June 9, 2026

The Madras High Court recently clarified the constitutional position of the Governor under Article 161 by ruling that the Governor is bound by the advice of the State Cabinet while deciding prisoner remission pleas. The judgment reinforces the parliamentary nature of India’s constitutional system, where real executive authority lies with the elected Council of Ministers.

Constitutional Position of the Governor

Under Article 161: Governor may grant pardons, reprieves, respites, remissions, or commute sentences under State law\text{Article 161: Governor may grant pardons, reprieves, respites, remissions, or commute sentences under State law}Article 161: Governor may grant pardons, reprieves, respites, remissions, or commute sentences under State law

the Governor possesses the power to grant pardon, remission, reprieve, or commutation for offences against state laws. However, this power is not personal or absolute.

The Court held that:

• The Governor acts only on the “aid and advice” of the Council of Ministers under Article 163.
• Independent discretion cannot be exercised in remission matters.
• The “bias exception” evolved in the 2004 M.P. Special Police Establishment case does not apply to Article 161 powers.
• The Perarivalan Case had already affirmed that the Governor is merely a constitutional head in executive matters.

Thus, the decision strengthens the principle of cabinet responsibility and democratic accountability.

Constitutional Framework

Key constitutional provisions governing the Governor include:

• Article 154: Executive power of the State is vested in the Governor but exercised through subordinate officers, i.e., the Council of Ministers.
• Article 163(1): Governor is generally bound by ministerial advice except in matters requiring discretion.
• Article 163(2): The Governor’s decision regarding discretionary matters is final.
• Article 163(3): Courts cannot inquire into ministerial advice.

However, the Nabam Rebia Judgment clarified that discretionary powers are still subject to judicial review if exercised arbitrarily.

When Can the Governor Act Discretionarily?

The Constitution permits limited discretionary powers in situations such as:

1. Reserving Bills for the President under Article 200.
2. Recommending President’s Rule under Article 356.
3. Appointment of a Chief Minister in a hung Assembly.
4. Dismissing a government that loses majority support.
5. Special responsibilities in states like Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh.
6. Sixth Schedule matters in northeastern states.

Further, the Supreme Court in the State of Punjab v Governor ruled that Governors cannot indefinitely delay assent to Bills and must act “as soon as possible”.

Significance of the Judgment

The ruling is significant because it:

• Prevents misuse of gubernatorial office for political purposes.
• Reinforces cooperative federalism.
• Upholds the supremacy of elected governments in executive decisions.
• Clarifies constitutional morality and limits on gubernatorial activism.

The judgment ultimately strengthens India’s parliamentary democracy by reaffirming that Governors are constitutional heads, not parallel centres of executive authority.

The Constitution (106th Amendment) Act, 2023 marked a historic step toward gender equality in Indian politics by providing 33% reservation for women in the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies. However, despite broad political consensus, implementation has been delayed because the reservation is linked to delimitation based on the first Census conducted after 2026. This has revived debate on whether alternative mechanisms can ensure faster implementation of women’s political reservation.

Constitutional Provisions of the 106th Amendment

The amendment introduces Articles 330A, 332A, and 334A into the Constitution to operationalise women’s reservation.

Key provisions include:

• One-third reservation for women in the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies.
• Within the SC/ST reserved seats, one-third seats are reserved for women belonging to those communities.
• Reserved seats will rotate periodically across constituencies.
• Reservation will come into effect only after delimitation following the first Census conducted after 2026.
• The reservation is initially valid for 15 years, though Parliament may extend it.

The amendment aims to improve women’s representation in legislative institutions, where participation remains significantly low despite constitutional guarantees of equality.

Why is Implementation Delayed?

1. Census Requirement

The amendment links implementation to the first Census conducted after 2026. Since the Census itself is pending, the reservation cannot currently be operationalised.

2. Delimitation Process

After the Census, delimitation must redraw constituency boundaries and identify reserved constituencies. Delimitation is a lengthy administrative and political exercise that may take several years.

3. Constitutional Freeze on Seat Allocation

The Constitution currently freezes the reallocation of parliamentary seats among states until after the Census. This further delays restructuring of constituencies necessary for reservation.

4. Political and Administrative Challenges

Balancing regional representation, population changes, and political interests complicates the delimitation process and contributes to implementation delays.

Proposed Alternative: Proportional Representation System

To avoid prolonged delays, some experts have proposed adopting a hybrid proportional representation (PR) model for implementing women’s reservation immediately.

Features of the Proposal

• Existing constituencies would remain unchanged.
• Additional seats reserved for women would be created temporarily.
• Seats would be allocated to political parties based on their vote share.
• Political parties would nominate women candidates from pre-declared party lists.

Under proportional representation, seats in the legislature are distributed according to the percentage of votes secured by political parties. Thus, representation more accurately reflects voter preferences.

Advantages of the Proposal

Immediate Implementation

The proposal avoids waiting for Census and delimitation, enabling faster operationalisation of women’s reservation.

Cost Efficient

Since no new constituencies or separate elections are required, the model reduces administrative and electoral expenditure.

Reflects Voter Mandate

Allocation of seats based on vote share ensures fairer and more proportional political representation.

Reduces Structural Barriers

Women often face financial, social, and organisational barriers in constituency-based elections. Party-list systems can improve women’s access to legislatures.

Encourages Party Accountability

Political parties would be compelled to promote women leaders through transparent candidate lists.

Challenges in the Proposal

Despite its advantages, the proportional representation model raises several concerns.

• India currently follows the First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) electoral system, and introducing PR may require major electoral reforms.
• Additional seats could increase the size of legislatures significantly.
• Political parties may still nominate women from elite or dynastic backgrounds rather than ensuring broad-based representation.
• Coalition politics and fragmented mandates may increase under proportional systems.

Need for Women’s Political Representation

Greater representation of women strengthens inclusive governance, improves policy responsiveness, and enhances democratic legitimacy. Studies across countries show that higher women’s participation often leads to stronger focus on education, health, welfare, and social justice.

India has already demonstrated success in women’s reservation at the local government level through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments, which reserve seats in Panchayats and Municipalities.

However, women continue to remain underrepresented in Parliament and State Assemblies compared to global averages.

Conclusion

The Constitution (106th Amendment) Act, 2023 is a landmark reform for advancing gender justice in Indian democracy. However, linking implementation to future Census and delimitation processes may significantly delay its benefits. Exploring innovative alternatives such as proportional representation could help fast-track women’s reservation while preserving democratic fairness. Ultimately, ensuring meaningful political participation of women is essential for building a more representative, inclusive, and equitable democracy.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi becoming India’s longest-serving Prime Minister has reignited debate over the absence of executive term limits in India’s parliamentary democracy. The issue raises important constitutional and democratic questions regarding concentration of power, parliamentary accountability, and institutional checks and balances.

Constitutional Position

The Indian Constitution does not prescribe any fixed tenure or term limit for the Prime Minister. Under Article 75, the Prime Minister holds office as long as they enjoy the confidence of the Lok Sabha. This reflects the essence of the parliamentary form of government adopted by India, where the executive is accountable to the legislature on a continuous basis.

During the Constituent Assembly debates, B. R. Ambedkar opposed the idea of fixed executive tenure. He argued that regular parliamentary scrutiny through questions, debates,

motions, and collective responsibility would serve as a stronger democratic safeguard than rigid term limits. Thus, India consciously adopted political accountability instead of constitutional restrictions on tenure.

The Council of Ministers is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, which theoretically enables Parliament to remove a government through a no-confidence motion whenever it loses majority support.

Why the Debate Has Re-emerged

Although the constitutional framework assumes continuous legislative accountability, critics argue that the practical effectiveness of these mechanisms has weakened over time.

1. Impact of the Anti-Defection Law

The Tenth Schedule, inserted through the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, was enacted to prevent political defections and ensure governmental stability. However, it has significantly curtailed the independence of legislators.

Members of Parliament risk disqualification if they vote against the party whip. Consequently, MPs often prioritize party discipline over independent legislative scrutiny. This has weakened Parliament’s ability to effectively hold the executive accountable.

2. Weakening of No-Confidence Motions

No-confidence motions are intended to function as an important constitutional check on executive authority. However, when ruling parties enjoy overwhelming numerical majorities and party discipline is rigidly enforced, such motions become largely symbolic.

The fear of disqualification discourages dissent within ruling coalitions, reducing the possibility of meaningful legislative challenge to executive decisions.

3. Decline in Parliamentary Deliberation

There has also been concern regarding declining parliamentary sittings, disruptions, reduced debate on legislation, and frequent passage of Bills without detailed scrutiny. These trends weaken deliberative democracy and enhance executive dominance over the legislature.

4. Weak Intra-Party Democracy

Another factor contributing to concentration of executive power is the limited scope for leadership challenges within political parties. Centralised party structures often discourage internal debate and dissent, leading to greater personalization of political authority.

Global Practices on Executive Term Limits

Several democracies impose constitutional term limits to prevent excessive concentration of power and ensure periodic leadership transition.

• United States limits its President to two terms through the 22nd Amendment.
• Brazil permits only two consecutive presidential terms.
• South Korea allows only a single five-year presidential term.
• Indonesia restricts Presidents to two terms.

These countries primarily follow presidential systems where executive power is directly concentrated in one office. India’s parliamentary system differs structurally because the executive remains dependent on legislative confidence. Nevertheless, the debate persists regarding whether long incumbencies may weaken democratic competition and institutional balance.

Arguments in Favour of Term Limits

Prevents Excessive Concentration of Power

Long tenures may centralise authority within the executive, weakening institutional autonomy and federal balance.

Encourages Leadership Renewal

Term limits promote political competition and facilitate emergence of new leadership and ideas.

Strengthens Democratic Culture

Regular leadership transitions reduce risks of personality-driven politics and democratic backsliding.

Protects Institutional Independence

Frequent change in leadership may reduce possibilities of institutional capture by the executive.

Arguments Against Term Limits

Parliamentary Democracy Already Provides Accountability

In India, governments can be removed anytime through parliamentary mechanisms and elections.

Restricts Democratic Choice

Term limits may prevent voters from re-electing a popular and effective leader.

Stability and Continuity

Long-serving leaders may provide policy continuity, political stability, and long-term governance vision.

Unsuitable for Parliamentary Systems

Most parliamentary democracies such as the United Kingdom and Canada do not impose constitutional term limits on Prime Ministers.

Way Forward

Rather than focusing solely on executive term limits, strengthening democratic accountability mechanisms may be more effective.

Reform the Anti-Defection Law

Experts suggest exempting confidence and no-confidence motions from the anti-defection law to restore legislative independence.

Strengthen Parliamentary Functioning

Increasing parliamentary sittings, empowering committees, and ensuring detailed legislative scrutiny can improve accountability.

Promote Intra-Party Democracy

Institutionalising internal elections and leadership challenges within parties can reduce excessive concentration of power.

Safeguard Constitutional Institutions

Ensuring independence of the Election Commission, judiciary, media, and regulatory institutions remains essential for maintaining democratic balance.

Debate on Limited Consecutive Terms

Some scholars advocate introducing limits on consecutive terms for Prime Ministers and Chief Ministers, while allowing re-entry after a cooling-off period.

Conclusion

India’s constitutional design relies on parliamentary accountability rather than formal executive term limits. However, weakening legislative oversight, rigid party discipline, and centralisation of political authority have revived concerns about concentration of executive power. The debate is therefore not merely about limiting tenure, but about strengthening

democratic institutions, preserving checks and balances, and ensuring that accountability mechanisms function effectively within India’s parliamentary framework.

Context

The Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) has introduced a Computational Thinking (CT) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) curriculum for Classes 3–8 from the academic session 2026–27. Instead of creating a separate subject, the curriculum integrates AI concepts into

conventional subjects through games, puzzles, storytelling, and activity-based learning.

The initiative aligns with the objectives of the Central Board of Secondary Education and the National Education Policy 2020 to promote 21st-century skills among students.

Key Features of the Curriculum

Integration-Based Approach

• AI and computational thinking are embedded within existing subjects.
• Focus on experiential learning through activities and storytelling.

Core Skills Targeted

The curriculum aims to develop:

• Pattern recognition
• Logical reasoning
• Problem-solving ability
• Algorithmic thinking

These skills form the foundation for future digital and AI literacy.

Challenges in Student Preparedness

1. Literacy Gap

According to ASER 2024, nearly 50% of students cannot read Class 2-level text. Weak foundational literacy directly affects students’ ability to grasp computational concepts and logical reasoning.

2. Digital Divide

Many rural households depend on a single smartphone shared among family members. Limited digital access creates unequal learning opportunities between rural and urban students.

3. Policy Sequencing Issues

The rollout coincides with the timeline of the NIPUN Bharat Mission, which seeks universal foundational literacy by 2026–27. Introducing AI learning before achieving basic literacy may burden students and reduce learning effectiveness.

4. Infrastructure Deficit

Several schools continue to face:

• Irregular electricity supply
• Poor internet connectivity
• Lack of modern hardware and digital labs

This limits the practical implementation of AI-enabled education.

5. Teacher Preparedness

Around 85% of teachers lack exposure to AI tools and digital pedagogy. Existing training programmes such as NISHTHA Programme are often criticised for being theoretical rather than practice-oriented.

Significance of the Initiative

Despite challenges, the curriculum is an important step toward preparing students for a technology-driven future. Early exposure to computational thinking can:

• Improve analytical skills
• Encourage innovation and creativity
• Enhance employability in emerging sectors
• Promote digital inclusion in the long term

It also supports India’s ambition of becoming a global digital and innovation hub.

Way Forward

• Strengthen foundational literacy and numeracy before advanced AI integration.
• Expand digital infrastructure in rural schools.
• Provide affordable device access and internet connectivity.
• Introduce practical teacher training in AI and digital pedagogy.
• Ensure phased and region-sensitive implementation.

Conclusion

The CBSE’s AI curriculum reflects India’s attempt to prepare students for the future digital economy. However, successful implementation requires strong foundational education, teacher readiness, and digital infrastructure. Without addressing these structural gaps, the benefits of AI education may remain unevenly distributed.