India-China Relations

India-China LAC | Buffer zones to Depsang to Demchok: Spotlight on pullback plan, the extent

Context: Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to intensify efforts for expeditious disengagement and de-escalation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh, the spotlight is now on the exact contours of plans being drawn up by military commanders on the ground to pull back troops. 

About the Depsang Plains issue

  • The Depsang Plains issue began in 2013 when China carried out an 18-km incursion in the area. 
  • The Depsang Plains are located close to the strategically important Daulat Beg Oldie. 
  • At the Depsang Plains, Chinese troops have been blocking Indian access to PPs 10 to 13 from a bottleneck known as the Y-junction as well as the 972 sq km tract of land there. 
  • In Demchok, which is in the southern part of eastern Ladakh, the problem is mainly at the Charding Ninglung Nullah (CNN) junction. 
  • Despite the two countries agreeing to go back from their positions, the PLA troops did not vacate the area completely.
  • In multiple instances, the PLA also stopped Indian graziers at the Saddle Pass at the CNN junction, well within India’s perception of the LAC.
  • India has since deployed a separate brigade to look after the area. 
image 116

Efforts for disengagement

  • Since 2020, Corps Commanders of India and China have been discussing the resolution of the flashpoints along the LAC, including those that emerged after the standoff began.
  • Sources said while clear orders are awaited, various modalities have been prepared for possible limited disengagement in phases.
  • Commanders on the ground have been discussing possible scenarios for limited disengagement at certain mutually-accepted points along the boundary after the 19th round of India-China military talks earlier in the month of August 2023.
  • The talks led to some forward movement with both sides deciding to pull back troops – and dismantle temporary structures – from the Galwan Valley, the north and south banks of Pangong Tso and Patrolling Points in the Gogra and Hot Springs area. 
  • The last such movement was in September 2023 when both armies disengaged from PP-15 in the Gogra-Hot Springs area after multiple rounds of talks. 
  • Disengagement in most of these areas led to the creation of buffer zones – this stops troops of both sides from accessing areas that they patrolled earlier.
  • Following the 19th round of talks this month, Major General-level talks were held to decide the finer details of resolving the existing issues, including the legacy issues along the LAC, as well as gaining access to all pre-2020 patrolling points along the LAC.
  • The commanders discussed several issues such as mutually ensuring that no new posts are constructed in close proximity to the LAC, and identifying specific limits of patrolling.

India-China Tibet Issue

Context: China protested the meeting between the Dalai Lama and officials of the “Central Tibetan Administration” (CTA) with visiting U.S. official Uzra Zeya in New Delhi, calling it an attempt to “interfere” in China’s “internal affairs”. Ahead of the meeting with Ms. Zeya, the Dalai Lama, who arrived in Delhi on Saturday, said that Tibetans did not seek “independence” and he was open for talks with the Chinese government, which he said had sent feelers to him.

image 34
  • Xizang [Tibet] affairs are purely internal affairs of China and no external forces have the right to interfere. China firmly opposes any form of contact between foreign officials and the “Tibetan independence” forces,” 
  • China had similarly protested Ms. Zeya’s visit to Dharamshala to meet the Dalai Lama in May 2022 and had opposed the setting up of the “special coordinator on Tibetan issues” post by the Biden administration in 2021
  • The U.S. should take concrete actions to honour its commitment of acknowledging Xizang as part of China, stop meddling in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of Xizang-related issues, and offer no support to the anti-China separatist activities of the Dalai clique. Referring to the CTA as a “separatist political group” not recognised by any country.

History of Tibet

  1. Tibet was India’s actual neighbour, and in 1914, it was Tibetan representatives, along with the Chinese that signed the Simla convention with British India that delineated boundaries. Remember, most of India’s boundaries and the 3500km LAC is with the Tibetan Autonomous Region, and not the rest of China.
  2. India’s voluntary revocation of its special rights in Tibet, inherited from the British raj, during the 1950s for the sake of better India-China relations. This coupled with the acceptance of Chinese rule in Tibet has reduced India’s ability to play any meaningful role in Tibet.
  3. After China’s full accession of Tibet in 1950, that China repudiated the convention and the McMahon line that divided the two countries. And in 1954, India signed an agreement with China agreeing to trading terms on what it called the “Tibet region of China”.
  4. In 1959, when the Dalai Lama fled to India, PM Nehru gave him and Tibetan refugees shelter, and they set up the Tibetan government in exile, which continues to hold elections.
  5. The disappearance of Tibet as a buffer in 1951 meant that Indian and Chinese forces stood eye-to-eye across the undemarcated Himalayan border. Prime minister Nehru was willing to sacrifice Tibet for the sake of friendship between India and China. But the Chinese also claimed that the boundary between British India and Tibet was the work of “European imperialists and Tibetan feudal lords”, and thus the boundary treaties needed to be re-negotiated.
  6. The presence of the Dalai Lama and his followers in India is a source of friction between India and China. China has repeatedly claimed that the Dalai Lama is using his position to lobby for independence for Tibet and thus trying to break up China, which the Chinese government describes as “splitting the motherland” .It has asked the Indian government to address these issues.
  7. China feels that India continues to keep the “Tibetan Question” alive by giving refuge to the Dalai Lama. This has not helped improve relations between the two Asian giants and this issue will continue to remain the bone of contention as China tries to increase its presence and hold over Tibet
  8. It is to be understood that Tibet is at the heart of the India-China rivalry for dominance in Asia. When Tibet was occupied, it changed the asymmetry between the two sides. China was able to exercise geo-strategic influence over much of south Asia and challenge India’s dominance in the region. India recognises that the loss of Tibet as a buffer zone crippled the security of its northern frontiers forcing it to maintain hundreds and thousands of soldiers along the Himalayan frontier.

Today the official Indian policy is that the Dalai Lama is a spiritual leader, and the Tibetan community in India, with more than a lakh exiles, is not allowed to undertake any political activity. Despite frequent protests from China, especially when the Dalai Lama is invited to an official event or travels to Arunachal Pradesh, most governments have held the line on what is seen as a contradictory stand.

Recent developments in Tibet

  • Changes in Tibet itself: Over the past few decades, the Chinese government has moved to change Tibet in many ways. From pouring in investment, infrastructure projects, to pouring in Han or mainland Chinese, in an effort to Sinicize the population. While there has been rapid development, including the famous Qinghai Tibet, and now Sichuan Tibet rail lines, there has also been an increasing suppression of the Tibetan populations’ links to the Dalai Lama, and old border crossings from Nepal have been sealed
  • Infrastructural Drive: The construction of Chinese dams on the upper riparian areas of the Brahmaputra, and  construction of Tibetan villages along the LAC, particularly along Arunachal Pradesh boundary, which can prove to be a future flashpoint aimed at bolstering Chinese claims of territory.
  • Changed Geo-Security Outlook: China has begun to raise Tibetan Militia groups, while the Indian Army trains the Tibetan Special Frontier Force, which could lead to the frightening albeit unlikely spectre of Tibetans on both sides fighting each other at some point in the future.
  • Question over Tibetan people: The question over the future of the Tibetan community in India, that the government doesn’t give citizenship to Tibetans born in India after the cut-off year of 1987, leaving the youth of the community completely in limbo, living in segregated communes in different parts of India, but not being given rights as Indians, with little recourse or connection to what is happening back home in Tibet.
  • Increased US interest: The US has also increased its role, by accepting more Tibetan refugees, with an estimated 30,000 now residing there. Most prominently, the Karmapa Lama the head of the Karma Kagyu sect, who took Dominican citizenship, also resides permanently in the US now, and as US-China relations deteriorate, is likely to increase its interest in the Tibetan issue.
  • Succession of Dalai Lama: The larger question is over the succession to the Dalai Lama, who has been not only the spiritual leader but also a political leader of the community worldwide. China has made it clear it intends to announce its own Dalai Lama, as it once did the Panchen Lama, and try to control the succession. The US is likely to weigh in as well, as it has by settling the Karmapa there.

Indo-China Border Management: 3 years after Galwan clash

Context: The Galwan clash of June 15-16, 2020 marked a watershed in India-China ties, which were already tense after the Chinese in April intruded into several places in Eastern Ladakh that are claimed by India. The Foreign Minister of India said despite many rounds of negotiations and engagement at multiple levels, the military tensions continue. India has said there can be no normal ties if China breaches border agreements.

image 105

About Galwan Clash

  • A clash in Galwan in June 2020 happened when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army pitched tents and an observation post on India’s side of the LAC. 
  • After a general agreement on disengaging in the Galwan sector earlier in June, the Chinese agreed to withdraw. 
  • But on the night of June 15, 2020, a disagreement over the continued presence of the Chinese led to the bloodiest clash between India and China since 1975 resulting in the deaths of 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers.

Border dispute between India-China

  • The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the demarcation that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory. 
  • India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km. 
  • It is divided into three sectors: the eastern sector which spans Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, the middle sector in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, and the western sector in Ladakh.
  • Disputes:
  • Western sector (China is seeking claims): Trig Heights in the Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO) area, Demchok, Depsang Bulge, Galwan, Pangong Lake, and Hot Springs.
  • Middle sector: Barahoti pasture north of Chamoli in Uttarakhand.
  • Eastern sector: The 1914 McMahon Line serves as the alignment of the LAC in the eastern sector, although minor disagreements exist over the ground locations in accordance with the high Himalayan watershed principle. This also applies to specific regions of India's international border, such as Longju and Asaphila.

Border Agreement between India-China

  • In 2012, India and China agreed to establish a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination to “study ways and means to conduct and strengthen exchanges and cooperation between military personnel and establishments in the border areas.
  • The 2013 Border Defence Cooperation Agreement lists several mechanisms to reduce misunderstandings and improve communication. 
  • It covers border stability and security, information asymmetry, smuggling, socio-economic reconstruction, environment, and disease transmission along the line of actual control.
  • The agreement prohibits either side from tailing the patrols of the other in areas where there is no common understanding of the line of actual control.
  • BDCA mentions the "India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity" and four previous border agreements:
  • Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, 1993: Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India–China Border Areas) to maintain the status quo on their mutual border pending an eventual boundary settlement.
  • Agreement on Confidence Building Measures, 1996: It limits the deployment of major categories of armaments close to the LAC, including tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns with 75-mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120-mm or above, and various missiles. It also limits combat aircraft from flying within 10 km of the LAC.
  • Protocol for the Implementation of Military Confidence Building Measures, 2005: It seeks to implement the 1993 and 1996 agreements by further detailing the confidence-building measures.
  • Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, 2012: For improved institutionalized information exchange on border-related issues.

Relations thereafter

  • Three years on, the military tensions continue. India has more than 50,000 troops in Eastern Ladakh, with deployment at forward posts throughout the year.
  • Communication between the two sides had not broken down.

Border management after Galwan Clash

  • 5-point statement: On the ground, after 18 rounds of military level talks India and China have disengaged at five so-called “friction points”, a term favoured by the government to describe the unilateral changes made by the Chinese to the LAC in April 2020.
  • Both sides should take guidance from the consensus of the leaders on developing India-China relations, including not allowing differences to become disputes.
  • The current situation in the border areas is not in the interest of either side and therefore the border troops of both sides should continue their dialogue, quickly disengage, maintain proper distance and ease tensions.
  • The two sides shall abide by all the existing agreements and protocols on China-India boundary affairs and maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas and avoid any action that could escalate matters.
  • The two sides will continue communications through the Special Representatives mechanism, and meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on border affairs will continue.
  • As the situation eases, the two sides should expedite work to conclude new confidence-building measures to maintain and enhance peace and tranquillity in the border areas.
  • Demilitarised “buffer zones” have been established at disputed places such as the north and south banks of Pangong Tso, Patrolling Point (PP) 17 in the Gogra-Hot Springs area etc. There is no clarity about how much land has been converted into buffer zones over the disengagement process.
  • China is also creating infrastructure in the region, including two bridges on its side of Pangong Lake for easier movement from the north bank to the southern bank, and roads and accommodation. India too has been rapidly developing infrastructure on its side building.

Way forward

  • All issues at the LAC need to be resolved in accordance with existing bilateral agreements and commitments.
  • Both countries should take a long-term view, place the border issue in an appropriate position in bilateral relations and promote the transition of the border situation to normalised management.
  • Since the Galwan incident, the two sides have disengaged at multiple friction points even as military and diplomatic talks continue to find a way out of the impasse at Depsang and Demchok.
  • India should boost security forces and border infrastructure in the border areas as the Chinese side has an edge over India in terms of infrastructure and forces in the region.
  • People living in the border areas should be integrated into the developmental mainstream so that they do not feel left behind and leave their homes. This can be done through schemes like Vibrant Villages Program and promoting tourism in the region.
  • Trade and other linkages should be promoted along the land borders with China. This can be done by establishing more trading points and establishing land border trading points.
  • The long-term solution lies in permanently settling the border dispute once and for all. The mechanisms established for settling borders should be taken seriously and both countries should look to settle their differences.

Countering the Chinese Rise

Context: The intensifying head-to-head clash between the United States and China has set alarm bells ringing. The beginning was with a trade war in 2018, U.S. policy towards China has morphed into a draconian technology denial regime aimed at hobbling China’s rise. Further the USA is preventing any Chinese military venture to capture Taiwan, for which it has taken major steps across the Indo-Pacific to shore up its military edge. Both China and US are jostling for power and influence across the world. It is to understand that “Extreme competition” over technologies may have initiated the conflict, but their insecurities are increasingly bringing their military and nuclear instruments to the fore.

USA's approach towards China

The United States today is seeking wider international consensus on the new economic approach from its allies and partners, including India. The Unites states is pushing its efforts to build a “New Washington Consensus” as the Washington Consensus has started showing fissures and the lacunas in the approach which are highlighted by the following reasons:

image 441
  • The conviction that the “markets know best” approach led to the hollowing out of the US industrial base. It was argued that in the name of oversimplified market efficiency, entire supply chains of strategic goods along with the industries and jobs that made them moved overseas. It was realised that deep trade liberalisation though helped America export goods, but not jobs and capacity.
  • Secondly the notion that “all growth was good growth”, led to the privileging of some sectors like finance “while other essential sectors, like semiconductors and infrastructure, atrophied”.
  • Thirdly, the old assumption “that economic integration would make nations more responsible and open, and that the global order would be more peaceful and cooperative”, also led to distortion wherein Unites States referred to the premise underlying China’s admission into the WTO in 2001 wherein admitting countries into the rules-based order should have incentivised them to adhere to its rules”. However  the problems triggered by the integration of a “large non-market economy” like China into the WTO.

It was realised that the America’s economic policy must confront the urgent need for a “just and efficient transition” to green economic growth and the political imperative of reducing economic inequality at home that has undermined American democracy. Thus for this purpose the United States has offered a five-fold policy framework under the New Washington Consensus 

  • The first is to return to industrial policy that was the hallmark of US economic development historically, but dismissed by economic neoliberalism in the last few decades. For this the US has restored the role of the state in pumping investments into semiconductor production and promoting the development and deployment of green technologies.
  • Second, the United States under its new approach is not seeking autarky or promoting protectionism. The US is not going alone, and wants to develop a joint effort with US allies and partners, including India.
  • Third, United States wants its friends and partners to look beyond traditional trade policies. Wherein he highlighted the US-proposed Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is not a free trade agreement.
  • Fourth, the US is trying to mobilise “trillions in investment into emerging economies with solutions that those countries are fashioning on their own, but with capital enabled by a different brand” of US economic diplomacy. This primarily involves offering an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, addressing the global debt crisis, and reforming multilateral development banks.
  • Lastly United States is also pushing the efforts to develop a new set of export controls on sensitive technology that will limit national security threats from China and other rivals.

However International Scholars believe that the new Washington Consensus will face some of the critical challenges as it marred with variety of challenges like

  • CURTAIL NOT CONTAIN: Experts believe that while export controls may slow China, it is impossible to prevent it from developing its own technologies. The Russian experience shows too that sanctions are not easy to work either.
  • UNEQUIVOCAL CHINESE STAND: China does not see much difference between “de-risking” and “containment”. Its immediate response to the G-7 was to order its infrastructure companies to stop buying from American companies. 
  • FISSURES WITHIN WEST: The United States will also face much challenge from its allies as the French President Emmanuel Macron’s has refused to be a vassal state of the U.S., which represents a tip of the iceberg of the worries of its partners in Europe and allies such as South Korea. 
  • ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE: China made up roughly one-third of the U.S. industry’s market and would be “impossible to replace as both a source of components and an end market for its product
  • POLITICS OVER ECONOMICS: While the old Washington Consensus was largely in the area of economics, the new suffers from an overdose of geopolitics which is also feeding into local U.S. politics as well.

CONCLUSION

United states and China seem to be involved in what the Americans call a game of “chicken” which comes with a high risk of miscalculation, war or a messy global economic breakdown.

However, U.S. estrangement with China enhances India’s geopolitical value, something that India wants to capitalise on. But there is also a caution that while the Sino-American hostility may bring benefits to India, a breakdown would be catastrophic, for not just India but also the world.

RCEP & India

Context: In November 2019, India walked out from the trade pact called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) involving China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the 10-state Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) grouping. Fast forward to 2023, and now India along with many of the same countries, but with China replaced by the United States, is getting into the U.S.-driven Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).

Moving Away from China

  • The one clear difference is of China versus the U.S. Developing a strategic partnership with the U.S. is India’s top foreign policy priority. Its relationship with China has, meanwhile, further deteriorated. But a strategic partnership with the U.S. need not come at the cost of economic dependency on it. With China, the big economic fear was any trade deal’s impact on India’s manufacturing sector; of cheap Chinese goods flooding Indian markets.
  • Traditionally, trade deals used to be mostly about tariffs. Increasingly though, issues related to intellectual property, services, investment, domestic regulation, digital, and labour and environmental standards, are becoming more important. The U.S.’s IPEF proposal completely removes the tariff element of typical trade deals, and is entirely about all these other areas.

Potential Negative Impact

  • Early assessment by many experts shows that the IPEF would result in a complete stranglehold over the economic systems of the participating countries, in a manner that is to the complete advantage of the U.S. The systemic integration caused by the IPEF’s actual long-term impact will leave little leeway for domestic policies to help a country’s own industrialisation (for example through tight supply chain integration that many elements of the IPEF contribute to).
  • The IPEF has four pillars: trade, supply chains, clean economy, and fair economy. Fearful of a possible trap, India has joined the other three pillars but not trade. But there is great pressure on it to join trade too, and India could relent. Joining the trade pillar is the worst, but the other pillars too contribute to developing hard new economic architectures and structures that are not tariff-based.
  • The IPEF can already be seen to have deep implications in agriculture, in terms of genetically modified seeds and food, surrendering policy space for regulating Big Tech, and compromising a comparative advantage in manufacturing because of unfair labour and environment standards. It will also seriously affect India’s ability to create a vibrant domestic ecosystem in emerging areas such as a digital economy and green products.

To read more about IPEF i.e. Background, Pros and Cons 
(https://compass.rauias.com/current-affairs/indo-pacific-economic-framework-prosperity/)

India’s China strategy needs to be debated

Context: The Chinese policy follows the principle of making headlines on India’s borders. The latest move, in April, saw them “renaming” 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh, which they consider to be “Zangnam” or, in English, “South Tibet”. The announcement was made after approval from the State Council, implying a green light from the very top of the Chinese system.

India-China Relations

  • Ever since the unresolved stand-off at Galwan in June 2020, there has been no serious attempt by Beijing at a resolution, let alone a restoration of the status quo ante, while several instances of further provocation have occurred from the Chinese side. 
  • Another border skirmish in December 2022 in the Tawang area showed that whatever policy the Ministry of External Affairs is masking with its anodyne statements, it is not ensuring deterrence.

India’s Tepid Response

The current response of Indian foreign policy despite of the subsequent reports of incursions seems to be tepid and scholars have identified following reasons for the same:

  • The growing power differential between the two countries act as a deterring force on India taking an aggressive stand against government.
  • Further there is also uncertainty about the strategic actions of major powers such as the U.S. in case of a military stand-off actually takes place between two hostile neighbours.
  • There is a wide military differential capability between the two countries and strategic reports have pointed out that India is not equipped for a major war with China. 
  • There is also pressure from Indian business interests who are anxious to safeguard trade as despite of the rhetoric (under Atmanirbhar Bharat) India’s trade dependence on China has now crossed over $100 billion.
  • Further there is a lack of consensus within the various ministries of the government about the kind of response the Chinese threat merits which is reflected in the non-coherent statements made by different heads of ministries.
  • At last there is a lack of political will within assertive and majoritarian government at the central level which seeks to safeguard its tough image domestically.

This brings us to the question that if India repeating the errors made in its pre-1962 engagement with Communist China? 

  • During 1962, PM Nehru’s vision of India and China as the two major south Asian civilizations led to India being one of the first countries to recognise the Communist government in China and ended up with its softening its line on China’s invasion and occupation of Tibet, its encroachment on India’s borders and its cartographical aggression in the pursuit of Chinese goodwill. 
  • PM Modi’s current policy seems eerily similar to what can be called as Chinese appeasement, and scholars believe that it could end just as badly if not exactly as it did in 1962.
  • Further the Chinese Communist Party has shored up its domestic credibility by valorising its international image. The earlier policy which was anchored in the “peaceful rise” theory, it is now about showing strength, determination, economic might and an unwillingness to compromise on what it sees as its core national interests. 
  • Previously China has always had a fear of being isolated in global affairs but today guided by the geopolitical interest and pragmatism in foreign policy, its assertiveness today is accompanied by diplomatic overtures in Europe, Russia and West Asia, to add an adroit diplomatic gloss to its uncompromising military determination.

Conclusion:

  • When dealing with the Chinese, India must always remember Mark Twain’s observation, that history does not repeat itself, but it often rhymes.
  • The period since Galwan, 2020-23, is not the same as 1949-62, but the same pattern of appeasement and self-denial is ominously emerging.
  • India should not miss an opportunity to loudly and proudly raise matters of its own vital interest by not using a strategy that fractures China’s image by challenging it publicly on its transgressions.

Geopolitics of Indo-Pacific

Context: There was an assessment made by Central Intelligence Agency as per which China will likely launch its military mission against Taiwan sometime around 2027. It has made efforts to ready itself for this mission continue to make ripples among the tiny island nations of the South Pacific where it seeks to set up bases to tighten its grip in the region.

Recent Steps taken by China that highlights China flexing its muscle:

  • The Solomon Islands have been in the news recently with China trying to enter into a security pact with that country by persuading it to quit its present arrangement overseen by Australia. China has also been eyeing Vanuatu.
  • China has been trying to coerce the countries in the region to toe its line on Taiwan, especially when taken with Federated State of Micronesia.
  • Australia definitely has reasons to worry about China's attempts to win over the South Pacific island nations. Strategic access to these island nations could help China's military manoeuvres in the event of a conflict involving Australia or the US. This fear has been testified by China's deployment of its anti-ship ballistic missiles DF21 and DF21D.
  • China's recent manoeuvres should worry India also. It was reported that one of the missions of Xi Jinping during his recent summit with President Putin was to seek Russian supply of nuclear fuel, which China needs badly for expanding its arsenal at a feverish pace.
  • The closer Russia comes within China's sphere of influence the more uncertain will be Russia's dependability as a friend if the India-China conflict were to worsen.
  • China's role as a peacemaker in the Middle East could also be problematic. Most nations will see the peace brokered by China between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the region as a symbol of its increasing heft as a global mediator and its ability to fill the space held so long by the US. It could become a leading arms supplier of the region and bring in massive investments. The promise of a $400 billion investment in Iran is one of them.
  • Further China could even help Iran overcome its bottlenecks and realise its nuclear ambitions. India's involvement in Iran's Chabahar port project could be jeopardised in the long term and if China succeeds in peddling its influence in Yemen, with its base also in Djibouti on the horn of Africa, its presence in the region will be formidable.

India-China Defence Ministers Meeting

Context: The meeting between defence minister Rajnath Singh and his counterpart Li Shangfu saw both sides reiterating their positions, highlighting the persisting gap in the respective perceptions about what went wrong in Ladakh in 2020, its resolution, and how to move forward peacefully from there.

  • It was reiterated that development of relations between India and China is premised on prevalence of peace and tranquillity at the borders, all issues at the LAC need to be resolved in accordance with existing bilateral agreements and commitments and the violation of basic agreements has eroded the entire basis of bilateral relations.

On Border Dispute and its resolution:

  • Previously Indian and Chinese armies have conducted 18 rounds of military talks on ending the border row.
  • Though at the 16th round of military talks, the two sides carried out disengagement from Patrolling Point 15 in the Gogra-Hot springs area. 
  • The ties between the two countries nosedived significantly following the fierce clash in the Galwan Valley in June 2020 that marked the most serious military conflict between the two sides in decades. As a result of a series of military and diplomatic talks, the two sides completed the disengagement process on the north and south banks of the Pangong Lake and in the Gogra area. The eastern Ladakh border standoff erupted following a violent clash in the Pangong Lake area.
  • Recently China released a statement included a map that showed the 11 places renamed by China as being within “Zangnan”, or southern Tibet in Chinese, with Arunachal Pradesh included in southern Tibet and China’s border with India demarcated as just north of the Brahmaputra river.

Russia China Nexus & Implications for India

Mr. Xi “will pay a state visit to Russia from March 20 to 22 at the invitation of Russian Presi­dent Vladimir Putin,

China “always believes pol­itical dialogue is the only way to resolve conflicts and disputes”

Beijing, earlier on the one ­year anniversary of Russia’s invasion, re­ leased a position paper that called on both sides to reach “a comprehensive ceasefire”. The paper reflected Beijing’s approach of, on the one hand, saying it supported the “sove­reignty” of all countries, while on the other, criticis­ing the West, which has questioned Beijing’s cre­dentials as a mediator, cit­ing its close “no limits” re­lationship with Russia.

Beijing’s recent hosting of landmark talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran has turned the spotlight on its aspirations to emerge as a key player in the Ukraine crisis. Over the past year, China hasn’t condemned Russia for its invasion. It has called for peace, but at the same time justified Russian security concerns with regard to the West and NATO.

Historical evolution of ties

The relationship between Russia and China can be described as multi-layered and complex with a side of strong geo-political alignment against a unipolar west dominated world order and other side being disagreements over the junior partner status for Russia, especially in the region of Central Asia which Russia sees as its backyard and is important for China to fuel its economic growth and expand the influence in middle east.

The relationship between the erstwhile USSR and China was marked with mistrust, hostility and different ideological affinity during the cold war phase . Though USSR and China both had communist regime and mutually collaborated in the initial years wherein USSR provided the necessary initial support to China but things started to change after China gradually opened its economy under Deng Xiaoping and border confrontations emerged between the two neighbouring nations.

The relationship between the two countries changed when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and paid a state visit to China in 1989.

Along with that the disintegration of USSR, with the much weaker Russia was now looking for new partners also paved the way for cooperation.

Timeline

  • The two countries demarcated the land borders in 1991 and later the two countries also resolved the dispute over territories of ABAGAITU islet, BOLSHOY island and in 2005 over the disputed Vladivostok region.
  • In 1992, the two countries declared that they were pursuing a "constructive partnership"; in 1996, they progressed toward a "strategic partnership".
  • The two countries signed the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and friendly cooperation in 2001, which had mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-interference each other’s internal affairs as the broad guidelines

Present Status

China-Russia relationship today are defined by a growing ideological affinity to rewrite the global order and a shared opposition to the United States on the global stage begins to come into focus.

China and Russia’s relationship had transformed in the 14 years as both Moscow and Beijing had accumulated  grievances against the West and China’s new ambition to replace the US as Asia’s dominant power have brought the countries much closer now.

  • The two countries signed a partnership (BEJING DECLARATION) “without limits” and with no “forbidden areas” in 2022.
  • It also  offered a blueprint for further political, economic, and military cooperation while showcasing a common front against the west.
  • The Beijing declaration laid out a solid basis for jointly confronting the West and this Sino-Russian alliance added to Moscow’s confidence in risking a confrontation with the West in Europe.

Cooperation

  • The main form of cooperation is the  economic relations between Russia and China is trade. From 2003 until 2013, mutual trade increased 7.7 times; in 2014 the scale of bilateral operations increased even more. The aggravation of relations between Russia and Western countries contributed to the expansion of economic ties with China.
  • The two countries entered into $400bn gas deal to supply 38 billion cubic meters of gas annually to China for next 30 years
  • The two countries again signed an agreement in 2022 for Power of Siberia 2
  • The trade between the two countries have almost tripled from the levels of 2016 and China has now emerged as the largest trading partner for Russia.
  • The countries are also in advance stages of formally linking Chinese belt and road Initiative and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union.
  • Russia has reaffirmed its support to One-China principle and opposed any sort of independence for  Taiwan. China has also backed Russia’s stand on expansion of western military alliance in Europe.
  • Russia sold advanced fighter aircraft and missile systems to the Chinese (which includes advanced weapons like the S-400 missile-defence system and Su-35 fighter jets)
  • China has continued buying discounted Russian energy and aiming to make transactions in rubbles or Chinese renminbi owing to western sanctions post Russia-Ukraine war.
  • Many Russian regions have set new trade records with neighbouring Chinese provinces, a dependence that looks set to grow in the future.

Difference Between Russia & China

  • There is no-formal security alliance between China and Russia and the ideological affinity is also transactional
  • Russia’s position has further weakened after Ukraine war and its economy is one tenth the size of Chinese economy, thus compromising its position as equal partners.
  • China has still not ratified Crimea’s accession to Russia and further Russia wants to regain its lost glory of USSR days and will not willing to subscribe to junior partner status.
  • China is the EU’s largest trading partner and will not compromise on its economic interest and similarly it goes for Russia, wherein its trade with Europe is much more rewardable.

The Ukraine war has further complicated the relationship between China and Russia

  • Ukraine forms a critical part of Chinese BRI jig-saw and thus will not compromise its larger geo-economic interest in the region.
  • Russia’s  victory in Europe would have had a dramatic impact on Asia too. It would have reinforced the sentiment that America is in terminal decline, weakened US alliances in Asia, and boosted China’s ambition to radically reshape its periphery.
  • It has facilitated the resurrection of Western unity under American leadership.
  • War triggered the fear of Chinese territorial expansionism in Asia. This has led to the strengthening of US bilateral alliances with Australia and Japan.
  • Berlin and Tokyo are also now committed to raising their defence spending to cope with the security challenges from Moscow and Beijing.
  • Chinese firms aren't too excited about stepping up business with Russia as they fear that secondary sanctions could be applied, and Chinese firms don't want to take risks.

However China remains committed to Russia as a strategic partner, Russia may have proved itself less valuable, but [Beijing] continues to see the United States as a strategic competitor and will want to have Russia on its side.

Russia more dependent on China -- both politically and economically -- than ever before, and Putin’s willingness to openly challenge the United States still holds great appeal for Beijing as it continues to rise on the global stage.

Impact on India

  • The Sino-Russian alliance puts India in a terrible predicament: China can ramp up, at will, the military pressure on the disputed border with India and Delhi  depends on Russian military supplies which in turn is a junior partner of China.
  • The Russian partnership was long seen as the key to India’s “strategic autonomy”, Delhi’s arms dependence on Moscow is now the biggest constraint on India’s freedom of action.
  • Russia also opposes QUAD and align itself with Chinese claim, of Quad being aimed at containing China by calling Quad as ASIAN NATO
  • Russia is also critical of term INDO-PACIFIC and believes it as step back towards cold war mentality, a way contain Russia and China.

India’s alliance with the US and its allies to restore the regional balance of power and new Sino-Russian alliance  has further complicated the relationship.

Saudi – Iran Deal and role of China

The deal highlights a long-standing ally of the US — Saudi Arabia accepted and acknowledged publicly the mediatory role of China, which is locked in a sharpening, all-round confrontation with the US, cannot be regarded as anything less than a major diplomatic setback for Washington

Saudi Arabia and Iran have agreed to revive two key agreements they concluded during an earlier phase of positive bilateral relations.

One is a 1998 agreement on economic, trade and investment cooperation;

The other is an agreement on internal security cooperation, concluded in 2001, which covered organised crime, terrorism and drug trafficking.

WHY US IS WITHDRAWING ?

  • The US is also distancing itself from the region as it is no longer dependent on energy imports from the region.
  • It has itself emerged as a significant exporter of both oil and gas.
  • America knows that its survival in the region is very costly, because it will remain under the strikes of the Axis of Resistance, which has grown and gained great influence in last decade, meaning that the American presence is no longer without cost, but rather the price will rise if US stays. 
  • The only reason US remains engaged because its major allies are still dependent on energy supplies from the region.
  • US also has a stake in the security of Israel, which also serves as its key regional ally.

AXIS OF RESISTANCE The term Axis of Resistance (also Resistance and Deterrence Axis) commonly refers to a Shiite anti-Israel and anti-Westernalliance between Iran, Syria,  the Lebanese Militant  group Hezbollah and Hamas. 

This Iran-led alliance aims to oppose Western, namely United States and Israel, interests in the region.

FOR INDIA

  • India has done well in recent years in forging much closer relations with key Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman.
  • India has been able to do so even while forging a close strategic partnership with Israel. The Abraham Accords opened the door to the I2U2 initiative which brought together India, Israel, the UAE and the US in a quadrilateral regional framework, akin to the Quadrilateral (Quad) in the Indo-Pacific.
  • But the deal brokered by China highlights the growing clout, following this if the multi-billion dollar($400bn) deal between Iran and China is materialized and partnership with Saudi is strengthened it will put brakes on ambitious targets set under I2U2

SILVER LINING

  • American President Joe Biden has earlier assured, the US is not leaving the Middle East and that America “will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia, or Iran”.
  • Earlier US saw itself as the sole provider of regional security, now this approach is changing with US effort to craft a Middle East Air Defence coalition is an example of this.
  • US  focus on national interest found an echo in the Middle East. The region earlier focused on transcendental notions of “pan Arabism” and “pan Islamism”.  Arab leaders now are not willing to let that come in the way of normalisation of relations with Israel. Ex Abraham Accords

Thus India must find ways to revive and expand its energy partnership with Iran and fast-track the implementation of the Chabahar port and the transport corridor that would link it to Central Asia. India’s western flank is far too important to be accorded second place to the Indo-Pacific.

Recognition of McMahon Line by the US to mark boundary between India & China

What is McMahon Line?

  • The McMahon Line, named after British colonial officer Henry McMahon, is a disputed boundary between India and China that runs through the eastern Himalayas.
  • The line was established in a 1914 treaty between the British Empire and Tibet, which was then an independent country. China, however, does not recognize the McMahon Line and considers it a relic of British colonialism.
image 26

Right hand palm theory of China

  • Firstly, it is important to understand the history of the McMahon Line and the dispute surrounding it. When the treaty was signed in 1914, the Chinese government was not consulted, and it has since claimed that the treaty was invalid. China maintains that Tibet was a part of China at the time and that the McMahon Line was never recognized by the Chinese government.
  • The McMahon Line became the de facto boundary between India and China after India gained independence from Britain in 1947.
  • China, under the leadership of Mao Zedong considered Tibet to be the right hand’s palm of China with Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) as its five fingers.
  • It therefore was China’s responsibility to “liberate” these regions believed Mao. 
  • After annexation of Tibet it was widely expected that China may attempt to liberate these regions but global outcry against Tibet’s annexation forced Mao to distance himself temporarily from the idea. 
  • However, in 1962, China launched a surprise attack on India along the McMahon Line, resulting in a brief but intense war that ended with China's victory. Since then, there have been occasional flare-ups along the border, including a deadly clash in 2020 that led to the deaths of several Indian and Chinese soldiers.
  • India and China have engaged in several rounds of talks over the years to resolve the border dispute, but progress has been slow. Meanwhile, the US has increasingly taken an interest in the region, viewing China's growing influence and assertiveness as a threat to its strategic interests.

Recognition of McMahon Line by the US

  • Recently, there has been much discussion about the recognition of the McMahon Line as the official boundary between India and China by the United States.
  • The move, if it were to happen, would have significant geopolitical implications for the region.
  • The US recognizing the McMahon Line as the official boundary between India and China would be a significant diplomatic move, one that would have implications for the entire region. It would signal US support for India and its territorial claims, which could embolden India in its dealings with China. It could also encourage other countries in the region, such as Japan and Australia, to take a stronger stance against China's assertiveness.
  • However, such a move would undoubtedly be met with strong opposition from China, which views any recognition of the McMahon Line as a violation of its territorial integrity.
  • China has already warned against any such move by the US, stating that it would harm bilateral relations between the two countries.

India-China Border Dispute

  • India shares a 3488-km boundary with China along J&K, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim & Arunachal Pradesh. 
  • Border between India and China is not demarcated throughout and there is no mutually agreed Line of Actual Control (LAC). 
  • Entire border is divided into three sectors: Western sector is disputed (Ladakh); Middle sector is largely settled and peaceful (Himachal Pradesh & Uttarakhand) and Eastern sector is unsettled and disputed (China claims entire Arunachal). 
  • China claims that the border claimed by India as signed by British India and Tibet was under colonial pressure and a weak China. China does not agree. 
  • British India had failed to produce a single integrated and well-defined northern boundary separating the Indian subcontinent from Xinjiang and Tibet. 

Western Sector 

Western sector i.e., Aksai Chin Sector 

  • The two sides differ over boundary line that separates Ladakh region from Xinjiang province of China. 
  • India accuses China of illegally occupying Aksai Chin and some other parts of Ladakh region. China sees Aksai Chin as extension of Tibet plateau whereas India claims it is an extension of Ladakh plateau. The region is mostly uninhabited. 
  • Aksai Chin is important for China as it connects two backward provinces of China i.e., Tibet and Xinjiang. 
  • British Johnson Line where Aksai Chin was part of Kashmir another advocated McDonald line under which Aksai Chin falls under Xinjiang Province of China. 
  • As a result, disagreement prevails with India claiming Johnson Line to be correct and China claiming McDonald Line to be correct. 
  • In the official map of India of 1950, India marked east of Karakoram range as “boundary undefined”.
  • Currently, LAC at present separates India and China in the absence of a mutually agreed boundary, there is a difference in perceptions about the alignment of the line. 

Eastern Sector: McMahon Line 

  • In eastern sector, boundary was delineated in 1914 Shimla conference of British India, China and Tibet. 
  • British proposed formation of Outer Tibet bordering India & Inner-Tibet bordering China. 
  • A boundary demarcating Tibetan region of China and the North-east Frontier Areas of India (current Arunachal Pradesh) was agreed upon by British and Tibetan representatives which came to be called McMahon Line. 
  • China does not recognize McMahon line as it was signed between British and Tibet which was not a sovereign state at the time. 
  • As a result, China claims Arunachal Pradesh especially Tawang as part of Tibet. 
  • India on its part while recognizes Chinese suzerainty over Tibet and considers McMahon line to be the official boundary.

In conclusion, the recognition of the McMahon Line by the US as the official boundary between India and China would be a significant development in the ongoing border dispute between the two countries. While it would provide India with diplomatic support, it could also escalate tensions with China, which has already warned against such a move. Ultimately, a peaceful resolution to the border dispute remains the best outcome for all parties involved.

Trending now

Captagon
B’nei Menashe: Identity, Migration, and the “Lost Tribes” Debate
Bauxite Mining Conflict in Odisha
Impact of Rising Energy Costs on Migrant Labourers