Asia Pacific Region

The AUKUS partnership for Canberra, London, and Washington is about promoting deterrence and stability in the Indo-Pacific. For China, AUKUS, along with the Quadrilateral forum or the Quad, is one of the dangerous “small cliques” that the US is building in Asia. China has warned Canberra that Australia is making an “expensive mistake” that will “plant a time bomb” in the region.

The future of this partnership will involve Canberra, London and Washington to overcome several technical and policy issues in implementing the AUKUS road map. The current estimated cost of the project will be around $250 billion. It will be nearly three decades before an Australian-built nuclear submarine will enter service.

This multi-decadal plan will trigger multiple strategic consequences:

1. AUKUS is in essence about transforming Australia’s strategic capabilities and making it a powerful factor in shaping the Indo-Pacific regional security environment. AUKUS will see a deeper partnership between the US, UK, and Australia in developing a range of underwater technologies to cope with the dramatic expansion of Chinese naval capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.

• The UK is the lynchpin in the AUKUS, with its critical role in designing and developing a new class of nuclear-powered submarines by including cutting-edge US technologies to Britain’s domestic nuclear capabilities and the Australian demand. AUKUS will begin to change that by reinforcing London’s renewed claim for a long-term role in Indo-Pacific security.

• AUKUS has reinvigorated the idea of an “Anglosphere” that speaks of the enduring geopolitical bonds between the US, UK, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. India, which had difficult ties with the Anglosphere in the past, is now seeing a rapid expansion of its ties with the English-speaking world.

FUNCTIONAL CHALLENGES THAT AUKUS WILL FACE

1. It is for the U.S. to build nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) for Australia but the U.S. policymakers seem sceptical about the option.
2. Even if Australia acquires a submarine the integration with the onboard combat system would be difficult due to differences between the current Australian and American fleets.
3. Canberra could announce a modified version or new design i.e. a completely new AUKUS-class design to be acquired by all three countries but again the biggest of challenges which Australia has to figure out how to get around U.S. export controls. As the U.S.’s stringent export control and protocol regime could jeopardise the technology transfer agreement.
4. Nuclear technology is difficult under the international system. For Australia to operate nuclear-powered submarines with high-enriched uranium (HEU) fuelled reactors, it will have to exploit a loophole that allows non-nuclear weapon countries to withdraw the fissile material required for submarine reactors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)-monitored stockpile.
5. For India Acquiring nuclear propulsion technology is likely to be complicated as India is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

ABOUT AUKUS USA, UK and Australia have formed a security partnership in Indo–Pacific with an aim to counter Chinese aggression. This group has been created in addition to already existing collaborations like QUAD, 5 eyes alliance etc. In this backdrop let us understand the various dimensions of AUKUS and its implications on the geo-politics of Indo- Pacific.

BENEFITS OF AUKUS FOR INDIA

1. Strengthens India-Australia relations
   • Aims at improving defence capabilities of Australia which is a strategic partner of India.
   • India & Australia recently held their first round of 2+2 dialogue to deepen their defence & strategic ties.

India can now see a dramatic upgradation of those Australian capabilities in the coming years. This should also open the door for greater S&T cooperation between India and Australia which should eventually expand to cover sensitive strategic areas.

2. Augments Quads capability

• Augment capacity of Quad of which both US and  Australia are members.
• This is a first of its kind defence initiative of the US in the Indo - Pacific since Quad has not clearly outlined its defence motives clearly.
• AUKUS is beneficial for India because it reflects continued & intensifying US-Australian concerns about China.
• Bolster both Australian and American ability to deter China or to respond in the event of a crisis. Thus, supplements Quad’s efforts.

3. Clarifies role of Big Powers in Indo - Pacific

• Indian policymakers have gone from worrying about too much US presence and interest in Indian Ocean to worrying about Washington paying too little attention to this region. AUKUS could ease this concern.
• AUKUS conveys the U.K.’s seriousness about its tilt to the Indo-Pacific and signals a change in UK’s assessment of China.
• AUKUS rollout gives India an opportunity to boost diplomatic, defence & trade ties, particularly with France. France will probably double down on its efforts to secure arms deals with India—for commercial and political economic reasons and maybe even to get one over on the U.S.
• France’s reaction to AUKUS could make it more willing and able to help India attain nuclear-powered submarines in addition to or in place of Russia.

Thus it can be concluded that India has now  a rare opportunity to develop a unique set of arrangements of its own with Washington and its allies that will strengthen India’s comprehensive national power as well as enhance its contribution to regional peace and security.

CHALLENGES FROM AUKUS FOR INDIA

1. Tussle between AUKUS nations & France discourages consensus on larger issue of rise of China.
2. France's discontent feeds China’s narrative about U.S. unreliability.
3. Despite India’s increasing collaboration with US, India did not get the offer that US has offered to Australia under AUKUS.
4. Creation of AUKUS signals a dilution of USA’s interest in India, in its Indo – Pacific strategy.
5. Shrinks potential space available for Quad, and India, to play a serious role in region’s security architecture.

The government of India has quietly begun to build a holistic naval base on Great Nicobar Island, which stands squarely overlooking the entrance to the Malacca Straits, and is barely 90 miles from the tip of Indonesia.

 A naval base in Great Nicobar would be the central piece to an oceanic strategy, to offer a counter punch to Chinese aggression in the Himalayas.

China’s deep vulnerability in its dependence on imported oil, China’s Indian Ocean lines of communications imports over 65 per cent of its oil dependency.

With a base in Great Nicobar, the entry to the Malacca Straits would be a hundred miles away while the nearest Chinese base in Sanya would be 1,500 miles away.

Further it was  rumoured that the Chinese have awarded a major dredging contract off Gwadar and that their intention is to operate an aircraft carrier in support of Djibouti and base it in Gwadar. With access to the Malacca Straits in Indian hands, these deep laid plans of China will get an effective countercheck.The current Indian strategy is in accordance with the current revolution in military affairs, where the prerequisite to victory is in formation dominance and the denial of information to the enemy.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF STRAIT OF MALACCA

• Strait of Malacca is the shortest transportation route between the Far East and Indian Ocean.
• Approximately 60 percent of the world’s maritime transport passes through the Strait of Malacca
• The Strait of Malacca is on the transport route of approximately 25 percent of the oil transported between the Middle East and Asia.
• With the increase in the population and wealth of China and other regional powers, this ratio is increasing steadily.
• The Strait of Malacca plays a key geographical role for the entire Indo-Pacific region. For this reason, many countries in the region, including China and even the USA, are dependent on the Strait of Malacca

FOR INDIA

1. The main strategy regarding the Strait of Malacca relates to the strait becoming a gateway to its “East View Policy”.
2. In addition, India attaches importance to the Strait of Malacca at the point of developing bilateral and regional relations through various cooperation mechanisms such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum.

FOR CHINA

• China's disadvantage in high seas becomes all the more grave in the South China Sea where China is fighting six countries.
• Eighty per cent of China's oil imports come through the Malacca Strait. It is also the route for a considerable amount of Chinese trade.
• According to an estimate, China’s shipping costs could increase by more than $64 million if the Strait of Malacca is closed for even a week, another estimate says alternative routes could cost Beijing anywhere between $84 to 220 billion a year.
• China is aware of the fact that the Indian navy eyes Chinese SLOCs [sea lines of communication] through the Malacca Strait as its ‘Achilles heel’.
• A detour through the Sunda or Lombok Straits will not ensure complete security for China’s strategic commodity trade because, ultimately, Chinese SLOCs traverse near the Indian peninsula

WHY THE STRATEGY OF BLOCKING MIGHT NOT WORK FOR INDIA

1. The same lanes serve India’s friends and partners, both from the West and the East, such as Japan. A wholesale blockade of shipments from the Indian side of the strait would create as many challenges for such countries as it would for China. Tokyo, for instance, is just as reliant on oil traveling through the Strait of Malacca as China is. For Saudi Arabia, a country with which India also enjoys good relations, shipments of oil to China, Japan, and South Korea through the same lanes constitute a large part of total crude exports.
2. China could temporarily block at least parts of its exports to India (on which New Delhi relies much more than Beijing relies on imports from India), by simple administrative decisions, without resorting to blocking cargo ships on waters with a navy.
3. The Chinese navy may build the capacity, , to a India-bound ship in waters closer to Djibouti. The same may one day be true for the Chinese presence in Pakistan.
4. Fifty percent of India’s trade now goes through the Malacca and Singapore Straits and complete control over wider waters is usually not a dominion of one power. India and China, “in their respective regions cannot unilaterally acquire the sea control necessary to secure sea lines of communication.
5. China is exploring is Northern Sea Route in the Arctic which could create a ‘Polar Silk Road.’ The importance of this is underlined by China’s 2018 Arctic Policy. It asserts, “Geographically, China is a “Near-Arctic State”, one of the continental States that are closest to the Arctic Circle.”

WAYFORWARD

1. Focus on multilateral organisation and rules based order as promoted under UNCLOS and the UN charter.
2. Nurture new partnership with like-minded countries. For example with countries of South China sea which have maritime disputes with China to promote free, open and rules based maritime order.
3. To continue develop its own partnership (under necklace of diamonds) for example on lines of Changi naval base in Indonesia, Sabang base, Duqm port access etc.
4. Expansion of partnership under QUAD to new level with possible expansion through democratic countries like UK and FRANCE who have large naval strength and access to extra-territorial jurisdiction under them. (Ex. Reunion Island and Diego Garcia).