International Relations

G20 push: Over 30 big cities on list to tap municipal bond market

Context: The Centre has identified more than 30 cities with good ratings in the Municipal (Muni) bond market. Surat and Visakhapatnam are likely to issue Muni bonds soon and Chennai could be the first of the megacities to do so this year.

Previously: Indore Municipal Corporation has become the first in India to issue the Green Bonds on the National Stock Exchange.

Also, recently (February 2023), NSE’s Index services subsidiary, NSE Indices limited has launched India’s first ever Municipal Bond Index, Nifty India Municipal Bond Index. It would tracks the performance of municipal bonds issued by Indian municipal corporations across maturities and having investment grade credit rating.

Background

In 2023 Union Budget, Finance Minister announced steps for cities to issue Muni bonds.
Centre has been holding workshops with states on side-lines of G20 infra groups meetings. The selected cities are rationalising property tax rates, cleaning up their books, and planning revenue-generating projects.
Government is also conducting regular workshops with states and municipal authorities on the side-lines of the G20 Infrastructure working group meetings.
The annual Muni bond market size in India is not even $1 billion against $386 billion in USA.

These 30-plus cities rated ‘A’ are the ones that have done the most work, in rationalising property tax rates, cleaning up their books, planning revenue-generating projects, etc.

About Muni Bonds

Municipal bonds (also known as Muni Bonds) are the bonds issued by Urban Local Bodies (ULB) to raise money for the development of various capital-intensive infrastructure projects. In India, the Bengaluru Municipal Corporation issued municipal bonds for the first time in 1997.

Types

General obligation bonds: Can be used for creation and upgradation of any infrastructure. The money raised through such Bonds is repaid from the overall revenues earned by the ULBs.
Revenue Bonds: The money raised through these Bonds can be used for a specific infrastructure project such as Construction of new Road. The money raised through such Bonds is repaid only through the revenue earned from such as specific infrastructure project.

G20 Infrastructure Working Group meeting

First such meeting was organised in Pune this year in January where 18 nations participated.
It discussed the 2023 Infrastructure Agenda under the Indian G20 Presidency.
Theme of the meeting was “Financing Cities of Tomorrow- Inclusive, Resilient and Sustainable”.
The meeting included discussions on various facets of making cities economic centres of growth, financing urban infrastructure, building future-ready urban infrastructure, the role of cities in meeting sustainability targets, directing fiscal investments for unlocking private financing for energy-efficient and environmentally sustainable infrastructure and mitigating social imbalances.
The second meeting of the Infrastructure Working Group is scheduled to be held in Vishakhapatnam, Andhra Pradesh, on 28th and 29th of March, 2023.

Understanding IMF bailouts

Context: The International Monetary Fund (IMF) last week confirmed a $3 billion bailout plan for Sri Lanka’s struggling economy. IMF officials are also in negotiations with Pakistan for a $1.1 billion bailout plan as the country faces a severe economic crisis marked by a falling currency and price rise.

Why do nations seek an IMF bailout?

Countries seek help from the IMF usually when their economies face a major macroeconomic risk, mostly in the form of a currency crisis. For instance in the case of Sri Lanka and Pakistan, both countries have witnessed domestic prices rise rapidly and the exchange value of their currencies drop steeply against the U.S. dollar.
Such currency crises are generally the result of gross mismanagement of the nation’s currency by its central bank, often under the covert influence of the ruling government.
Central banks may be forced by governments to create fresh money out of thin air to fund populist spending.
Such spending eventually results in a rapid rise of the overall money supply, which in turn causes prices to rise across the economy and the exchange value of the currency to drop.
A rapid, unpredictable fall in the value of a currency can destroy confidence in said currency and affect economic activity as people may turn hesitant to accept the currency in exchange for goods and services.
Foreigners may also be unwilling to invest in an economy where the value of its currency gyrates in an unpredictable manner.
In such a scenario, many countries are forced to seek help from the IMF to meet their external debt and other obligations, to purchase essential imports, and also to prop up the exchange value of their currencies.
Bad luck can also contribute to a crisis. In the case of Sri Lanka, a decrease in foreign tourists visiting the country led to a steep fall in the flow of U.S. dollars into the nation.

How does the IMF help countries?

The IMF basically lends money, often in the form of special drawing rights (SDRs), to troubled economies that seek the lender’s assistance.

SDRs simply represent a basket of five currencies, namely the U.S. dollar, the euro, the Chinese yuan, the Japanese yen, and the British pound. The IMF carries out its lending to troubled economies through a number of lending programs such as the extended credit facility, the flexible credit line, the stand-by agreement, etc.

Countries receiving the bailout can use the SDRs for various purposes depending on their individual circumstances.

Currently, both Sri Lanka and Pakistan are in urgent need for U.S. dollars to import essential items and also to pay their foreign debt. So any money that they receive from the IMF is likely to go towards addressing these urgent issues.

Are there any strings attached to an IMF bailout?

On giving loans to countries, the IMF makes the loan conditional on the implementation of certain economic policies. These policies tend to involve:

Reducing government borrowing – Higher taxes and lower spending
Higher interest rates to stabilise the currency.
Allow failing firms to go bankrupt.
Structural adjustment. Privatisation, deregulation, reducing corruption and bureaucracy.

The problem is that these policies of structural adjustment and macroeconomic intervention can make difficult economic situations worse.
For example, in the Asian crisis of 1997, many countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand were required by the IMF to pursue tight monetary policy (higher interest rates) and tight fiscal policy to reduce the budget deficit and strengthen exchange rates. However, these policies caused a minor slowdown to turn into a serious recession with very high levels of unemployment.

What is the International Monetary Fund?

Its headquarters is in Washington DC.
Membership: 190 countries
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an international organization that:

Promotes global economic growth and
Promotes global financial stability,
Encourages international trade, and
Reduces poverty.

Origin: The IMF was originally created in 1945 as part of the Bretton Woods agreement, which attempted to encourage international financial cooperation by introducing a system of convertible currencies at fixed exchange rates.
Change in its role: Since the Bretton Woods system collapsed in the 1970s, the IMF has promoted the system of floating exchange rates, meaning that market forces determine the value of currencies relative to one another. This system remains in place today.

Functions of IMF:

The IMF collects massive amounts of data on national economies, international trade, and the global economy in aggregate and provides economic forecasts.
One of the IMF's most important functions is to make loans to countries that are experiencing economic distress to prevent or mitigate financial crises.
The IMF provides technical assistance, training, and policy advice to member countries through its capacity-building programs. These programs include training in data collection and analysis, which feed into the IMF's project of monitoring national and global economies.

The IMF gets its money through quotas and subscriptions from its member countries. These contributions are based on the size of the country's economy, making the U.S., with the world's largest economy, the largest contributor.
Quotas are a key determinant of the voting power in IMF decisions. Votes comprise one vote per SDR 100,000 of quota plus basic votes (same for all members).
IMF Grants: These are given to charities in Washington D.C. and member countries. The grants are meant to foster economic independence through education and economic development." The average grant size is $15,000.
Note: Membership of the IMF is compulsory to be part of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank).

Multilateralism

What is multilateralism?

Multilateralism refers to the coming together of three or more states, in formal or informal institutional settings, to discuss issues of mutual interest and coordinate their policies.

An example of multilateral institution is United Nations (UN) since it has universal membership. All countries, irrespective of their size and power, enjoy equal status in the form of one-country, one vote.

If such a grouping is small in size, it is best referred to as a mini-lateral or plurilateral forum.

One example of a plurilateral forum is BRICS, of which India is a member along with Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa. Another example is G20, a grouping of top 20 economies of the world based on their GDPs (at PPP). Both these are cross-regional forums. Examples of regional multilateral forums are South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), etc

Difference from Multi-alignment

Multi-alignment, on the other hand, refers to the policy of formation of several alliances, not necessarily military, to fulfil national interests ranging from the more tangible security and development related ones to the more intangible ideational ones.

Multi-alignment conveys a sense of engagement and participation and a strong pragmatic outlook aimed not only at a better India but also a better world.

But multilateralism cannot be completely isolated from power politics. The Bretton Woods institutions, for instance, with their contribution-based quotas and weighted voting are standing edifices of realpolitik. Normatively, multilateralism is a counter to unilateralism.

Challenges to Multilateralism

Dominance of West: The postcolonial backlash against the predominance of the West and the rising tide of populism have been profoundly eroding the liberal values underpinning the multilateral system
Crisis in UN: The UN and its manifold agencies have been losing their lustre, criticised for their lack of efficiency, institutional sclerosis and ideological infighting.
Trade Talks: The WTO has failed to conclude the negotiations of the Doha Agenda started in 2001, as bilateralism and protectionism are resurging worldwide, and its dispute settlement system has stalled
Climate: Multilateral efforts to address climate change have made symbolic progress at best.
Digital Space: The governance of the internet is forfeiting its initial aspiration of a borderless knowledge society as a few private companies are hoarding data exponentially and authoritarian states are misusing it as a tool of surveillance and repression.
Rise of Nationalistic politics: Seen in global as well emerging powers. Example: BREXIT or withdrawal of UK from the EU marks a dent to the spirit of multilateralism. The powerful nations are challenging the multilateral world order.
Changing Geopolitics: Rise of China, concretization of Russia China axis, SCO etc. has made West conscious of preserving its hegemony. West sees China as a challenger to US led world order and does not seem to cooperate with China and Russia. At the same time, China and Russia try to counter the west. This competition has led to erosion of spirit of cooperation and collaboration, hurting multilateralism.

Why is it difficult to Reform

Multilateralism is deeply entrenched in global power politics. As a result, any action in reforming multilateral institutions and frameworks automatically transforms into a move that seeks changes in the current distribution of power.
The status quo powers see multilateral reforms as a zero-sum game. For instance, in the context of the Bretton Woods system, the U.S. and Europe believed reform would reduce their influence and dominance. This makes decisions about reform in these institutions, by consensus or voting, hard.
Multilateralism appears at odds with the realities of the emerging multiplex global order. The emerging order seems more multipolar and multi-centred. Such a situation facilitates the formation of new clubs, concerts and coalitions of the like-minded, which makes the reform of older institutions and frameworks more challenging.

What G20 and India can do

G-20 should first focus on setting proper narratives of multilateral reform. G-20 may constitute an engagement group dedicated to bring the narrative to the forefront of global discourse. India should also urge the upcoming chairs of the grouping, Brazil and South Africa, to place multilateral reforms as their presidential priorities
It should be acknowledged that limitations of multilateral cooperation. Competing interests and the dominance of powerful states are there to stay in multilateral platforms. Therefore, while supporting multilateral cooperation, G-20 should continue encouraging mini lateral groupings as a new form of multilateralism and try to transform them into multi-stakeholder partnerships
Creating networks of issue-based mini laterals, particularly in areas related to the governance of the global commons will be helpful in preventing competitive coalitions where other actors play the same game to their advantage, leading to a more fragmented world order.
The group needs to be more inclusive without sacrificing efficiency. For example, including the African Union as a permanent member and the UN Secretary-General and General Assembly President as permanent invitees would be helpful to enhance its legitimacy.
G-20 should put all its efforts into solving one or two pressing global issues and showcase it as the model of new multilateralism. Food, fuel and fertilizer security can be one such issue. On the one hand, it falls under the ‘low politics’ of world politics, so cooperation is more achievable.

INDIA’s STRATEGY OF REFORMING MULTILATERALISM

India’s strategy for reformed multilateralism rests on 5S pillars which includes

1. Samman (Respect)

2. Samvad (Dialogue)

3. Sahyog (Cooperation)

4. Shanti (Peace)

5. Samriddhi (Prosperity)

Moreover, India has to engage with regional groupings in stronger ways though China has a pre-eminent position in the architecture of these organisations. Interdependence in the economy cannot be overlooked, especially for an emerging state like India.
India must continue to pursue institutionalisation of multilateral frameworks irrespective of regional conflicts. On such occasions, one has to look at the possibility of strengthening neighbourhood multilateral frameworks (such as SARRC
India needs to build multilateral trade blocs/economic groupings involving its South Asian neighbours along with Indian Ocean neighbours, while rejuvenating organisations such as BIMSTEC and IOR-ARC.

Thus India should not allow a “recession for multilateralism” in its diplomatic vision as it can be concluded that the multilateral system is merely undergoing a profound mutation and one that might even end up making it more effective and better adapted to the realities of the 21st century.

Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)

CONTEXT: An Inter-Ministerial delegation from India led by Department of Commerce participated in the second Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) negotiating round in Bali, Indonesia

Key Developments Summit

During the Bali Round, discussions covered all the four pillars of the IPEF i.e. Trade, Supply Chain resilience, Clean Energy and decarbonisation and Fair Economy (Taxation & Anticorruption)

However India participated in the discussions related to Supply Chain resilience and Fair Economy (Taxation & Anticorruption)

The pillar which deals primarily with trade was not joined by India because the contours of the framework - particularly on commitments required on environment, labour, digital trade and public procurement — are still emerging.

India reiterated its belief that IPEF will deepen the economic engagement and promote inclusive development through enhancement in trade and investment in the region.
On the side-lines of the negotiating round, the Chief Negotiator and the Pillar Leads also held bilateral meetings with IPEF countries and other concerned stakeholders.
Further a representative from National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) also gave a detailed presentation at the Business Forum on Unified Payment Interface (UPI), a successful example of Digital Public infrastructure in India.

ABOUT IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity)

In the backdrop of US withdrawal from the Trans- Pacific Partnership under Donald Trump, there has been concern over the absence of a credible US economic and trade strategy to counter China’s economic influence in the region.

The US President first talked about it at the at the October 2021 East Asia Summit. It has been launched at present Quad summit 2022.

Objective

To “advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness, and competitiveness” in these economies.

Members and Membership

Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Together, these countries account for 40% of global GDP.

Countries are free to join (or not join) initiatives under any of the stipulated pillars but are expected to adhere to all commitments once they enrol.

Leadership

U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) will be spearheading the trade pillar,
Supply chain resilience, clean energy and decarbonisation, and taxes and anti-corruption measures will fall under the purview of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Areas of cooperation

1. Trade Pillar: To establish “high- standard, inclusive, free, and fair-trade commitments” to fuel economic activity and investments benefitting both workers and consumers.

2. Digital Trade Pillar: Incorporates not just the purchase and sale of goods online but also data flows that enable the operation of global value chains and services, like smart manufacturing, platforms and applications

3. Supply chain resilience Pillar: The framework aspires to secure access to key raw and processed materials, semiconductors, critical minerals and clean energy, tech, particularly for crisis response measures and ensuring business continuity

4. Clean energy, decarbonisation and infrastructure Pillar: In line with the Paris Agreement, provide technical assistance and help mobilize finance, including concessional finance, to improve competitiveness and enhance connectivity by supporting countries in the development of sustainable and durable infrastructure for adopting renewable energy.

5. Tax and anti-corruption Pillar: Aimed at promoting fair competition by enforcing robust tax, anti-money laundering and anti-bribery regimes in line with existing multilateral obligations, standards and agreements to curb tax evasion and corruption in the region.

Benefits

A new US vehicle for economic re- engagement with East Asia and Southeast Asia.
It would help in countering China dominated Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and other regional trade initiatives like Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Digital Economic Partnership (DEPA) (A new type of trade agreement to facilitate digital trade and creating a framework for the digital economy, was born out of the common interest of Chile, New Zealand and Singapore) of which US and India are not a party.
Would help U.S. companies that are looking to move away from manufacturing in China.
It is significant that 7 of 10 ASEAN countries and 11 out of 15 of countries that form RCEP took part in the launch.
Signifies first multilateral attempt to boost supply chain resilience to ease global inflationary pressures and mitigate effects of future disruptions, particularly key raw materials, critical minerals, and semiconductors.

Challenges

IPEF is not a traditional trade agreement.
It would include different modules covering “fair and resilient trade, supply chain resilience, infrastructure and decarbonization, and tax and anticorruption.”
Countries would have to sign up to all the components within a module, but do not have to participate in all modules.
The “fair and resilient trade” module will be led by the US Trade Representative and include digital, labour, and environment issues, with some binding commitments.
IPEF will not include market access commitments such as lowering tariff barriers, as the agreement is “more of an administrative arrangement,” and Congressional approval, which is a must for trade agreements, is not mandatory for this.
Critics suggest it would be security, and not economics, which will drive U.S. trade engagement in the region.
Exclusion of U.S. ally Taiwan from the arrangement, despite its willingness to join, exhibits USA’s geopolitical caution to call out China and despite Taiwan being eligible on economic merit.

Concerns for India

US’ preference to allow free and open data flows under digital economy pillar will constrict India’s ability to regulate data for domestic purposes.
India might be reluctant to sync its tax policies with the push for a global tax standard amongst US partners to mitigate tax avoidance and evasion.
Labour Standards and non-Tariff barriers will remain a bone of contention for India.

Commission for Control of Interpol’s Files (CCF)

CONTEXT: The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on Tuesday said that it had taken up, with the Commission for Control of Interpol’s Files (CCF), the serious shortcomings and mistakes committed in reaching the “unfounded and perfunctory” decision to remove the Red Notice against fugitive Mehul Choksi. It has initiated measures to get the Interpol notice restored.

About Commission for Control of Interpol’s

The CCF is an independent body that ensures that all personal data processed through INTERPOL’s channels conforms to the rules of the Organization. It is not under the control of the Interpol Secretariat.

Role of the CCF

The Commission has three functions, as defined in Interpol’s Constitution

A supervisory role - under which it monitors the application of the Organization's data protection rules to personal data processed by Interpol

An Advisory role - under it advises the Organization with regard to any operations or projects concerning the processing of personal information

A Processing role - It processes requests for access and deletion to files and applications for revision.

Structure

The CCF comprises seven members appointed for a five-year term, renewable once for an additional term of three years.

Members are appointed because of their expertise, and in such a way as to allow the CCF to carry out its mission completely independently. They are generally lawyers with experience and/or expertise in the following fields:

Data-protection;
International police matters, in particular international police cooperation;
International criminal law;
Human rights;
Senior judicial or prosecutorial role, preferably in international judicial cooperation.

To perform its functions, the Commission directly consults the INTERPOL General Secretariat, National Central Bureaus and other relevant entities.

What are the main principles in INTERPOL’s rules that are applicable to the CCF?

The main principles set out in INTERPOL’s rules are the following:

Respect of fundamental human rights.
Neutrality.
National sovereignty.
Respect of data protection principles - primarily lawfulness and fairness, purpose, accuracy, access, proportionality, security, supervision and sanction, and non-discrimination.

About INTERPOL

Interpol stands for International Criminal Police Organization, an inter-governmental organization. It has 194 member countries and helps police in all of them to work together to make the world a safer place.

In each country, an INTERPOL National Central Bureau (NCB) provides a central point of contact for General Secretariat and other NCBs. An NCB is run by national police officials and usually sits in the government ministry responsible for policing.
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) is designated as the National Central Bureau of India. INTERPOL Notices are international requests for cooperation or alerts allowing police in member countries to share critical crime-related information.
Notices are published by the General Secretariat at the request of a National Central Bureau and are made available to all our member countries.
Headquarters - LYON, FRANCE

Decision Making: General Assembly takes decisions. Each member country represented has one vote. Decision-making process is made by either a simple or two-thirds majority, depending on the subject matter.

Funding :

There are two main sources of income:

Statutory contributions from our membership: Each of our member countries pays a statutory contribution to INTERPOL each year; it is an obligatory payment. This contribution is based on economic weight.
Voluntary funding for our activities: Most of the voluntary funding comes from government agencies, notably those responsible for policing, but there were also smaller contributions from international and non- governmental organizations, foundations and private entities.

Global Complex for Innovation

Based in Singapore since 2015, the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation is the centre of our activities in cybercrime, research and development, and capacity building. It also provides an Asian base for the Organization in several crime areas.

Interpol Metaverse

Interpol has developed its own virtual reality space to help users train and attend virtual meetings. This new virtual reality space can be only accessed through secure servers. It helps police officers to experience Metaverse, offering them an idea of what crimes could take place and how they could be handled in future.

India’s Performance as the Non-permanent member of UNSC

CONTEXT:India concluded its eighth stint in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) at the end of December 2022. And, by any yardstick, its two-year stint has been unprecedented.

India focused inter alia on maritime security, terrorism, UN peacekeeping, reformed multilateralism and the Global South. India was elected Chair of three important UNSC Committees: the Taliban Sanctions Committee, Libyan Sanctions Committee and Counter-terrorism Committee.

Following were the achievements of India at the end of two year tenure.

On Maritime security

As the head of UNSC meeting on maritime security the presidential Statement issued was the first holistic document on this issue which, for the first time, had a direct reference to UN Convention on the Law of the Sea as international law setting out the legal framework in the context of maritime activities. The statement also called for freedom of navigation, anti-piracy and combating terror and transnational crime at sea.

On Myanmar

In Myanmar the military coup took place. The Permanent-5 (P-5) were pulling in opposing directions while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) counselled caution. India shares a nearly 1,700 kilometre-long border with Myanmar and it was vital to stop violence, bring in stability and ensure democratic processes went forward. India ensured balanced and comprehensive Council pronouncements, which finally culminated in a resolution on Myanmar

On Afghanistan

In Afghanistan Taliban took over the control. India was able to steer the negotiations which resulted in UNSC Resolution 2593 laying down benchmarks: on stopping cross-border terrorism from Afghan soil, including from proscribed UN terrorist entities in Pakistan; protecting the rights of women, minorities and children; ensuring an inclusive government, and providing humanitarian assistance.

On Terrorism

As Chair of the UNSC Counter-terrorism Committee (CTC), India brought the CTC meeting to India in October 2022. Though India’s attempt to list terrorists under UNSC Resolution 1267 sanctions (along with the U.S.) was thwarted, in a significant development, the proposal to list Abdul Rehman Makki, Deputy Amir/Chief of the Lashkar-e-Taiba was approved by the UNSC.

On Peacekeeping

India launched the UNITE Aware technology platform to strengthen real-time protection of peacekeepers.

India introduced UNSC resolution, calling for accountability for crimes against peacekeepers.

India also gifted two lakh vaccines to all UN peacekeepers.

On Global South

India thwarted a move by the West to wrest climate change from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change-led process and bring it under the ambit of the UNSC, where the P-5 are also major historical polluters. The draft resolution was defeated in the Council when India and Russia voted against. A change in the climate change architecture would have shut out the voice of the Global South, especially Small Island Developing States.

The conclusion under the India’s Presidency was the need for immediate reform of the Council. India’s performance over two years is testimony to why India needs to be at the horseshoe table permanently.

PRELIMS POINTER

About Unite Aware

India, in collaboration with the UN, launched a technology platform to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers who are operating in an increasingly complex and risky environments across the world. For the project India contributed USD 1.64 million.

It is a situational awareness software programme that will utilise modern surveillance technology for real time threat assessments to peacekeepers and help them enhance their security.
This will access live video and satellite imagery, and in very volatile circumstances can also deliver early warnings to peacekeepers. It can also record data on critical incidents and events and follow daily operational activities.
Using the platform, the entire peacekeeping operation can be visualised, coordinated, and monitored on a real time basis.
India has developed the technology platform in partnership with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Operational Support.

Initial roll out

India has partnered with the UN to roll out the UNITE Aware platform initially in four UN Peacekeeping Missions: MINUSMA (Mali), UNMISS (South Sudan), UNFICYP (Cyprus) and AMISOM (Somalia).

About UNSC

United Nations Security Council

Security Council has primary responsibility, under the UN Charter, for maintenance of international peace and security.
It has 15 Members (5 permanent and 10 non- permanent members). Each Member has one vote.
Elections of Non-Permanent Members of UNSC: Each year the UN General Assembly elects 5 non- permanent members (out of total 10 non-permanent members) for a two-year term. The 10 non-permanent seats are distributed on a regional basis: Five for African & Asian States; One for Eastern European States; Two for Latin American & Caribbean States; Two for Western European and other States.

A retiring member is not eligible for immediate re-election.

The election is held by a secret ballot and there are no nominations. Non-permanent members of the UNSC are elected by two-thirds majority in UNGA. (India was elected as the non-permanent member of the UN Security Council on January 1, 2021. Term of India as non-permanent member ended on December 31, 2022. India has earlier been a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-78, 1984-85, 1991-92 and 2011-12.)
UN Security Council is organised to be able to function as continuous body. Meetings of UNSC are held at the call of the President of UNSC at any time he deems necessary, but that interval between meetings shall not exceed 14 days.
Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions.
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: Consist of military, police and civilian personnel, who work to deliver security, political and early peacebuilding support. They are usually led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and many although not all – peacekeeping operations have a Chapter VII mandate.

In addition, peacekeeping operations, as opposed to other missions, have a military or international police presence in the field.

China’s Global Security Initiative and the dichotomy

Context: Recently China introduced the Global Security Initiative (GSI) Concept Paper. The GSI is as a China-led framework that seeks to restore stability and security, particularly in Asia. The paper has outlined five major pillars to effectively implement the GSI, i.e., mutual respect; openness and inclusion; multilateralism; mutual benefit, and a holistic approach.

GSI is tailored more to be an empty narrative to compete with United States leadership and dominant U.S.-led concepts. As the war in Ukraine intensified and diverging perceptions among developing countries vis-à-vis the West and the unfolding war, China is seeking to leverage these fault lines by promoting its vision as a capable alternative leader.

Understanding the concept paper and dichotomy

The GSI’s first principle centres on the need for countries to adhere to the United Nations Charter and international law based on mutual trust and cooperation.

However China has consistently demonstrated the exact opposite in terms of its relations with its neighbours. Along its southwestern border, China continues to ensure that its relations with India are provocative by constantly undermining India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

China is also increasing its assertive manoeuvres in the South China Sea by greatly militarising the disputed maritime territory at the expense of the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of its Southeast Asian neighbours.

Further, in its complete rejection of international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China continues to assertively intrude and block the access of its neighbours within their respective Exclusive Economic Zones.

The second principle of the GSI lies in its openness to spearhead inclusive international engagements

However China at the same time continues to engage in exclusionary policies in the East and South China Seas. This an outright rejection of freedom of navigation enshrined in international law and also a display of narrowly defined interests to consolidate its sphere of influence in the region.

The third principle focuses on bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and consultations to address issues of concern with the parties involved.

However analysing the Chinese understanding of consultation can be seen through the prism of asymmetric power relations such as constraining members of the ASEAN from pursuing collective actions against Beijing’s assertion.

Moreover, China continues to delay the establishment of a crucial Code of Conduct for the South China Sea as it continues to bolster its military power projection in the disputed territory and indulge in various grey zone strategies.

The fourth principle highlights the GSI’s prioritisation of positive-sum cooperation, where parties involved can equally benefit

However if we look at China’s Belt and Road which seems to address the significant infrastructure deficit in the developing world, but the initiatives disregard for international macroeconomic stability by funding unsustainable projects for countries with low or non-existing credit ratings that creates more debt burdens for these countries.

Further China has also shown disregard for its neighbour’s sovereignty and sovereign rights, as China has insisted on receiving a larger share in its bid for a joint exploration of resources with Manila in Philippine waters

The fifth and the last principle that GSI advocates a holistic approach towards traditional and non-traditional security threats, with an equal emphasis on eliminating any “breeding ground for insecurity”.

Rather than being holistic, China’s engagements with the powers indicate a more narrowly defined goal for its power interests.

China also continues to be a catalyst for insecurity in the non-traditional security realm, starting from its alleged lack of accountability regarding the COVID-19 pandemic to arming terror groups, such as in Myanmar.
Therefore it can be concluded that China’s GSI is far from being a sustainable, equitable, and transparent solution to the growing insecurity that the world is facing, given an objective understanding of its track record in fulfilling its own principle requirements. Rather, the GSI indicates Beijing’s attempt to counter U.S. leadership through narratives, regardless of whether it can effectively operationalise such initiatives on the ground.

India and the USA

Context: After signing all the four foundational agreements to take forward strategic partnership, India and the U.S. are now working to finalise an “air information sharing agreement”.

The two countries are exploring opportunities under the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) for co-development and co-production of high tech weapons.
The pact is expected to facilitate sharing of information between the Indian and the US forces apart from cooperation in specific areas.

Further the two countries announced an initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET).
In addition, the U.S. is considering an application from engine manufacturer General Electric to jointly produce the GE-414 jet engines in India to power the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA)-Mk2 and the fifth generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).

India has now signed all four foundational agreements with the U.S.

The logistics agreement in 2016, Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) in 2018 and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial cooperation (BECA) in 2020. While the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was signed a long time ago, an extension to it, the Industrial Security Annex (ISA), was signed in 2019.

FOUNDATIONAL AGREEMENTS

BECA Finalising the agreement helped India get real-time access to American geospatial intelligence that will enhance the accuracy of automated systems and weapons like missiles and armed drones. Through the sharing of information on maps and satellite images, it will help India access topographical and aeronautical data, and advanced products that will aid in navigation and targeting. This was key to Air Force-to-Air Force cooperation between India and the US. In simpler terms just as your radio cab (or the GPS in your smartphone) helps you zero in on the path to your destination and helps you reach it quickly and efficiently, BECA will provide Indian military systems with a high-quality GPS to navigate missiles with real-time intelligence to precisely target the adversary.

LEMOA (first agreement to be signed in 2016) allows the militaries of the US and India to replenish from each other’s bases, and access supplies, spare parts and services from each other’s land facilities, air bases, and ports, which can then be reimbursed. It is extremely useful for India-US Navy-to-Navy cooperation, since the two countries are cooperating closely in the Indo-Pacific. In simple terms, it is like being able to stop at a friend’s garage or workshop to refuel your car or get it repaired when you are far away from your own home or workshop.

COMCASA (signed in September 2018, after the first 2+2 dialogue) it allows the US to provide India with its encrypted communications equipment and systems so that Indian and US military commanders, and the aircraft and ships of the two countries, can communicate through secure networks during times of both peace and war. In simpler terms it’s like being able to exchange messages or communicate with a friend on WhatsApp, Signal, or Telegram in real time and in a secure manner.

GSOMIA (signed in 2002) allows the militaries to share the intelligence gathered by them but the information was exchanged between the Government authorities of the two countries but not between private partiesIndustrial Security Annex (ISA) (signed at 2+2 dialogue in 2019) The Industrial Security Annex (ISA) to the India-U.S. General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) will provide a framework for exchange and protection of classified military information between the U.S. and Indian defence industries.
It will enable greater industry-to-industry collaboration for co-production and co-development in the defence sector, in line with the Indian objective of promoting Make in India in the defence sector.

PM to inaugurate ITU Area Office

Context: Prime Minister of India will inaugurate the new International Telecommunication Union (ITU) Area Office and Innovation Centre in India.

About International Telecommunication Union (ITU):

It is a specialized agency of the United Nations that focuses on information and communication technologies (ICTs).
ITU was established in 1865 to enhance global connectivity in communication networks.
The organization is responsible for managing the allocation of global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, as well as developing technical standards that enable seamless interconnectivity among networks and technologies.
Membership of ITU is open to all member states of the United Nations.
There are currently 193 member states of the ITU, including all UN member states except the Republic of Palau.
Its headquarters is based in Geneva, Switzerland.

Reports/Publications of ITU:

ICT Development Index
Global ICT Regulatory Outlook 2020
Global Cyber Security Index
Global e - Waste Monitor (along with United Nations University & International Solid Waste Association (ISWA)

India & ITU:

India has been an active member of the ITU since 1869, earnestly supporting the development and propagation of telecom in the global community of nations.
The country has been a regular member of the ITU Council since 1952, and has played an important role in harmonizing the contributions of member States from the region, always respecting the principles of equality and consensus-building.
India had been elected as a Member of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Council for 4-year term (2019-2022).
India signed Host Country Agreement with the International Telecommunication Union for establishment of Area Office & Innovation Centre at New Delhi (March 2022). The Host Country Agreement provides the legal and financial framework for establishment and operations of the Area Office.
The Area Office and Innovation Centre of ITU at New Delhi is expected to serve South Asian countries namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Iran, Maldives, Nepal, Sri Lanka and India.

India and Japan Relations

CONTEXT: During the recent visit PM Kishida said that today’s Ukraine could be tomorrow’s Asia,” and indicated Japan’s concerns over China’s actions in the Senkaku Islands, South China Sea and Taiwan Straits.

The issue of “shared responsibilities” on the rule of law between India and Japan was discussed by the two leaders during bilateral talks.

The Japanese Prime Minister went on to launch Japan’s New Plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

The Japanese PM also highlighted the need for common perspective for international order.

The two leaders acknowledged that 2023 is a pivotal year for both India and Japan as chairs of the two major international groupings – India as the President of the G20 and Japan as the Chair of G7. Our countries have the unique opportunity of converging our priorities on issues of significance and drive through that and in the process, the global agenda.

The two leaders spoke about the challenge that they face in the region (China) and also globally.

The two leaders further highlighted that i.e. India and Japan and other like-minded countries can work together to address those challenges.

About India and Japan

India and Japan celebrated 70 years of friendship in 2022. Reflecting on how this relationship has developed from a Global partnership to a “special strategic and global partnership”.

However we can see gaps in economic partnership and people-to-people connect. While the economic partnership was the pillar on which this relationship took shape, the two leaders will unquestionably direct the policymakers of both nations to scrutinize and reflect on how to enhance this pillar.

Moreover, much-touted civilizational linkages have not translated into robust people-to-people connections.

The two leaders are hence putting forth various schemes to enable exchanges of people, namely youth, workforce, and artists, along with a stronger emphasis on tourism.

AGREEMENTS AND MOU’s IN RECENT MEETING

The two leaders exchanged documents on the financing of the 4^th tranche of Japanese funding for a loan of 300 billion Yen for the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail (MAHSR) or “Bullet Train” project.
A MoU on Japanese language education for the MEA.
Japan further plans to mobilise a total of U.S. $75 billion in public and private funds by 2030. Japanese leader also mentioned about coordinating with India for projects as a part of a “Bay of Bengal-Northeast India industrial value chain”.
The two leaders also had discussions over co-innovation, co-design, co-creation in defence field and also investment collaboration, investment partnership in this space. Indian PM highlighted the openness of Indian defence sector to Japanese private companies and Japanese FDI.
Ministry of Environment of Japan and Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change of India, signed an Aide Memoire essentially on the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) that has been under discussion for quite some time between the two countries.
The two leaders announced 2023 as "India-Japan Year of Tourism”. Indian PM expressed the desire to declare the next year as the year of youth exchanges between the two countries.

Founding Pillars of India - Japan Relations

Strategic Collaboration between India and Japan

Convergence on free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific.
Defence and security and in the region. – Quad, AUKUS, MALABAR.
India and Japan signed a Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services Agreement (RPSS).
The inaugural 2+2 ministerial meeting was held in November 2019.
Act East Forum: A decision was taken in the 2017 Summit to establish the India-Japan Act East Forum. The objective is to coordinate developmental projects in North-East India in areas of connectivity, forest management, disaster risk reduction and capacity building.
Northeast development - Upgradation of highways in Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram are underway. 20 km-long bridge over the Brahmaputra River between Assam and Meghalaya.
Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) – The Trade and Economy Ministers of India, Japan and Australia launched the (SCRI) on 27 April 2021.

Economic Collaboration

Investment Promotion Partnership 2014: Both have achieved the target of 3.5 trillion Japanese Yen in public and private investments in India.
Industrial collaboration: 1,455 Japanese companies in India. Eleven Japan Industrial Townships (JIT).
FDI: Japan is 5th largest source of FDI, largest supplier of ODA.
Infrastructure projects are underway through Japanese assistance including Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail, Dedicated Freight Corridor, metro projects, DMIC etc.
Digital Partnership 2018 Indian start-ups have raised more than USD 10 billion from Japanese VCs. India and Japan have also launched a private sector driven fund-of-funds to invest in technology start-ups in India which has raised USD 100 million.
Cooperation in ICT, in areas such as 5G, under-sea cables, telecom and network security.
Movement of skilled workers: Japan’s population has peaked out its and working age population is reducing. In this respect, India with its surplus labour force can provide workers for Japan’s needs. India and Japan signed MoU on Specified Skilled Workers to promote movement of skilled workers and Japanese language requirement from India to Japan for employment on a contractual basis. `

Three main challenges which have constrained the Japan-India economic partnership:

India’s complex regulations, red tape, ad hoc nature of state-level interventions.
Japanese companies face considerable logistics challenges and non-availability of uninterrupted power supply constrains their manufacturing plans in India.
While India can emerge as a large market for Japanese infrastructure system exports (one of the core components of Abenomics), there have been incredible delays in the commencement of the projects. While there is the shining example of the Delhi Metro Rail, the delays with DMIC, CBIC are disappointing.

Collaboration in the Indo – Pacific

Collaboration in QUAD, SRI, MALABR Naval exercise with US and other like-minded countries in the Indo–Pacific.
Countering the Chinese assertion – Along the LAC, South China Sea and East China Sea.
Japan's Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)’ Strategy and India's ‘Act East’ Policy converge in action in the northeast of India—a bridge between South and Southeast Asia. Ex – Act EAST Forum.
Collaboration through infrastructure development in third countries (in the Indo- Pacific) such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC)—a collaborative effort to soft-balance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project.

Collaboration on Global Issues

Both believe in upholding freedom of navigation and reinforcing rules-based international order.
Japan supported a waiver of Nuclear Suppliers Group’s (NSG) embargo on nuclear trade with India and backed its application for membership of group.
Joint military exercises have contributed to the image of their rising regional power. JIMEX, MALABAR etc.
Both works closely on global issues such as proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), terrorism, space and cyber security, and environment (e.g., the International Solar Alliance).
Permanent membership of the UNSC – Both are members of G4 club besides Brazil and Germany.

Differences between two countries

Neither of the two countries want to downgrade its own relations with China and neither is too eager to open alliance against China
Though two main political parties have positive disposition towards Japan their lies have shown negative attitude towards Japan due to its proximity with USA.
Japanese foreign policy is pre-eminence of Japanese career bureaucrats in foreign ministry that makes radical changes In policy difficult to accomplish
Weak political leadership and vertically divided administration as well as fragmented domestic consensus will continue to adversely affect Japan’s foreign policy
The trade and security bureaucratic establishment continue to have a rather negative opinion of India
Integration b/w Indian and Japanese economies remains shallow, in services sector both the countries have different demands from each other for opening up. For Japan these are maritime ,insurance, civil aviation and banking while for India these include IT , BIO TECH and Medical
Infrastructure inadequacy, a complicated legal and taxation system and insufficient regulation for interstate-transaction

Conclusion

Thus there is a need to enhance the relationship between the two countries in order that India-Japan relations are elevated to a new dimension.

As the Ex Japanese PM SHINZO ABE talked about a ‘broader Asia’ wherein he talked about advancing Japan’s national interest by strengthening its ties with India and in the next decade Japan-India relations to overtake Japan-US and Japan-China ties.

Charges Against President Putin of Russia fixed by ICC

ICC has held him responsible for the war crime of unlawful deportation of the population (children) and unlawful transfer of the population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation for violation of the Rome Statute.
These children were taken away from orphanages and childcare homes. Many of these children have been given for adoption in Russian Federation. Law was changed in Russia, by Presidential decrees by President Putin, to expedite the conferral of Russian citizenship.
The war crimes were allegedly committed in Ukrainian occupied territory by Russian Forces on 24 February 2022.
While not a United Nations organization, the Court has a cooperation agreement with the United Nations. When a situation is not within the Court’s jurisdiction, the United Nations Security Council can refer the situation to the ICC granting it jurisdiction.

About International Criminal Court

International Criminal Court (ICC) investigates and where warranted tries individuals charged with gravest crimes of concern to international community, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and crime of aggression.
ICC came into existence by the Rome Statute which established ICC as the world's first permanent international criminal court.
ICC aims to end impunity through international criminal justice, holds those responsible accountable for their crimes and helps prevent these crimes from happening again.
As a court of last resort, ICC seeks to complement, not replace, national courts.
The seat of ICC is in the Hague, Netherlands.

Rome Statute grants ICC jurisdiction over four main cases:

Crime of Genocide: Characterised by specific intent to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnic, racial or religious group by killing its members or by others means; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life to bring about its physical destruction; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Crimes against humanity: These crimes constitute serious violations committed as part of large-scale attach against any civilian population. 15 forms of crimes against humanity listed in Rome Statute include offences such as murder, rape, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, enslavement - particularly of women and children, sexual slavery, torture, apartheid and deportation.
War crimes: They are grave breaches of Geneva conventions in context of armed conflict and include, for ex., use of child soldiers, killing of torture of persons such as civilians or prisoners of war; intentionally directing attacks against hospitals, historic monuments, or buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes.
Crime of aggression: These consists of armed force by a State against sovereignty, integrity or independence of another State. The definition of this crime was adopted through amending the Rome Statute in 2010.

Geneva Conventions

Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols are international treaties that contain the most important rules limiting the barbarity of war. They protect people who do not take part in the fighting and those who can no longer fight.

First Geneva Convention: Protects wounded and sick soldiers on land during war.
Second Geneva Convention: Protects wounded, sick and shipwrecked military personnel at sea during war.
Third Geneva Convention: Applies to prisoner of war.
Fourth Geneva Convention: Affords protection to civilians, including in occupied territory.
Common Article 3: Covers situations of non-international armed conflicts like traditional civil wars, internal armed conflicts that spill over into other States or internal conflicts in which third States or a multinational force intervenes alongside the government.

Additional Protocols to Geneva Conventions

Additional Protocol I: Strengthen the protection of victims of international armed conflicts.
Additional Protocol II: Strengthen the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts.
Additional Protocol III: Created an additional emblem, the Red Crystal, which has the same international status as the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems.

Jurisdiction with respect to State Parties

123 countries are State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Out of them 33 are African States, 19 are Asia-Pacific States, 18 are from Eastern Europe, 28 are from Latin America and Caribbean and 25 from Western Europe and other States.
ICC has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute. ICC may exercise jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of Rome Statute for that State, unless that State has made a declaration.
A State which becomes a Party to Rome Statute accepts jurisdiction of ICC with respect to crimes listed above.
ICC may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of ICC:
1. State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft.
1. State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.
Acceptance of a State which is not a party to ICC: A State may by declaration lodged with Registrar accept the jurisdiction of ICC with respect to the crime in question. (Ukraine was a not a State Party to ICC. However, Ukraine has accepted jurisdiction of ICC throughout the territory of Ukraine from 20th February 2014 onwards.)

Jurisdiction of ICC

ICC exercises jurisdiction in a situation of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes committed on or after 1st July 2002 and:

Crimes were committed by a State Party National, in the territory of a State Party or in a State that has accepted the jurisdiction of ICC. (Since in the present case, the alleged crimes were committed in the territory of Ukraine which is not a State party but has accepted the jurisdiction of ICC, hence ICC has jurisdiction in the present case, despite Russia not being a party to ICC).
Crimes were referred to ICC Prosecutor by the UN Security Council (UNSC) under a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of UN Charter.

Russia China Nexus & Implications for India

Mr. Xi “will pay a state visit to Russia from March 20 to 22 at the invitation of Russian President Vladimir Putin,

China “always believes political dialogue is the only way to resolve conﬂicts and disputes”

Beijing, earlier on the one year anniversary of Russia’s invasion, re leased a position paper that called on both sides to reach “a comprehensive ceaseﬁre”. The paper reﬂected Beijing’s approach of, on the one hand, saying it supported the “sovereignty” of all countries, while on the other, criticising the West, which has questioned Beijing’s credentials as a mediator, citing its close “no limits” relationship with Russia.

Beijing’s recent hosting of landmark talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran has turned the spotlight on its aspirations to emerge as a key player in the Ukraine crisis. Over the past year, China hasn’t condemned Russia for its invasion. It has called for peace, but at the same time justiﬁed Russian security concerns with regard to the West and NATO.

Historical evolution of ties

The relationship between Russia and China can be described as multi-layered and complex with a side of strong geo-political alignment against a unipolar west dominated world order and other side being disagreements over the junior partner status for Russia, especially in the region of Central Asia which Russia sees as its backyard and is important for China to fuel its economic growth and expand the influence in middle east.

The relationship between the erstwhile USSR and China was marked with mistrust, hostility and different ideological affinity during the cold war phase . Though USSR and China both had communist regime and mutually collaborated in the initial years wherein USSR provided the necessary initial support to China but things started to change after China gradually opened its economy under Deng Xiaoping and border confrontations emerged between the two neighbouring nations.

The relationship between the two countries changed when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and paid a state visit to China in 1989.

Along with that the disintegration of USSR, with the much weaker Russia was now looking for new partners also paved the way for cooperation.

Timeline

The two countries demarcated the land borders in 1991 and later the two countries also resolved the dispute over territories of ABAGAITU islet, BOLSHOY island and in 2005 over the disputed Vladivostok region.
In 1992, the two countries declared that they were pursuing a "constructive partnership"; in 1996, they progressed toward a "strategic partnership".
The two countries signed the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and friendly cooperation in 2001, which had mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-interference each other’s internal affairs as the broad guidelines

Present Status

China-Russia relationship today are defined by a growing ideological affinity to rewrite the global order and a shared opposition to the United States on the global stage begins to come into focus.

China and Russia’s relationship had transformed in the 14 years as both Moscow and Beijing had accumulated grievances against the West and China’s new ambition to replace the US as Asia’s dominant power have brought the countries much closer now.

The two countries signed a partnership (BEJING DECLARATION) “without limits” and with no “forbidden areas” in 2022.
It also offered a blueprint for further political, economic, and military cooperation while showcasing a common front against the west.
The Beijing declaration laid out a solid basis for jointly confronting the West and this Sino-Russian alliance added to Moscow’s confidence in risking a confrontation with the West in Europe.

Cooperation

The main form of cooperation is the economic relations between Russia and China is trade. From 2003 until 2013, mutual trade increased 7.7 times; in 2014 the scale of bilateral operations increased even more. The aggravation of relations between Russia and Western countries contributed to the expansion of economic ties with China.
The two countries entered into $400bn gas deal to supply 38 billion cubic meters of gas annually to China for next 30 years

The two countries again signed an agreement in 2022 for Power of Siberia 2
The trade between the two countries have almost tripled from the levels of 2016 and China has now emerged as the largest trading partner for Russia.
The countries are also in advance stages of formally linking Chinese belt and road Initiative and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union.
Russia has reaffirmed its support to One-China principle and opposed any sort of independence for Taiwan. China has also backed Russia’s stand on expansion of western military alliance in Europe.
Russia sold advanced fighter aircraft and missile systems to the Chinese (which includes advanced weapons like the S-400 missile-defence system and Su-35 fighter jets)
China has continued buying discounted Russian energy and aiming to make transactions in rubbles or Chinese renminbi owing to western sanctions post Russia-Ukraine war.
Many Russian regions have set new trade records with neighbouring Chinese provinces, a dependence that looks set to grow in the future.

Difference Between Russia & China

There is no-formal security alliance between China and Russia and the ideological affinity is also transactional
Russia’s position has further weakened after Ukraine war and its economy is one tenth the size of Chinese economy, thus compromising its position as equal partners.
China has still not ratified Crimea’s accession to Russia and further Russia wants to regain its lost glory of USSR days and will not willing to subscribe to junior partner status.
China is the EU’s largest trading partner and will not compromise on its economic interest and similarly it goes for Russia, wherein its trade with Europe is much more rewardable.

The Ukraine war has further complicated the relationship between China and Russia

Ukraine forms a critical part of Chinese BRI jig-saw and thus will not compromise its larger geo-economic interest in the region.
Russia’s victory in Europe would have had a dramatic impact on Asia too. It would have reinforced the sentiment that America is in terminal decline, weakened US alliances in Asia, and boosted China’s ambition to radically reshape its periphery.
It has facilitated the resurrection of Western unity under American leadership.
War triggered the fear of Chinese territorial expansionism in Asia. This has led to the strengthening of US bilateral alliances with Australia and Japan.
Berlin and Tokyo are also now committed to raising their defence spending to cope with the security challenges from Moscow and Beijing.
Chinese firms aren't too excited about stepping up business with Russia as they fear that secondary sanctions could be applied, and Chinese firms don't want to take risks.

However China remains committed to Russia as a strategic partner, Russia may have proved itself less valuable, but [Beijing] continues to see the United States as a strategic competitor and will want to have Russia on its side.

Russia more dependent on China -- both politically and economically -- than ever before, and Putin’s willingness to openly challenge the United States still holds great appeal for Beijing as it continues to rise on the global stage.

Impact on India

The Sino-Russian alliance puts India in a terrible predicament: China can ramp up, at will, the military pressure on the disputed border with India and Delhi depends on Russian military supplies which in turn is a junior partner of China.
The Russian partnership was long seen as the key to India’s “strategic autonomy”, Delhi’s arms dependence on Moscow is now the biggest constraint on India’s freedom of action.
Russia also opposes QUAD and align itself with Chinese claim, of Quad being aimed at containing China by calling Quad as ASIAN NATO
Russia is also critical of term INDO-PACIFIC and believes it as step back towards cold war mentality, a way contain Russia and China.

India’s alliance with the US and its allies to restore the regional balance of power and new Sino-Russian alliance has further complicated the relationship.