Judiciary

SC Directions on Online Content Regulation

The Supreme Court has issued significant directions to the Union Government to establish a robust framework for regulating abusive, obscene, and harmful online content. The Court observed that the surge in user-generated content—often unverified, defamatory, or targeting vulnerable groups—requires stronger state oversight without undermining constitutional freedoms.

Key Observations and Directives of the Supreme Court

1. Need for an Independent Regulator

The Court held that existing self-regulatory models followed by digital platforms are ineffective, as they lack neutrality and enforceability. It called for a statutory, autonomous regulator to ensure accountability across social media, OTT platforms, and other online intermediaries.

2. Preventive Rather Than Reactive Mechanisms

Currently, harmful content is removed only after it becomes viral, causing reputational, psychological, and sometimes irreversible harm. The bench stressed the need for real-time moderation capabilities, early-warning tools, and content-flagging systems to curb the initial spread of harmful material.

3. Free Speech and Reasonable Restrictions

While reaffirming the protection under Article 19(1)(a), the Court emphasised that restrictions under Article 19(2)—relating to decency, morality, and public order—must be precise and narrowly tailored. Vague phrases like “anti-national attitudes” or “hurting sentiments” are prone to misuse unless backed by judicially tested standards.

4. Clear Definitions for Content Categories

Ambiguity in defining harmful or prohibited online content can lead to over-censorship. The Court urged the government to adopt narrow and well-defined categories aligned with global best practices and constitutional jurisprudence.

5. Strong Age-Verification Models

Simple disclaimers (“18+ only”) are inadequate. The bench suggested exploring Aadhaar-based or comparable high-assurance age-verification systems to prevent children from accessing pornography, violent content, or self-harm-inducing media.

6. Protection for Persons with Disabilities (PwDs)

Noting the rise in online ridicule targeting PwDs, the Court recommended enacting a specific penal law, akin to the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, to safeguard dignity and prevent harassment.

Existing Regulatory Framework

Ministry of Electronics & IT (MeitY) and Ministry of Information & Broadcasting (MIB) oversee online content.
IT Act, 2000:
- Section 79 – Safe harbour for intermediaries subject to due diligence.
- Section 69A – Government power to block content in the interest of national security.
- Section 67 – Penalises publication or transmission of obscene materials.
IT Rules, 2021: Introduced due-diligence norms, content-classification, traceability requirements, and grievance redress; increased obligations on significant social media intermediaries.
Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023: Regulates consent-based processing of personal data.
Other Statutes:
- Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 (IRWA)
- POCSO Act, 2012
Shreya Singhal (2015):
- Struck down Section 66A for being vague and unconstitutional.
- Held intermediaries liable to remove content only upon court order or government direction.
- Upheld Section 69A as constitutionally valid.

The Court’s latest directive signals a shift toward a more coherent and preventive digital-governance framework, balancing free expression with safety, dignity, and constitutional morality.

SC Strikes Down Key Provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021

Context: The Supreme Court of India has struck down multiple provisions of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, citing violation of judicial independence, separation of powers, and past constitutional rulings. The Court observed that Parliament had repeatedly re-enacted provisions already invalidated in earlier Madras Bar Association (MBA) judgments, amounting to a legislative override of judicial decisions.

Why the SC Struck Down the Provisions

1. Re-enactment of Previously Invalidated Clauses

The Court held that the Central Government had introduced nearly identical provisions that had already been struck down in the MBA (2020 & 2021) cases, which amounted to colourable legislation.

2. Executive Dominance Over Appointments

Since the government is frequently a litigant before tribunals, allowing it control over:

tenure,
age limits,
service conditions,
and the final choice of members
undermines natural justice and the independence of adjudication.

3. National Tribunal Commission (NTC)

The Supreme Court directed the Centre to establish the National Tribunal Commission (NTC) within four months to ensure:

independent appointments,
uniform administration,
transparent service rules, and
reduced executive interference.

Struck-Down Provisions of the 2021 Act

1. Four-Year Tenure

The Act fixed a four-year term for chairpersons and members.

SC held it unconstitutional because it increases dependence on the executive for reappointment and violates prior directions mandating at least a five-year term.

2. Minimum Age of 50 Years

The Court struck this down for being discriminatory and blocking younger, competent advocates from entering tribunal service.

3. Panel of Two Names

The Act required the Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) to recommend two names per vacancy, allowing the executive to choose one.

SC held this violates the principle of judicial primacy.

4. Parity with Civil Servants

Aligning service conditions with civil servants diluted the judicial character of tribunals and increased executive control.

Issues Identified by the Court

Short Tenure → Executive Dependence
Arbitrary Age Restriction → Talent Barrier
Two-Name Panel → Executive Dominance
Civil Service Parity → Loss of Tribunal Autonomy

About the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021

The Act aimed to streamline tribunals by:

Abolishing several appellate tribunals,
Transferring functions to High Courts,
Standardising appointments and service conditions,
Empowering the Central Government to frame rules,
Creating the SCSC for selection.

However, the Act repeatedly clashed with constitutional safeguards identified in MBA rulings.

About the Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC)

Chairperson: Chief Justice of India or a SC judge nominated by him
Members:
- Two senior Central Government Secretaries
- Retired SC/HC judge nominated by the CJI (in some tribunals)
Member-Secretary: Secretary of the concerned Ministry (no voting rights)

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment reinforces the basic structure principles of separation of powers and judicial independence. By mandating the creation of the National Tribunal Commission, the Court has signalled the need for a transparent, uniform, and autonomous tribunal system that is free from executive overreach.

Supreme Court Expands Scope of Public Trust Doctrine

Context: In a landmark judgment (Swacch Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2025), the Supreme Court has expanded the Public Trust Doctrine (PTD) to include artificial waterbodies, marking a significant evolution in Indian environmental jurisprudence. The case pertained to the protection and restoration of Nagpur’s historic Futala Lake, which had been deteriorating due to unchecked encroachments and pollution.

Understanding the Public Trust Doctrine

The Public Trust Doctrine is a legal principle that treats the State as the trustee of certain natural and cultural resources, such as forests, rivers, lakes, and public spaces, for the benefit of present and future generations.
Its core idea is that these resources are too vital to be privately owned or misused and must be preserved for public welfare and ecological balance.

Objectives:

To ensure sustainable and equitable use of environmental resources.
To uphold intergenerational equity — protecting resources for future generations.
To prevent arbitrary state actions that harm ecological assets.

Evolution:

Roman Law Origin: The concept stemmed from the Roman notion of “res communes” — resources like air, water, and shores belong to everyone.
English Common Law: The Crown held such resources in trust for the public.
Indian Jurisprudence: Adopted formally through M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath (1997), where the Supreme Court ruled against leasing forest land for private use.

Constitutional Backing

The doctrine draws strength from:

Article 21: Right to Life includes the right to a clean and healthy environment.
Article 48A: Directive for the State to protect and improve the environment.
Article 51A(g): Fundamental duty of citizens to protect the natural environment.

Key Judgments Expanding the Doctrine

Case	Year	Scope Expanded To
M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath	1997	Forest land and rivers
M.I. Builders v. Radhey Shyam Sahu	1999	Urban parks and public spaces
Intellectuals Forum v. State of A.P.	2006	Lakes and wetlands
Fomento Resorts v. Minguel Martins	2009	Coastal and beach areas
T.N. Godavarman v. Union of India	1996–2022	Forests and eco-sensitive zones
Swacch Association v. State of Maharashtra	2025	Artificial waterbodies like Futala Lake

Significance of the 2025 Ruling

Recognizes artificial lakes as public ecological assets.
Imposes a duty on urban authorities to preserve man-made waterbodies.
Reinforces citizen participation and public accountability in conservation.
Strengthens environmental governance under constitutional principles.

Conclusion

By extending the Public Trust Doctrine to artificial waterbodies, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed India’s commitment to sustainable urban ecosystems.

This judgment bridges the gap between natural ecology and human-made infrastructure, ensuring that environmental stewardship remains central to governance and justice.

Supreme Court Allows Direct Recruitment for District Judges

In a landmark judgment, the Supreme Court of India has permitted serving judicial officers to apply for the post of District Judge through the direct recruitment channel. This ruling marks a significant reinterpretation of Article 233(2) of the Constitution, which deals with the appointment of District Judges.

Background:

Traditionally, District Judges have been appointed through two distinct routes:

Direct recruitment from practising advocates (Bar quota), and
Promotion from the subordinate judiciary.

The controversy arose after a Kerala judicial officer was disqualified from applying under the advocate quota based on the Supreme Court’s Dheeraj Mor vs. High Court of Delhi (2020) judgment. The Court had earlier held that a person serving as a judicial officer could not be considered an “advocate” under Article 233(2).

However, recognising the evolving nature of judicial service and the need to widen talent pools, a five-judge Constitution Bench revisited the issue to harmonise merit-based selection with judicial experience.

Key Directions Issued:

Eligibility Expansion: Serving judicial officers can now apply for District Judge posts under the direct recruitment quota.
Experience Requirement: Applicants must have a minimum of 7 years of continuous professional experience — either as an advocate, a judicial officer, or a combination of both.
Age Limit: Minimum 35 years of age is required for all candidates.
Eligibility Timeline: Eligibility shall be determined at the time of application, not at the time of appointment.

Significance of the Ruling:

Widened Talent Pool: Ensures merit and experience from both bar and bench can contribute to higher judicial positions.
Judicial Efficiency: Brings practical courtroom and administrative experience together.
Constitutional Clarity: Provides a definitive interpretation of Article 233(2), resolving ambiguity from earlier rulings.
Institutional Impact: Strengthens the independence and inclusiveness of the judiciary.

Way Forward:

The judgment paves the way for more transparent and inclusive recruitment in the higher judiciary. It aligns with the larger constitutional goal of ensuring efficiency, independence, and accessibility in India’s judicial system.

Judicial Experimentalism versus the Right to Justice

Context: In Shivangi Bansal vs Sahib Bansal (2025), the Supreme Court endorsed the Allahabad High Court’s guidelines mandating a two-month cooling period and referral to Family Welfare Committees in Section 498A/85 BNS cases. This raises concerns of judicial experimentalism and delay in justice.

Relevance of the Topic: Mains: Basic idea of Judicial experimentalism and issues related to it.

Section 498A of the IPC

Section 498A (now Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita) was inserted in the Indian Penal Code to punish cruelty by the husband or his relatives towards a married woman.
Cruelty includes physical or mental abuse, harassment for dowry, or conduct likely to drive the woman to suicide or harm her health.
The offence is cognisable, allowing the police to register a case and investigate without prior approval of a magistrate.
The offence is non-bailable, meaning bail is subject to judicial discretion and not a matter of right.
The offence is non-compoundable, which means once a complaint is filed, it cannot be withdrawn by compromise between the parties.
The punishment under Section 498A is imprisonment up to three years and a fine.

Safeguards to prevent misuse of Section 498A:

Over the years, courts have expressed concern about the increasing misuse of Section 498A, through false or exaggerated complaints, often leading to unnecessary arrests of husbands and their relatives. To address this, several measures were introduced:

In the Lalita Kumari (2013) case, the Supreme Court placed matrimonial disputes in the category of preliminary inquiry before registration of an FIR.
The recent criminal law reforms have also required that cases of cruelty by the husband undergo a preliminary inquiry before an FIR is registered.
To check misuse through arbitrary arrests, the CrPC amendment of 2008 introduced the principle of necessity, mandating that arrests should only be made when justified.
In the Arnesh Kumar (2014) case, the Supreme Court restricted unbridled police powers by mandating a checklist for arrest and introducing the practice of issuing a notice of appearance.
In the Satender Kumar Antil (2022) case, the Court strengthened safeguards further by directing that bail should be granted if an arrest was made in violation of the Arnesh Kumar guidelines.

Recently in Shivangi Bansal vs Sahib Bansal (2025), the Supreme Court endorsed the guidelines by the Allahabad High Court to prevent the misuse of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.

The Allahabad High Court had introduced

A two-month ‘cooling period’ for any coercive action after the registration of a first information report (FIR) or complaint to the magistrate.
During the ‘cooling period’, the matter will be referred to a Family Welfare Committee (FWC).

Associated Concerns:

This ruling is a form of judicial experimentalism as it:

Creates a new dispute-resolution mechanism (FWCs) and procedural bar (cooling period) outside the statutory framework.
It interferes with the functional autonomy of police and magistrates.
Delays the victim’s right to timely justice, and introduces quasi-judicial bodies without legislative sanction.

What is Judicial Experimentalism?

Judicial experimentalism means the courts create rules or mechanisms not explicitly given in law, often to fill gaps or deal with pressing social concerns.
It can sometimes be helpful, as seen in Vishaka vs State of Rajasthan (1997) where the Court laid down guidelines on workplace sexual harassment in the absence of a law. These guidelines later became the POSH Act, 2013.
But it can also be problematic, as in the Shivangi Bansal case (2025) where such experiments weaken victims' access to justice and undermine statutory authorities.

Criticism of Judicial Experimentalism:

It breaches separation of powers by encroaching upon the legislative and executive domain.
It dilutes rule of law by introducing mechanisms beyond statutory mandate.
It delays justice and erodes institutional autonomy of police and magistrates.
It risks judicial overreach, where courts move from interpreting law to making policy, weakening democratic accountability.

The Supreme Court’s 2025 ruling on Section 498A reflects judicial experimentalism that goes beyond legislative intent. While misuse of the law has been addressed through existing safeguards, the introduction of cooling periods and Family Welfare Committees delays justice and undermines institutional autonomy.

Under Representation of Women in Judiciary

Context: Indian Courts have been male-dominated institutions. Presently, there is just one woman judge out of the full strength of 34 judges in the Supreme Court. In order to implement inclusive policies, it is necessary to employ a female perspective into the institution.

Relevance of the Topic: Mains: Essay; Under Representation of Women in Judiciary: Reasons and Way Forward.

Introduction

Over the past century, women in law have made significant progress in India. The first woman lawyer, Cornelia Sorabji, was entitled to practice in 1924. Since then, women have entered the legal profession in increasing numbers, attained the rank of Senior Advocates, and served as judges in the lower judiciary.
Despite these advancements, women’s representation in the higher judiciary remains alarmingly low, which highlights deep-rooted systemic inequality.

Issue of Glass Ceiling in the Higher Judiciary

Women’s representation in the higher judiciary continues to be minimal.

Only 13.4% of High Court judges are women.
- In eight High Courts— Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Manipur, Meghalaya, Odisha, Tripura, and Uttarakhand— there is either no woman judges or just one.
- Allahabad High Court, the largest in the country, has only three women judges out of 79 (2%).
- Only one High Court, the Gujarat High Court, currently has a woman Chief Justice.
Women judges are appointed at a later age than men, with an average appointment age of 53 years compared to 51.8 years for men. This delay prevents them from reaching senior positions.

At Supreme Court level

The situation in the Supreme Court is even more dire:

Since 2021, 28 judges have been appointed to the Supreme Court, but none of them are women.
In the past 75 years, nine men have been elevated directly from the Bar to the Supreme Court, while only one woman has received the same elevation.
Only 11 women have been appointed to the Supreme Court till date (August 2025), which is a mere 3.8% of total judges appointed since its inception in 1950.
There is total absence of caste diversity among women judges in the Supreme Court due to non-appointment of women judges from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
The delayed age of appointment for women results in women judges not making it to the Collegium or as Chief Justice of India. The first woman CJI will be Justice B. V. Nagarathna, who is scheduled to be appointed for only 36 days (in 2027).

Reasons for under-representation of women in Judiciary:

1. Barriers to Women’s inclusion:

Heightened Scrutiny: Women face greater scrutiny when being considered for elevation, with their merit being questioned more rigorously than their male counterparts.
Entry-level barriers: The Judicial Service Rules in many states require continuous legal practice, which can be challenging for women who need career breaks due to family responsibilities. This restricts their chances of elevation to the Bench.
Retention challenges: Even when women enter the judiciary, career progression is hampered by rigid transfer policies and lack of support structures, discouraging their long-term participation.
Infrastructure deficiencies: Many courts lack basic facilities such as separate washrooms, crèches, and family-friendly spaces. A 2019 survey by the Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy found that nearly 100 district courts lack dedicated washrooms for women, making their daily work environment difficult.

2. Collegium System and alleged gender bias:

No clearly defined criteria: There are no clearly defined criteria for eligibility, merit, or the selection process.
Composition: Collegiums, predominantly composed of men, rarely make a concerted effort to identify and elevate qualified women candidates.
Rejection by the government: Even when women’s names are recommended, they are disproportionately rejected by the government. Since 2020, nine women’s names were recommended for High Court appointments, but five were rejected outright.

Way Forward

1. Transparent Appointment Process:

Collegium should establish a clear and transparent selection process based on merit.
Time-bound approvals for collegium recommendations (A timeframe of 90 days is proposed).

2. Gender diversity as a stated objective:

Gender diversity should be an explicit criterion in judicial appointments, ensuring that at least one-third of judges in the High Courts and Supreme Court are women.
Adopt Kerala's model of 50% reservation for women in lower judiciary.
Establish gender diversity targets (33-50%) in higher judiciary appointments.

3. Inclusive infrastructure and policy-level changes:

Judicial policies should account for women’s specific needs, including maternity benefits and flexible transfer policies.
Courts must prioritise gender-friendly infrastructure, including sanitary facilities, feeding rooms, and crèches.
Inclusion of women in the High Court and Supreme Court committees on infrastructure and policy-making to ensure gender-sensitive decision-making.

4. Encouraging women in the legal profession:

Law firms, bar councils, and judiciary bodies should actively mentor and support women lawyers to build a strong pipeline of candidates for judicial roles.

Carole Pateman’s theory of the “public-private divide” aptly explains how traditionally male-dominated institutions fail to adapt to the inclusion of women. A female-centric gaze in judicial policy-making is necessary to ensure that infrastructure, recruitment, and retention policies are designed with women’s lived realities in mind.

AI in Judiciary: Promise and Challenges

Context: In July 2025, the Kerala High Court issued India’s first policy on the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the district judiciary, highlighting both its potential to tackle the backlog of over 5 crore cases and the risks of errors, bias, and accountability gaps.

Relevance of the Topic: Mains: Use of AI in Judiciary: Promises and Challenges.

AI in Judiciary

The judiciary faces longstanding challenges such as case backlogs, language barriers, and the need for digital modernisation.

AI in Judiciary including Machine Learning (ML), Natural Language Processing (NLP), Optical Character Recognition (OCR), and Predictive Analytics are being leveraged to automate administrative tasks, improve case tracking, and enhance crime prevention.
Initiatives like e-Courts Project Phase III, AI-assisted legal translation, predictive policing, and AI-driven legal chatbots are reshaping the legal landscape, making processes faster, smarter, and more transparent.
The Kerala High Court’s July 2025 guidelines on AI use in district judiciary marked the first official policy in India addressing AI adoption in courts.

Promise of AI in Judiciary:

Speed and Efficiency:
- Translation of documents into regional languages can help judges and litigants overcome language barriers.
- Automated transcription of oral arguments and witness depositions saves manual effort.
- Defect identification in filings ensures faster case listing and reduces delays.
Enhanced Legal Research: AI enables quick scanning of vast legal databases, saving time and supporting more focused, substantive legal analysis.
Improved Accessibility: AI-based tools can simplify judgments into easy-to-read summaries for litigants. Translation features enhance access to justice in regional languages.
Administrative Support: AI can assist registries in case classification, docket management, and scheduling, helps reduce the burden on court staff and ensures smoother case flow.
Potential Cost Reduction: By saving time and resources in transcription, research, and filing checks, AI can lower litigation costs, making justice more affordable.

Problems with AI in Judiciary

While AI promises efficiency and accessibility, its deployment in the judiciary raises serious legal, ethical, and technical concerns.

Translation and Transcription Errors: E.g., “Leave granted” translated as “holiday approved” in Hindi. In Noel Anthony Clarke vs Guardian News & Media Ltd. (2025), the claimant’s name “Noel” was repeatedly transcribed as “no.” Such errors, though small, can distort meaning and impact case outcomes.
AI Hallucinations: A study published in theJournal of Empirical Legal Studies found that legal Large Language Models (LLM) can make up case laws and cite incorrect sources to substantiate claims. E.g., OpenAI’s Whisper has been reported to “hallucinate” entire phrases or sentences, especially when speakers pause during speech.
Search Engine Bias: AI-powered legal research may reflect user behaviour patterns, not objective comprehensiveness. Risk of “invisibilising” important precedents, skewing legal arguments and judgments.
Loss of Human Nuance: Judicial decision-making requires context, empathy, and balancing of equities. Over-reliance on AI risks reducing adjudication to mechanical rule-based inferences.
Data Privacy and Security: Use of sensitive, non-public, or personal data in AI systems lacks a clear framework. Risk of data leaks, misuse, or surveillance by private vendors supplying AI tools.
Infrastructure Deficits: Many courts in India still rely heavily on paper-based processes. Weak internet connectivity, lack of digitisation, and poor hardware are major obstacles to AI deployment.

Courts are not just service providers; they are custodians of justice. Over-reliance on AI risks undermining fairness, transparency, and human judgment. Hence, AI must be adopted with caution, transparency and safeguards.

When can Courts Order a Recount of Votes?

Context: Recently, the Supreme Court of India overturned the sarpanch election result of a village in Panipat, Haryana. The Court ordered a recount of votes by summoning Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) to its own premises in New Delhi, marking the first known instance of the apex court directly recounting EVM votes.

Relevance of the Topic: Prelims: Legal Framework for Challenging Elections, Grounds for Invalidating an Election, When Courts Can Order a Recount of Votes.Mains: Role of Judiciary in Free and Fair Elections.

Legal Framework for Challenging Elections:

The validity of the results of Parliamentary, Assembly or State Council elections can be challenged by filing an election petition before the High Court of the particular state in which the election was conducted.
In the case of local body elections, such petitions are to be filed before the district-level civil courts.
Who can file? A candidate or an elector related to the election.
Timeframe: Petition must be filed within 45 days of declaration of results.
The petition must contain a concise statement of material facts on which the challenge is based. If it alleges corrupt practices, it must specify the names of the persons involved, the nature of the act, and the date and place of occurrence.
The Supreme Court has held that allegations of corrupt practices are quasi-criminal and require strict standards of proof. Vague or ambiguous claims are not entertained, and petitions lacking material facts can be dismissed at the outset.

Grounds for Invalidating an Election

Courts can declare an election void on several grounds. This includes :

Bribery, undue influence, such as a candidate failing to disclose their criminal antecedents or promoting enmity among social groups.
If the winning candidate was not qualified or was disqualified on the date of their election.
Improper rejection of a nomination paper of an electoral candidate.
Improper acceptance of a nomination or the improper reception or rejection of votes (but only when it is proven that these actions materially affected the election’s outcome).
And non-compliance with the Constitution or any election laws and rules, if such non-compliance materially affected the result.

When can Courts order a Recount of Votes?

A recount of votes is one of the remedies a court can order, but it is not granted lightly. As it involves re-examining ballots, it is seen as potentially compromising the secrecy of the vote, a cornerstone of free and fair elections. Therefore, a court will only order a recount if :

The petitioner presents specific material facts, and
Provides sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that a counting error is probable and has materially affected the result.

Courts usually order vote recounts to take place at the location where the election was held, unlike in the case of the Panipat sarpanch election dispute, in which the SC recounted the votes at its premises.

Role of Judiciary in Ensuring Free and Fair Elections:

Adjudication of Election Disputes: Under Article 329(b) and the Representation of the People Act, 1951, judiciary acts as the final arbiter of election disputes, upholding the rule of law in the electoral process.
Enforcement of Electoral Law: Ensures compliance with the Constitution, statutory provisions, and electoral rules, thereby upholding the rule of law in the electoral process.
Checking Electoral Malpractices: Declares elections void in cases of corrupt practices, undue influence, bribery, or disqualification, preventing the erosion of the electoral mandate.
Balancing Ballot Secrecy with Electoral Justice: Recounts are ordered only on prima facie proof of irregularities, reflecting judicial restraint while ensuring electoral justice without undermining ballot secrecy.

In Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), the SC declared free and fair elections as part of the Basic Structure, making electoral integrity non-negotiable.

Boost the capacity of Legal Aid System in India

Context: Legal services institutions established under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, are tasked with the mandate of providing free legal aid to nearly 80% of India’s population. However, the actual reach remains modest.

Relevance of the topic:

Prelims: Key facts about NALSA.

Mains: Issues in India’s legal aid system.

Legal Aid System in India: Constitutional and Statutory Mandate

Access to Justice is a fundamental right. Article 39A of the Indian Constitution mandates the State to ensure that no citizen is denied justice due to economic or other disabilities.
To fulfill this constitutional vision, the Legal Services Authorities Act 1987 established a framework to deliver free legal aid to the weaker and vulnerable sections of society. The Act establishes a three-tier structure of legal services institutions:
- National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) at the National level
- State Legal Services Authorities (SLSAs) at the State level
- District Legal Services Authorities (DLSAs) at the District level

Who is Entitled to Free Legal Aid?

Under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, the following categories of persons are eligible for free legal aid in India:
- Women and Children
- All members of SC and ST communities
- Victims of Trafficking or Begging
- Persons in Custody: Includes undertrials, prisoners, and persons in psychiatric institutions
- Persons with Disabilities
- Industrial Workmen
- Victims of Natural Disasters or Mass Disasters
- Persons with an Annual Income below a Prescribed Limit: Income threshold varies by State (generally ₹1 lakh to ₹3 lakh per annum)
- HIV/AIDS Patients
Services include: Legal advice, representation in court, mediation, and legal awareness.

Institutional Framework:

Legal services institutions operate front offices in court complexes and legal aid clinics in rural and remote areas, serving as first points of contact for legal advice and guidance.
A panel of qualified and trained lawyers is empanelled to provide free legal representation to eligible beneficiaries.
The Act promotes the deployment of trained para-legal volunteers to spread legal awareness and assist in dispute resolution at the grassroots level.
The Act empowers legal services authorities to organise Lok Adalats for amicable settlement of disputes. Also promotes mediation and conciliation as part of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR).
Regular legal literacy camps, awareness drives, and training programmes are mandated to educate citizens about their rights and remedies.

The Performance Gap:

However, the implementation and impact remain modest, exposing a critical gap between policy intent and on-ground realities.

Between April 2023 and March 2024, only 15.5 lakh individuals accessed legal aid, even though nearly 80% of India’s population is eligible.
Since 2019, the national per capita spending on legal aid has doubled from roughly ₹3 to ₹7.

Key Challenges in Legal Aid System

Low Budget and Underutilisation of Funds:

The budget for legal aid comprises less than 1% of the total justice budget (police, prisons, judiciary, and legal aid).
During 2017-18 to 2022-23, NALSA’s funds fell from ₹207 crore to ₹169 crore. The utilisation of NALSA funds has dropped from 75% to 59%.

Rigid Expenditure Guidelines:

As per the NALSA Manual 2023, the State Legal Services Authorities (SLSAs) have been barred from incurring expenditure from the NALSA fund on certain items without prior approval. These include:
- hiring project or front office staff
- purchasing or hiring vehicles and equipment
- engaging outsourced personnel
- expenses related to victim compensation
- food distribution, and tree plantation.
Funds are to be used only for specific functions with ceilings: 50% for legal aid and advice, 25% for awareness and outreach, and 25% for Alternate Dispute Resolution and mediation.

Declining Para-Legal Volunteers:

Low budgets constrict the ability to deploy para-legal volunteers (PLVs) on the ground. The total number of para-legal volunteers dropped by nearly 38% between 2019 and 2024. From 5.7 per lakh population, there were only 3.1 per lakh population in 2023.
Reluctance of States to revise honorariums for para-legal volunteers. Most PLVs receive honorarium far below minimum wages (as less as ₹250 per day in certain states). Poor pay leads to high attrition rate among PLVs, who form the backbone of last-mile legal access.

Implementation Challenges in the Legal Aid Defence Counsel (LADC) Scheme:

Introduced in 2022, the LADC scheme is a dedicated legal aid initiative for representing only accused persons, based on the public defender model. It aims to ensure quality legal representation for accused/convicts and reduce the burden on the assigned counsel system.
In 2023-23, ₹200 crore was specially earmarked for LADCs by NALSA and it was fully utilised. However, in 2024-25, the allocation has dropped to ₹147.9 crore.

Way Forward

Financial Reforms:
- Increase budgetary allocation, especially for frontline workers.
- Remove fund utilisation bottlenecks- allow flexibility to SLSAs and DLSAs.
- Ensure uniform and fair honorariums for PLVs.
Human Resources: Recruit and retain more para-legal volunteers and legal aid lawyers. Upgrade training and monitoring mechanisms for better outcomes.
Infrastructure: Expand Legal Aid Clinics, especially in rural areas. Ensure tech-based legal access via mobile apps, kiosks, or tele-law.
Monitoring & Accountability: Introduce independent audits and feedback mechanisms. Regularly assess impact and outcomes, not just inputs.

It is essential to boost the capacity of legal aid systems to make them truly effective. Without these resources, the system falls short of providing the quality of justice enshrined in the Constitution.

Also Read: Who are entitled to receive free legal aid? Assess the role of the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) in rendering free legal aid in India.

Impeachment Process of Judge of High Court

Context: The impeachment of Justice Yashwant Varma - the ex-Delhi High Court judge has begun after 145 MPs, from ruling and opposition parties, submitted a memorandum to the Lok Sabha Speaker. The Parliament has the jurisdiction to constitutionally remove a High Court judge.

Relevance of the Topic:Prelims: Key facts about Removal process of a Judge of High Court.

Removal process of a Judge of HC

A judge of a High Court can be removed from his/her office by an order of the President. The President can issue the removal order only after an address by the Parliament has been presented to him/her in the same session for such removal.
The address must be supported by a special majority of each House of the Parliament (i.e., a majority of the total membership of that House and majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting).
The grounds for removal are two: proved misbehaviour or incapacity. Thus, a judge of a High Court can be removed in the same manner and on the same grounds as a judge of the Supreme Court.

The Judges Enquiry Act (1968) regulates the procedure relating to the removal of a judge of a High Court by the process of impeachment:

A removal motion signed by 100 members (in the case of Lok Sabha) or 50 members (in the case of Rajya Sabha) is to be given to the Speaker/Chairman.
The Speaker/Chairman may admit the motion or refuse to admit it.
If it is admitted, then the Speaker/Chairman is to constitute a three-member committee to investigate the charges.
The committee should consist of (a) the Chief Justice or a Judge of the Supreme Court, (b) Chief Justice of a High Court, and (c) a distinguished Jurist.
If the committee finds the judge to be guilty of misbehaviour or suffering from an incapacity, the House can take up the consideration of the motion.
After the motion is passed by each House of Parliament by a special majority, an address is presented to the President for removal of the judge.
Finally, the President passes an order removing the judge.

The procedure for the impeachment of a judge of a High Court is the same as that for a judge of the Supreme Court. No judge of a High Court has been impeached so far.

Can the Supreme Court halt an Act passed by a State?

Context: The Supreme Court held that Chhattisgarh’s law on auxiliary forces did not violate its 2011 order banning Special Police Officers (SPOs), clarifying that valid legislation cannot be treated as contempt of Court.

Relevance of the topic:

Prelims: Concept of Separation of powers.

Mains: Nandini Sundar and Others vs State of Chhattisgarh case judgement and Doctrine of Separation of powers.

In the Nandini Sundar and Others vs State of Chhattisgarh case, the Supreme Court dismissed a contempt petition against the State of Chhattisgarh for enacting the Chhattisgarh Auxiliary Armed Police Forces Act, 2011.

The petitioners alleged that the State violated the Supreme Court’s 2011 order that prohibited the use of Special Police Officers (SPOs) in anti-Maoist operations.

Background: The 2011 Supreme Court Order

The Supreme Court in July 2011 issued an order stating that :

The State of Chhattisgarh shall cease and desist from using Special Police Officers (SPOs) in any activities, directly or indirectly, aimed at controlling, countering, mitigating or otherwise eliminating Maoist activities.
The State was directed to prevent the operation of groups like Salwa Judum and Koya Commandos.
The Court also directed the Union of India to cease and desist from using any of its funds in supporting, directly or indirectly, the recruitment of SPOs for the purposes of engaging in any form of counter-insurgency activities against Maoists.
The Court concluded that the appointment of inadequately paid and ill-trained SPOs engaged in checking Maoism was violative of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution

Consequent to the Supreme Court order of July 2011, the State of Chhattisgarh enacted the Chhattisgarh Auxiliary Armed Police Forces Act, 2011.

Key Provisions of Chhattisgarh Auxiliary Armed Police Forces Act 2011:

Section 4(1) of the Act provides that an auxiliary force shall be constituted ‘to aid and assist the security forces’ in the maintenance of public order and preventing, controlling and combatting Maoist/Naxal violence and insurgency, etc.
The members of the auxiliary force shall not be deployed in the front-line positions of an operation and shall always work under supervision of the security forces.
The provision of compulsory training for a period not less than six months, is also prescribed under the Act.
Only those SPOs, who would be eligible as per these prescribed yardsticks, were to be inducted into the auxiliary force (by screening committee).

A petition was filed claiming that the enactment was not in consonance with the Court’s order and therefore amounted to contempt of Court.

The Supreme Court rejected the Contempt petition stating that:

The state of Chhattisgarh had complied with all directives from the 2011 ruling.
Every State legislature has plenary powers to pass an enactment so long as the said enactment was not declared to be ultra vires of the Constitution.
Any law made by Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be held as an act of contempt.
The Court clarified that a legislature has the power to pass a law, to remove the basis of a judgment or validate a law which has been struck down by a Constitutional Court. This is the core of the doctrine of separation of powers and must always be acknowledged in a constitutional democracy.
The judiciary cannot invalidate legislation on contempt grounds unless the law is proven to be beyond legislative competence, or violative of the Constitution.

In Indian Aluminium Co. versus State of Kerala (1996), the Supreme Court observed that Courts must maintain the delicate balance devised by the Constitution between the three sovereign functionaries (Legislature, Executive, Judiciary).

When can a sitting Judge face an FIR?

Context: Recently, the Vice President of India has criticised the in-house inquiry as having “no legal sanctity” and called for reviewing the Veeraswami judgment, terming it a “scaffolding of impunity”.

Relevance of the Topic: Prelims: In-house inquiry, Veeraswami judgment in the light of Judicial independence and accountability.

Constitution Safeguard for Judges:

It is fundamental to the independence of the judiciary that judges should be able to decide cases without fear of personal consequences, including criminal prosecution.

The only procedure prescribed in the Constitution is the removal of a judge through impeachment.
- Article 124: Removal of a Supreme Court (SC) judge.
- Article 218: Removal of a High Court (HC) judge.
The judge can only be removed by Parliament on two grounds:
- Proven misbehavior or incapacity.
- Proven misbehavior and incapacity are not defined in the Constitution.
The impeachment process requires a motion to be passed in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha with at least two-thirds of those present and voting, in such a way that it is more than 50% of the total membership of each House, i.e., special majority. If the Parliament approves, the President issues the final removal order. However, no SC Judge has been impeached so far.

Looking for alternative mechanisms to deal with complaints against judges, the SC developed the mechanism of the in-house inquiry.

What is an In-house Inquiry?

The Chief Justice of India (CJI) sets up a panel of judges to verify if there is a prima facie case against a judge.
The report is sent to the CJI, who may forward it to the President or executive.
If the judge is found guilty of misconduct, the panel can recommend voluntary resignation, withdrawal of judicial work and initiation of impeachment proceedings.
It is not a legal or statutory proceeding, it is an internal fact-finding process. It cannot lead directly to an FIR or prosecution.
The CJI himself has limited powers to deal with errant judges beyond transferring or withdrawing work from the judge.

Veeraswami Case (1991): When can a sitting judge face an FIR?

In the Veeraswami case, Justice K. Veeraswami, former Chief Justice of the Madras High Court, was accused of possessing assets disproportionate to his known sources of income.
The central legal question was whether a sitting judge could be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, and if so, who had the authority to sanction such prosecution.
The SC held that:
- A sitting judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court can be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, but only with prior sanction from the Chief Justice of India.
- While a judge can be considered a public servant for a corruption case to be registered against him, the sanction must come from the CJI.
Ordinarily, sanction is granted by the authority that has the power to appoint the public servant. But the SC emphasised that there is no master and servant relationship or employer and employee relationship between a Judge and the President of India.
The judgment aims to maintain a balance between Judicial independence and judicial accountability.

In 2019, for the first time, then CJI Ranjan Gogoi gave permission to the CBI to register an FIR against Justice S N Shukla of the Allahabad High Court for alleged favours to a private medical college for MBBS admissions.