India Nuclear Doctrine

India’s Defence Minister had said that India’s ‘No First Use’ (NFU) policy on nuclear weapons depended upon changed circumstances in the future and had therefore raised apprehensions on the likely revision of India’s NFU policy and nuclear doctrine.

About Nuclear Doctrine

Credible Minimum deterrent: refers to quantity of nuclear forces that India needs to deter potential nuclear adversaries.
No First Use: nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.
Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority. Nuclear Command Authority comprises a Political Council and an Executive Council. Prime Minister chairs Political Council. It is sole body which can authorize use of nuclear weapons.
Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. However, in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.
A continuance of strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies, participation in Fissile Material Cut off Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests.
Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

CREDIBLE MINIMUM DETTERANCE

Main purpose of CMD is to ensure a nuclear arsenal that can assure a second-strike capability. This implies that in the event of another nation conducting a first nuclear strike of any magnitude against India, India’s nuclear forces shall be ready to ensure survivability of the attack and the capability to conduct a massive nuclear retaliation aimed at the enemy country.
CMD intends to convey a non-aggressive and defensive nuclear posture by projecting a nuclear arsenal that fulfils the bare needs of defence and security.
CMD does not imply indefinite expansion of the nuclear arsenal and it is not an arbitrary control on number of nuclear weapons India may possess. The number of nuclear weapons India may possess over time depends upon India’s security situation.
While India is committed to maintain the deployment of a deterrent which is both minimum and credible, it will not accept any restraints on building its nuclear R&D capability.

ADVANTAGES OF NO FIRST USE POLICY

Obviates need for expensive nuclear weapons infrastructure that is associated with a first-use doctrine.
Onus of escalation to a nuclear War is on adversary, without preventing India from defending itself. This prevents India from shouldering moral responsibility of initiating a nuclear War.
India’s self-proclaimed restraint has formed the basis for its claims to belong to the nuclear mainstream — such as the claim to membership for the Nuclear Suppliers Group and our recent membership to MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia Group.
India’s nuclear weapons were based on staggering and punitive retaliation in case deterrence failed. NFU showcases India to be a responsible nuclear power whereby India has shown that its nuclear weapons are for defensive purposes and we will use it only when someone uses it against us.

CRITIQUE OF NO FIRST USE

NFU posture is only possible for a country that has extreme confidence not only in the survivability of its national nuclear forces sufficient to muster a devastating retaliatory strike, but also in the efficacy of its crisis management system. The Indian bureaucratic system is yet to show capability of handling any emergency as dire as a nuclear strike.
India’s NFU policy frees Pakistan from fearing an Indian nuclear attack to either terrorism or limited war. Pakistan has also threatened to deploy Tactical nuclear weapons in limited theatres such as against Indian naval armada or against Indian soldiers that capture Pakistani territory. This has raised concerns whether India can use strategic nuclear weapons that wipe out cities against a smaller nuclear attack by Pakistan.
NFU is a confidence building measure among States, however no country practically believes those that pledge NFU. China has pledged NFU, yet India will not trust China’s pledge and similarly, Pakistan does not believe in India’s NFU pledge.
Countries that have pledged NFU such as India and China, while countries that have not such as Pakistan have the same deployment pattern of weapons during peace time and War time.
It is argued that a NFU means that India is not capable of deciding when to use nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Suppliers Group – Related Issues

Established in 1975, Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is comprised of 48 states that have voluntarily agreed to coordinate their export controls to non-nuclear-weapon states.
NSG governs the transfers of civilian nuclear material and nuclear-related equipment and technology.
NSG aims to prevent nuclear exports for commercial and peaceful purposes from being used to make nuclear weapons.
To ensure that their nuclear imports are not used to develop weapons, NSG members are expected to forgo nuclear trade with governments that do not subject themselves to confidence-building international measures and inspections.
NSG has two sets of Guidelines listing the specific nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies that are subject to export controls.
India’s explosion of a nuclear device in 1974 reaffirmed the fact that nuclear materials and technologies acquired under the guise of peaceful purposes could be diverted to build weapons. In response to India’s action, several Zangger Committee members, along with France—who was not a member of the NPT at that time—established the NSG to further regulate nuclear-related exports
IAEA is charged with verifying that non-nuclear-weapon states are not illicitly pursuing nuclear weapons. To prevent nuclear material or technology from being stolen or misappropriated for weapons, IAEA safeguards include inspections, remote monitoring, seals, and other measures.

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)

NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

India’s membership issue of NPT and NSG

India has advanced its bid to join the NSG.
However, India did not sign the NPT which is a prerequisite for joining NSG
India’s stand is that NPT creates a club of “nuclear haves” and a larger group of “nuclear have- nots” by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967.
Although President Barack Obama expressed support for India’s membership to the NSG in 2010, the group remains divided, in part because, as a non-state-party to the NPT, India does not meet a core criterion for membership.
At the June 2016 NSG meeting, the United States and India pushed for acceptance of India’s bid for membership.
All participating states, except for China, support allowing India to join NSG without signing the NPT.
China noted that other non-NPT states in addition to India had expressed desire in joining the NSG, and therefore India should not receive an exclusive exemption.
According to China – NPT membership constitutes one of the prerequisite factors for consideration of NSG participation, [m]ore discussions are needed before the Group is in a position to review…participation by any specific non-NPT state at meetings of the Group.
In response to India’s bid, Pakistan also expressed a desire to join the NSG.

India’s Nuclear triad

Nuclear Triad essentially has 3 major components: Strategic bombers, Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) for delivery a nuclear weapon.
The reason for having such three branched capability is to significantly reduce the possibility of the destruction of the entire nuclear architecture of the state in the first nuclear strike by the enemy itself.
The triad provides the potency to the country which has been under the nuclear attack to respond swiftly by nuclear means.Such system essentially increases deterrence potential of the state’s nuclear forces.
India’s ‘triad’ is a mix of missiles fired from -Land — Agni 2, Agni 4 and Agni 5.Air – Sukhoi Su-30MKIs, Mirage 2000s and Jaguars can launch nuclear missiles.
6,000-tonne INS Arihant now adds a maritime strike capability.