle Sector (Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, ~545 km) which is the least disputed, though differences exist near the Barahoti plains.
Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, ~1346 km) where China claims about 90,000 sq. km of Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet,” while the Sikkim boundary is formally settled but still faces PLA activity.

India-China Border Dispute

Historically, the 1914 Simla Agreement drew the McMahon Line between British India and Tibet, but China rejected it.
China occupied Tibet in 1950 and built a road in Aksai Chin in the 1950s.
The 1962 India-China war resulted in India’s defeat, with China retaining Aksai Chin and withdrawing from its advances in Arunachal Pradesh, leaving the boundary issue unresolved. India-China relations after the 1962 war remained tense, with little progress on the boundary dispute.
In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing marked a turning point, as it re-opened dialogue after decades of mistrust.
However, political instability in India (1989-1991) slowed progress until P.V. Narasimha Rao’s government (1991-1996) was able to re-focus on China.

Initial Steps (1988-1992):

Between 1988 and 1993, six rounds of talks of the Joint Working Group (JWG) were held.
The dialogue included both diplomats and military commanders, with first meetings at Bum La (eastern sector) and Chushul/Moldo (western sector) in 1992.
Border trade resumed in 1992 after a gap of over 30 years, and consulates were re-opened in Mumbai and Shanghai in December 1992.

Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement (BPTA), 1993:

Signed during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to Beijing in September 1993.
Core Principle: The boundary dispute would be resolved peacefully, and neither side would use or threaten force.
The Agreement recognised the Line of Actual Control (LAC) for the first time in an official bilateral document. Both sides agreed :
- Not to cross the LAC; if intrusions occurred, forces would withdraw upon caution.
- To jointly check and determine contested segments of the LAC.
- To maintain minimal force levels along the LAC and reduce them on the principle of mutual and equal security.
- To freeze the military situation, acknowledging India’s geographic disadvantage compared to China’s easy access through the Tibetan plateau.

The agreement emphasised setting aside the boundary dispute to build cooperation in other areas.

1996 Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures:

Signed during Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit to India in 1996.
Expanded upon the 1993 BPTA by specifying military confidence-building measures (CBMs).
Both sides agreed :
- Not to use force and to continue peaceful consultations.
- To reduce or limit military forces and heavy weaponry (tanks, artillery, missiles) in border areas.
- To avoid large-scale military exercises near the LAC; if held, exercises would be directed away from the other side.
- Article X: Stressed the need for a common understanding of the LAC alignment. Both sides committed to exchange maps for clarification and confirmation.

Challenge of LAC Clarification

In 2000, both sides exchanged maps of the relatively undisputed Central sector.
In 2002, maps of the western sector were exchanged, but were rejected within minutes as they represented maximalist positions of both sides.
By 2005, efforts to clarify the LAC were abandoned.
Key contested areas included: Samar Langpa, Trig Heights, Depsang, Kong Ka La, Pangong Tso, Spanggur Gap, Mount Sajun, Dumchele, Demchok, and Chumar. These same areas became flashpoints in later standoffs, including in 2020.

The 1993 and 1996 agreements marked important milestones in institutionalising peace and stability along the border. However, the failure to define and clarify the LAC meant that the agreements could only postpone and not prevent future confrontations.

The failure to achieve a mutually accepted definition of the Line of Actual Control left the core dispute unresolved making subsequent tensions and face-offs inevitable.

Also Read: hTaking stock of India-China Bilateral Ties

India-Singapore Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Roadmap

Context: Recently, the Prime Minister of Singapore was on his official visit to India. India and Singapore marked 60 years of diplomatic ties by adopting a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Roadmap.

Relevance of the Topic: Mains: Significance of India-Singapore Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Roadmap.

Both countries agreed on a forward-looking roadmap for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) covering eight priority areas.

Key Elements of the Roadmap towards Comprehensive Strategic Partnership:

1. Economic Cooperation:

Deepen bilateral trade and market access by Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) and initiate the review of CECA in 2025.
Substantial review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA).
Semiconductor ecosystem collaboration through policy dialogues, resilient supply chains, R&D partnerships, workforce training, and business-to-business cooperation.
Jointly develop sustainable and next-generation industrial parks with advanced manufacturing capabilities.
Enhance capital market connectivity through NSE-IFSC-SGX GIFT Connect.

2. Skills Development:

The National Centre of Excellence for Skilling in Advanced Manufacturing will be established in Chennai with Singapore’s support.
Both sides will promote cooperation in Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET), curriculum development, certification frameworks, internships, and teacher training.
State-level initiatives (such as Singapore-Assam Nursing Talent Skills Cooperation) will be scaled up.

3. Digitalisation and Technology:

Strengthening digital finance and fintech cooperation, cyber security, and capital market linkages.
The Joint Working Group on Digital Technologies will explore opportunities in AI, quantum computing, critical and emerging technologies.
Specific AI collaboration will involve AI-ready datasets and sectoral applications in agriculture, healthcare, and education.
The UPI-PayNow linkage will be expanded to maximise paperless, secure, cross-border payments.

4. Sustainability:

Collaborate on green hydrogen and ammonia production and trade. Explore cooperation in urban water management and civil nuclear energy.
Joint work will continue in multilateral platforms such as the International Solar Alliance and Global Biofuels Alliance.
Food security cooperation will include export promotion and accreditation frameworks for agricultural products.
Green and Digital Shipping Corridor (GDSC) will be developed to strengthen maritime connectivity and promote green maritime fuels.

5. Connectivity:

Maritime connectivity will be expanded through the Green & Digital Shipping Corridor.
Aviation connectivity will be expanded through partnerships in aviation and aerospace Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO).
Cooperation in Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF) will be promoted.

6. Healthcare and Medicine:

The MoU on Health Cooperation will be implemented to cover digital health, disease surveillance, maternal and child health, access to medicines, and combating communicable and non-communicable diseases..

7. People-to-People and Cultural Exchanges:

Student exchanges, including ITI students and Singapore-India Partnership Foundation's immersion programmes will be expanded.
Internships for Singaporean students in Indian companies under the India Ready Talent (IRT) programme will be encouraged.

8. Defence and Security:

Deepen defence technology cooperation in AI, quantum computing, automation, and unmanned vessels.
Maritime cooperation will include maritime security, submarine rescue, and Maritime Domain Awareness. Singapore acknowledged India’s interest in the Malacca Straits Patrol highlighting shared maritime security interests.
The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty will be used to strengthen cooperation in criminal investigations.

Institutional Mechanisms:

India-Singapore Ministerial Roundtable will be institutionalised as the foremost mechanism to monitor the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership roadmap annually. Regular Foreign Office Consultations will review bilateral relations.

Strategic Significance

The roadmap reflects India’s Act East Policy and positions Singapore as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific region.
The focus on semiconductors, digital economy, and green shipping aligns with India’s strategic priorities for self-reliance and sustainable growth.
Cooperation in maritime security and the Malacca Straits Patrol enhances India’s strategic presence in one of the world’s busiest sea lanes.
Skill development initiatives and the National Centre of Excellence in Chennai will strengthen India’s human capital and industry-readiness.
Expansion of UPI-PayNow and fintech linkages highlights India’s global leadership in Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI).
Counter-terrorism coordination deepens India’s regional and global security partnerships.

Nepal objects to India-China Trade through Lipulekh Pass

Context: Nepalese Prime Minister has voiced his concerns over India and China to resume using Lipulekh pass to carry out border trade. Nepal claims Lipulekh as its own territory, however, India has categorically dismissed it as “neither justified nor based on historical facts and evidence”.

Relevance of the Topic: Prelims: Key facts about Lipulekh Pass. Mains: An important aspect of challenges associated with India-Nepal Relations.

About Lipulekh Pass

The Lipulekh Pass is a Himalayan pass situated in the Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand, India. It is located on the border between Uttarakhand, Nepal and Tibet.
Lipulekh is strategically important to India as it provides access to Tibet and serves as a key route for the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra.
- The pass is near the trading town of Taklakot (Purang) in Tibet and has been used since ancient times by traders, mendicants and pilgrims.
- It is also used by pilgrims to Kailash-Manasarovar Yatra.

Nepal’s claim to Lipulekh Pass and Kalapani Region:

Historical Basis: Nepal claims the southern side of the pass called Kalapani territory, based on the Treaty of Sugauli 1816 between British East India Company and Nepal.
The treaty delimited the boundary along Kali river (Sharda/Mahakali river). It stated that Nepal would cede the territories west of the Kali river.
- Nepal claims that the Kali river originates from Limpiyadhura, west of Kalapani and Lipulekh. On this basis, Nepal claims Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura as its part.
- India claims that the Kali river originates at Kalapani village in Pithoragarh, where all its tributaries merge.

Hence, the bone of contention is the differing interpretation of the origin of the Kali River.

India’s stand on Lipulekh Pass:

Border trade between India and China through Lipulekh Pass commenced in 1954 and has been going on for decades. This trade had been disrupted in recent years due to COVID-19 and other developments, and both sides have now agreed to resume it.
India rejects Nepal’s objection to resumption of India-China border trade through the Lipulekh Pass stating that the arguments are not based on “historical facts”. Any unilateral artificial enlargement of territorial claims by Nepal is untenable.

In the recent past the official map of Nepal, included in the constitution of Nepal, shows Limpiyadhura, Lipulekh and Kalapani located to the east of the Mahakali River as integral parts of Nepal.

India-Japan Joint Crediting Mechanism

Context: The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change has signed an Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with the government of Japan on Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

Relevance of the topic:

Prelims: Article 6.2 of Paris Agreement, National Designated Authority.

Mains: Significance of India-Japan Joint Crediting Mechanism.

The MoC was unveiled as part of the broader Indo-Japan cooperation framework titled Green Energy Focus for a Better Future.

Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement

Under Article 6.2 countries can trade emissions reductions bilaterally. It enables a host country to sell units to a buyer country, in exchange for investments, support for capacity building, and access to technologies not available through domestic resources.
The buyer country purchases these units known as Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) to address any gaps in meeting its own climate goals.

About the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM)

The JCM is a Japanese initiative designed to promote global climate action. Under this mechanism, Japan implements and invests in low-carbon technologies in developing countries.
The resulting emission reductions are credited to both Japan and the host country, and Japan uses its share to meet its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).
Unlike the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) established under Kyoto Protocol, host countries under JCM act as joint implementers, not just passive participants.
A Joint Committee manages the mechanism including rules, methodologies, project registration, and credit sharing.
India has established a National Designated Authority (NDA) to approve JCM projects and oversee the functioning of the domestic carbon market.

Significance for India’s Climate Commitments:

India has made ambitious NDC commitments under the Paris Agreement for 2030. These include:

Reducing the emission intensity of GDP by 45% from 2005 levels.
Achieving 50% cumulative electric power capacity from non-fossil fuel sources.
Creating an additional carbon sink of 2.5-3 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent through afforestation.

JCM will support India in meeting these targets by providing foreign investment, advanced technology, and access to international carbon markets.

It will also enable the international trading of carbon credits generated from such projects under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement with Japan and other countries on similar lines without adversely impacting India’s NDC commitments.

India-Japan Ties: Old partners, New priorities

Context: Recently, the Prime Minister of India visited Japan for the 15th India-Japan Annual Summit. The visit is expected to further consolidate the Special Strategic and Global Partnership between the two nations.

Relevance of the Topic: Mains: India-Japan bilateral relations.

Key Highlights of India PM’s Visit to Japan

India and Japan inked 21 pacts during the recent visit. The key agreements, MOUs and announcements include:

India-Japan joint vision for the next decade: The roadmap covers vital areas such as economic growth, security, technology, innovation, health, sustainability, mobility and people-to-people exchanges.
Revision of the 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.
Bilateral energy partnership on clean Hydrogen and Ammonia.
Memorandum of cooperation on joint crediting mechanism.
Private investment target of ¥10 trillion (about $68 billion) in India over the next decade.
Economic Security Initiative launched to promote supply chain resilience in strategic sectors.
MoU on India-Japan digital partnership 2.0
Launch of the India - Japan AI Initiative to strengthen collaboration on large language models, data centres, and AI governance.
Launch of the Next Generation Mobility Partnership
Launch of the India - Japan Small and Medium Enterprises Forum
Launch of the Sustainable Fuel Initiative
Implementing arrangement between the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) and Japan aerospace exploration agency (JAXA) concerning joint lunar polar exploration mission.
Transfer of Japan's next-generation E10 series Shinkansen technology for the Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train project.
Japan Human Resource Exchange: an action plan to promote two-way exchange of 5 lakh people between India and Japan, particularly 50,000 skilled and semi-skilled personnel from India to Japan in the next five years.

Overview of India-Japan Bilateral Relationship:

India and Japan are two of Asia’s leading democracies and among the world’s top five economies. The partnership is rooted in civilisational ties reinforced by convergence in their regional and global outlooks. The countries share values, trust, and strategic outlook.

Strategic Partnership:

India-Japan bilateral relations were elevated to Global Partnership in 2000, Strategic and Global Partnership in 2006, and Special Strategic and Global Partnership in 2014.
India’s Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) align closely with Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) policy.

Multilateral and Regional Cooperation:

Cooperation between the countries extends to plurilateral platforms such as the:
- Quad (India and Japan coordinate closely with the US and Australia to ensure a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific)
- International Solar Alliance (ISA)
- Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI)
- Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (India and Japan are looking to diversify and secure supply chains through the SCRI which also involves Australia).
Japan leads the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI’s) connectivity pillar.

Trade Ties:

Bilateral trade reached $22.8 billion in FY 2024.
Imports from Japan continue to outweigh exports.
- India’s main exports: chemicals, vehicles, aluminium, and seafood
- India’s major imports: machinery, steel, copper, and reactors.

Investment:

Japan is India’s fifth-largest source of FDI with $43.2 billion cumulative investment up to December 2024. Annual inflows have been strong: $3.1 billion in FY 2024.
Around 1,400 Japanese companies with nearly 5,000 establishments operate in India; more than 100 Indian companies are present in Japan.

Emerging Focus Areas:

Digital cooperation (involving AI, semiconductors, startups), clean energy, supply chain resilience, industrial competitiveness, public infrastructure and skill development.
Economic security initiative focuses on semiconductors, critical minerals, AI, telecommunications and clean energy.

Infrastructure Cooperation:

Japan has been India’s largest Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) donor since 1958, supporting critical infrastructure and human development projects. ODA disbursement stood at about JPY 580 billion ($4.5 billion) in FY 2024.
The flagship Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail is the flagship project symbolising advanced technology transfer and skill development. The latest tranche of JPY 300 billion ($2.2 billion) was signed in 2023.
Japan is transferring its next-generation E10 series Shinkansen technology for the Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train project.

Defence and Security:

Key agreements on defence and security include the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (2008), Defence Cooperation and Exchanges MoU (2014), Information Protection Agreement (2015), Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Agreement (2020), and co-development of the UNICORN naval mast (2024).

Military Exercises:

Malabar (with the US and Australia), Milan (multilateral naval), JIMEX (bilateral maritime), Dharma Guardian (Army), and Coast Guard cooperation are held regularly.
Dialogue Mechanisms: Defence Ministers’ meetings, Chiefs’ visits, and Joint Service Staff Talks (2024) have consolidated trust.

People-to-People, Culture and Education:

Tourism: 2023-24 was celebrated as the Year of Tourism Exchange with the theme “Connecting Himalayas with Mount Fuji”.
Education: There are more than 665 academic partnerships between Indian and Japanese universities. Platforms like Edu-Connect and Universities Forum promote exchanges. The Skill Connect platform launched in 2023 links Indian talent with Japanese employers.
Diaspora: About 54,000 Indians live in Japan, mainly IT professionals and engineers.

The visit consolidates India-Japan relations making Japan India’s most consistent partner in Asia.

US’s Tariffs: Nature, Impacts, and Lessons for India

Context: The US has imposed 50% tariffs on most US imports from India with effect from August 27, 2025.

Relevance of the Topic: Prelims: Concept of Tariff, WTO, MFN Principle, India-US Trade. Mains: US’s Tariffs - nature, impact, and lesson for India.

What is Tariff?

A tariff is a tax or duty imposed on imported or exported goods by a government.
It is one of the oldest instruments of trade policy used to regulate cross-border trade.
Objectives:
- To protect domestic industries from foreign competition
- To raise government revenue
- To be used as a tool of foreign policy or retaliation.

Under the WTO framework, members commit to tariff ceilings and must follow the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle, applying equal tariffs to all members except under FTAs or customs unions.

Nature of US Tariffs on India:

The US has imposed two layers of tariffs on Indian products:
- a reciprocal tariff of 25% (effective August 7, 2025)
- secondary tariff of 25% (effective August 27, 2025).
The tariffs apply to a broad range of Indian exports, sparing only a few critical sectors such as pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, mobile phones, lumber, and certain chemicals.
The tariffs have been imposed unilaterally by the US without negotiation or consultation, making them a violation of WTO commitments.
The tariffs directly breach the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle, since India is being treated less favourably compared to other WTO members such as the EU and China, which are not subjected to similar duties.
The tariffs violate binding tariff commitments under WTO schedules, where the US had agreed to maintain duties below certain ceilings for all members.
The tariffs are discriminatory in nature, the US has not imposed any tariff on the EU and China, the two largest buyers of energy from Russia.

The tariffs demonstrate the weaponisation of trade policy, where tariffs are being used to pursue geopolitical objectives such as pressuring countries on Russian oil purchases.

The paralysis of the WTO’s Appellate Body since 2019 has been exposed further, as countries like India have no effective mechanism to challenge such unilateral actions.

India’s Concessions to the US:

India reduced tariffs on bourbon whiskey, high-end motorcycles, and electric vehicles.
India withdrew the equalisation levy on offshore entities, a long-standing US objection.
India offered zero or near-zero tariffs on most industrial products and some agricultural products.
India expressed willingness to increase energy imports from the US to reduce the bilateral trade deficit.

At the same time, India drew red lines by refusing concessions on GM foods, soya, maize, cereals, and dairy products, citing farmer livelihoods and food security.

Likely Impact on India:

Impact on Exports:

Tariffs are expected to affect 55% of India’s $89-billion goods exports to the United States.
Labour-intensive industries such as textiles, clothing, gems and jewellery, and engineering goods will be among the worst hit.
Indian exporters in low-to-medium value segments will lose competitiveness, as South and Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam and Bangladesh enjoy lower tariff regimes.
China may gain an advantage because of the 90-day tariff extension it received from the US and a lower 30 per cent tariff rate, thereby diverting some orders away from India.

Impact on Imports:

India’s imports from the US, which include mineral fuels, uncut diamonds, capital goods, machinery, organic chemicals and plastics, and edible fruits and nuts, will not be directly protected by retaliation.
Any counter-tariffs by India on these imports would hurt domestic industries that depend on these products as raw materials or intermediates.

Impact on Services and Investments:

Tariff retaliation by India may provoke the US to adopt cross-sectoral retaliation in services trade, threatening India’s IT and professional services exports.
Indian professionals may face stricter visa regimes or regulatory hurdles in the US, which would affect India’s services sector earnings.
The US investors may become more cautious about investing in India if trade relations deteriorate, thereby affecting foreign direct investment flows.

Impact on Employment and Economy:

Job losses are likely in labour-intensive industries like textiles, jewellery, and engineering goods, where export demand will shrink.
Export slowdown may create inflationary pressures in India by reducing foreign exchange earnings and widening the current account deficit.
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which form the backbone of India’s export ecosystem, will be particularly vulnerable to these shocks.

Way Forward

India must recognise the risks of overdependence on a single market, as nearly 17% of its goods exports currently go to the United States. It shows the urgent need to diversify export destinations, particularly towards Latin America, Africa, West Asia, and other emerging economies.
India must broaden its export basket by moving beyond traditional sectors such as textiles, gems, and jewellery to high-value areas like electronics, green technologies, and services.
Strengthening and fast-tracking trade agreements with partners such as the EU, Japan, Korea, ASEAN, and Australia is necessary to secure alternative markets.
India should expand intra-BRICS and South-South trade, thereby reducing dependence on Western economies and creating alternative trade corridors.
India must invest in skilling, technology, and innovation ecosystems to ensure its workforce and industries remain competitive in a rapidly changing global economy.

The episode should be seen as a wake-up call similar to the 1991 reforms, pushing India towards deeper economic reforms and stronger integration with global trade networks.

India-Fiji deepen Defence and Climate Cooperation

Context: Recently, the Prime Minister of Fiji paid his first official visit to India. India and Fiji unveiled significant initiatives to enhance defence and maritime security cooperation, positioning Fiji as an important partner in the Indo-Pacific amidst rising Chinese influence in the region.

Relevance of the Topic: Mains: Strategic Significance of India-Fiji ties in the Indo-Pacific.

Key Outcomes of the Visit

The most important outcome of the visit was the announcement of enhanced defence and maritime cooperation between India and Fiji.

India has committed to providing training and equipment to upgrade Fiji’s maritime security and strengthen the capacity of its armed forces.
A Defence Attaché post was created at the High Commission of India in Suva, which will also cover the wider Pacific Islands, marking a permanent institutional mechanism for security engagement.
India announced the gifting of two sea ambulances to the Fijian Military Forces and extended support to Fiji’s initiative “Ocean of Peace,” which aligns with India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative.
India announced the establishment of a Cyber Security Training Cell in Fiji, thereby extending cooperation in digital security and resilience against cyber threats.
Both sides agreed to deepen cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, given the vulnerability of Fiji and other Pacific Island countries to cyclones and climate-induced disasters.
Nine agreements and MoUs were exchanged between the two countries, including- construction and operation of a super-speciality hospital in Fiji; supply of medicines under the Jan Aushadhi scheme; migration and mobility partnership etc.

Strategic Significance of India-Fiji Ties in Indo-Pacific

Geopolitical Leverage: Fiji’s central location in the South Pacific provides India with a strategic gateway to engage with other Pacific Island nations and expand its maritime outreach.
Maritime Security Cooperation: By assisting Fiji in protecting its vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), India strengthens regional maritime security and ensures safe and open sea lanes in the Indo-Pacific.
Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC): India views Fiji as a hub for its engagement with Pacific Island countries, and closer ties with Suva strengthen India’s position in FIPIC.
Countering Chinese Influence: Strengthening defence and development ties with Fiji helps India counterbalance China’s growing military and economic footprint in the Pacific Islands.
Quad Plus Alignment: Closer India-Fiji ties complement the objectives of the Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia) to promote a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific order.
Climate and Disaster Resilience: Cooperation in disaster management and humanitarian assistance positions India as a credible partner for climate-vulnerable Pacific Island states.
Diaspora Connect: Fiji’s large Indian-origin community (nearly 38% of the population) provides India with strong cultural and people-to-people linkages that reinforce strategic trust.
Soft Power and Development Diplomacy: India’s initiatives in healthcare, migration, and capacity building enhance its image as a development partner, broadening the scope of its influence beyond defence into socio-economic cooperation.

India-Fiji relations have acquired new strategic depth by combining defence, development, and maritime cooperation within the larger Indo-Pacific framework.