Geo-Politics of Strait of Malacca

The government of India has quietly begun to build a holistic naval base on Great Nicobar Island, which stands squarely overlooking the entrance to the Malacca Straits, and is barely 90 miles from the tip of Indonesia.

 A naval base in Great Nicobar would be the central piece to an oceanic strategy, to offer a counter punch to Chinese aggression in the Himalayas.

China’s deep vulnerability in its dependence on imported oil, China’s Indian Ocean lines of communications imports over 65 per cent of its oil dependency.

With a base in Great Nicobar, the entry to the Malacca Straits would be a hundred miles away while the nearest Chinese base in Sanya would be 1,500 miles away.

Further it was  rumoured that the Chinese have awarded a major dredging contract off Gwadar and that their intention is to operate an aircraft carrier in support of Djibouti and base it in Gwadar. With access to the Malacca Straits in Indian hands, these deep laid plans of China will get an effective countercheck.The current Indian strategy is in accordance with the current revolution in military affairs, where the prerequisite to victory is in formation dominance and the denial of information to the enemy.

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF STRAIT OF MALACCA

• Strait of Malacca is the shortest transportation route between the Far East and Indian Ocean.
• Approximately 60 percent of the world’s maritime transport passes through the Strait of Malacca
• The Strait of Malacca is on the transport route of approximately 25 percent of the oil transported between the Middle East and Asia.
• With the increase in the population and wealth of China and other regional powers, this ratio is increasing steadily.
• The Strait of Malacca plays a key geographical role for the entire Indo-Pacific region. For this reason, many countries in the region, including China and even the USA, are dependent on the Strait of Malacca

FOR INDIA

1. The main strategy regarding the Strait of Malacca relates to the strait becoming a gateway to its “East View Policy”.
2. In addition, India attaches importance to the Strait of Malacca at the point of developing bilateral and regional relations through various cooperation mechanisms such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum.

FOR CHINA

• China's disadvantage in high seas becomes all the more grave in the South China Sea where China is fighting six countries.
• Eighty per cent of China's oil imports come through the Malacca Strait. It is also the route for a considerable amount of Chinese trade.
• According to an estimate, China’s shipping costs could increase by more than $64 million if the Strait of Malacca is closed for even a week, another estimate says alternative routes could cost Beijing anywhere between $84 to 220 billion a year.
• China is aware of the fact that the Indian navy eyes Chinese SLOCs [sea lines of communication] through the Malacca Strait as its ‘Achilles heel’.
• A detour through the Sunda or Lombok Straits will not ensure complete security for China’s strategic commodity trade because, ultimately, Chinese SLOCs traverse near the Indian peninsula

WHY THE STRATEGY OF BLOCKING MIGHT NOT WORK FOR INDIA

1. The same lanes serve India’s friends and partners, both from the West and the East, such as Japan. A wholesale blockade of shipments from the Indian side of the strait would create as many challenges for such countries as it would for China. Tokyo, for instance, is just as reliant on oil traveling through the Strait of Malacca as China is. For Saudi Arabia, a country with which India also enjoys good relations, shipments of oil to China, Japan, and South Korea through the same lanes constitute a large part of total crude exports.
2. China could temporarily block at least parts of its exports to India (on which New Delhi relies much more than Beijing relies on imports from India), by simple administrative decisions, without resorting to blocking cargo ships on waters with a navy.
3. The Chinese navy may build the capacity, , to a India-bound ship in waters closer to Djibouti. The same may one day be true for the Chinese presence in Pakistan.
4. Fifty percent of India’s trade now goes through the Malacca and Singapore Straits and complete control over wider waters is usually not a dominion of one power. India and China, “in their respective regions cannot unilaterally acquire the sea control necessary to secure sea lines of communication.
5. China is exploring is Northern Sea Route in the Arctic which could create a ‘Polar Silk Road.’ The importance of this is underlined by China’s 2018 Arctic Policy. It asserts, “Geographically, China is a “Near-Arctic State”, one of the continental States that are closest to the Arctic Circle.”

WAYFORWARD

1. Focus on multilateral organisation and rules based order as promoted under UNCLOS and the UN charter.
2. Nurture new partnership with like-minded countries. For example with countries of South China sea which have maritime disputes with China to promote free, open and rules based maritime order.
3. To continue develop its own partnership (under necklace of diamonds) for example on lines of Changi naval base in Indonesia, Sabang base, Duqm port access etc.
4. Expansion of partnership under QUAD to new level with possible expansion through democratic countries like UK and FRANCE who have large naval strength and access to extra-territorial jurisdiction under them. (Ex. Reunion Island and Diego Garcia).